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Background: Corruption exists at all levels of our global society and is a potential threat to food security, food safety, equity, and social justice. However, there is a knowledge gap in the role and impact of corruption within the context of the global food system. We aimed to systematically review empirical literature focused on corruption in the global food system to examine how it is characterized, the actors involved, its potential impacts, and the solutions that have been proposed to address corruption in the food system. Methods: We used a systematic scoping review methodology. Terms combining corruption and the food system were searched in Scopus, PubMed, Web of Science, PsycInfo and Econlit, in October 2021. Two screeners applied a priori selection criteria to screen the articles at the title and abstract and full-text levels. Data was extracted into a charting form and thematically synthesized to describe the types of corruption in the food system, the actors involved, how corruption impacts the food system, and potential solutions. Sankey diagrams and narrative summaries were developed to summarize the included studies and findings. Results: From the 238 included records, five main types of corruption were identified in the global food system: bureaucratic corruption, fraud, bribery, organized crime, and corporate political activity. These different types of corruption spanned across various food system areas, from policy and governance structures to food environments, and involved a wide range of actors. More powerful actors like those in public and private sectors tended to instigate corruption in the food system, while community members and primary producers tended to be impacted by it. The impacts of corruption were mostly negative and corruption was found to undermine food system governance and regulatory structures; threaten health, safety, and food security; and lead or contribute to environmental degradation, economic loss, erosion of trust, social inequities, and decreased agricultural productivity. While solution-oriented literature was limited, the essential role of strong governance, use of technology and predictive modelling methods to improve detection of corruption, and organizational approaches to problem solving were identified. Conclusion: Our review findings provide researchers and policymakers with a comprehensive overview of corruption in the global food system, providing insights to inform a more holistic approach to addressing the issue. Addressing corruption in the food system is an essential element of supporting the transition to a more healthy, equitable and sustainable global food system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: A major challenge to transforming food systems to promote human health and sustainable development is the global rise in the manufacture and consumption of ultra-processed foods (UPFs). A key driver of this dietary transition is the globalization of UPF corporations, and their organized corporate political activity (CPA) intended to counter opposition and block government regulation. UPF industry CPA and the corporate interest groups who lobby on their behalf have been well described at the national level, however, at the global level, this network has not been systematically characterized. This study aims to map, analyse, and describe this network, and discuss the implications for global food policy action on UPFs, global food governance (GFG), and food systems transformation. Methods: We conducted a network analysis of the declared interest group memberships of the world's leading UPF corporations, extracted from web sources, company reports, and relevant academic and grey literature. Data on the characteristics of these interest groups were further extracted for analysis, including year founded, level, type, and headquarter location. Results: We identified 268 interest groups affiliated with the UPF industry. The UPF manufacturers Nestlé (n = 171), The Coca-Cola Company (n = 147), Unilever (n = 142), PepsiCo (n = 138), and Danone (n = 113) had the greatest number of memberships, indicating strong centrality in coordinating the network. We found that this network operates at all levels, yet key actors now predominantly coordinate globally through multistakeholder channels in GFG. The most common interest group types were sustainability/corporate social responsibility/multistakeholder initiatives, followed by branding and advertising, and food manufacturing and retail. Most corporate interest groups are headquartered where they can access powerful government and GFG decision-makers, nearly one-third in Washington DC and Brussels, and the rest in capital cities of major national markets for UPFs. Conclusions: The UPF industry, and especially its leading corporations, coordinate a global network of interest groups spanning multiple levels, jurisdictions, and governance spaces. This represents a major structural feature of global food and health governance systems, which arguably poses major challenges for actions to attenuate the harms of UPFs, and to realising of healthy and sustainable food systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: The exploitative marketing of commercial milk formula (CMF) reduces breastfeeding, and harms child and maternal health globally. Yet forty years after the International Code of Marketing of Breast-Milk Substitutes (The Code) was adopted by WHO member states, many countries are still to fully implement its provisions into national law. Furthermore, despite