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This paper examines the socio-economic and geopolitical outcomes associated with infrastructure development across multiple scales. Starting from the premise that planetary socio-technical transformations in this vein have distinctly national drivers, we focus on the urban agency of Chinese-led investment. The paper explores how different forms of infrastructural development generated by the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) affects transformations in the political and material fabric of cities and their host regions. We approach BRI-related infrastructural practice through three interconnected optics – discourse, instruments, and politics – so as to interrogate the articulation of projects linked to the BRI within the material site of the urban. Based on theorisations of infrastructure from an urban perspective and a critical review of literature on the BRI itself, we develop three illustrative case studies at different spatial scales and within different geographic contexts – in Pakistan, Central Europe and the UK. To examine the cases as well as their embeddedness in broader debates on the topic, we use a systematic review methodology relying on a wide variety of sources. We offer comparative and relational perspectives on the manner in which these relatively diverse cases demonstrate China's role as a global urban actor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of 'new' state capitalism has garnered increasing attention among scholars due to the emergence of a polymorphism of state interventions in recent years. These interventions are now being examined through a spatial lens, departing from the previously dominant methodological nationalism. In this case, the 'new' Chinese state capitalism is particularly noteworthy. The People's Republic of China (PRC) has adopted a spatial state-led strategy to facilitate the Renminbi (RMB) transnationalization. This strategic approach transcends traditional national boundaries, stretching across different spaces. Our research focuses on the specific case of Luxembourg in relation to this spatial strategy. We assert that the RMB transnationalization represents a distinctive feature of the 'new' Chinese state capitalism, as it is underpinned by explicit Chinese state policies, unlike other currencies whose global use was the result of growing economies. Moreover, we contend that the PRC's explicit policies regarding the RMB do not aim for full convertibility and widespread acceptance like the US-Dollar (USD). Instead, they prioritise its role as a trade currency for international trade settlements, as the main goal is to reduce the dependence on the USD and to create a stable International Monetary System (IMS) that will bring benefits to its trade-oriented economic model. Overall, this paper significantly contributes to the existing literature by offering a novel perspective on the RMB transnationalization within the framework of the 'new' Chinese state capitalism, emphasising China's quest for autonomy from the USD. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper conducts a discourse analysis of Chinese tourist writings about Africa on the most popular Chinese online tourist forum, Mafengwo (hornet's nest). By examining 2,950 travelogues collected online, our research finds that Chinese tourists' conceptions of Africa are mainly built through 5 frames, including the exotic frame, the adventurous frame, the poverty frame, the China's engagement frame, and the affection frame that describe Africa as a remote, exotic, adventurous, dangerous, miserable, and backward place compared to a modern China that strongly supports Africa's development. Much tourist writing corresponds with the official Chinese geopolitical narrative of China-Africa relations that perceives China itself as a peacefully rising power who would also like to help developing others like Africa. However, we also find that some Chinese tourists' descriptions of Africa fit uneasily into the official Chinese geopolitical conceptions, in which they demonstrate affection for Africa, but only in regard to its Western aspects, e.g., architecture, food, activities. One contribution of this study is providing a bottom-up Chinese citizenry discourses and cultural experiences of Africa, and with this empirical analysis it updates theories of everyday Chinese geopolitics of tourism. We think this study is unique in that we have broadened the understanding of both official and citizenry Chinese geopolitical conceptions and their (dis)connections, in particular from the everyday encounter between geopolitics and tourism, which also sets a frame for comprehending Chinese citizenry geopolitical conceptions of the outside 'other'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Travel booking engines can produce, resist, and destabilise popular and state-directed geopolitical representations of a world neatly divided into national and international space. Although they present as strictly functional technical platforms, booking engines obscure and omit what is contingent and contested in the production of a destination as a bordered national territory. Due to their embedding in the webs of political representation, these systems and their backers can become targets for economic boycotts, political threats, hacks, or other interventions when territorial designations are contested. Such interventions manifest as political performances aimed at multiple audiences, including tourists and travellers, as well as the businesses and political entities that facilitate or inhibit their circulation, with spillover effects into other domains of geopolitical representation. To empirically illustrate this argument, the paper analyzes the People's Republic of China's mostly successful efforts to coerce the international travel industry to relist destinations within Taiwan as belonging to China. By extending the notion of border performativity into the 'code/spaces' that span the online and offline worlds, it concludes that booking engines, like other forms of infrastructure that serve travellers and tourists, can produce popular geopolitical effects that exceed their own technical systems. Peering through these ruptures reveals the uneasy and unstable assemblages of travel infrastructure and territorial representation that regulate global mobility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper examines the geopolitics of the Falun Gong (FLG) and