Search

In this study, we used a visual target detection task to investigate three hypotheses about how the peri-personal space is extended after tool-use training: Addition, Extension, and Projection hypotheses. We compared the target detection performance before and after tool-use training. In both conditions, the participants held a hockey stick-like tool in their hands during the detection task. Furthermore, we added the no-tool-holding condition to the experimental design. In the no-tool-holding condition, a peri-hand space advantage in the visual target detection task was observed. When the participants held the tool with their hands, this peri-hand space advantage was lost. Furthermore, there was no peri-tool space advantage before tool training. After tool training, the peritool space advantage was observed. However, after tool training, the advantage of the peri-hand space was not observed. This result suggested that the perihand advantage was reduced by simply holding the tool because the participants lost the functionality of their hands. Furthermore, tool-use training improved detection performance only in the peri-tool space. Thus, these results supported the projection hypothesis that the peri-personal space advantage would move from the body to the functional part of the tool. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why does one need creativity? On a personal level, improvisation with available resources is needed for online coping with unforeseen environmental stimuli when existing knowledge and apparent action strategies do not work. On a cultural level, the exploitation of existing cultural means and norms for the deliberate production of novel and valuable artifacts is a basis for cultural and technological development and extension of human action possibilities across various domains. It is less clear, however, how creativity develops and how exactly one arrives at generating new action possibilities and producing multiple alternative action strategies using familiar objects. In this theoretical paper, we first consider existing accounts of the creative process in the Alternative Uses Task and then present an alternative interpretation, drawing on sociocultural views and an embodied cognition approach. We explore similarities between the psychological processes underlying the generation of new uses in the Alternative Uses Task and children’s pretend play. We discuss possible cognitive mechanisms and speculate how the generation of new action possibilities for common objects in pretend play can be related to adults’ ability to generate new action strategies associated with object use. Implications for creativity development in humans and embodied artificial agents are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why does one need creativity? On a personal level, improvisation with available resources is needed for online coping with unforeseen environmental stimuli when existing knowledge and apparent action strategies do not work. On a cultural level, the exploitation of existing cultural means and norms for the deliberate production of novel and valuable artifacts is a basis for cultural and technological development and extension of human action possibilities across various domains. It is less clear, however, how creativity develops and how exactly one arrives at generating new action possibilities and producing multiple alternative action strategies using familiar objects. In this theoretical paper, we first consider existing accounts of the creative process in the Alternative Uses Task and then present an alternative interpretation, drawing on sociocultural views and an embodied cognition approach. We explore similarities between the psychological processes underlying the generation of new uses in the Alternative Uses Task and children’s pretend play. We discuss possible cognitive mechanisms and speculate how the generation of new action possibilities for common objects in pretend play can be related to adults’ ability to generate new action strategies associated with object use. Implications for creativity development in humans and embodied artificial agents are discussed.

Learning to use, make, and modify tools is key to our species' success. Researchers have hypothesized that play with objects may have a foundational role in the ontogeny of tool use and, over evolutionary timescales, in cumulative technological innovation. Yet, there are few systematic studies investigating children's interactions with objects outside the post-industrialized West. Here, we survey the ethnohistorical record to uncover cross-cultural trends regarding hunter-gatherer children's use of objects during play and instrumental activities. Our dataset, consisting of 434 observations of children's toys and tools from 54 hunter-gatherer societies, reveals several salient trends: Most objects in our dataset are used in play. Children readily manufacture their own toys, such as dolls and shelters. Most of the objects that children interact with are constructed from multiple materials. Most of the objects in our dataset are full-sized or miniature versions of adult tools, reflecting learning for adult roles. Children also engage with objects related to child culture, primarily during play. Taken together, our findings show that hunter-gatherer children grow up playing, making, and learning with objects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the context of office work, learning to handle an Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system is important as implementation costs for such systems and associated expectations are high. However, these expectations are often not met because the users are not trained adequately. Electronic Performance Support Systems (EPSS) are designed to support employees' ERP-related problem-solving and informal learning. EPSS are supposed to enhance employees' performance and informal workplace learning through task-specific and granular help in task performance and problem-solving. However, there is little empirical research on EPSS. Two survey studies addressed this research gap. In the first study, 301 people working in Human Resource (HR)-related positions and functions evaluated the learning potential of EPSS as well as potential advantages and obstacles concerning the implementation and use of EPSS. Though other measures are currently assessed as more important for learning, HR employees expect a strong increase in the significance of EPSS for employee learning. In the second study, 652 users of ERP software completed a questionnaire on characteristics of their daily work tasks, team characteristics, individual dispositions, their coping with ERP-related problems, and characteristics of EPSS. Findings indicate that the most frequently available and used approach when dealing with an ERP-related problem is consulting colleagues. Three EPSS types can be distinguished by their increasing integration into the user interface and their context-sensitivity (external, extrinsic, and intrinsic EPSS). While external and extrinsic EPSS are available to many users, intrinsic EPSS are less common but are used intensively if available. EPSS availability is identified to be a strong positive predictor of frequency of EPSS use, while agreeableness as well as the task complexity and information-processing requirements show small negative effects. Moreover, more intensive ERP users use EPSS more frequently. In general, ERP users value, features such as context-sensitivity, an integration of the EPSS into the ERP system's user interface, the option to save one's own notes, and information displayed in an extra window. It is expected that EPSS will play an important role in workplace learning in the future, along with other measures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Learning to use, make, and modify tools is key to our species’ success. Researchers have hypothesized that play with objects may have a foundational role in the ontogeny of tool use and, over evolutionary timescales, in cumulative technological innovation. Yet, there are few systematic studies investigating children’s interactions with objects outside the post-industrialized West. Here, we survey the ethnohistorical record to uncover cross-cultural trends regarding hunter-gatherer children’s use of objects during play and instrumental activities. Our dataset, consisting of 434 observations of children’s toys and tools from 54 hunter-gatherer societies, reveals several salient trends: Most objects in our dataset are used in play. Children readily manufacture their own toys, such as dolls and shelters. Most of the objects that children interact with are constructed from multiple materials. Most of the objects in our dataset are full-sized or miniature versions of adult tools, reflecting learning for adult roles. Children also engage with objects related to child culture, primarily during play. Taken together, our findings show that hunter-gatherer children grow up playing, making, and learning with objects.