The Code, worldwide CMF markets have markedly expanded. In this paper, we adopt Brazil as a case study to understand the power of the baby food industry's marketing and corporate political activity, and how this influences the country's 'first-food system' in ways that promote and sustain CMF consumption. Methods: We used a case study design, drawing data from from documents and key informant interviews (N = 10). Results: Breastfeeding rates plummeted in Brazil to a historic low in the 1970s. A resurgence in breastfeeding from the mid-1980s onwards reflected strengthening political commitment for a national policy framework and breastfeeding protection law, resulting in-turn, from collective actions by breastfeeding coalitions, advocates, and mothers. Yet more recently, improvements in breastfeeding have plateaued in Brazil, while the industry grew CMF sales in Brazil by 750% between 2006 and 20. As regulations tightened, the industry has more aggressively promoted CMF for older infants and young children, as well as specialised formulas. The baby food industry is empowered through association with powerful industry groups, and employs lobbyists with good access to policymakers. The industry has captured the pediatric profession in Brazil through its long-standing association with the Brazilian Society of Pediatrics. Conclusion: Brazil illustrates how the baby food industry uses marketing and political activity to promote and sustain CMF markets, to the detriment of breastfeeding. Our results demonstrate that this industry requires much greater scrutiny by regulators. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: There has been remarkable tobacco control progress in many places around the globe. Tobacco industry interference (TII) has been identified as the most significant barrier to further implementation of the World Health Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC). Civil society has been recognised as a key actor in countering TII. While TII has been extensively studied for several decades now, there is little research that focuses on counteractions to limit it and their effectiveness to do so. This scoping review seeks to map the peer-reviewed literature on civil society's activities of countering TII in policymaking to identify common counterstrategies and assess their effectiveness. Methods: Data sources: We searched Embase, IBSS, JSTOR, PubMed, Science Direct, Scopus and Web of Science using the following terms: ("Tobacco industry" OR "Tobacco compan*") AND. ("corporate political activity" OR "CPA" OR "lobbying" OR "interference") AND ("advoca*" OR "counter*" OR "activi*"), without time or language restrictions. Study selection: Our selection criteria included peer-reviewed studies that were written in English, German, or Spanish that drew on primary data and/or legal and policy documents and reported at least one specific example of civil society members or organisations countering tobacco industry action-based strategies. Data extraction: Advocates' counterstrategies were analysed inductively and countered industry strategies were analysed using the Policy Dystopia Model (PDM). Perceptions of effectiveness of countering attempts were analysed descriptively. Results: We found five common counterstrategies among 30 included papers covering five WHO regions; 1. Exposing industry conduct and false claims; 2. Accessing decision-makers; 3. Generating and using evidence; 4. Filing a complaint or taking legal action; 5. Mobilising coalition and potential supporters. These counterstrategies were used to work against a wide range of industry strategies, which are captured by five action-based strategies described in the PDM (Coalition Management, Information Management, Direct Access and Influence, Litigation, Reputation Management). While some studies reported the outcome of the countering activities, their impact remained largely underexplored. Conclusion: The review shows that peer-reviewed literature documenting how civil society actors counter TII is scarce. It suggests that advocates employ a range of strategies to counter TII in its different forms and use them flexibly. More work is needed to better understand the effects of their actions. This could stimulate discussions about, and facilitate learning from, past experiences and help to further enhance advocates' capacity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Evidence is mounting that the ultra - processed food industry seeks to influence food and nutrition policies in ways that support market growth and protect against regulatory threats, often at the expense of public health. However, few studies have explored how this occurs in lower - middle income countries. We aimed to explore if and how the ultra - processed food industry seeks to influence food- and nutrition - related policy processes in the Philippines, a lower - middle income country in East Asia. Methods: Semi - structured key informant interviews were conducted with ten representatives from the Philippines government and non - government organisations closely involved with nutrition policy making in the Philippines. Interview schedules and data analysis were guided by the policy dystopia model, which we used to identify the instrumental and discursive strategies used by corporate actors to influence policy outcomes. Results: Informants were of the view that ultra - processed food companies in the Philippines sought to delay, prevent, water - down and circumvent implementation of globally recommended food and nutrition policies by engaging in a range of