how its practices challenge the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) authority within the Chinese state. Drawing upon Laclau and Mouffe's concept of discourse, I analyse the FLG's scriptures in order to understand how its millennial ideas of 'telling-truth/saving-life' and 'reviving five thousand years of civilization' have developed since the People's Republic of China's (PRC) ban and crackdown on the FLG since 1999. Based on the FLG's resources and my fieldwork data, this paper also demonstrates how the concepts of 'telling-truth/saving-life' were practised and coordinated globally. This paper presents the dynamic relationship between spirituality and geopolitics. It demonstrates how politics are spiritually interpreted and how critical spiritual discourses are converted to geopolitical practices that challenge the authority of an atheist state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The completion of the Hong Kong-Zhuhai-Macau Bridge marks not only a record-setting achievement in engineering, but also a materialisation of ongoing efforts by the People's Republic of China to engage in cooperative projects aimed at expanding and deepening integrative connections with the semi-autonomous Special Administrative Regions of Macau and Hong Kong. This paper explores the colonial and post-colonial social construction of Hong Kong as a political-economic island, and the implications this carries into the tensions and open conflicts that have unfolded under the One Country, Two Systems agreement. Using the bridge as a case, it critically examines the geopolitical and biopolitical dimensions of infrastructure as a practice of subnational (de)bordering. The case renders visible a contemporary moment where infrastructure occupies a central position at the conjuncture of technology, advanced governmentality and shifting geographies of sovereignty in the People's Republic of China, within subnational city-regional development plans, as well as internationally in projects, such as the geographically expansive Belt and Road Initiative. A close examination of the Bridge project highlights the constructed and contested nature of borders, as well as the complex identities and ideologies that define them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper maps out contemporary discourses of Chinese diplomacy that have proliferated under the aegis of 'major country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics'. We examine how these narratives are underpinned by webs of relationality that see China promoting equal and win–win partnerships with other state actors, yet are also defined by hierarchical premises for such diplomatic engagements. These relational contradictions are most clearly manifested when we interrogate the spatial dynamics of China's diplomatic endeavours through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). By scrutinising the geopolitical imaginations, sites and scales associated with the BRI, we turn attention to three spatial tensions that are closely bounded up with the relational contradictions of Chinese diplomacy: 'win–win' diplomacy promoting a 'harmonious world' versus territorially based diplomacy; periphery diplomacy versus the global ambitions of BRI; and the centralisation versus decentralisation dimensions of Chinese diplomacy. This allows us to make sense of the multiplicity of descriptors that have been affixed to Chinese diplomacy, in order to underscore the 'work' they perform to bequeath (at times, divergent and contested) meanings to China's new foreign policy approach. Hence, a relational and spatial understanding of Chinese diplomacy, we argue, can reveal a more nuanced picture of the promises, potential and disjunctures of China's rapidly expanding geopolitical and diplomatic actions on the international stage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines China's Belt and Road Initiative as an exercise in geocultural power. To date, Belt and Road has been analysed as a geopolitical and geo-economic initiative, with arguments constructed around the development of infrastructure, trade or finance agreements. This paper introduces the Silk Roads as one of the most compelling geocultural concepts of the modern era to show its strategic value as a platform for cooperation and multi-sector connectivity. A critical analysis of the Silk Roads provides new insights into Belt and Road, revealing how China is mobilising its geocultural potential as a civilisational state to build regional and continental connectivities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper conceptualises the geosocial by examining the transnational connections of African student migrants and their educational experiences in Chinese cities. While there is now an established scholarship on Chinese migration to Africa, new research on the concurrent flow of African migration to China is emerging. Recent publications on African migrants in China tend to focus on the experiences of African traders, drawing out issues of illegality, ‘low-end’ globalisation and their impacts on Chinese trading cities. In comparison, this paper shifts the analytical lens to African educational migration in Chinese cities, foregrounding how global householding patterns reflect and leverage on the geopolitical and geo-economic dimensions of China-Africa relations. The paper shows that individual and family goals are negotiated through educational migration that, on the one hand, is concerned with accumulating human and cultural capital through a learning stint in Chinese cities, and on the other hand, is framed by perceptions of China-Africa relations. The paper argues that through educational migration, transnational social reproduction links Africa with China, but the social differentiation and everyday sociality that the African students experience in Chinese cities reinforce racial coding and development asymmetries. In so doing, the paper draws out how the geosocial reflects and constitutes the geopolitical and geo-economic dimensions of transnationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With China rapidly expanding its aid programme in the Pacific Islands region, there is a growing concern among established powers about China's sway over the aid-dependent Pacific Island states. Systematic studies of China's development finance to the small island countries are, however, rare and generally limited to mapping Chinese finance flows in the Pacific. This study seeks to contribute