In the context of office work, learning to handle an Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system is important as implementation costs for such systems and associated expectations are high. However, these expectations are often not met because the users are not trained adequately. Electronic Performance Support Systems (EPSS) are designed to support employees’ ERP-related problem-solving and informal learning. EPSS are supposed to enhance employees’ performance and informal workplace learning through task-specific and granular help in task performance and problem-solving. However, there is little empirical research on EPSS. Two survey studies addressed this research gap. In the first study, 301 people working in Human Resource (HR)-related positions and functions evaluated the learning potential of EPSS as well as potential advantages and obstacles concerning the implementation and use of EPSS. Though other measures are currently assessed as more important for learning, HR employees expect a strong increase in the significance of EPSS for employee learning. In the second study, 652 users of ERP software completed a questionnaire on characteristics of their daily work tasks, team characteristics, individual dispositions, their coping with ERP-related problems, and characteristics of EPSS. Findings indicate that the most frequently available and used approach when dealing with an ERP-related problem is consulting colleagues. Three EPSS types can be distinguished by their increasing integration into the user interface and their context-sensitivity (external, extrinsic, and intrinsic EPSS). While external and extrinsic EPSS are available to many users, intrinsic EPSS are less common but are used intensively if available. EPSS availability is identified to be a strong positive predictor of frequency of EPSS use, while agreeableness as well as the task complexity and information-processing requirements show small negative effects. Moreover, more intensive ERP users use EPSS more frequently. In general, ERP users value, features such as context-sensitivity, an integration of the EPSS into the ERP system’s user interface, the option to save one’s own notes, and information displayed in an extra window. It is expected that EPSS will play an important role in workplace learning in the future, along with other measures.

Novel problems often partially overlap with familiar ones. Some features match the qualities of previous situations stored in long-term memory and therefore trigger their retrieval. Using relevant, while inhibiting irrelevant, memories to solve novel problems is a hallmark of behavioral flexibility in humans and has recently been demonstrated in great apes. This capacity has been proposed to promote technical innovativeness and thus warrants investigations of such a mechanism in other innovative species. Here, we show that proficient tool—users among Goffin's cockatoos—an innovative tool—using species—could use a relevant previous experience to solve a novel, partially overlapping problem, even despite a conflicting, potentially misleading, experience. This suggests that selecting relevant experiences over irrelevant experiences guides problem solving at least in some Goffin's cockatoos. Our result supports the hypothesis that flexible memory functions may promote technical innovations.

Novel problems often partially overlap with familiar ones. Some features match the qualities of previous situations stored in long-term memory and therefore trigger their retrieval. Using relevant, while inhibiting irrelevant, memories to solve novel problems is a hallmark of behavioral flexibility in humans and has recently been demonstrated in great apes. This capacity has been proposed to promote technical innovativeness and thus warrants investigations of such a mechanism in other innovative species. Here, we show that proficient tool—users among Goffin's cockatoos—an innovative tool—using species—could use a relevant previous experience to solve a novel, partially overlapping problem, even despite a conflicting, potentially misleading, experience. This suggests that selecting relevant experiences over irrelevant experiences guides problem solving at least in some Goffin's cockatoos. Our result supports the hypothesis that flexible memory functions may promote technical innovations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Technical reasoning refers to making inferences about how to use tools. The degree of technical reasoning is indicated by the bias of the gaze (fixation) on the functional part of the tool when in use. Few studies have examined whether technical reasoning differs between familiar and unfamiliar novel tools. In addition, what effect the intention to use the tool has on technical reasoning has not been determined. This study examined gaze shifts in relation to familiar or unfamiliar tools, under three conditions (free viewing, lift, and use), among 14 healthy adults (mean age ± standard deviation, 29.4 ± 3.9 years). The cumulative fixation time on the functional part of the tool served as a quantitative indicator of the degree of technical reasoning. The two-way analysis of variance for tools (familiar and unfamiliar) and conditions (free viewing, lift, and use) revealed that the cumulative fixation time significantly increased under free viewing and use conditions, compared to lift conditions. Relative to the free viewing condition, cumulative fixation time for unfamiliar tools significantly decreased in the lift condition and significantly increased in the use condition. Importantly, the results showed that technical reasoning was performed in both the use and the free viewing conditions. However, technical reasoning in the free viewing condition was not as strong as in the use condition. The difference between technical reasoning in free viewing and use conditions may indicate the difference between automatic and intentional technical reasoning.