strategies. Discursive strategies included various tactics in which globally recommended policies were framed as being ineffective or highlighting potential unintended negative impacts. Instrumental strategies included: directly engaging with policymakers; promoting policies, such as industry - led codes and practices, as substitutes for mandatory regulations; presenting evidence and data that industry has generated themselves; and offering gifts and financial incentives to government individuals and agencies. Conclusions: In the Philippines, the ultra - processed food industry engaged in overt activities designed to influence food and nutrition policy processes in their favour. A range of measures to minimise industry influence on policy processes should be introduced, to ensure that implemented food and nutrition policies align with best practice recommendations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: The commercial determinants of health include a range of practices to promote business interests, often at the expense of public health. Corporate political practices, such as lobbying and campaign donations, are used to influence policy makers and foster a political and regulatory environment conducive to business interests. Despite recognition of their public health importance, thus far there are relatively few efforts to systematically monitor commercial political practices. Methods: A pilot study was conducted to explore the feasibility of systematically monitoring two political practices – lobbying and political contributions – for 'harmful industries' (alcohol, gambling, ultra-processed food and tobacco industries) in Australia. Potential data sources were reviewed to compare data availability and detail. Two publicly available datasets were selected for the pilot: ministerial diaries for New South Wales and annual donor filings from the Australian Electoral Commission. Google Data Studio was used to analyse and visualise findings. Results: The pilot study resulted in the creation of several interactive charts and dashboards that supported analysis and interrogation of the data. These charts helped to easily convey the volume of lobbying and political donations, as well as changes over time. For example, we found that between July 2014 and December 2020, NSW ministers had 20,607 meetings, of which 634 meetings were with harmful industries. And between 1998 and 2020, a total of $576,519,472 disclosed donations were made to political parties and other entities, of which $35,823,937 were from harmful industries. Conclusions: Opportunities to develop a program to monitor commercial political practices face several challenges including access barriers arising from poor availability and detail of data, technical barriers arising from the format of data disclosures and coding challenges arising from the diverse nature of the commercial sector. Despite these challenges, our pilot study demonstrates the potential to implement a monitoring program and to expand its scope to other commercial determinants of health. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) are the leading cause of death globally, and the World Health Organization (WHO) has recommended a comprehensive policy package for their prevention and control. However, implementing robust, best-practice policies remains a global challenge. In Fiji, despite political commitment to reducing the health and economic costs of NCDs, prevalence of diabetes and cardiovascular disease remain the highest in the region. The objective of this study was to describe the political and policy context for preventing diet-related NCDs in Fiji and policy alignment with WHO recommendations and global targets. We used a case study methodology and conducted (1) semi-structured key informant interviews with stakeholders relevant to diet-related NCD policy in Fiji (n = 18), (2) documentary policy analysis using policy theoretical frameworks (n = 11), (3) documentary stakeholder analysis (n = 7), and (4) corporate political activity analysis of Fiji's food and beverage industry (n = 12). Data were sourced through publicly available documents on government websites, internet searches and via in-country colleagues and analysed thematically.Results: Opportunities to strengthen and scale-up NCD policies in Fiji in line with WHO recommendations included (1) strengthening multisectoral policy engagement, (2) ensuring a nutrition- and health-in-all policy approach, (3) using a whole-of-society approach to tighten political action across sectors, and (4) identifying and countering food industry influence.Conclusion: Diet-related NCD policy in Fiji will be strengthened with clearly defined partner roles, responsibilities and accountability mechanisms, clear budget allocation and strong institutional governance structures that can support and counter industry influence. Such initiatives will be needed to reduce the NCD burden in Fiji. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: The political activities of industry stakeholders must be understood to safeguard the development and implementation of effective public health policies.Methods: A quantitative descriptive study was performed using data from Canada's Registry of Lobbyists to examine the frequency and governmental target of lobbying that occurred between various types of stakeholders (i.e., industry versus non-industry) and designated public office holders (DPOH) regarding Health Canada's Healthy Eating Strategy, from September/2016 to January/2021. Initiatives of interest were revisions to Canada's Food Guide, changes to the nutritional quality of the food supply, front-of-pack nutrition labelling and restrictions on food marketing to children.Results: The majority of registrants (88%), and corporations and organizations (90%) represented in lobbying registrations had industry ties. Industry-affiliated stakeholders were responsible for 86% of communications with DPOH, interacting more frequently with DPOH of all ranks, compared to non-industry stakeholders. Most organizations and corporations explicitly registered to lobby on the topic of marketing to children (60%), followed by Canada's Food Guide (48%), front-of-pack nutrition labelling (44%), and the nutritional quality of the food supply (23%). The food and beverage industry, particularly the dairy industry, was the most active, accounting for the greatest number of lobbying registrations and communications, followed by the media and communication industry.Conclusions: Results suggest a strategic advantage of industry stakeholders in influencing Canadian policymakers. While some safeguards have been put in place, increased transparency would allow for a better understanding of industry discourse and help protect public health interests during the policy development process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: There is evidence that food industry actors try to shape science on nutrition and physical activity. But they are also involved in influencing the principles of scientific integrity. Our research objective was to study the extent of that involvement, with a case study of ILSI as a key actor in that space. We conducted a qualitative document analysis, triangulating data from an existing scoping review, publicly available information, internal industry documents, and existing freedom of information requests.Results: Food companies have joined forces through ILSI to shape the development of scientific integrity principles. These activities started in 2007, in direct response to the growing criticism of the food industry's funding of research. ILSI first built a niche literature on COI in food science and nutrition at the individual and study levels. Because the literature was scarce on that topic, these publications were used and cited in ILSI's and others' further work on COI, scientific integrity, and PPP, beyond the fields of nutrition and food science. In the past few years, ILSI started to shape the very principles of scientific integrity then and to propose that government agencies, professional associations, non-for-profits, and others, adopt these principles. In the process, ILSI built a reputation in the scientific integrity space. ILSI's work on scientific integrity ignores the risks of accepting corporate funding and fails to provide guidelines to protect from these risks.Conclusions: The activities developed by ILSI on scientific integrity principles are part of a broader set of political practices of industry actors to influence public health policy, research, and practice. It is important to learn about and counter these practices as they risk shaping scientific standards to suit the industry's interests rather than public health ones. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: In 2016, the South African government became the first in the African region to announce the introduction of an SSB tax based on sugar content as a public health measure to reduce obesity. This tax was introduced against the backdrop of South Africa having a large sugar production and SSB manufacturing industry, as well as very high unemployment rates. The introduction of fiscal measures, such as a SSB tax, has been met with well-coordinated and funded opposition in other countries.Methods: The aim of this study is to describe and analyse the arguments and strategies utilised by industry during policymaking processes to oppose regulatory actions in LMIC. This study analyses arguments and strategies used by the beverage and related industries during the public consultation phase of the process to adopt the South African SSB tax.Results: Industry opposition to the SSB tax was comprehensive and employed several tactics. First, industry underscored its economic importance and the potential job losses and other economic harms that may arise from the tax. This argument was well-received by policymakers, and similar to industry tactics employed in other middle income countries like Mexico. Second, industry discussed self-regulation and voluntary measures as a form of policy substitution, which mirrors industry responses in the US, the Caribbean and Latin America. Third, industry misused or disputed evidence to undermine the perceived efficacy of the tax. Finally, considerations for small business and their ability to compete with multi-national corporations were a unique feature of industry response.Conclusions: Industry opposition followed both general trends, and also introduced nuanced and context-specific arguments. The industry response experienced in South Africa can be instructive for other countries contemplating the introduction of similar measures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: In the business literature, the term "corporate political activity" (CPA) refers to the political strategies undertaken by corporations to protect or expend their markets, by influencing, directly or indirectly, the policy process. There is evidence that food industry actors use such political practices, which poses a significant threat to public health. Our study objective was to identify the political practices of the food industry in Chile.Results: In