Search

This paper studies how subjectivity in capitalist culture can be characterised. Building on Lacan’s later seminars XVI, XVII, XVIII and XIX, the author first outlines Lacan’s general discourse theory, which includes four characteristic discourses: the discourse of the master, the discourse of the university, the discourse of the hysteric and the discourse of the analyst. Next, the author explores the subjectivity and the mode of dealing with jouissance and semblance, which is entailed in a fifth type of discourse, the capitalist discourse, discussed by Lacan in 1972. Indeed, like the other discourses that Lacan discerns, the discourse of the capitalist can be thought of as a mode of dealing with the sexual non-rapport. It is argued that in the case of neurosis the discourse of the capitalist functions as an attempt to ignore the sexual non-rapport and the dimension of the unconscious. Psychosis, by contrast, is marked by an a priori exclusion from discourse. In that case, consumerist ways of relating to the other might offer a semblance, and thus the possibility of inventing a mode of relating to the other. Two clinical vignettes are presented to illustrate this perspective: one concerning the neurotic structure and one concerning the psychotic structure.

Background: Self-concept clarity describes the extent to which the schemas of the self are internally integrated, well defined, and temporally stable. This article presents a theoretical model that describes how different shapes of self-concept clarity change (especially stable increase and “V” shape) observed in the course of psychotherapy are related to the therapy outcome. Linking the concept of Jean Piaget and the dynamic systems theory, the study postulates that a stable self-concept clarity increase is needed for the participants with a rather healthy personality structure, while self-concept clarity change characterized by a “V” shape or fluctuations is optimal for more disturbed patients. Method: Correlational study in a naturalistic setting with repeated measurements (M=5.8) was conducted on the sample of 85 patients diagnosed with neurosis and personality disorders receiving intensive eclectic group psychotherapy under routine inpatient conditions. Participants filled in the Self-Concept Clarity Scale, Symptoms’ Questionnaire KS-II, and Neurotic Personality Questionnaire KON-2006 at the beginning and at the end of the course of psychotherapy. The Self-Concept Clarity Scale was also administered every two weeks during psychotherapy. Results: As hypothesized, among the relatively healthiest group of patients the stable self-concept clarity increase was related to positive treatment outcome, while more disturbed patients benefited from the fluctuations and “V” shape of self-concept clarity change. Conclusions: The findings support the idea that for different personality dispositions either a monotonic increase or transient destabilization of self-concept clarity is a sign of a good treatment prognosis.

Histrionic Personality Disorder is one of the most ambiguous diagnostic categories in psychiatry. Hysteria is a classical term that includes a wide variety of psychopathological states. Ancient Egyptians and Greeks blamed a displaced womb, for many women’s afflictions. Several researchers from the 18th and 19th centuries studied this theme, namely, Charcot who defined hysteria as a “neurosis” with an organic basis and Sigmund Freud who redefined “neurosis” as a re-experience of past psychological trauma. Histerical personality disorder (HPD) made its first official appearance in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders II (DSM-II) and since the DSM-III, histrionic personality disorder is the only disorder that kept the term derived from the old concept of hysteria. The subject of hysteria has reflected positions about health, religion and relationships between the sexes in the last 4000 years, and the discussion is likely to continue.

In contemporary Lacanian psychoanalysis, Verhaeghe’s theory of actualpathology / psychopathology in psychosis and the Millerian idea of “ordinary psychosis” provide diverging conceptual approaches to psychosis. In this paper, the two approaches to psychosis are examined with a particular emphasis on “mild psychosis” and compensatory mechanisms. Despite the shared focus on similar clinical phenomena, particularly body disturbances, these two theories provide different explanations of psychosis. Verhaeghe’s theory of psychosis is a synthesis of Lacanian theory, Freud’s idea of actual neurosis and psychoanalytic attachment concepts. Moreover, these ideas are situated in the “schizophrenia / paranoia dichotomy” an important heuristic device utilised in clinical practice with psychosis. In contrast, the Millerian field of ordinary psychosis aims to broaden the idea of psychosis by reviving the idea of “mild psychosis” and the different forms of stabilisation possible in psychosis. Clinicians adapting the idea of ordinary psychosis aim to rethink pivotal Lacanian concepts - “untriggered” psychosis and stabilisation - beyond the scope of the schizophrenia / paranoia dichotomy. Although the idea of ordinary psychosis requires further development, it promise greater utility than Verhaeghe’s model, as it provides a broader and more nuanced approach to the complex vicissitudes of triggering and restitution in psychosis.

First, three case studies are presented of psychotic patients having in common an inability to hold something down or out. In line with other theories on psychosis, we propose that a key change is at the efference copy system. Going back to Freud's mental apparatus, we propose that the messages of discharge of the motor neurons, mobilized to direct perception, also called "indications of reality," are equivalent to the modern efference copies.With this key, the reading of the cases is coherent with the psychodynamic understanding of psychosis, being a downplay of secondary processes, and consequently, a dominance of primary processes. Moreover, putting together the sensorimotor idea of a failure of efference copy-mediated inhibition with the psychoanalytic idea of a failing repression in psychosis, the hypothesis emerges that the attenuation enabled by the efference copy dynamics is, in some instances, the physiological instantiation of repression. Second, we applied this idea to the mental organization in neurosis. Indeed, the efference copymediated attenuation is thought to be the mechanism through which sustained activation of an intention, without reaching it i.e. inhibition of an action gives rise to mental imagery. Therefore, as inhibition is needed for any targeted action or for normal language understanding, acting in the world, or processing language, structurally induces mental imagery, constituting a subjective unconscious mental reality. Repression is a special instance of inhibition for emotionally threatening stimuli.These stimuli require stronger inhibition, leaving (the attenuation of) the motor intentions totally unanswered, in order to radically prevent execution which would lead to development of excess affect. This inhibition, then, yields a specific type of motor imagery, called "phantoms," which induce mental preoccupation, as well as symptoms which, especially through their form, refer to the repressed motor fragments. © 2012 Bazan., SCOPUS: ar.j, info:eu-repo/semantics/published