to the literature on China's development efforts in the Pacific Islands region. Drawing on project-level data from AidData for the period 2000–2014, this paper disaggregates China's official financing into its constituent parts and systematically explores the determinants of China's Official Development Assistance (ODA) and its commercially-oriented finance flows to the Pacific. The panel data analysis finds that, contrary to popular belief, China does not reward voting compliance in the United Nations nor is its allocation of financing to the Pacific influenced by the countries' level of indebtedness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reviews the genealogy of 'Chinese' political geography, which, to a certain extent, can be read as a national report of the status of political geography in Chinese scholarship. It begins by outlining the short duration of the development of political geography in China, compared to the longer history of western political geography. Looking at the extant studies related to political geography in China, this paper suggests an existence of a duality in this field. One strand of scholarship is termed 'exogenous political geography', which is largely influenced by western scholarship with a particular focus on theories and vocabularies from classical geopolitics and geo-economy. The other strand is termed as 'endogenous political geography', which covers rich topics, including, yet not limited to, political and geographical views of inter-state relationships, central-local relationships and emperor-people relationships. Such a duality is important for understanding the condition of current political geography in China. The dualised understanding, however, seems to have undermined the comprehensiveness of political geography in China. In this regard, this paper calls for a more complete, integrated and critical agenda for political geography in China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past 5–10 years, a growing number of Chinese scholars and policy experts have sought to theorise the 'development' of other peoples and places in the Global South. These intellectual efforts include building temporal frameworks for describing development processes, and often, an implicit set of directives for effecting positive change. Drawing on eight months' fieldwork in Beijing, this paper examines the representational practices of depicting development and its temporal dimension that have been mobilised in the ongoing production of Chinese international development thinking. In particular, it is concerned with the ways in which temporal distance and proximity have been constructed to provide a theoretical and moral justification for China's intensifying geopolitical and economic preoccupations. We argue that more than a system of explanations, current Chinese thinking contains and expresses a recalibrated will to geopolitical power, which has had a conditioning effect on the enframing of the meanings and relations of development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With China's continuous rise and growing external commercial, strategic, and political endeavours, questions have arisen about the motivation, timing, and locale of China's outreaching strategies. This research analyzes China's overseas port investments through a comparative study of Greece and Pakistan, two important partners of China's Belt and Road Initiative. Adopting the neoclassical realist framework and drawing on expert interviews, official statistics, and policy documents, this paper reveals how China's economic security objectives in combination with changing geopolitical structures led to its external port investments. This research contributes to the studies on rising powers and geopolitics by showing how China as a rising power capitalizes on geopolitical opportunities created by the changing interests of dominant powers to expand its presence in strategically important regions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the intimate relationship between narratives emanating from China and their uses of Chinese history, and how such perspectives inform China’s geopolitical positioning and practices in lieu of its purported ‘rise’. Taking inspiration from the deconstructive impetus of critical geopolitics, this article contends that these historical claims to China’s rise constitute deterministic accounts, hinging on the notion of Chinese exceptionalism to provide discursive backing for a Sinocentric geopolitical order in the coming decades. This in turn downplays ‘alternative’ historiographies that can shed light on how the nature of China’s emergence may be more dependent on and shaped by the external environment than previously acknowledged. Building on the historical-geographical expositions related to the idea of contingency, this article demonstrates how China (whether it be in the past or present) cannot be seen as operating in a vacuum but has to constantly negotiate and adjust its strategy of engagements/interactions based on the specific demands imposed by world politics. Specifically, by elucidating these dimensions through cross-strait relations between China and Taiwan, it is argued that understanding China’s contingencies can raise important questions for us to critically appreciate the contextual actors, processes and relationships that differentially impact on China’s engagements in the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing on the life stories of post-Soviet women from Ukraine and Russia who married Chinese citizens and moved their married lives to China, this article examines how these women engage in intimate geopolitics in the adverse immigration environment for foreign family members. The elaborated argument maintains that the women – driven by the uncertainty surrounding their legal and socio-economic status and the fear of forced separation from their children – resort to their home citizenship or informal dual citizenship arrangements as leverage to defend parental rights against the backdrop of China's strict single citizenship regime. The women develop strategies to ensure their parental rights through citizenship structures available to them, and seek to remedy their emotional uncertainties amid the environment of limited and tenuous immigrant and family statuses in China. This paper develops analytical potential of intimate geopolitics through an analysis of post-Soviet wives' subjectivities constituted through the interplay of geopolitical