Chile, food industry actors supported community initiatives, particularly those targeted at children and those focused on environmental sustainability. Food industry actors also funded research through prizes, scholarships, and by supporting scientific events. Food industry actors lobbied against the development and implementation of a front-of-pack nutrition labelling policy, including with support from the Ministries of Economy, Agriculture and Foreign Affairs. Food industry actors, for example, claimed that there would be unintended negative consequences for society and the economy, and that the policy would breach trade agreements. The same arguments were used against a proposed tax increase on sugar-sweetened beverages. Food industry actors stressed their crucial role in the Chilean economy and claimed to be part of the solution in the prevention and control of obesity, with a particular focus on their efforts to reformulate food products, and their support of physical activity initiatives. Interviewees noted that the political influence of the food industry is often facilitated by the neo-liberal and market-driven economy of Chile. Nevertheless, this system was questioned through social protests that started in the country during data collection.Conclusions: In Chile, food industry actors used numerous action- and argument-based CPA practices which may influence public health policy, research, and practice. Despite strong influence from the food industry, Chile adopted a front-of-pack nutrition labelling policy. While the country has some measures in place to manage the interactions between government officials or public health professionals, and the industry, there is still a need to develop robust mechanisms to address undue influence from corporations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Non-communicable diseases (NCDs) are the leading cause of mortality in Fiji, a middle-income country in the Pacific. Some food products processed sold and marketed by the food industry are major contributors to the NCD epidemic, and the food industry is widely identified as having strong economic and political power. However, little research has been undertaken on the attempts by the food industry to influence public health-related policies and programs in its favour. The "corporate political activity" (CPA) of the food industry includes six strategies (information and messaging; financial incentives; constituency building; legal strategies; policy substitution; opposition fragmentation and destabilisation). For this study, we aimed to gain a detailed understanding of the CPA strategies and practices of major food industry actors in Fiji, interpreted through a public health lens.Methods and Results: We implemented a systematic approach to monitor the CPA of the food industry in Fiji for three months. It consisted of document analysis of relevant publicly available information. In parallel, we conducted semi-structured interviews with 10 stakeholders involved in diet- and/or public health-related issues in Fiji. Both components of the study were thematically analysed. We found evidence that the food industry adopted a diverse range of strategies in an attempt to influence public policy in Fiji, with all six CPA strategies identified. Participants identified that there is a substantial risk that the widespread CPA of the food industry could undermine efforts to address NCDs in Fiji.Conclusions: Despite limited public disclosure of information, such as data related to food industry donations to political parties and lobbying, we were able to identify many CPA practices used by the food industry in Fiji. Greater transparency from the food industry and the government would help strengthen efforts to increase their accountability and support NCD prevention. In other low- and middle-income countries, it is likely that a systematic document analysis approach would also need to be supplemented with key informant interviews to gain insight into this important influence on NCD prevention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Transnational tobacco companies (TTCs) may respond to processes of regional trade integration both by acting politically to influence policy and by reorganising their own operations. The Central American Common Market (CACM) was reinvigorated in the 1990s, reflecting processes of regional trade liberalisation in Latin America and globally. This study aimed to ascertain how British American Tobacco (BAT), which dominated the markets of the CACM, sought to influence policy towards it by member country governments and how the CACM process impacted upon BAT's operations.Methods: The study analysed internal tobacco industry documents released as a result of litigation in the US and available from the online Legacy Tobacco Documents Library at http://legacy.library.ucsf.edu/. Documents were retrieved by searching the BAT collection using key terms in an iterative process. Analysis was based on an interpretive approach involving a process of attempting to understand the meanings of individual documents and relating these to other documents in the set, identifying the central themes of documents and clusters of documents, contextualising the documentary data, and choosing representative material in order to present findings.Results: Utilising its multinational character, BAT was able to act in a coordinated way across the member countries of the CACM to influence tariffs and taxes to its advantage. Documents demonstrate a high degree of access to governments and officials. The company conducted