Solving problems that are perceptually dissimilar but require similar solutions is a key skill in everyday life. In adults, this ability, termed analogical transfer, draws on memories of relevant past experiences that partially overlap with the present task at hand. Thanks to this support from long-term memory, analogical transfer allows remarkable behavioral flexibility beyond immediate situations. However, little is known about the interaction between long-term memory and analogical transfer in development as, to date, they have been studied separately. Here, for the first time, effects of age and memory on analogical transfer were investigated in 2–4.5-olds in a simple tool-use setup. Children attempted to solve a puzzle box after training the correct solution on a different looking box, either right before the test or 24 h earlier. We found that children (N = 105) could transfer the solution regardless of the delay and a perceptual conflict introduced in the tool set. For children who failed to transfer (N = 54) and repeated the test without a perceptual conflict, the odds of success did not improve. Our findings suggest that training promoted the detection of functional similarities between boxes and, thereby, flexible transfer both in the short and the long term.

It was thought that tool use in animals is an adaptive specialization. Recent studies, however, have shown that some non-tool-users, such as rooks and jays, can use and manufacture tools in laboratory settings. Despite the abundant evidence of tool use in corvids, little is known about the neural mechanisms underlying tool use in this family of birds. This review summarizes the current knowledge on the neural processes underlying tool use in humans, macaques and corvids. We suggest a possible neural network for tool use in macaques and hope this might inspire research to discover a similar brain network in corvids. We hope to establish a framework to elucidate the neural mechanisms that supported the convergent evolution of tool use in birds and mammals.

The ability to think about and plan for the future is a critical cognitive skill for our daily life. There is ongoing debate about whether other animals possess future thinking. Part of the difficulty in resolving this debate is that there is not a definite methodology that allow us to conclude that animals (and human children) are truly thinking about a future event. Research with humans—both children and adults- will benefit the field of comparative psychology by providing information about the range of humans’ responses when they are faced with problems similar to those presented to other animals. Inspired by a problem that chimpanzees experienced in the wild, children of 4 and 5 years of age and young adults were presented with a situation in which they were expected to select two tools in order to obtain a reward. More older children than 4 years old successfully obtained the reward. Adults also succeeded at solving the problem. However, both children and adults struggled to select the two correct tools before any tool-use action was executed. While children’s performance is discussed in the context of temporal components required to envisage future events, adults’ performance is interpreted in the context of cognitive effort. These findings link developmental and adult cognition with comparative psychology.

Technical reasoning refers to making inferences about how to use tools. The degree of technical reasoning is indicated by the bias of the gaze (fixation) on the functional part of the tool when in use. Few studies have examined whether technical reasoning differs between familiar and unfamiliar novel tools. In addition, what effect the intention to use the tool has on technical reasoning has not been determined. This study examined gaze shifts in relation to familiar or unfamiliar tools, under three conditions (free viewing, lift, and use), among 14 healthy adults (mean age ± standard deviation, 29.4 ± 3.9 years). The cumulative fixation time on the functional part of the tool served as a quantitative indicator of the degree of technical reasoning. The two-way analysis of variance for tools (familiar and unfamiliar) and conditions (free viewing, lift, and use) revealed that the cumulative fixation time significantly increased under free viewing and use conditions, compared to lift conditions. Relative to the free viewing condition, cumulative fixation time for unfamiliar tools significantly decreased in the lift condition and significantly increased in the use condition. Importantly, the results showed that technical reasoning was performed in both the use and the free viewing conditions. However, technical reasoning in the free viewing condition was not as strong as in the use condition. The difference between technical reasoning in free viewing and use conditions may indicate the difference between automatic and intentional technical reasoning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Solving problems that are perceptually dissimilar but require similar solutions is a key skill in everyday life. In adults, this ability, termed analogical transfer, draws on memories of relevant past experiences that partially overlap with the present task at hand. Thanks to this support from long-term memory, analogical transfer allows remarkable behavioral flexibility beyond immediate situations. However, little is known about the interaction between long-term memory and analogical transfer in development as, to date, they have been studied separately. Here, for the first time, effects of age and memory on analogical transfer were investigated in 2–4.5-olds in a simple tool-use setup. Children attempted to solve a puzzle box after training the correct solution on a different looking box, either right before the test or 24 h earlier. We found that children (N = 105) could transfer the solution regardless of the delay and a perceptual conflict introduced in the tool set. For children who failed to transfer (N = 54) and repeated the test without a perceptual conflict, the odds of success did not improve. Our findings suggest that training promoted the detection of functional similarities between boxes and, thereby, flexible transfer both in the short and the long term. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It was thought that tool use in animals is an adaptive specialization. Recent studies, however, have shown that some non-tool-users, such as rooks and jays, can use and manufacture tools in laboratory settings. Despite the abundant evidence of tool use in corvids, little is known about the neural mechanisms underlying tool use in this family of birds. This review summarizes the current knowledge on the neural processes underlying tool use in humans, macaques and corvids. We suggest a possible neural network for tool use in macaques and hope this might inspire research to discover a similar brain network in corvids. We hope to establish a framework to elucidate the neural mechanisms that supported the convergent evolution of tool use in birds and mammals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The ability to think about and plan for the future is a critical cognitive skill for our daily life. There is ongoing debate about whether other animals possess future thinking. Part of the difficulty in resolving this debate is that there is not a definite methodology that allow us to conclude that animals (and human children) are truly thinking about a future event. Research with humans—both children and adults- will benefit the field of comparative psychology by providing information about the range of humans' responses when they are faced with problems similar to those presented to other animals. Inspired by a problem that chimpanzees experienced in the wild, children of 4 and 5 years of age and young adults were presented with a situation in which they were expected to select two tools in order to obtain a reward. More older children than 4 years old successfully obtained the reward. Adults also succeeded at solving the problem. However, both children and adults struggled to select the two correct tools before any tool-use action was executed. While children's performance is discussed in the context of temporal components required to envisage future events, adults' performance is interpreted in the context of cognitive effort. These findings link developmental and adult cognition with comparative psychology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Keywords: tool use; dog cognition; cognitive evolution; comparative cognition; methods of behavioral research EN tool use dog cognition cognitive evolution comparative cognition methods of behavioral research 1 3 3 07/24/21 20210722 NES 210722 Brooks and Yamamoto ([3]) attempt to shed new light on old facts, when they propose that dogs' notorious chewing of sticks could be an overlooked instance of tool use. Intentional behaviour in dog-human communication: an experimental analysis of "showing" behaviour in the dog. Therefore, to propose a widening of the definition in this manner, resembles a dog which tries to lift the extension of a mattress on which it is standing [but note, dogs do not do that (Lenkei et al., [14])]. [Extracted from the article]

