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We study whether the basic tenets of the theory of zero-sum games are still valid when players are uncertainty averse. We focus on games with one-sided information, in which the uninformed player is uncertain about the state of nature. Uncertainty aversion turns the underlying zero-sum game into a many-player, non-zero-sum game. We show that the uninformed player has a unique equilibrium payoff. We provide conditions under which there is a unique equilibrium payoff vector. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Based on an experiment in the lab, we classify behavior in one-shot normal-form games along three important dimensions. The first dimension, which is of main interest, is about whether subjects are ambiguity-loving, ambiguity-neutral, or ambiguity-averse. The second dimension is about whether subjects are risk-loving, risk-neutral, or risk-averse. The third dimension is about whether subjects are naive or strategic. Our main result is that, in our main treatment, percent of subjects are classified as ambiguity-loving/ambiguity-neutral/ambiguity-averse. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]