structures and their emotional intensities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Historical and conventional international relations (IR) frameworks describe the Belt Road Initiative (BRI) as representing a newly ambitious Chinese drive into global politics that positions China as moving away from its long-time reticence towards foreign entanglements. This raises a contradiction of China being at one and the same time both a defender of its own territorial sovereignty while also being engaged in various projects, particularly the BRI and the associated Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), that point in completely different directions. This paper seeks to build upon and move beyond conventional framings to understand how the BRI represents a conflict over the workings of state sovereignty that such frameworks have trouble addressing. We argue that the absence of an official Chinese government BRI map promotes a 'useful fuzziness' with regards to China being open to crafting a new as of yet undefined geopolitical identity. In light of the absence of such a map, this work considers key ideas relating to China's geopolitical expansion via the BRI in terms of so-called sovereignty regimes – the idea that various practices of authority and control emanating originally from states take different geographical shapes. Conflicts arise when a state, such as China, finds itself caught between the operational imperatives of multiple regimes. By identifying the current sovereignty dynamics raised by the BRI in light of the relevant, yet distinctive historical experience of the Marshall Plan, this work can be used as a model for understanding how China's current leadership is managing the debate of simultaneously protecting 'strong borders' yet also promoting a policy of 'going out'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China’s “One Belt, One Road” project is comprised of two components: the Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI) and the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB)—that were announced separately in 2013. Each component has the potential to transform the global geopolitical landscape through the construction of interrelated infrastructure projects including ports, highways, railways and pipelines. Such hard infrastructure requires the complementary construction of soft infrastructure, such as free trade and investment agreements, and other accords. We introduce a special section focusing specifically on the geopolitics of the MSRI that stems from a workshop hosted in November 2015 in Shanghai. The origins, scope and content of the MSRI are described, along with a summary of the current literature discussing the project, and dominant geopolitical representations. The MSRI is a geopolitical project that involves a number of actors (governments, private companies and Chinese state-owned enterprises) at a number of geographic scales (cities, provinces, states and continents). Arrghi’s twin logics of territorial and economic power help frame and connect the papers of the special section to illustrate the complexity and dynamism of the geopolitics of the MSRI. The articles provide insights into the geopolitics of a large connectivity project. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Enclosure, dispossession and displacement loom large in current debates about the recent boom in transnational farmland deals, and about Chinese agribusiness for export in particular. Often under-examined, however, are the ways that legacies of geopolitical conflict shape the inevitably uneven distribution of enclosure, dispossession and displacement. This paper constructs a case of these ‘micro-geopolitical’ legacies by examining a Chinese rubber planting ‘promotion’ project in northwestern Laos’s emerging ‘Golden Quadrangle’ development region. It argues that longstanding concerns about security inform the ways that local authorities deploy investment projects that are otherwise seen as examples of ‘foreign’ land grabbing. Further, it shows that while the geographical aims of foreign agribusiness mesh with state-mediated resettlement efforts (a darker spin on the narrative of ‘win-win’ cooperation), these activities often precede current land deals rather than result from them. Chinese agribusiness in Laos’s upland interior thus appears less as a driver of displacement than a means for attempting to secure in place a particular (if precarious) configuration of population and security. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper considers the Sri Lanka/Tamil Eelam conflict with attention to how its dramatic end can be explained through postcolonial territorial politics. I argue discourses of postcolonial nationalism and global terrorism aligned along domestic, regional, and international political levels to enable a military victory for the government of Sri Lanka. At the domestic political level, there was a change in government along with a split and defection within the LTTE command. At the international level, there was a turn away from Western allies due to their perceived inability to understand the needs of the Asian front in the global war on terror (GWOT). This led to a geopolitical realignment with China, a state sympathetic to fighting terrorism and secession movements. The case is studied under a theoretical lens of “de/re territorialisation” from Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari. De/re territorialisation reveals simultaneous efforts to inscribe nationalist meaning into territory in a constant process of “becoming.” [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rise of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) as major investors in the global economy has raised worries that they serve the geopolitical ends of owner countries. However, given the paramount importance of surviving domestic political competitions, SWFs are likely also tools of domestic political survival. In examining the corporate governance and underlying political environment in which SWFs in Singapore and in China operate, this paper further examines the role of political unity in directing SWF behaviour in authoritarian regimes. The main finding is that a highly unified autocracy is more likely to direct SWFs to maximise long-term profit, while a fragmented one like China is more likely to treat its SWF as an arena for domestic political and bureaucratic infighting. SWFs operating in a fragmented regime are unlikely to make