The brain generally integrates a multitude of sensory signals to form a unified percept. Even in cursor control tasks, such as reaching while looking at rotated visual feedback on a monitor, visual information on cursor position and proprioceptive information on hand position are partially integrated (sensory coupling), resulting in mutual biases of the perceived positions of cursor and hand. Previous studies showed that the strength of sensory coupling (sum of the mutual biases) depends on the experience of kinematic correlations between hand movements and cursor motions, whereas the asymmetry of sensory coupling (difference between the biases) depends on the relative reliabilities (inverse of variability) of hand-position and cursor-position estimates (reliability rule). Furthermore, the precision of movement control and perception of hand position are known to differ between hands (left, right) and workspaces (ipsilateral, contralateral), and so does the experience of kinematic correlations from daily life activities. Thus, in the present study, we tested whether strength and asymmetry of sensory coupling for the endpoints of reaches in a cursor control task differ between the right and left hand and between ipsilateral and contralateral hemispace. No differences were found in the strength of sensory coupling between hands or between hemispaces. However, asymmetry of sensory coupling was less in ipsilateral than in contralateral hemispace: in ipsilateral hemispace, the bias of the perceived hand position was reduced, which was accompanied by a smaller variability of the estimates. The variability of position estimates of the dominant right hand was also less than for the non-dominant left hand, but this difference was not accompanied by a difference in the asymmetry of sensory coupling – a violation of the reliability rule, probably due a stronger influence of visual information on right-hand movements. According to these results, the long-term effects of the experienced kinematic correlation between hand movements and cursor motions on the strength of sensory coupling are generic and not specific for hemispaces or hands, whereas the effects of relative reliabilities on the asymmetry of sensory coupling are specific for hemispaces but not for hands.

The brain generally integrates a multitude of sensory signals to form a unified percept. Even in cursor control tasks, such as reaching while looking at rotated visual feedback on a monitor, visual information on cursor position and proprioceptive information on hand position are partially integrated (sensory coupling), resulting in mutual biases of the perceived positions of cursor and hand. Previous studies showed that the strength of sensory coupling (sum of the mutual biases) depends on the experience of kinematic correlations between hand movements and cursor motions, whereas the asymmetry of sensory coupling (difference between the biases) depends on the relative reliabilities (inverse of variability) of hand-position and cursor-position estimates (reliability rule). Furthermore, the precision of movement control and perception of hand position are known to differ between hands (left, right) and workspaces (ipsilateral, contralateral), and so does the experience of kinematic correlations from daily life activities. Thus, in the present study, we tested whether strength and asymmetry of sensory coupling for the endpoints of reaches in a cursor control task differ between the right and left hand and between ipsilateral and contralateral hemispace. No differences were found in the strength of sensory coupling between hands or between hemispaces. However, asymmetry of sensory coupling was less in ipsilateral than in contralateral hemispace: in ipsilateral hemispace, the bias of the perceived hand position was reduced, which was accompanied by a smaller variability of the estimates. The variability of position estimates of the dominant right hand was also less than for the non-dominant left hand, but this difference was not accompanied by a difference in the asymmetry of sensory coupling – a violation of the reliability rule, probably due a stronger influence of visual information on right-hand movements. According to these results, the long-term effects of the experienced kinematic correlation between hand movements and cursor motions on the strength of sensory coupling are generic and not specific for hemispaces or hands, whereas the effects of relative reliabilities on the asymmetry of sensory coupling are specific for hemispaces but not for hands. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Empirical evidence is reviewed indicating that the extraordinary aspects of the human mind are due to our species’ ability to go beyond simple “dyadic associations” and to process the relations among three items of information simultaneously. Classic explanations of the “triadic” nature of human skills have been advocated by various scholars in the context of the evolution of human cognition. Here I summarize the core processes as found in (i) the syntax of language, (ii) tool-usage, and (iii) joint attention. I then review the triadic foundations of two perceptual phenomena of great importance in human aesthetics: (iv) harmony perception and (v) pictorial depth perception. In all five subfields of human psychology, most previous work has emphasized the recursive, hierarchical complexity of such “higher cognition,” but a strongly reductionist approach indicates that the core mechanisms are triadic. It is concluded that the cognitive skills traditionally considered to be “uniquely” human require three-way associational processing that most non-Primate animal species find difficult or impossible, but all members of Homo sapiens – regardless of small cultural differences – find easy and inherently intriguing.

