Search

Increasing evidence suggests that cognitive-control processes can be configured to optimize either persistence of information processing (by amplifying competition between decision-making alternatives and top-down biasing of this competition) or flexibility (by dampening competition and biasing). We investigated whether high-frequency binaural beats, an auditory illusion suspected to act as a cognitive enhancer, have an impact on cognitive-control configuration. We hypothesized that binaural beats in the gamma range bias the cognitive-control style toward flexibility, which in turn should increase the crosstalk between tasks in a dual-task paradigm. We replicated earlier findings that the reaction time in the first-performed task is sensitive to the compatibility between the responses in the first and the second task-an indication of crosstalk. As predicted, exposing participants to binaural beats in the gamma range increased this effect as compared to a control condition in which participants were exposed to a continuous tone of 340 Hz. These findings provide converging evidence that the cognitive-control style can be systematically biased by inducing particular internal states; that high-frequency binaural beats bias the control style toward more flexibility; and that different styles are implemented by changing the strength of local competition and top-down bias.

Musical training is becoming increasingly popular as a topic for scientific research. Here we review the available studies investigating whether and to which degree musical experience generalizes to cognitive functions unrelated to music abilities in healthy humans. In general, it seems that musical training is associated with enhancing effects, even if sometimes only restricted to the auditory domain, on various cognitive functions spanning from executive control to creativity. We conclude that musical engagement may be a useful cognitive training to promote cognitive enhancement, but more research using longitudinal studies and taking into account individual differences is necessary to determine actual benefits.

Emerging research suggests that individuals experience vicarious social pain (i.e., ostracism). It has been proposed that observing ostracism increases activity in the insula and in the prefrontal cortex (PFC), two key brain regions activated by directly experiencing ostracism. Here, we assessed the causal role of the insula and PFC in modulating neural activity in these areas by applying transcutaneous Vagus Nerve Stimulation (tVNS), a new non-invasive and safe method to stimulate the vagus nerve that has been shown to activate the insula and PFC. A single-blind, sham-controlled, within-subjects design was used to assess the effect of on-line (i.e., stimulation overlapping with the critical task) tVNS in healthy young volunteers (n = 24) on the prosocial Cyberball game, a virtual ball-tossing game designed to measure prosocial compensation of ostracism. Active tVNS did not increase prosocial helping behavior toward an ostracized person, as compared to sham (placebo) stimulation. Corroborated by Bayesian inference, we conclude that tVNS does not modulate reactions to vicarious ostracism, as indexed by performance in a Cyberball game.

A previous study has shown that the degree of trust into others might be biased by inducing either a more "inclusive" or a more "exclusive" cognitive-control mode. Here, we investigated whether the degree of interpersonal trust can be biased by environmental factors, such as odors, that are likely to impact cognitive-control states. Arousing olfactory fragrances (e.g., peppermint) are supposed to induce a more exclusive, and calming olfactory fragrances (e.g., lavender) a more inclusive state. Participants performed the Trust Game, which provides an index of interpersonal trust by assessing the money units one participant (the trustor) transfers to another participant (the trustee), while being exposed to either peppermint or lavender aroma. All participants played the role of trustor. As expected, participants transferred significantly more money to the alleged trustee in the lavender as compared to the peppermint and control (no aroma) conditions. This observation might have various serious implications for a broad range of situations in which interpersonal trust is an essential element, such as cooperation (e.g., mixed-motives situations), bargaining and negotiation, consumer behavior, and group performance.

The link between serotonin (5-HT) and one of the most important elements of prosocial behavior, charity, has remained largely uninvestigated. In the present study, we tested whether charitable donating can be promoted by administering the food supplement L-Tryptophan (TRP), the biochemical precursor of 5-HT. Participants were compared with respect to the amount of money they donated when given the opportunity to make a charitable donation. As expected, compared to a neutral placebo, TRP appears to increase the participants' willingness to donate money to a charity. This result supports the idea that the food we eat may act as a cognitive enhancer modulating the way we think and perceive the world and others.

Stimulus-induced response conflict (e.g., in Simon or Stroop tasks) is often reduced after conflict trials-the Gratton effect. It is generally assumed that this effect is due to a strengthening of the representation of the current intention or goal, which in turn increases the degree of stimulus and/or response control. Recent evidence suggests that the motivational signal driving the Gratton effect might be affective in nature. If so, individual differences in either the strength of affective signals and/or the ability to interpret such signals might explain individual differences in cognitive-control adjustments as reflected in the Gratton effect. We tested this hypothesis by relating individual sizes of the Gratton effect in a Simon task to scores on the affective and the cognitive dimension of the Bermond/Vorst Alexithymia Questionnaire (BVAQ)-which we assumed to assess individual differences in affective-signal strength and ability to interpret affective signals, respectively. Results show that the cognitive, but not the affective dimension predicted control adjustment, while the accuracy of heartbeat detection was only (and only weakly) related to online control. This suggests that the motivation to fine-tune one's cognitive-control operations is mediated by, and may depend on one's ability to interpret one's own affective signals.

Interpersonal trust is an essential ingredient of many social relationships but how stable is it actually, and how is it controlled? There is evidence that the degree of trust into others might be rather volatile and can be affected by manipulations like drawing attention to personal interdependence or independence. Here we investigated whether the degree of interpersonal trust can be biased by inducing either a more integrative or a more focused/exclusive cognitive control mode by means of a creativity task requiring divergent or convergent thinking, respectively. Participants then performed the trust game, which provides an index of interpersonal trust by assessing the money units one participant (the trustor) transfers to another (the trustee). As expected, trustors transferred significantly more money to trustees after engaging in divergent thinking as compared to convergent thinking. This observation provides support for the idea that interpersonal trust is controlled by domain-general (i.e., not socially dedicated) cognitive states.

This study aimed at assessing whether the mere belief of performing a task with another person, who is in charge of the complementary part of the task, is sufficient for the so-called joint Simon effect to occur. In all three experiments of the study, participants sat alone in a room and underwent two consecutive Go/NoGo tasks that were identical except for the instructions. In Experiment 1, participants performed the task first individually (baseline task), and then either co-acting with another person who responded from an unknown location to the NoGo stimuli (joint task) or imaging themselves responding to the NoGo stimuli (imaginative task). Relative to the baseline, the instructions of the imaginative task made the Simon effect occur, while those of the joint task were ineffective in eliciting the effect. This result suggests that sharing a task with a person who is known to be in charge of the complementary task, but is not physically present, is not sufficient to induce the representation of an alternative response able to produce interference, which happens instead when the instructions explicitly require to imagine such a response. Interestingly, we observed that when the Simon effect was already present in the baseline task (i.e., when the response alternative to the Go response was represented in the individual task due to non-social factors), it disappeared in the joint task. We propose that, when no information about the co-actor's position is available, the division of labor between the participant and co-actor allows participants to filter out the possible (incidental) representation of the alternative response from their task representation, thus eliminating potential sources of interference. This account is supported by the results of Experiments 2 and 3 and suggests that under certain circumstances task-sharing may reduce the interference produced by the irrelevant information, rather than increase it.