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This paper seeks to clarify the proximate end. A distinction is made between the definition of an act and the identification of an act. The principle of objectified circumstances ( POC) is postulated which, without expanding beyond the proximate end, gives due weight to both the perspective of the acting person and the context within which an act occurs. POC is used to help discern the object contained within the proximate end. It is applied to the issues of euthanasia, lying, mutilation, and the controversy between Martin Rhonheimer and Janet Smith concerning the use of condoms for HIV protection. The challenge of angelism is addressed. The paper argues that the object, located exclusively in the proximate end, can be understood in a way that is sensitive to both traditionalist and proportionalist schools of thought. POC opens up an avenue of thought for fresh dialogue concerning the identification of the moral object. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many students who sign up for undergraduate‐level philosophy arrive with the expectation that moral philosophy is concerned with how one should act in the concrete and familiar situations of everyday life. Yet moral philosophers are often motivated by an ideal of neutrality, and adopt a detached perspective to achieve a scientific view of the competing moral theories. To concretise the points of disagreement they present highly specific examples that are abstracted from daily reality. There is something odd about the image of morality that comes into view. What kind of guidance about how to act in concrete and familiar situations can this form of theorising bring about? This paper examines Iris Murdoch's account of moral perception as an alternative starting point. Murdoch offers a perspective that is conceptually prior to the separation of thought from action, one that addresses the agent on the level of perception. While accounts of moral perception are often criticized for proposing a complacent moral theory that is inherently conservative, I argue that Murdoch's account offers a radical – or tragic – form of perfectionism. While moral philosophy cannot provide sufficient reasons to act, Murdoch shows that it can, like art, make us practical, capable of acting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores to solve a hard metaphysical problem for contemporary social ontology by turning to medieval theology and solve a problem for medieval theology by turning to social ontology. Topics include examines exotic as it may seem, the connection between the two has been noted before and in his review of an edited volume on social ontology, Wolfgang Grassl wondered why one avenue has been totally neglected from which insights may be derived.

The article focuses on the puzzling incident of Exodus 4:24-26, which interrupts the main narrative to describe a mysterious exchange between Zipporah, YHWH and an enigmatic male figure. Topics include examines without any explanation the text states that YHWH met him and sought to kill him and considered within the narrative context, the pronoun him could apply to either Moses or his son.

This paper argues that the impasse in Catholic moral theology around the role of the object in determining the moral species of the act was rooted in shared misunderstandings of Thomas Aquinas's analysis of human action. The paper describes Thomas's account of moral action centering upon his claim in ST I- II.18.6 that the object is twofold. This distinction was often missed on both sides of the proportionalist debates. The paper argues that understanding the moral object as twofold upholds the essential elements of both sides of the proportionalist debates, holding them in their rightful balance. Moreover such an understanding offers an essential framework for Catholic theologians attending to the essential connection between acts and agents in accounts of morality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I offer a possible approach to accomplishing Benedict's goal proposed in his Regensburg address. 1 I take his goal to be twofold. First, we must expand our concept of reason beyond the privileged position of scientific empiricism and philosophical reasoning, both of which form what I have called the Secular Magisterium, put in place as the dominant intellectual force by the Enlightenment. Second, the motivation for expanding our concept of reason is for the purpose of greater dialogue across cultures, across religions and across academic disciplines. Since I take Benedict's goal to be twofold, my paper will address these issues in two parts, the second building from the first. In the first section, I will revisit the counter-Enlightenment thinking of some well known, yet significantly marginalized voices, with the goal of hearing them again and reviving their critique to inform our own. By the end of this section, I will offer what I take to be a counter-Enlightenment approach to knowing our world by means of an expanded concept of reason. In the second section, I will address what I take to be some of the more intellectual challenges to the possibilities for conversation across cultures, religions, and disciplines. It is my goal to show how an embodied version of the counter-Enlightenment approach I offer in the first section can allow for genuine conversation that not only provides opportunities to better know our conversation partners, but also offers the possibility of honest persuasion in which the other sees reality differently and considers this way better. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the most important questions about divine revelation is the question – what is the nature of divine revelation? This conceptual question even precedes such epistemological questions as whether we can know that a divine revelation occurred, or whether divine revelation can produce religious knowledge. In this paper, I argue for a particular analysis of the concept of divine revelation. Key to my proposal is that ‘to reveal’ is a term of epistemic appraisal: if a subject revealed a proposition to a receiver, then this implies that the receiver actually accepted the information offered. I will end this paper by investigating what the consequences of my proposal are for answering the two epistemological questions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I argue that 'classical liberalism' does not sanction any easy permissiveness about suicide and active euthanasia. I will use liberal arguments to argue that the distinction between active and passive euthanasia is real and that assisted suicide is, at the very least, deeply troubling when viewed from an authentic liberal perspective. The usual argument for active euthanasia is a utilitarian, not a liberal argument, as recent calls to eliminate the conscientious objection rights of doctors who refuse participation in such procedures plainly demonstrate. The paper focuses on arguments in the public sphere (such as those articulated by James Rachels). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Generally speaking, just war theory (JWT) holds that there are two just causes for war: self‐defence and 'other‐defence'. The most common type of the latter is popularly known as 'humanitarian intervention'. There is debate, however, as to whether these can serve as just causes for preventive war. Those who subscribe to JWT tend to be unified in treating so‐called preventive war with a high degree of suspicion on the grounds that it fails to satisfy conventional criteria for jus ad bello; – particularly the just cause and last resort criteria. Francisco di Vitoria held that the only just cause for war was 'a wrong received', which renders impossible any justification for preventive war. There are assumptions implicit in recent military practice, however – most notably, the US‐led invasion of Iraq in 2003 – that challenge this ban on preventive war. Interestingly, both supporters and critics attempt to justify their views through the broader logic of JWT; viz., through a conception of what is good for both political communities and individuals, and through a legitimate defence of these goods. Supporters point to situations where so‐called rogue states represent 'grave and imminent risk' of committing acts of aggression as grounds that justify preventive war; critics argue that to attack another political community on the basis of crimes not yet committed is a breach of the very rights JWT was created to defend. The advocate of preventive war does not appreciate important aspects concerning the morality of war. In the ongoing tension between Iran and The United States and her allies – if the rhetoric is to be believed – I am asked to tolerate a threat to my security and liberty, and to risk suffering aggression in defence of the rights of the antagonistic, but not yet aggressive, state. The crucial question is how such tolerance and risk fit in with the logic of just war: at what point, if any, does the risk of being attacked become great enough to justify declaring war in anticipation? In this paper I highlight some of the theoretical and practical difficulties in determining what counts as a grave and imminent threat, focusing especially on the complicated case of 'imminence' in the face of so‐called 'Weapons of Mass Destruction'. Secondly, I will argue that not only is the notion of preventive war inconsistent with the defence of the rights of political communities that JWT requires; it is also forbidden by the proportionality requirement of jus ad bellum. A risk of being subjected to aggression is the price for global peace. Whilst political communities can do much to prevent aggression and prepare themselves in case it occurs, the conditions for just war require that this prevention and preparation stop short of declaring war. We must live with a certain degree of risk in this area. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper contains a discussion of the idea of using what could loosely be called an ‘aesthetic attitude’ (stemming largely from Kantian notions of disinterest and explicitly articulated by such writers in the 20th century as Edward Bullough and Jerome Stolnitz) in the context of the encounter between religions. The ‘problem’ that is addressed is formulated as an attempt to find a space in which the participation of those with committed faith positions (e.g. conservative evangelicals) in sympathetic and empathetic meeting with other faiths can be facilitated. To this end, the paper is critical of the use of spirituality (or inter-spirituality) as an oft-suggested mode by which religions meet and ‘converse’ in depth-encounters. That is, it is argued that the language of inter-spirituality that is employed by some interfaith writers often betrays liberal assumptions that are unsettling for more committed religious persons. Thus, it is suggested that by changing the language of encounter from ‘inter-spirituality’ to a more aesthetic (or playful) mode of discourse, one is creating a different, but nonetheless experientially recognisable, space of empathetic meeting and encounter that might be deemed ‘safer’. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is commonly presumed that the earliest recoverable writing of the New Zealand born Philosopher Arthur N. Prior is that published in the Australasian Journal of Philosophy and Psychology in 1937. Yet Prior was an extremely active writer as both an undergraduate and as a recent graduate, in a variety of publications. This paper recovers the unknown early Prior and discusses the importance of neo–orthodox Christian theology upon the life and thought of the early Arthur Prior. During the 1930s Prior was primarily a theologian–philosopher and in these early writings there can be discerned important influences upon his thinking. This paper traces Prior’s writings from an early unpublished manuscript through his theological writings and the development of his neo–orthodox thinking to a point where preparatory work for his influential 1942 article ‘Can Religion be Discussed?’ occurs. It ends where Prior bibliographies begin, with a theologian–philosopher remaking himself as a philosopher theologian. Yet to understand the later Prior we need to understand his early life, thought and writing. This paper is an attempt to recover Prior’s early life and note his influences and talent in areas apart from tense logic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The outcomes of a market economy depend on human behaviour within business organisations and this, in turn, is closely related to our conceptions of organisational culture and corporate social responsibility. Markets cannot be seen as ‘autonomous' as is often suggested, but behaviour within markets is affected by the cultural environment within which business organisations operate. The first insight of this paper is the importance of culture in the economic sphere in influencing individual decision making. Secondly, we point out that culture itself is shaped bythe decisions of human persons: culture is not exogenous. Thirdly, we argue that an important aspect of a Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) policy within an organisation should be the promotion of virtuous behaviour in order to help create a culture of virtue in the business sector more generally. It is concluded that both individuals and companies have a responsibility to help foster a culture of virtue within the business environment in which they operate which has‘spillovers' outside the organisation itself. A practical application of the ideas to the concept of‘whistle-blowing' is proposed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Interreligious dialogue and conversion are two contentious foci for understanding how religion operates. An interpretation of George Lindbeck serves as a starting point for discussion in this paper. The dominant reading is that Lindbeck claims that traditions absorb the world. Religious traditions are isolated, and the one with a greater capacity to assimilate others' concerns emerges the strongest – implying what is called exclusivism. My proposal is that a different reading of Lindbeck is possible; I am not so much questioning Lindbeck as highlighting another aspect of his oeuvre. If grammar, framework and structure – and not propositional first‐order ontological contents – are given first place, dialogue and conversion appear differently. Questions must be raised, however; isn't it true that there is always some content and substance – even if hidden or disguised? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

William Lane Craig has recently formulated a set of arguments that aim to undermine the rationality of Islamic theism. This paper will consider seven arguments that Craig deploys against Muslim belief. The seven arguments can be summarised as follows: (1) the Quran makes an egregious historical error by denying the crucifixion of Jesus; (2) the Quran contains legendary stories about Jesus; (3) the Quran is mistaken about the self‐understanding of Jesus; (4) the Quran misunderstands the Trinity; (5) the Islamic concept of God is morally deficient; (6) the Islamic concept of God is less plausible than a Trinitarian concept of God; and (7) the Muslim doctrine of salvation compromises God's holiness and proves to be unattainable. I contend that Craig's arguments, when examined closely, do not undermine the rationality of Islamic theism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My goal in this paper is to demonstrate that Milbank and Ẑiẑek's respective criticisms of Hegel's redescription of the Christian narrative are flawed because both identify Hegelian spirit as fully immanent. This misreading has enormous consequences, for it suggests that Hegel did not find a way to adequately support his project of reconciling the finite and the infinite. By contrast, I suggest that if Hegel's philosophy of religion is understood as both immanent and transcendent, or more precisely, as advancing a theory of mutual immanence, the charges of nihilism and atheism cannot be upheld. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the argument that scientific thinkers who embrace a religious tradition can promote intellectual integration between religion and science rather than fragmented discourse. It is argued that God's Word as an event and the concept of structural directedness, an organized movement toward a future that does not demand a consciously intended end, may be helpful in understanding God's actions in an indeterminant way. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to note the convergence between two critical realist philosophies of science, namely, that of Roy Bhaskar and Bernard Lonergan with regard to the intelligibility of experimental activity. Bhaskar very explicitly argues that 'differentiation implies stratification.' The idea is that because the situations produced in laboratories are special instances of closure (like the solar system in the open universe, they do not represent the general case) the significance of experimental activity is that it brings about regularities with a view to understanding scientific laws at a deeper level. This is to say, when experiment is properly understood, the weaknesses of empiricism are exposed. Although he is not as explicit, Lonergan also has recourse to this argument. The parallels between Bhaskar and Lonergan are not surprising given the Aristotelian heritage that is manifest in their common concern for a realist ontology. Nevertheless, some differences between the two emerge, for example, in Lonergan's concern with the development of statistical science, and as well, a firm commitment to substance (rather than to powers, simply). Some attention to the significance of experimental activity for the debate surrounding realism is explored; it is suggested that Lonergan has something to offer in the subsequent conversation associated with Maxwell, van Fraassen, Hacking and Cartwright. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reviews the book "Explorations in Ancient and Modern Philosophy," by Myles F. Burnyeat.

The article presents the discussion on explicit atheism being a philosophical position where belief in God being irrational following from Cantorian set theory.

In 1845, John Henry Cardinal Newman wrote a treatise describing the development of Christian doctrine. Since then, his ideas have been challenged, in particular by Protestant theologians who have argued that the development of doctrine does not progress in either a smooth or linear path. In the philosophy of science, Thomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions has challenged the idea that science is purely driven by objective and rational motives. In this paper, Kuhn's ideas are applied to the development of Christian doctrine. Drawing from historical examples, it is shown that Kuhn's contextual approach to describe the progress of science aids in understanding the way doctrines themselves develop. Although this is not the first time that theology and Kuhn have conversed, the notion of doctrinal development being systematically and methodically shown to have parallels with Kuhn's ideas is novel. Ultimately, this work is another important step in building interdisciplinary links between science and theology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At a 2011 meeting of the Society of Christian Philosophers, N. T. Wright offered four reasons for rejecting the existence of soul. This was surprising, as many Christian philosophers had previously taken Wright's defense of a disembodied intermediate state as a defense of a substance dualist view of the soul. In this paper, I offer responses to each of Wright's objections, demonstrating that Wright's arguments fail to undermine substance dualism. In so doing, I expose how popular arguments against dualism fail, such as (1) dualism is merely an unwarranted influence of Greek culture on Christianity, and (2) substance dualism is merely a soul‐of‐the‐gaps hypothesis. Moreover, I demonstrate that Wright himself has offered a powerful reason for adopting substance dualism in his previous works. In conclusion I offer a view that explains why the human soul needs a resurrected body. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rapid rise of varieties of historicism in Germany, during the mid- to late-nineteenth century, and subsequently in England and America, resulted in a radical transformation of the principles of coherence and methods of analysis within biblical studies.1This paper will argue that the foundational 'subject/object' metaphysics of historicism has been subverted over the past century. For this reason, historical positivism should no longer be accorded the status of 'normative paradigm' and 'gatekeeper' over and against other interpretive approaches. This paper next lays out five principles for a renewed practice of historical inquiry. It argues, first, that historical inquiry continues to serve a vital function within biblical studies in its ability to call attention to historical difference, and, thereby, to contribute to a strategy of resistance to ideology and to totalizing theories; second, that the traditional appeal to historical 'context' and 'author' in the interpretation of texts continues to be a useful practice - despite the provisional and constructed nature of both - as a way of taking into account extra-lingual reference and of avoiding presentism; third, that the substitution of new 'grand narratives' of Christian origins in place of the (quasi-theological) 'historical' narrative of traditional Christianity - under the claim of historical objectivity - should be abandoned because the very concept of 'origins' is the result of a literalizing of a metaphor. Such totalizing narratives always reduce history's inherent polycentricism. Fourth, I will argue that the continued use of historicism in the antiquarian attempt to reconstruct the past, disconnected from both