Consciousness is not a process in the brain but a kind of behavior that, of course, is controlled by the brain like any other behavior. Human consciousness emerges on the interface between three components of animal behavior: communication, play, and the use of tools. These three components interact on the basis of anticipatory behavioral control, which is common for all complex forms of animal life. All three do not exclusively distinguish our close relatives, i.e., primates, but are broadly presented among various species of mammals, birds, and even cephalopods; however, their particular combination in humans is unique. The interaction between communication and play yields symbolic games, most importantly language; the interaction between symbols and tools results in human praxis. Taken together, this gives rise to a mechanism that allows a creature, instead of performing controlling actions overtly, to play forward the corresponding behavioral options in a “second reality” of objectively (by means of tools) grounded symbolic systems. The theory possesses the following properties: (1) It is anti-reductionist and anti-eliminativist, and yet, human consciousness is considered as a purely natural (biological) phenomenon. (2) It avoids epiphenomenalism and indicates in which conditions human consciousness has evolutionary advantages, and in which it may even be disadvantageous. (3) It allows to easily explain the most typical features of consciousness, such as objectivity, seriality and limited resources, the relationship between consciousness and explicit memory, the feeling of conscious agency, etc.

Over the evolution, humans have constantly developed and improved their technologies. This evolution began with the use of physical tools, those tools that increase our sensorimotor abilities (e.g., first stone tools, modern knives, hammers, pencils). Although we still use some of these tools, we also employ in daily life more sophisticated tools for which we do not systematically understand the underlying physical principles (e.g., computers, cars). Current research is also turned toward the development of brain–computer interfaces directly linking our brain activity to machines (i.e., symbiotic tools). The ultimate goal of research on this topic is to identify the key cognitive processes involved in these different modes of interaction. As a primary step to fulfill this goal, we offer a first attempt at a common framework, based on the idea that humans shape technologies, which also shape us in return. The framework proposed is organized into three levels, describing how we interact when using physical (Past), sophisticated (Present), and symbiotic (Future) technologies. Here we emphasize the role played by technical reasoning and practical reasoning, two key cognitive processes that could nevertheless be progressively suppressed by the proficient use of sophisticated and symbiotic tools. We hope that this framework will provide a common ground for researchers interested in the cognitive basis of human tool-use interactions, from paleoanthropology to neuroergonomics.

Empirical evidence is reviewed indicating that the extraordinary aspects of the human mind are due to our species’ ability to go beyond simple “dyadic associations” and to process the relations among three items of information simultaneously. Classic explanations of the “triadic” nature of human skills have been advocated by various scholars in the context of the evolution of human cognition. Here I summarize the core processes as found in (i) the syntax of language, (ii) tool-usage, and (iii) joint attention. I then review the triadic foundations of two perceptual phenomena of great importance in human aesthetics: (iv) harmony perception and (v) pictorial depth perception. In all five subfields of human psychology, most previous work has emphasized the recursive, hierarchical complexity of such “higher cognition,” but a strongly reductionist approach indicates that the core mechanisms are triadic. It is concluded that the cognitive skills traditionally considered to be “uniquely” human require three-way associational processing that most non-Primate animal species find difficult or impossible, but all members of Homo sapiens – regardless of small cultural differences – find easy and inherently intriguing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Consciousness is not a process in the brain but a kind of behavior that, of course, is controlled by the brain like any other behavior. Human consciousness emerges on the interface between three components of animal behavior: communication, play, and the use of tools. These three components interact on the basis of anticipatory behavioral control, which is common for all complex forms of animal life. All three do not exclusively distinguish our close relatives, i.e., primates, but are broadly presented among various species of mammals, birds, and even cephalopods; however, their particular combination in humans is unique. The interaction between communication and play yields symbolic games, most importantly language; the interaction between symbols and tools results in human praxis. Taken together, this gives rise to a mechanism that allows a creature, instead of performing controlling actions overtly, to play forward the corresponding behavioral options in a "second reality" of objectively (by means of tools) grounded symbolic systems. The theory possesses the following properties: (1) It is anti-reductionist and anti-eliminativist, and yet, human consciousness is considered as a purely natural (biological) phenomenon. (2) It avoids epiphenomenalism and indicates in which conditions human consciousness has evolutionary advantages, and in which it may even be disadvantageous. (3) It allows to easily explain the most typical features of consciousness, such as objectivity, seriality and limited resources, the relationship between consciousness and explicit memory, the feeling of conscious agency, etc. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the evolution, humans have constantly developed and improved their technologies. This evolution began with the use of physical tools, those tools that increase our sensorimotor abilities (e.g., first stone tools, modern knives, hammers, pencils). Although we still use some of these tools, we also employ in daily life more sophisticated tools for which we do not systematically understand the underlying physical principles (e.g., computers, cars). Current research is also turned toward the development of brain-computer interfaces directly linking our brain activity to machines (i.e., symbiotic tools). The ultimate goal of research on this topic is to identify the key cognitive processes involved in these different modes of interaction. As a primary step to fulfill this goal, we offer a first attempt at a common framework, based on the idea that humans shape technologies, which also shape us in return. The framework proposed is organized into three levels, describing how we interact when using physical (Past), sophisticated (Present), and symbiotic (Future) technologies. Here we emphasize the role played by technical reasoning and practical reasoning, two key cognitive processes that could nevertheless be progressively suppressed by the proficient use of sophisticated and symbiotic tools. We hope that this framework will provide a common ground for researchers interested in the cognitive basis of human tool-use interactions, from paleoanthropology to neuroergonomics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most studies of human-tool interactions focus on the typical use of a tool (e.g., cutting in the case of a knife). However, little is known about situations requiring atypical tool use (e.g., using a knife to tighten a screw). The present study focused on a selection of atypical uses of everyday tools which might be in conflict with their typical use. Our objective was to study how tool function influences the selection of the relevant action. In Experiment 1, which involved visuomotor priming, two everyday tools (a knife and a screwdriver) and two neutral tools (two bars, with no strong functional affordance) were used as primes and targets. Participants had to use the target with the appropriate box (indicated by the color) that allowed to make an action. Longer initiation times were observed when the prime was an everyday tool, irrespective of the nature of the target. We therefore observed a conflict between functional and situational affordances. To investigate whether the priming effect is caused by the task-irrelevance of the prime, we asked the participants in Experiment 2 to perform an action associated with the prime. The results showed longer initiation times only when the prime and target were everyday tools, irrespective of their precise nature. This suggests that activation of the typical use of a tool might not be fully automatic but flexible depending on the situation.