long-term profit and foreign policy objectives top priorities, and their behaviour can be highly unpredictable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study interrogates the geopolitical nature of China's Xisha tourism, and unravels the territorial politics played out in tourism, while examining the complex interplay between tourism and territorialisation. It demonstrates that Xisha tourism is inherently geopolitical and integral to China's comprehensive territorialisation strategy in the South China Sea (SCS). It reveals that Xisha tourism is politically oriented, highly regimented, and performatively constituted. Tourism and territorialisation are found to be mutually constituted and interdependent. The main argument of this study is that tourism should be conceptualised as a constitutive dimension of geopolitical restructuring processes in the SCS, and an essential part of the performative and discursive assemblage that sustains the state's will to claim territorial possession of the SCS. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using the approaches of critical geopolitics, the authors compare Russian official, expert and media discourses on Russian-Chinese relations and China including such issues as its domestic and foreign policies, its role in the world, economic development and military potential. To study the official political discourse, more than 300 official documents were collected, including speeches, presentations and interviews by Russian leaders from 2012 to 2019. The screening of the Vesti news programme at the "Russia-1" state federal TV channel served a basis for the media discourse analysis. A scrutiny of about 2,900 articles on China and Russian-Chinese relations found in course of screening of 2012–2019 issues of the Nezavisimaya Gazeta, a daily federal "intellectual" newspaper destined to highly educated audience that pays much attention to foreign policy, was selected as a source of information on the expert discourse. The authors conclude that there is a clear gap between the official and expert discourse on China. While most of the participants agree that there is no alternative to a partnership with the great eastern neighbour, many experts express their concerns about the growing asymmetry in the two countries' potential. This difference arises from the lack of confidence at the grassroots level as well as from the fact that some Russian partners seek to excuse their failures by blaming them on China's unwillingness to compromise. In conclusion the authors consider the influence that different discourses have on Russian public opinion using the results of national surveys and focus groups. They show that part of the elite itself, accustomed to certain doubts about the possibility of strategic cooperation with China, reproduces a sceptical attitude towards the Chinese partners. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2011, Burma/Myanmar one-sidedly halted the billions-worth construction of Myitsone Dam, derailing China's then-largest-ever hydroelectric project abroad and creating a lasting controversy in China–Burma relations. This decision followed an unprecedented public outcry in Burma and a decade of inter-ethnic resistance against this mega-project. This article explores how, throughout the Myitsone Dam controversy, actors at different scales and in three national societies speculated about hidden hostile inter-national plots behind the project or the resistance. Drawing on more than two years of ethnographic fieldwork in 2010–2019, interviews, and media analysis, this article takes seriously many Chinese, Burmese, and Kachin voices – from ambassadors and journalists, to activists and village elders – who claim or dispute various hidden hostile inter-national strategies. The Myitsone case shows how deeply inter-national speculating shapes Burma, often in ways that erase ethnic-minority actors, popular movements, or dispossession. More broadly, it shows how nationalist thinking and competing nationalisms can shape ideas about a frontier of resource extraction. Finally, ethnographic research has often revealed how marginalised people's conspiratorial narratives can reflect realities, but this study suggests using ethnography to let people challenge dominant conspiracy theories about themselves. Researchers across ethnographic disciplines, International Relations, and critical geopolitics face the analytical and ethical challenge of both contextualising and evaluating any people's claim that someone plots against them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In May 2013, China gained observer status in the Arctic Council, exemplifying its growing legitimacy as a regional actor in the eyes of the eight countries with territory north of the Arctic Circle. Yet since China remains an extraregional state without territory in the Arctic, Chinese officials continue to bolster their state’s legitimacy as an Arctic stakeholder through two spatially inconsistent but mutually reinforcing grand regional narratives. On the one hand, Chinese officials recognize the salience of territory and presence in the Arctic, underscoring their country’s “near-Arctic” location and polar scientific expeditions. On the other hand, officials depict the Arctic as a maritime, global space where climate change has potential ramifications for the entire planet. Significantly, these reframings are affecting intraregional states’ perceptions of the Arctic, demonstrating how a region’s territorial extent, symbolic meaning, and institutional form emerge through the ongoing conversation between extraregional and intraregional narratives. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Many analysts and practitioners argue that the United States should actively engage in geoeconomic competition with China. This article suggests that an argument against this claim can be counter-intuitively derived from offensive realism – an influential international relations theory known for its pessimism on great power relations. Offensive realism suggests that a great power should try to maximize its material capacity and pay careful attention to the balance of material power between major states. It also suggests that a great power should avoid spending its limited resources in influence or legitimacy competition in the peripheries. In this context, offensive realism prescribes that the United States should not actively oppose Chinese economic initiatives unless those projects have meaningful impact on the bilateral balance of power and its security. On the contrary, Washington should encourage China to expand its investments in geoeconomic initiatives since China is likely to end up spending a large amount of its resources in regions that do not have significant implications to the balance of material power. For offensive realists, a great power should take balance of power competition in major regions seriously, not influence competition around the globe. Accordingly, the United States should restrain itself and avoid geoeconomically confronting China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on Uyghur communities in China often focuses on the power and oppression of the Chinese state, neglecting the power situated in the domestic sphere and women's bodies. My research addresses how younger Uyghur women (aged 18–35 years old) feel suffocated by the expectations of their ethnocultural identity, and how those women both conform to and reject social norms. The themes of marriage and clothing illustrate how representations and discourses of the female body reinforce the boundaries of the Uyghur community. The pleasure and pain of Uyghur identity manifests in women's bodies during territorial insecurity of fading nationalist space. Multiple scales of identity in the body and household disrupt the imaginary cohesiveness and boundedness of territory. While the Chinese state polices Uyghur bodies, so too does Uyghur society police the bodies of other Uyghurs – especially women – as a security strategy of bordering the nation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The geopolitics of development are explored through an examination of development assistance to two African countries as a mechanism of competition between China and the US. The processes of competition include the actions and rhetoric of African leaders. We define a geopolitical context for the agency of political leaders and opinion-makers in Ghana and Zambia. The geopolitical context consists of the structure and dynamics of the world-economy; especially the competition to capture the newest round of innovations and the related need to establish supply chains of raw materials from peripheral countries. By analysing quotes from Ghanaian and Zambian elites we identify the possibility for geopolitical agency in the periphery that is constrained by, and largely maintains, China-US competition and the core-periphery hierarchy of the world-economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The globalisation of China's development strategy, from its origins as infrastructure diplomacy connecting its domestic west with its Central Asian periphery, into the transnational Belt and Road Initiative encompassing the periphery of the world system, epitomises the rapid evolution of a Chinese grand strategy of great economic and political ambition. The small state of Panama is a key node in the global trading system that can make an unexpectedly large contribution to China's national security and international influence. Accordingly, China's economic statecraft in Panama is not only opening up the Latin America and Caribbean markets to further Chinese commercial penetration, but is simultaneously expanding its political influence in this remotest part of the global South. China's is a two-track grand strategy positing to other nations a choice between a liberal internationalist co-prosperity and a zero-sum realist contest. This audacious approach relies on relational power amongst small states, especially semi-peripheral ones like Panama, to put China at the forefront of what is shaping up as a grand coalition of the global South collectively challenging American hegemony. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2015 earthquakes in Nepal killed more than 9,000 people, displaced millions of people and deeply affected the economy. The earthquakes and reconstructions processes also transformed Nepal into a complex terrain of geoeconomic accumulation and geopolitical manoeuvring, including major international capital flows, the promulgation of a new constitution, an economic blockade by India and the expansion of trade corridors with China. Building on critiques of 'disaster capitalism', we propose and mobilize the concept of 'geo-logics of power' to draw further attention to the materialities of geopolitical and geoeconomic processes shaping reconstruction in post-earthquake Nepal. Focusing on two trans-Himalayan corridors connecting Nepal and China, we argue that the Nepal experienced a particular form of disaster capitalism: one in which the geo-logics of power – including trans-Himalayan discourses, practices, and materialities – came to shape political and economic transformations of a country long portrayed as a 'buffer' state between Indian and China. More broadly, we suggest that geo-logics of power result from a combination of geopolitical and geoeconomic power dynamics informed by geological formations and associated socio-natural processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Transboundary flows of energy across Yunnan Province in China and to Southeast Asian states provide insight into the changing nature of borders and border areas. Rather than monolithic symbols of state sovereignty, China’s southwest borders in Yunnan can be more accurately characterised as zones of connectivity and exchange, serving a range of local, national and regional objectives. Energy production and distribution in and across Yunnan can be understood as functioning in a set of dynamic transnational processes that serve as economic and political bridges – increasing interaction and deepening regional integration – while also working to mitigate risk to China’s energy demands. In this article, energy projects in Yunnan and Southeast Asia demonstrate the ways border regions can respond to increasing globalisation, simultaneously strengthening national energy security while promoting regional interconnection and diplomacy. Thus, connections to and through a once peripheral region present an apparent contradiction: once rigid territorial borders are increasingly characterised by transboundary infrastructure development and exchanges of energy, capital and diplomacy, while promoting broader, diversified national energy security objectives – essentially strengthening national security through transnational energy projects. This article investigates how energy development works to shape Yunnan’s role as an “energy conduit,” while advancing both transnational and national geopolitical objectives, and thus, suggesting that these projects can be understood as trans-political in nature. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The purpose of this study is to investigate the importance of population and language for China’s Central Asian policy through soft power resources. This article will evaluate the steps China has taken since the disintegration of the USSR to remove the perception of threat felt by the peoples of the region. We will argue that China is trying to turn its population, which is seen as the biggest threat it poses, into an advantage for itself. Moreover, it will be pointed out that China is actively using its spiritual heritage to eliminate these negative perceptions and in this regard the objectives of Confucius schools will be assessed. The study will elaborate on the fact that China is using these schools and its population as important tools in expanding its area of influence in regional and international platforms. As a result of the study, it was revealed that although the soft power of China, which is popular in academic circles and with officials, was sometimes successful in practice, there were certain limitations in its population and language policies. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Over the past few decades, the rapid growth of China’s development co-operation with Africa has attracted worldwide attention. Some people assert that development co-operation in Africa has contributed to the general development of the continent; however, others, many of whom are scholars and Western politicians, dispute its influence on Africa and are suspicious of its real motives, noting its exploitation of natural resources and increasing market encroachment. This study will discuss the expansion of China’s development co-operation with African countries from the perspective of Sinocentrism, as there appears to be an absence of a superordinate concept or ideology that extensively encompasses and interconnects the diverse explications from existing studies. Henceforth, this research aims to contribute towards examining whether Sinocentrism could be a possible superordinate concept of existing studies. As such, it could be helpful in better understanding Chinese development co-operation in Africa, by examining China’s history and its recent path in Africa as well as its international relations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The merging of geopolitical and economic goals, known as geoeconomics, is becoming more and more frequently an important factor of state policies in the age of globalisation and the changing international order. The article offers an analysis of the EU-China relations seen within the increasingly valid geoeconomics perspective. It is focused on two case studies: armament embargo after 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and the Galileo system (a European system of satellite communication). The aforementioned cooperation has laid bare the weakness of European geopolitical thought. It has also demonstrated the supremacy of short-term economic goals of the European actors over strategic goals (both within the economic and the political spheres). In contrast with China, the EU does not possess a coherent geoeconomics strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article is a critical geopolitical analysis of Chinese media representations of the 5 July 2009 riots in Xinjiang, China. Significant events often define the geopolitical climate by creating a space for the construction of boundaries between identity categories and the appropriate norms for behaviour towards the Other. The post-riot reports framed the event through the prism of the global war on terror to justify a violent response to protect Chinese citizens from the perceived threat of the Other. After connecting theories of narratives, the event, and group making, the article identifies three representational tropes – the criminal, the terrorist, and the outside agitator – in Chinese documents that create boundaries between the identity categories Uyghur and Han and define how the Other should be treated. The three representation tropes of the Other in the aftermath of the 5 July riots simultaneously situate the protestors as outside Chinese society and perpetuate the claim of the superiority of Chinese culture and civilisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The proposed bridge between Chiang Khong and Houay Xay will form the remaining crucial link of the Asian Highway 3, connecting Bangkok to Kunming, a project highly anticipated in the Greater Mekong Subregion's (GMS) development. With China funding half the cost of the bridge, it signifies a strong player in the economic borderland. The article seeks to uncover the locals' thoughts and feelings of the bridge to raise awareness of ‘voices’ from the Thai-Lao border in relation to the further destinations the bridge will serve. The local perceptions of the proposed bridge are used to provide a form of comprehension of anticipatory cross-border geopolitical relations between the Thai-Lao border and China. Drawing on the concepts of critical geopolitics, anti-geopolitics and geoeconomics, it concludes by underscoring the need to listen to local perceptions at the Thai-Lao border as they signal potential ill-feelings that could jeopardise future cross-border geopolitical ties and trade. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's double-digit average growth in the last twenty years has built up manufacturing and industrial behemoths that helped move the country from an agrarian society into a major economic player in the global economy. This prosperous growth coupled with construction of urban infrastructures and the rapid adoption of profligate lifestyles has created dependency on energy sources, raw materials and natural resources that need to be secured to maintain commercial, economic, and social wheels turning. In failing to sustain growth and security, both of which are national priorities, the Chinese Communist Party faces ideological and political risks. As a result, China's global resources quest is taking it to faraway lands and its presence as well as its motives and mechanisms raises geopolitical issues around the globe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the mid-1990s, China's and Russia's strategic outlooks have gradually been converging. The two great powers have incrementally shed their