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One of William Lane Craig's key arguments for the finitude of the past is the Successive Addition Argument (SAA). Malpass (2021) has recently developed a novel challenge to the SAA, utilising a thought experiment from the work of Fred Dretske, which is meant to show that it is possible to count to infinity, to argue that there is a counterexample to the SAA's second premise. In this paper, I contend that the Malpass‐Dretske counterexample should not worry advocates of the SAA. First, I argue that one objection Malpass considers—the Potential Infinite Objection—reveals an interesting fact: the SAA's second premise is unnecessarily strong and can be weakened whilst still yielding the same conclusion. Second, I show how another one of the objections considered by Malpass—the Accumulation Objection—is successful, provided some clarification to the SAA's premises. The upshot of both analyses is that we generate two 'new' Successive Addition arguments that not only move the dialectic forward, but shed light on deeper assumptions and motivating intuitions concerning the Kalām. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Ma Dexin (1794–1874), the prestigious Sino‐Muslim philosopher, bridged Sufi ideas and Neo‐Confucian philosophy by his handling of the concept of the Great Mandate. For Ma, the Sufi idea of 'the Muhammadan Reality', namely the reality of the perfect human, could be understood through an adoption and exploration of an ontological and cosmological interpretation of the Confucian concepts 'sage' and 'ming'. The paper explains how Ma departed from the Neo‐Confucian conceptual framework by holding that the Non‐Ultimate had more ontological significance than the Supreme Ultimate. It is proposed that Ma's difference from the Neo‐Confucians on that point explains his identification of the Great Mandate with the Non‐Ultimate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: My goal in this paper is to draw productively on Meister Eckhart's concept of the 'no‐thing' in order to illuminate Hegel's ontotheological account of both human and divine kenosis. I advance the view that just as divine kenosis is understood as the outpouring of the divine which includes the death of Christ in its economic activity, human kenosis also requires an engagement with death, namely, a spiritual death to the finite. It is via this species of death which is a becoming 'no‐thing' that the reconciliation between the human and the divine is disclosed as a unity that relies on the shared identity of the divine and the human while simultaneously respecting the integrity of both. Indeed, it is in and through their parallel activity of kenosis that finite and infinite being achieve their respective transcendence by necessarily engaging with the being of the other. Hence, Hegel's ontotheological work is not reducible to sheer immanentism as some scholars suggest, but instead upholds the genuine transcendence of the divine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Plantinga‐type ontological argument may be tersely represented as follows: (1) If a maximally great being (MGB) is possible, then a MGB exists; (2) a MGB is possible; (3) therefore, a MGB exists. The key premise in this type of ontological argument is the possibility‐premise, namely, that it is possible that a MGB exists. But why affirm the possibility‐premise? Proponents of the argument could claim that they have a strong modal intuition that the possibility‐premise is true. Unfortunately, critics could likewise claim that they have a strong modal intuition that it is possible that a MGB does not exist or that it is possible that a semi‐maximally great being exists, with these premises implying that a MGB does not exist. In this paper, I argue that, in light of this objection to the possibility‐premise, the Plantinga‐type ontological argument is difficult to defend. I then, however, offer a suggestion as to how one may argue for the existence of a MGB without defending the possibility‐premise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores to solve a hard metaphysical problem for contemporary social ontology by turning to medieval theology and solve a problem for medieval theology by turning to social ontology. Topics include examines exotic as it may seem, the connection between the two has been noted before and in his review of an edited volume on social ontology, Wolfgang Grassl wondered why one avenue has been totally neglected from which insights may be derived.

Interreligious dialogue and conversion are two contentious foci for understanding how religion operates. An interpretation of George Lindbeck serves as a starting point for discussion in this paper. The dominant reading is that Lindbeck claims that traditions absorb the world. Religious traditions are isolated, and the one with a greater capacity to assimilate others' concerns emerges the strongest – implying what is called exclusivism. My proposal is that a different reading of Lindbeck is possible; I am not so much questioning Lindbeck as highlighting another aspect of his oeuvre. If grammar, framework and structure – and not propositional first‐order ontological contents – are given first place, dialogue and conversion appear differently. Questions must be raised, however; isn't it true that there is always some content and substance – even if hidden or disguised? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although St. Thomas Aquinas holds that the transcendentals are convertible with being, one may question whether they all follow upon the metaphysical principles of a creature in the same way. Aquinas raises the question when he says that creatures are one by essence but good only by being. This paper examines the ground of truth according to Aquinas, considering his distinction between types of truth as well as his distinguishing kinds of knowers. To advance this investigation the essay compares truth and goodness; it also includes a discussion of unity. Clearly there is a close parallel between goodness and ‘the truth of a thing’, but must the truth of the intellect – truth in the primary sense – be grounded in the extramental being of a creature? This paper argues that, for Aquinas, human knowledge of composite beings is attained through encounters with their real instances and is reflected in necessarily true yet nonanalytic statements about these creatures, statements that can be explained by St.Thomas's theory of predication, to which the theory of an influential contemporary thinker is strikingly similar. God's knowledge of finite essences, and hence truth concerning them, does not assume the actual existence of their instantiations from all eternity, but it does assume their real existence at some time. The requirement of real existence for the human mode of knowing, and, as explained, for divine knowing, underscores the value of finite being and thus harmonizes with Aquinas's claims that composite beings, as what they are, possess being more truly in themselves than as in the mind of God, and they are known properly by God only when grasped as actually existent particulars. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