It is well-known that even toddlers are able to manipulate tools in an appropriate manner according to their physical properties. The ability of children to make novel tools in order to solve problems is, however, surprisingly limited. In adults, mechanical problem solving has been proposed to be supported by technical reasoning skills, which are thought to be involved in every situation requiring the use of a tool (whether conventional or unusual). The aim of this study was to investigate the typical development of real tool use skills and its link with technical reasoning abilities in healthy children. Three experimental tasks were adapted from those used with adults: mechanical problem solving (three different apparatus), real tool use (10 familiar tool-object pairs), and functional knowledge (10 functional picture matching with familiar tools previously used). The tasks were administered to 85 healthy children divided into six age groups (from 6 to 14 years of age). The results revealed that real tool use (p = .01) and mechanical problem solving skills improve with age, even if this improvement differs according to the apparatus for the latter (p < .01 for the Hook task and p < .05 for the Sloping task). Results also showed that mechanical problem solving is a better predictor of real tool use than functional knowledge, with a significant and greater weight (importance weight: 0.65; Estimate±Standard Error: 0.27±0.08). Ours findings suggest that real tool use and technical reasoning develop jointly in children, independently from development of functional knowledge. In addition, technical reasoning appears partially operative from the age of 6 onwards, even though the outcome of these skills depends of the context in which they are applied (i.e., the type of apparatus).

When performing a goal-directed action with a tool, it is generally assumed that the point of control of the action system is displaced from the hand to the tool, implying that body and tool function as one system. Studies of how actions with tools are performed have been limited to studying either end-effector kinematics or joint-angle coordination patterns. Because joint-angle coordination patterns affect end-effector kinematics, the current study examined them together, with the aim of revealing how body and tool function as one system. Seated participants made point-to-point movements with their index finger, and with rods of 10, 20, and 30 cm attached to their index finger. Start point and target were presented on a table in front of them, and in half of the conditions a participant displacement compensated for rod length. Results revealed that the kinematics of the rod’s tip showed higher peak velocity, longer deceleration time, and more curvature with longer rods. End-effector movements were more curved in the horizontal plane when participants were not displaced. Joint-angle trajectories were similar across rod lengths when participants were displaced, whereas more extreme joint-angles were used with longer rods when participants were not displaced. Furthermore, in every condition the end-effector was stabilized to a similar extent; both variability in joint-angle coordination patterns that affected end-effector position and variability that did not affect end-effector position increased in a similar way vis-à-vis rod length. Moreover, the increase was higher in those conditions, in which participants were not displaced. This suggests that during tool use, body and tool are united in a single system so as to stabilize the end-effector kinematics in a similar way that is independent of tool length. In addition, the properties of the actual trajectory of the end-effector, as well as the actual joint-angles used, depend on the length of the tool and the specifics of the task.

Observational learning is probably one of the most powerful factors determining progress during child development. When learning a new skill, infants rely on their own exploration; but they also frequently benefit from an adult’s verbal support or from demonstration by an adult modelling the action. At what age and under what conditions does adult demonstration really help the infant to learn a novel behavior? In this review, we summarize recently published work we have conducted on the acquisition of tool use during the second year of life. In particular, we consider under what conditions and to what extent seeing a demonstration from an adult advances an infant's understanding of how to use a tool to obtain an out-of-reach object. Our results show that classic demonstration starts being helpful at 18 months of age. When adults explicitly show their intention prior to demonstration, even 16-month-old infants learn from the demonstration. On the other hand, providing an explicit demonstration (look at how I do it) is not very useful before infants are ready to succeed by themselves anyway. In contrast, repeated observations of the required action in a social context, without explicit reference to this action, considerably advances the age of success and the usefulness of providing a demonstration. We also show that the effect of demonstration can be enhanced if the demonstration makes the baby laugh. Taken together, the results from this series of studies on observational learning of tool use in infants suggest, first, that when observing a demonstration, infants do not know what to pay attention to: demonstration must be accompanied by rich social cues to be effective; second, infants’ attention is inhibited rather than enhanced by an explicit demand of look at what I do; and finally a humorous situation considerably helps infants understand the demonstration.