mutual apprehensions and started a comprehensive and multifaceted cooperation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Simultaneously, as the rift between the US and Russia has opened up and the differences in their views on regional security in Eurasia have become even more evident, China's and Russia's quests for new models for regional security in Central Asia have gained ground. Enveloping the Central Asian states on issues of collective and energy security, both states are sternly against US dominance in international affairs. In this sense, they have initiated a new geopolitical script around Central Asia. As their mutual interests hold sway over US influence regionally, questions remain on whether specific interests are compatible, or harbour new rivalries. Chinese–Russian interaction in Central Asia reveals that there might be limits to the future expansion of their partnership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China, in its quest for a closer strategic partnership with Africa, has increasingly dynamic economic, political and diplomatic activities on the continent. Chinese leaders and strategists believe that China's historical experience and vision of economic development resonates powerfully with African counterparts and that the long-standing history of friendly political linkages and development co-operation offers a durable foundation for future partnership. Both in China and amongst some Western commentators a form of exceptionalism and generalisation regarding both China and Africa has been emerging. In this article instead we seek to develop theoretical tools for examining China as a geopolitical and geoeconomic actor that is both different and similar to other industrial powers intervening in Africa. This is premised on a political economy approach that ties together material interests with a deconstruction of the discursive or 'extra-economic' ways by which Chinese capitalism internationalises. From there we use this framework to analyse contemporary Chinese engagement in Africa. We examine the changing historical position of Africa within Beijing's foreign policy strategy and China's vision of the evolving international political system, looking in particular at China's bilateral and state-centric approach to working with African 'partners'. Chinese practice is uncomfortable and unfamiliar with the notion of 'development' as an independent policy field of the kind that emerged among Western nations in the course of the 1950s and increasingly China has come to be viewed as a 'rogue creditor' and a threat to the international aid industry. Rather than highlighting one strand of Chinese relations with African states (such as aid or governance) we propose here that it is necessary to critically reflect on the wider geopolitics of China-Africa relations (past and present) in order to understand how China is opening up new 'choices' and altering the playing field for African development for the first time since the neo-liberal turn of the 1980s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Chinese government and its companies have dramatically increased their presence in Africa in the last decade. There has been much media interest and commentary on the impacts of this engagement on governance in Africa, as it is often seen to be strengthening authoritarian states, such Sudan and Zimbabwe.1 However, Chinese actors are also engaging with more democratic states and spaces, such as Zambia. This article seeks to explore the impacts of increased Chinese engagement with Africa on governance through a comparative case study of two contrasting cases: Sudan and Zambia, using the concept of flexigemony. Contrary to popular perception, behaviour by Chinese actors has sometimes been a moderating force in Sudan, while provoking violence in Zambia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The global competition between states for position in the uncertain future of the life sciences brings a new dynamic to the intersection between geopolitics and the global knowledge economy. Armed with distinctive approaches to innovation in new health technologies, the emerging economies of China and India are determined to challenge the traditional hegemony of the developed countries in areas such as regenerative medicine where the promised biotechnology future is said to lie. Yet although the political belief that there is a future value for regenerative medicine is global, the precise nature of that future when measured in terms of the path of the science, the market demand, the cultural response, the commercialisation process and its associated business models is obscure. Drawing on theories of the competition and developmental state, I analyse the factors that shape a state's response to the promise of regenerative medicine, the strategies of 'speculative innovation' that may be adopted in pursuit of geopolitical advantage in this uncertain field, and the adaptive qualities necessary for a state's effective competition in an age of globalisation. This analysis is then applied to the emerging economies of China and India to assess their geopolitical strategies in regenerative medicine innovation, their current position in this part of the knowledge bioeconomy, and their likely impact on its continuing globalisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The simultaneous rise of China and now India is a fundamental factor for understanding the twenty-first century. In rising as Great Powers, a relative term, they are coming up against each other across Asia and its surrounding waters. Traditional geopolitical models, Mackinder, Spykman and Mahan point to their spatial politics around Central Asia, South Asia, Pacific Asia and the Indian Ocean. Actual spatial settings are combined with perceived spatial outlooks. These powerful neighbouring states seek to continue rising, and constrain the other where necessary through mutual encirclement and alliances/proxies. This type of 'Great Game' is evident in the military-security, diplomatic and economic areas. Globalisation has not replaced regionalism, nor has geoeconomics replaced geopolitics. The stakes are high as is their need for securing access to energy resources for their economics-led rise to Great Power status. Some cooperation is evident, in line with IR liberalism-functionalism. However, geopolitical IR realism and security dilemma perceptions still shape much of their actions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]