James K. A. Smith argues that the ontology of participation associated with Radical Orthodoxy is incompatible with a Christian affirmation of the intrinsic being and goodness of creatures. In response, he proposes a Leibnizian view in which things are endowed with the innate dynamism of 'force'. Creatures have a certain depth of being, and are intrinsically good, just because they each have an inner virtuality that they bring into expression. Such force is said to be a metaphysical component of the agent. In this paper it is asked whether John Milbank's ontology of participation can be defended by distinguishing between two senses of being a subject. Perhaps it is possible for a creature to bring into expression what is an infused 'alien' gift rather than a metaphysical component - to be expressive subject, but not ontic subject, for divine power. However, while this distinction promises to make sense of the reception of an indwelling 'other' in grace, knowledge and love, neither proper substance nor proper existence can be received in this way. A creature must be the ontic subject for its being, after all. Still, divine being might proceed from God as radical indwelling gift, as non-ontic ground for ontic being. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the twentieth century one interpretative perspective is curiously and strikingly absent: spatiality of narrative. Philosophical thought saw fundamental ontology as founded on temporality with space as decoration. Johannine inquiry has tended to follow in philosophy's temporal footsteps. However, it is plausible to assume that New Testament writers were spatially oriented while modern interpreters have been ensconced in temporal consciousness. Furthermore, as anthropology has long recognized, conceptions of space and place are central to any culture's sense of self. The undue hermeneutic privileging of linearity and causality may have forced biblical texts into a temporal mode of reading that their original authors may not have intended. In understanding biblical worlds it is necessary to again explore spatiality. This essay will introduce textured spatiality as it applies to John 9. It will briefly review temporal thought and consciousness and explain how visual imagery is an essential component to the transmission and preservation of tradition. Textuality will also be used to tell the tale of the man born blind. Using the nature of Shabbat as a pivot, and a narrative juxtaposition of two contrasting Sabbath spaces, the paper will point to a possible Urcarnivalesque element in the chapter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on classical accounts of the transcendentals hold that unity is convertible with being, along with the true and the good. Topics include considered that St. Thomas Aquinas speaks also of transcendental multitude that is a somewhat surprising addition, for one wonders, at least at first glance, that both unity and multiplicity could be found to be convertible with being.

This paper explores both the striking similarities and also the differences between Jonathan Edwards and Nicolas Malebranche’s philosophical views on the Holy Trinity and, in particular, the ways in which they both gave important roles to specific Persons of the Trinity in the various different branches of their respective metaphysical systems—ontological, epistemological and ethical. It is shown that Edwards and Malebranche were in very close agreement on ontological questions pertaining to the Trinity, both with respect to the internal, triune nature of the divine substance (characterising the Three Persons as the divine power, as the consubstantial idea of God which was generated as He eternally reflected on Himself, and as the mutual love which proceeded between the Father and this idea), and also with respect to the various roles these Three Persons played in the creation of the world. In epistemology, Malebranche postulated an illuminating union between the mind of man and the divine Word, insisting on an absolutely direct involvement of the Second Person in all human cognition, both intellectual and sensible. On this point Edwards did differ, endorsing instead an empiricist epistemology which left no room for such a direct union with the Word. However, when it came to ethics, Edwards and Malebranche both gave the Third Person an utterly central role, postulating much the same kind of union as Malebranche alone had postulated in the epistemological case, only now between the will of man and the Holy Spirit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the way in which Western metaphysics influences thinking and being. It discusses the Enlightenment and critique of Western philosophy, with topics including ontological problem, approach to common law principles, totality and infinity. Works by philosophers including Emmanuel Levinas, Desmond Manderson and Arne Naess, are discussed.

The article offers the author's arguments regarding the usage of German philosopher Martin Heidegger's book "Contributions to Philosophy" in the Pauline meontology informed by Lutheran irony of sola fide vis-à-vis the Mosaic Law. Topics discussed by the author include irony and Lutheran ontology, the appropriation of Heidegger in the sola fide doctrine of theologist Martin Luther King, and the sense or irony based on the philosophy of philosopher Soren Kierkegaard.

The article discusses the performative views of theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer. It explores the philosophical-theological basis of Bonhoeffer for such performative sensibilities in his work "Act and Being," where he criticized liberal theology for its failure to prove its relevance in Germany in the 1920s and 1930s. It says that Bonhoeffer inhabits philosophical concepts in theology to risk the questions of ontology, suggesting his openness to address problems between the two.

An essay on the ontology and interpretation of set theory in the works of Alain Badiou is presented. It states that the philosophy of Badiou is creative but argues with ontology and mathematics. It provides arguments and disapproval on the ontological atheism of Badiou and offers metaphysical interest in systematic theology. Meanwhile, it relates the German mathematician Georg Cantor who developed the set theory and left foundation on the mathematical advances of the twentieth century.

An essay is presented on two texts written by Soren Kierkegaard. It examines development of the inward self and of outward social formation which are dependent on one another. It informs that the works of Kierkegaard are based on the vision of social reality which is related to inward self. It mentions that Kierkegaard has developed the religious ontology in which God represents pure possibility.

Discusses the theological significance of subjectivity. Question on the possibility for an infinite and perfect being to come to know what it is like to be a finite and imperfect being; Ontological gulf between God and finite creatures; Concept of empiricism by David Blumenfeld; Torin Alter's proposal of three ways in which God could know ungodlike states without God having to have them; Traditional understanding of divine omniscience; Limits posed by the future free choices of individuals.