In a cursor-control task in which the motion of the cursor is rotated randomly relative to the movement of the hand, the sensed directions of hand and cursor are mutually biased. In our previous study, we used implicit and explicit measures of the bias of sensed hand direction toward the direction of the cursor and found different characteristics. The present study serves to explore further differences and commonalities of these measures. In Experiment 1, we examined the effects of different relative reliabilities of visual and proprioceptive information on the explicitly and implicitly assessed bias of sensed hand direction. In two conditions, participants made an aiming movement and returned to the start position immediately or after a delay of 6 s during which the cursor was no longer visible. The unimodal proprioceptive information on final hand position in the delayed condition served to increase its relative reliability. As a result, the bias of sensed hand direction toward the direction of the cursor was reduced for the explicit measure, with a complementary increase of the bias of sensed cursor direction, but unchanged for the implicit measure. In Experiment 2, we examined the influence of global context, specifically of the across-trial sequence of judgments of hand and cursor direction. Both explicitly and implicitly assessed biases of sensed hand direction did not significantly differ between the alternated condition (trial-to-trial alternations of judgments of hand and cursor direction) and the blocked condition (judgments of hand or cursor directions in all trials). They both substantially decreased from the alternated to the randomized condition (random sequence of judgments of hand and cursor direction), without a complementary increase of the bias of sensed cursor direction. We conclude that our explicit and implicit measures are equally sensitive to variations of coupling strength as induced by the variation of global context in Experiment 2, but are differently sensitive to variations of the relative reliabilities as induced by our additional unimodal proprioceptive information in Experiment 1.

In this study, we used a visual target detection task to investigate three hypotheses about how the peri-personal space is extended after tool-use training: Addition, Extension , and Projection hypotheses. We compared the target detection performance before and after tool-use training. In both conditions, the participants held a hockey stick-like tool in their hands during the detection task. Furthermore, we added the no-tool-holding condition to the experimental design. In the no-tool-holding condition, a peri-hand space advantage in the visual target detection task was observed. When the participants held the tool with their hands, this peri-hand space advantage was lost. Furthermore, there was no peri-tool space advantage before tool training. After tool training, the peri-tool space advantage was observed. However, after tool training, the advantage of the peri-hand space was not observed. This result suggested that the peri-hand advantage was reduced by simply holding the tool because the participants lost the functionality of their hands. Furthermore, tool-use training improved detection performance only in the peri-tool space. Thus, these results supported the projection hypothesis that the peri-personal space advantage would move from the body to the functional part of the tool., Competing Interests: The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest., (Copyright © 2023 Saneyoshi, Takayama and Michimata.)

Dedicated multisensory mechanisms in the brain represent peripersonal space (PPS), a limited portion of space immediately surrounding the body. Previous studies have illustrated the malleability of PPS representation through hand-object interaction, showing that tool use extends the limits of the hand-centered PPS. In the present study we investigated the effects of a special tool, the wheelchair, in extending the action possibilities of the whole body. We used a behavioral measure to quantify the extension of the PPS around the body before and after Active (Experiment 1) and Passive (Experiment 2) training with a wheelchair and when participants were blindfolded (Experiment 3). Results suggest that a wheelchair-mediated passive exploration of far space extended PPS representation. This effect was specifically related to the possibility of receiving information from the environment through vision, since no extension effect was found when participants were blindfolded. Surprisingly, the active motor training did not induce any modification in PPS representation, probably because the wheelchair maneuver was demanding for non-expert users and thus they may have prioritized processing of information from close to the wheelchair rather than at far spatial locations. Our results suggest that plasticity in PPS representation after tool use seems not to strictly depend on active use of the tool itself, but is triggered by simultaneous processing of information from the body and the space where the body acts in the environment, which is more extended in the case of wheelchair use. These results contribute to our understanding of the mechanisms underlying body-environment interaction for developing and improving applications of assistive technological devices in different clinical populations.

