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With the accelerating urbanization in China, the right-of-use transfer (RUT) of rural collectively owned construction land provides a promising means of increasing the efficiency of rural land use and promoting urban and rural integration. There are various ways of doing this and no universal mode of RUT that fits all areas because of the divergent cultural characteristics and geographical features of different regions and locations in China and decisions need to be made on a case-by-case basis. This paper proposes an analytical framework to help in such decision making. Firstly, the literature concerning the RUT of collective construction land is reviewed and six typical pilot reform areas are studied. Secondly, a theoretical analytical framework for the choice of RUT mode is developed based on the findings of the literature review and the experiences of the pilot reform areas. Thirdly, Zhoushan City's new urban district is used as a case study to demonstrate and test the framework, and an appropriate RUT mechanism is suggested. The analytical framework can serve as a guideline for local governments to make decisions on the form of collective construction land RUT throughout China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the level of urbanization in China now exceeding 50%, its collective rural land system is under increasing pressure, creating conditions in which there is increasing conflict between the efficient use of land for agricultural purposes and its retention as security for the rural population. This paper first examines the fundamental nature of China's collective land system by analyzing the collectivization history of China, then provides a comprehensive appraisal of the strengths and weaknesses of the collective land system's role in history and the challenges it faces in modern times. The main changes needed for the current collective system are identified as (1) the establishment of a new transfer mechanism for potential collective construction land, (2) the completion of land rights verification and consolidation work, and (3) the endowment of villagers with more rights to enjoy the distribution of land incremental value. The paper's main contribution is to question the relevance of collective rural land system in contemporary China, where a shift is now taking place from one of pure economic development to one involving more social concerns, and propose potential viable amendments to integrate the need for both perspectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The inverted-U relationship between urbanization and urban-rural inequality has been relatively widely observed and investigated. However, most are confined to the context-specific empirical evidence and a certain measure of inequality. Furthermore, the discussions concerning the mechanism involved deserve focus and extension, particularly with the goal of new-type urbanization in China. This study aims to provide an analytical framework of the distribution effect of urbanization. It includes mathematical deductions based on the Gini coefficient and Theil's index, and empirical evidence relating to both the nexus and mechanisms across Chinese provinces based on panel models and mediating effect models. The key findings are threefold. Firstly, the inverted U urbanization-inequality nexus has been substantiated both theoretically and empirically, and most Chinese provinces have experienced the 'decoupling' between urbanization and urban-rural income inequality. Secondly, such relationships are regionally heterogeneous in China, which is less significant in the northeast region but quite significant in the eastern and western regions. Finally, urbanization can play a key role in narrowing the income gap between the urban and rural areas through increasing fiscal expenditure on urban-rural affairs and reducing that on science, education, culture, and health. Nevertheless, the mediating effect of local fiscal expenditure on agricultural issues is relatively insignificant. These conclusions not only provide both theoretical and empirical support for the urbanization-inequality Kuznets curve, but also specify and expand insights into the mediating role of the local fiscal expenditure structure in the pursuit of China's new-type urbanization. • The inverted U urbanization-inequality nexus is substantiated theoretically and empirically. • Most Chinese provinces have experienced the 'decoupling' between urbanization and urban-rural income inequality. • The inverted U urbanization-inequality nexus is regionally heterogeneous. • Increasing fiscal expenditure on urban-rural affairs and reducing that on science, education, culture, and health have mediating effects involved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China has experienced considerable economic growth since 1978, which was accompanied by unprecedented growth in urbanization and, more recently, by associated rising urban housing and land banking issues. One such issue is that of land hoarding – where real estate developers purchase land to hold unused in the rising market for a future lucrative sale, often several years later. This practice is outlawed in China, where land use is controlled by increasingly strengthened Government policies and inspectors. Despite this, land hoarding continues apace, with the main culprits being the developers and inspectors working subversively. This resembles a game between two players – the inspector and the developer – which provides the setting for this paper in developing an evolutionary game theory model to provide insights into dealing with the dilemmas faced by the players. The logic and dilemma of land banking strategy and illegal land banking issues are analysed, along with the land inspector's role from a game theory perspective by determining the replication dynamic mechanism and evolutionary stable strategies under the various conditions that the players face. The major factors influencing the actions of land inspectors, on the other hand, are the costs of inspection, no matter if it is strict or indolent, conflict costs, and income and penalties from corruption. From this, it is shown that, when the net loss for corruption (income from corruption minus the penalties for corruption and cost of strict inspections) is less than the cost of strict inspections, the final evolutionary stable strategy of the inspectors is to carry out indolent inspections. Then, whether penalising developers for hoarding is severe or not, the evolutionary strategy for the developer is to hoard. The implications for land use control mechanisms and associated developer-inspector actions and counteractions are then examined in the light of the model's properties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Implementing international projects in a foreign country is a high risk business activity. Research on this subject has tended to emphasize traditional risks. However, an emerging new type of “social risk” in the globalization era has been ignored. With the rapid urbanization progress in China, many international contractors have entered the Chinese construction market due to the huge demand in the market. However, the differences in the social, economic and cultural backgrounds among the international contractors and their partners have led to difficulties and occasional disputes among various participants. In particular, they are presented with various social risks in a new environment. This paper identifies the key social risk factors associated with international contractors from a questionnaire survey and case study. The social risks highlighted from the questionnaire survey include “local protectionism (for local projects)”, “risk of poor social relations between various parties in the local region”, “permit or license risk in dealing with land use and construction planning issues due to policy changes” and “dispute risk with local construction labor”. Several risk response strategies for international contractors are also illustrated by the case study from China. Suggestions developed in the case study can provide useful references to those international contractors who have entered or are planning to operate their businesses in China. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

In recent years, China has undergone an extremely rapid phase of urbanization, which has caused many acute problems between urban and rural areas. This paper identifies three categories of social, economic and environmental conflict, and investigates their significance according to the views of two different populations using a questionnaire survey and interviews. Using fuzzy set theory, the key causes of urban-rural conflict related to urbanization in China are identified. The differences in urban and rural people's perceptions of these key factors are discussed and the factors underlying these perceptions are analyzed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Urban and rural areas are two different yet coexisting systems. Developing countries such as China have been undergoing a rapid urbanization process. However, urbanization often causes competition for land resources between urban and rural areas, and such competition can result in conflicts between the two systems. To identify the risk factors of urban-rural conflict, this paper utilizes a research framework including content analysis, brainstorming and semi-structured interviews. The results indicated that the main risk factors between urban and rural areas comprise conflicts in property, resources and development. Suggestions are proposed to reduce the conflicts occurring between urban and rural areas during the urbanization process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]