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Background: The attainment of global health security goals and universal health coverage will remain a mirage unless African health systems are adequately funded to improve resilience to public health emergencies. The COVID-19 pandemic exposed the global inequity in accessing medical countermeasures, leaving African countries far behind. As we anticipate the next pandemic, improving investments in health systems to adequately finance pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response (PPPR) promptly, ensuring equity and access to medical countermeasures, is crucial. In this article, we analyze the African and global pandemic financing initiatives and put ways forward for policymakers and the global health community to consider. Methods: This article is based on a rapid literature review and desk review of various PPPR financing mechanisms in Africa and globally. Consultation of leaders and experts in the area and scrutinization of various related meeting reports and decisions have been carried out. Main text: The African Union (AU) has demonstrated various innovative financing mechanisms to mitigate the impacts of public health emergencies in the continent. To improve equal access to the COVID-19 medical countermeasures, the AU launched Africa Medical Supplies Platform (AMSP) and Africa Vaccine Acquisition Trust (AVAT). These financing initiatives were instrumental in mitigating the impacts of COVID-19 and their lessons can be capitalized as we make efforts for PPPR. The COVID-19 Response Fund, subsequently converted into the African Epidemics Fund (AEF), is another innovative financing mechanism to ensure sustainable and self-reliant PPPR efforts. The global initiatives for financing PPPR include the Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility (PEF) and the Pandemic Fund. The PEF was criticized for its inadequacy in building resilient health systems, primarily because the fund ignored the prevention and preparedness items. The Pandemic Fund is also being criticized for its suboptimal emphasis on the response aspect of the pandemic and non-inclusive governance structure. Conclusions: To ensure optimal financing for PPPR, we call upon the global health community and decision-makers to focus on the harmonization of financing efforts for PPPR, make regional financing mechanisms central to global PPPR financing efforts, and ensure the inclusivity of international finance governance systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: The International Health Regulations (IHR) are a legally binding instrument designed to improve Global Health Security by limiting the cross boarder spread of health risks. All 196 signatories to the IHR (2005) are required to report progress towards IHR core capacity implementation through an annual multi-sectoral self-assessment process known as the State Parties Self-Assessment Annual Reporting (SPAR). This mandatory process sits alongside the voluntary, external, peer-reviewed Joint External Evaluations (JEE) as two core components of the IHR monitoring and evaluation framework. JEEs are intended to occur once every 4-5 years following a voluntary request from the member state. This means that interim monitoring of IHR core capacity compliance, can be challenging and additional data sources are required. The outputs of the SPAR process represent one such source. Although the JEE and SPAR tools are intended to be complimentary, there has been no publicly available mapping of JEE indicators to SPAR indicators in order to inform progress on IHR compliance.Results: This paper mapped JEE indicators to SPAR indicators and found a high level of correlation suggesting the SPAR process offers a method for countries and technical assistance programmes to monitor progress on IHR compliance and identify gaps in between JEE visits. However, coverage was not complete, and several gaps were identified most notably in antimicrobial resistance (AMR) and vaccinations.Conclusion: Enhancing alignment between JEE and SPAR could offer a more consistent and complete way of assessing compliance with IHR. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A challenging concept to teach, few combined courses on epidemic-related global health diplomacy and security exist, and no known courses are currently available that have been exclusively designed for African nationals. In response, the University of California, San Francisco's Center for Global Health Delivery, Diplomacy and Economics (CGHDDE) developed and delivered a workshop for LMIC learners to better understand how politics, policy, finance, governance and security coalesce to influence global health goals and outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: The importance of integrating the social sciences in epidemic preparedness and response has become a common feature of infectious disease policy and practice debates. However to date, this integration remains inadequate, fragmented and under-funded, with limited reach and small initial investments. Based on data collected prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, in this paper we analysed the variety of knowledge, infrastructure and funding gaps that hinder the full integration of the social sciences in epidemics and present a strategic framework for addressing them.Methods: Senior social scientists with expertise in public health emergencies facilitated expert deliberations, and conducted 75 key informant interviews, a consultation with 20 expert social scientists from Africa, Asia and Europe, 2 focus groups and a literature review of 128 identified high-priority peer reviewed articles. We also analysed 56 interviews from the Ebola 100 project, collected just after the West African Ebola epidemic. Analysis was conducted on gaps and recommendations. These were inductively classified according to various themes during two group prioritization exercises. The project was conducted between February and May 2019. Findings from the report were used to inform strategic prioritization of global investments in social science capacities for health emergencies.Findings: Our analysis consolidated 12 knowledge and infrastructure gaps and 38 recommendations from an initial list of 600 gaps and 220 recommendations. In developing our framework, we clustered these into three areas: 1) Recommendations to improve core social science response capacities, including investments in: human resources within response agencies; the creation of social science data analysis capacities at field and global level; mechanisms for operationalizing knowledge; and a set of rapid deployment infrastructures; 2) Recommendations to strengthen applied and basic social sciences, including the need to: better define the social science agenda and core competencies; support innovative interdisciplinary science; make concerted investments in developing field ready tools and building the evidence-base; and develop codes of conduct; and 3) Recommendations for a supportive social science ecosystem, including: the essential foundational investments in institutional development; training and capacity building; awareness-raising activities with allied disciplines; and lastly, support for a community of practice.Interpretation: Comprehensively integrating social science into the epidemic preparedness and response architecture demands multifaceted investments on par with allied disciplines, such as epidemiology and virology. Building core capacities and competencies should occur at multiple levels, grounded in country-led capacity building. Social science should not be a parallel system, nor should it be "siloed" into risk communication and community engagement. Rather, it should be integrated across existing systems and networks, and deploy interdisciplinary knowledge "transversally" across all preparedness and response sectors and pillars. Future work should update this framework to account for the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the institutional landscape. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Since the declaration of the 10th Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreak in DRC on 1st Aug 2018, several neighboring countries have been developing and implementing preparedness efforts to prevent EVD cross-border transmission to enable timely detection, investigation, and response in the event of a confirmed EVD outbreak in the country. We describe Uganda's experience in EVD preparedness.Results: On 4 August 2018, the Uganda Ministry of Health (MoH) activated the Public Health Emergency Operations Centre (PHEOC) and the National Task Force (NTF) for public health emergencies to plan, guide, and coordinate EVD preparedness in the country. The NTF selected an Incident Management Team (IMT), constituting a National Rapid Response Team (NRRT) that supported activation of the District Task Forces (DTFs) and District Rapid Response Teams (DRRTs) that jointly assessed levels of preparedness in 30 designated high-risk districts representing category 1 (20 districts) and category 2 (10 districts). The MoH, with technical guidance from the World Health Organisation (WHO), led EVD preparedness activities and worked together with other ministries and partner organisations to enhance community-based surveillance systems, develop and disseminate risk communication messages, engage communities, reinforce EVD screening and infection prevention measures at Points of Entry (PoEs) and in high-risk health facilities, construct and equip EVD isolation and treatment units, and establish coordination and procurement mechanisms.Conclusion: As of 31 May 2019, there was no confirmed case of EVD as Uganda has continued to make significant and verifiable progress in EVD preparedness. There is a need to sustain these efforts, not only in EVD preparedness but also across the entire spectrum of a multi-hazard framework. These efforts strengthen country capacity and compel the country to avail resources for preparedness and management of incidents at the source while effectively cutting costs of using a "fire-fighting" approach during public health emergencies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: This study aims to evaluate the gap between countries' self-evaluation and external evaluation regarding core capacity of infectious disease control required by International Health Regulations and the influence factors of the gap.Methods: We collected countries' self-evaluated scores (International Health Regulations Monitoring tool, IHRMT) of 2016 and 2017, and external evaluation scores (Joint External Evaluation, JEE) from WHO website on 4rd and 27rd November, 2018. There were 127 and 163 countries with IHRMT scores in 2016 and in 2017, and 74 countries with JEE scores included in the analysis. The gap between countries' self-evaluation and external evaluation was represented by the difference between condensed IHR scores and JEE. Civil liberties (CL) scores were collected as indicators of the transparency of each country. The Human Development Index (HDI) and data indicating the density of physicians and nurses (HWD) were collected to reflect countries' development and health workforce statuses. Then, chi-square test and logistic regression were performed to determine the correlation between the gap of IHRMT and JEE, and civil liberties, human development, and health workforce status.Results: Countries' self-evaluation scores significantly decreased from 2016 to 2017. Countries' external evaluation scores are consistently 1 to 1.5 lower than self-evaluation scores. There were significantly more countries with high HDI status, high CL status and high HWD status in groups with bigger gap between IHRMT and JEE. And countries with higher HDI status presented a higher risk of having bigger gap between countries' self and external scores (OR = 3.181).Conclusion: Our study result indicated that countries' transparency represented by CL status do play a role in the gap between IHR and JEE scores. But HDI status is the key factor which significantly associated with the gap. The main reason for the gap in the current world is the different interpretation of evaluation of high HDI countries, though low CL countries tended to over-scored their capacity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Under the International Health Regulations (2005) [IHR (2005)] Monitoring and Evaluation Framework, after action reviews (AAR) and simulation exercises (SimEx) are two critical components which measure the functionality of a country's health emergency preparedness and response under a "real-life" event or simulated situation. The objective of this study was to describe the AAR and SimEx supported by the World Health Organization (WHO) globally in 2016-2019.Methods: In 2016-2019, WHO supported 63 AAR and 117 SimEx, of which 42 (66.7%) AAR reports and 56 (47.9%) SimEx reports were available. We extracted key information from these reports and created two central databases for AAR and SimEx, respectively. We conducted descriptive analysis and linked the findings according to the 13 IHR (2005) core capacities.Results: Among the 42 AAR and 56 SimEx available reports, AAR and SimEx were most commonly conducted in the WHO African Region (AAR: n = 32, 76.2%; SimEx: n = 32, 52.5%). The most common public health events reviewed or tested in AAR and SimEx, respectively, were epidemics and pandemics (AAR: n = 38, 90.5%; SimEx: n = 46, 82.1%). For AAR, 10 (76.9%) of the 13 IHR core capacities were reviewed at least once, with no AAR conducted for food safety, chemical events, and radiation emergencies, among the reports available. For SimEx, all 13 (100.0%) IHR capacities were tested at least once. For AAR, the most commonly reviewed IHR core capacities were health services provision (n = 41, 97.6%), risk communication (n = 39, 92.9%), national health emergency framework (n = 39, 92.9%), surveillance (n = 37, 88.1%) and laboratory (n = 35, 83.3%). For SimEx, the most commonly tested IHR core capacity were national health emergency framework (n = 56, 91.1%), followed by risk communication (n = 48, 85.7%), IHR coordination and national IHR focal point functions (n = 45, 80.4%), surveillance (n = 31, 55.4%), and health service provision (n = 29, 51.8%). For AAR, the median timeframe between the end of the event and AAR was 125 days (range = 25-399 days).Conclusions: WHO has recently published guidance for the planning, execution, and follow-up of AAR and SimEx. Through the guidance and the simplified reporting format provided, we hope to see more countries conduct AAR and SimEx and standardization in their methodology, practice, reporting and follow-up. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]