It is well-known that even toddlers are able to manipulate tools in an appropriate manner according to their physical properties. The ability of children to make novel tools in order to solve problems is, however, surprisingly limited. In adults, mechanical problem solving (MPS) has been proposed to be supported by "technical reasoning skills," which are thought to be involved in every situation requiring the use of a tool (whether conventional or unusual). The aim of this study was to investigate the typical development of real tool use (RTU) skills and its link with technical reasoning abilities in healthy children. Three experimental tasks were adapted from those used with adults: MPS (three different apparatus), RTU (10 familiar tool-object pairs), and functional knowledge (FK; 10 functional picture matching with familiar tools previously used). The tasks were administered to 85 healthy children divided into six age groups (from 6 to 14 years of age). The results revealed that RTU (p = 0.01) and MPS skills improve with age, even if this improvement differs according to the apparatus for the latter (p < 0.01 for the Hook task and p < 0.05 for the Sloping task). Results also showed that MPS is a better predictor of RTU than FK, with a significant and greater weight (importance weight: 0.65; Estimate ± Standard Error: 0.27 ± 0.08). Ours findings suggest that RTU and technical reasoning develop jointly in children, independently from development of FK. In addition, technical reasoning appears partially operative from the age of six onward, even though the outcome of these skills depends of the context in which they are applied (i.e., the type of apparatus). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When performing a goal-directed action with a tool, it is generally assumed that the point of control of the action system is displaced from the hand to the tool, implying that body and tool function as one system. Studies of how actions with tools are performed have been limited to studying either end-effector kinematics or joint-angle coordination patterns. Because joint-angle coordination patterns affect end-effector kinematics, the current study examined them together, with the aim of revealing how body and tool function as one system. Seated participants made point-to-point movements with their index finger, and with rods of 10, 20, and 30cm attached to their index finger. Start point and target were presented on a table in front of them, and in half of the conditions a participant displacement compensated for rod length. Results revealed that the kinematics of the rod's tip showed higher peak velocity, longer deceleration time, and more curvature with longer rods. End-effector movements were more curved in the horizontal plane when participants were not displaced. Joint-angle trajectories were similar across rod lengths when participants were displaced, whereas more extreme joint-angles were used with longer rods when participants were not displaced. Furthermore, in every condition the end-effector was stabilized to a similar extent; both variability in joint-angle coordination patterns that affected end-effector position and variability that did not affect end-effector position increased in a similar way vis-à-vis rod length. Moreover, the increase was higher in those conditions, in which participants were not displaced. This suggests that during tool use, body and tool are united in a single system so as to stabilize the end-effector kinematics in a similar way that is independent of tool length. In addition, the properties of the actual trajectory of the end-effector, as well as the actual joint-angles used, depend on the length of the tool and the specifics of the task. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a cursor-control task in which the motion of the cursor is rotated randomly relative to the movement of the hand, the sensed directions of hand and cursor are mutually biased. In our previous study, we used implicit and explicit measures of the bias of sensed hand direction toward the direction of the cursor and found different characteristics. The present study serves to explore further differences and commonalities of these measures. In Experiment 1, we examined the effects of different relative reliabilities of visual and proprioceptive information on the explicitly and implicitly assessed bias of sensed hand direction. In two conditions, participants made an aiming movement and returned to the start position immediately or after a delay of 6 s during which the cursor was no longer visible. The unimodal proprioceptive information on final hand position in the delayed condition served to increase its relative reliability. As a result, the bias of sensed hand direction toward the direction of the cursor was reduced for the explicit measure, with a complementary increase of the bias of sensed cursor direction, but unchanged for the implicit measure. In Experiment 2, we examined the influence of global context, specifically of the across-trial sequence of judgments of hand and cursor direction. Both explicitly and implicitly assessed biases of sensed hand direction did not significantly differ between the alternated condition (trial-to-trial alternations of judgments of hand and cursor direction) and the blocked condition (judgments of hand or cursor directions in all trials). They both substantially decreased from the alternated to the randomized condition (random sequence of judgments of hand and cursor direction), without a complementary increase of the bias of sensed cursor direction. We conclude that our explicit and implicit measures are equally sensitive to variations of coupling strength as induced by the variation of global context in Experiment 2, but are differently sensitive to variations of the relative reliabilities as induced by our additional unimodal proprioceptive information in Experiment 1. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In three studies, we explored the retention and transfer of tool-making knowledge, learnt from an adult demonstration, to other temporal and task contexts. All studies used a variation of a task in which children had to make a hook tool to retrieve a bucket from a tall transparent tube. Children who failed to innovate the hook tool independently saw a demonstration.In Study 1, we tested children aged 4 to 6 years (N = 53) who had seen the original demonstration 3 months earlier. Performance was excellent at the second time, indicating that children’s knowledge was retained over the 3 month period. In Studies 2 and 3 we explored transfer of the new knowledge to other tasks. In Study 2, children were given two variants of the apparatus that differed in surface characteristics (e.g. shape and colour). Participants generalised their knowledge to these new apparatuses even though the new pipecleaner also differed in size and colour. Five- to 6-year-olds (n = 22) almost always transferred their knowledge to problems where the same tool had to be made. Younger, 3- to 5-year-olds’ (n = 46), performance was more variable. In Study 3, 4- to 7-year-olds (N = 146) saw a demonstration of hook making with a pipecleaner, but then had to make a tool by combining pieces of wooden dowel (or vice versa: original training on dowel, transfer to pipecleaner). Children did not transfer their tool-making knowledge to the new material. Children retained tool-making knowledge over time and transferred their knowledge to new situations in which they needed to make a similar tool from similar materials, but not different materials. We concluded that children’s ability to use tool-making knowledge in novel situations is likely to depend on memory and analogical reasoning, with the latter continuing to develop during middle childhood.

In a cursor-control task in which the motion of the cursor is rotated randomly relative to the movement of the hand, the sensed directions of hand and cursor are mutually biased. In our previous study, we used implicit and explicit measures of the bias of sensed hand direction toward the direction of the cursor and found different characteristics. The present study serves to explore further differences and commonalities of these measures. In Experiment 1, we examined the effects of different relative reliabilities of visual and proprioceptive information on the explicitly and implicitly assessed bias of sensed hand direction. In two conditions, participants made an aiming movement and returned to the start position immediately or after a delay of 6 s during which the cursor was no longer visible. The unimodal proprioceptive information on final hand position in the delayed condition served to increase its relative reliability. As a result, the bias of sensed hand direction toward the direction of the cursor was reduced for the explicit measure, with a complementary increase of the bias of sensed cursor direction, but unchanged for the implicit measure. In Experiment 2, we examined the influence of global context, specifically of the across-trial sequence of judgments of hand and cursor direction. Both explicitly and implicitly assessed biases of sensed hand direction did not significantly differ between the alternated condition (trial-to-trial alternations of judgments of hand and cursor direction) and the blocked condition (judgments of hand or cursor directions in all trials). They both substantially decreased from the alternated to the randomized condition (random sequence of judgments of hand and cursor direction), without a complementary increase of the bias of sensed cursor direction. We conclude that our explicit and implicit measures are equally sensitive to variations of coupling strength as induced by the variation of global context in Experiment 2, but are differently sensitive to variations of the relative reliabilities as induced by our additional unimodal proprioceptive information in Experiment 1. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Keywords: dog cognition; tool use; cognitive evolution; comparative cognition; teething; object manipulation EN dog cognition tool use cognitive evolution comparative cognition teething object manipulation 1 2 2 09/29/21 20210924 NES 210924 Iotchev ([6]) provides critical commentary to our recent suggestion that dog stick chewing may represent a previously overlooked form of tool use (Brooks and Yamamoto, [2]). Dog cognition, tool use, cognitive evolution, comparative cognition, object manipulation, teething. [Extracted from the article]