a coordinated, and largely successful, attempt to keep external tariff rates for cigarettes high and to reduce external tariffs for key inputs, whilst also influencing the harmonisation of excise taxes between countries. Protected by these high external tariffs, it reorganised its own operations to take advantage of regional economies of scale. In direct contradiction to arguments presented to CACM governments that affording the tobacco industry protection via high cigarette tariffs would safeguard employment, the company's regional reorganisation involved the loss of hundreds of jobs.Conclusions: Regional integration organisations and their member states should be aware of the capacity of TTCs to act in a coordinated transnational manner to influence policy in their own interests, and coordinate their own public health and tax policies in a similarly effective way. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: In Colombia, public health policies to improve food environments, including front-of-pack nutrition labelling and marketing restrictions for unhealthy products, are currently under development. Opposition to these policies by the food industry is currently delaying and weakening these efforts. This opposition is commonly known as 'corporate political activity' (CPA) and includes instrumental (action-based) strategies and discursive (argument-based) strategies. Our aim was to identify the CPA of the food industry in Colombia.Methods: We conducted a document analysis of information available in the public domain published between January-July 2019. We triangulated this data with interviews with 17 key informants. We used a deductive approach to data analysis, based on an existing framework for the CPA of the food industry.Results: We identified 275 occurrences of CPA through our analysis of publicly available information. There were 197 examples of instrumental strategies and 138 examples of discursive strategies (these categories are not mutually exclusive, 60 examples belong to both categories). Interview participants also shared information about the CPA in the country. The industry used its discursive strategies to portray the industry in a 'better light', demonstrating its efforts in improving food environments and its role in the economic development of the country. The food industry was involved in several community programmes, including through public private initiatives. The industry also captured the media and tried to influence the science on nutrition and non-communicable diseases. Food industry actors were highly prominent in the policy sphere, through their lobbying, close relationships with high ranking officials and their support for self-regulation in the country.Conclusions: The proximity between the industry, government and the media is particularly evident and remains largely unquestioned in Colombia. The influence of vulnerable populations in communities and feeling of insecurity by public health advocates is also worrisome. In Colombia, the CPA of the food industry has the potential to weaken and delay efforts to develop and implement public health policies that could improve the healthiness of food environments. It is urgent that mechanisms to prevent and manage the influence of the food industry are developed in the country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: The UN system's shift towards multistakeholder governance, now embedded in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), invites a broad range of actors, including the private sector, to the policymaking table. Although the tobacco industry is formally excluded from engagement, this approach provides opportunities for other unhealthy commodity industries to influence the World Health Organization's (WHO's) non-communicable disease (NCD) agenda. Focusing on the food industry, this research maps which actors engaged with WHO consultations, and critically examines actors' policy and governance preferences as well as the framing they employ to promote these preferences in the global context.Methods: All written responses from food industry actors to publicly available NCD-relevant WHO consultations held between September 2015 and September 2018 were identified, totalling forty-five responses across five consultations. A qualitative frame analysis was conducted to identify policy positions expressed by respondents, as well as arguments and frames used to do so.Results: Though no individual companies responded to the consultations, the majority of participating business associations had some of the largest multinational food corporations as members. Respondents overarchingly promoted non-statutory approaches and opposed statutory regulation and conflict of interest safeguards. To this purpose, they framed the food industry as a legitimate and necessary partner in policymaking, differentiating themselves from the tobacco industry and referencing a history of successful collaboration, while also invoking multistakeholder norms and good governance principles to portray collaboration as required. Respondents contrasted this with the limits of WHO's mandate, portraying it as out of step with the SDGs and framing NCD decision-making as a matter of national sovereignty.Conclusion: We observed that the UN's call for partnerships to support the SDGs is invoked to defend corporate access to NCD policy. This highlights the need for more cautious approaches which are mindful of the commercial determinants of health. Systematic opposition to regulation and to governance approaches which may compromise commercial actors' insider role in global health by food industry actors shown here, and the strategic use of the Sustainable Development agenda to this purpose, raises questions about the value of collaboration from the perspective of international health agencies such as WHO. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Different terms are described in the literature that refer to commercial determinants as drivers of ill-health. The aim of the present review was to provide an overview of the commercial determinants of health, through a review of the literature on this subject. The review was conducted in December 2019 and updated in February 2020. Searches were conducted from peer-reviewed scientific articles, commentaries, books, and books chapters, with no restriction in their publication dates and languages.Main Body: The commercial determinants of health cover three areas. First, they relate to unhealthy commodities that are contributing to ill-health. Secondly, they include business, market and political practices that are harmful to health and used to sell these commodities and secure a favourable policy environment. Finally, they include the global drivers of ill-health, such as market-driven economies and globalisation, that have facilitated the use of such harmful practices.Short Conclusion: The discussion on the commercial determinants of health offers a unique opportunity to shift the dominant paradigm in public health, where individual behaviours are considered to be driven by inadequate environments. Ill-health, damages to the environment, and health and social inequalities, might be better understood through a commercial determinant lens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Sugar sweetened beverages (SSB) are a major source of sugar in the diet. Although trends in consumption vary across regions, in many countries, particularly LMICs, their consumption continues to increase. In response, a growing number of governments have introduced a tax on SSBs. SSB manufacturers have opposed such taxes, disputing the role that SSBs play in diet-related diseases and the effectiveness of SSB taxation, and alleging major economic impacts. Given the importance of evidence to effective regulation of products harmful to human health, we scrutinised industry submissions to the South African government's consultation on a proposed SSB tax and examined their use of evidence.Results: Corporate submissions were underpinned by several strategies involving the misrepresentation of evidence. First, references were used in a misleading way, providing false support for key claims. Second, raw data, which represented a pliable, alternative evidence base to peer reviewed studies, was misused to dispute both the premise of targeting sugar for special attention and the impact of SSB taxes on SSB consumption. Third, purposively selected evidence was used in conjunction with other techniques, such as selective quoting from studies and omitting important qualifying information, to promote an alternative evidential narrative to that supported by the weight of peer-reviewed research. Fourth, a range of mutually enforcing techniques that inflated the effects of SSB taxation on jobs, public revenue generation, and gross domestic product, was used to exaggerate the economic impact of the tax. This "hyperbolic accounting" included rounding up figures in original sources, double counting, and skipping steps in economic modelling.Conclusions: Our research raises fundamental questions concerning the bona fides of industry information in the context of government efforts to combat diet-related diseases. The beverage industry's claims against SSB taxation rest on a complex interplay of techniques, that appear to be grounded in evidence, but which do not observe widely accepted approaches to the use of either scientific or economic evidence. These techniques are similar, but not identical, to those used by tobacco companies and highlight the problems of introducing evidence-based policies aimed at managing the market environment for unhealthful commodities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: The food industry can influence individual and population level food consumption behaviours, shape public preferences and interfere with government policy on obesity prevention and NCDs. This paper identifies the Corporate Political Activity (CPA) of major food companies in Thailand which relate to obesity and NCDs.Methods: Using the INFORMAS framework to classify CPA, we reviewed publicly available information by 12 food companies between August 2011 and July 2016 in order to identify, analyse and classify the CPA contents. Semi-structured interviews with 17 key stakeholders who are experts in this field supplemented evidence from the document review. Data analysis applied a thematic approach.Results: Food industry in Thailand applied a variety of CPA strategies and practices. The two most common strategies were constituency building and information and messaging.Conclusion: The diverse range of CPA strategies which influence government policy and public opinion can undermine efforts to prevent obesity and diet-related NCDs. We recommend systematic monitoring of their CPA, strengthening mechanisms to hold the food industry accountable for their role in protecting and promoting the nutrition and health of the population, introducing mandatory registration of lobbyists, mandatory disclosure of political donations, and stronger oversight of conflicts of interest among the government actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]