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Recent policy discussions by the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) regarding physician prices in the traditional fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare Program reflect movement toward a market pricing model. Earlier objectives such as sustainable levels of spending have given way to concerns over the relationship between fees and actual costs, access to care, and the importance of demand and supply in local markets. An important objective in other policy settings is economically efficient distribution of services. We explain the meaning of economic efficiency for Medicare physician prices and explore difficulties one might encounter in pursuing economic efficiency, as well as the cost of not pursuing it.

We estimate the relation between enhanced benefits offered by the Medicare+Choice (M+C) plan in 1999 and a measure of risk selection based on inpatient encounter data. Higher risks are attracted to plans that offer outpatient drug coverage. The risk score increases by 2.2 percent for drug coverage with an annual limit less than $800 and by 3.6 percent for coverage with a limit more than $800. However, some benefits such as dental coverage were related to favorable risk selection. If M+C plans competed on the basis of benefits and premiums, as they would if they could give untaxed premium rebates, benefits that attract high risks would be underprovided.

Premium rebates allow beneficiaries who choose more efficient Medicare options to receive cash rebates, rather than extra benefits. That simple idea has been controversial. Without fanfare, however, premium rebates have become a key area of agreement in the debate on Medicare reform. Moreover, in legislation in late 2000, it became official policy: Medicare+Choice (M+C) plans will be allowed to offer rebates beginning in 2003. This article explores the economic rationale for premium rebates, provides a historical perspective on the rebate debate, discusses some of the implementation issues that need to be addressed before 2003, and reviews the implications of premium rebates for current legislative proposals for Medicare reform.

Using 1993 and 1994 data, the authors examine whether beneficiaries who enroll in a Medicare health maintenance organization (HMO), including those enrolling for only a short period of time, have lower expenditures than continuous fee-for-service (FFS) beneficiaries the year prior to enrollment. We also test whether biased selection varies by the level of HMO market penetration and the rate of market-share growth. We find favorable selection associated with enrollment into Medicare HMOs, which declines as market share increases but does not disappear. Among short-term enrollees, we find unfavorable selection, however, selection bias was not sensitive to market characteristics.

This study compares expenditures on health care services for enrollees in a social health maintenance organization (S/HMO) and a Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA)-risk Medicare health maintenance organization (HMO). In addition to the traditional Medicare services covered by the TEFRA HMO, the S/HMO provided a long-term care (LTC) benefit and case management services for chronic illness. There do not appear to be any overall savings associated with S/HMO membership, including any savings from substitution of S/HMO-specific services for other, traditional services covered by both the S/HMO and the TEFRA HMO.

Using econometric models of endogenous sample selection, we examine possible payment bias to Medicare Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA) risk health maintenance organizations (HMOs) in the Twin Cities in 1988. We do not find statistically significant evidence of favorable HMO selection. In fact, the sign of the selection term indicates adverse selection into HMOs. This finding is interesting, in view of the fact that three of the five risk HMOs in the study have since converted to non-risk contracts.