a quest for social justice and a desire for personal self-creation, represents a form of thought that alienates scholars from themselves and from their real material contexts. Finally, and following on the previous point, this paper submits that the practice of historical analysis has an ethical dimension by virtue of the fact that the personhood of the biblical historian is indissolubly linked to other dimensions of life including the social and ethical aspects of life. These added dimensions complicate the making of choices, which is implicit within all practices of interpretation. These five principles are here suggested as points of departure for the reconceptualization of the scope and function of historical inquiry within the discipline of New Testament studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Patristics is a lively scholarly domain in which theologians and historians contribute to the study of Christian antiquity. But modern trends in patristic study (especially the application of contemporary critical theory to ancient sources) are not always conducive to theological research. This paper identifies the preoccupation in modern patristic study with heresy as a major source of problems. The modern study of Evagrius Ponticus (c. 345-99) provides an exemplary case in which some of these problems can be identified and explored. The initial presentation of modern scholarship will bring into focus the way that Evagrius' relationship to the sixth-century condemnations of Origenism is interpreted by most scholars. Next, the paper identifies and evaluates recent indications that Evagrius is prized precisely because he is considered a heretic. In the final section of the paper, attention is paid to the problem of presuming that subsequent events disclose the theological meaning of earlier writings and to the problem of foreclosing independent theological assessment in order to preserve ancient condemnations. The conclusions suggest that preoccupations with alleged heresy can be every bit as detrimental to understanding of theological writings as preoccupations with orthodoxy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the essays of two prominent ecclesiologists, Joseph Komonchak and Hans Urs Von Balthasar, on their respective fundamental definitions of the Church. Gleaning insights from their different perspectives, the paper applies aspects of Lonergan's philosophy in order to clarify some methodological presuppositions and some ecclesial distortions to be corrected in light of those presuppositions. Additionally, it addresses two fundamental issues for consideration in a post-conciliar theology of the Church. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers some of the ways in which 'postmodernism' is construed, before turning to several important representative examples of religious postmodern thought. It highlights some common features possessed by prominent examples of religious postmodern thought within Judaism and Christianity. Much postmodern religious thought is characterised by the separation of religious belief from religious experience, and is marked by the tendency to emphasise the latter at the expense of the former. This paper argues that, despite this tendency, the work of certain key postmodern religious thinkersparticularly those associated with open-traditionalism and radical orthodoxy-does not conform to this characterisation and needs to be understood in a broader cultural and theological context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A key legacy of the pontificate of Pope John Paul II was the concept of the new evangelization. This, amongst other things, was seen as a response to rising levels of religious indifference especially in countries that share a Western culture. This paper discusses the new evangelization in the light of two seminal ideas from the work of Lonergan, namely conversion and transcendence. It argues that these perspectives help explain and enrich the concept of the new evangelization. The second part of the paper explores some of the factors that can assist conversion, especially religious conversion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the concepts of desert and luck, familiar in political theory but neglected by sociologists. I argue that the idea of desert is composed of both personal performance and the degree of responsibility a person has over that performance. Distribution ought to be in accordance with the indebtedness created by the person's performance. This can be compromised by luck; that is, personal desert is undermined where lack of performance scuttles the applicability of the contributory model. This paper examines recent work, focusing on establishing desert criteria for each person's ends and life-plans, and a formula for distribution according to personal welfare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The work of René Girard invites us to re-imagine a ‘religious–secular’ interactivity within social space in a way released from the violent dualisms of the ‘sacred/profane.’ Earlier Dietrich Bonhoeffer considered the same task and suggested directions for a positive theology of church-state relations, even as the inherited forms of these institutions were collapsing about him. This paper explores the Girardian scenario for church and state becoming rivalrous ‘doubles’– whether it be secular utopic projects doubling religious narratives of redemption, or churches doubling the state as parallel yet purer societies – and suggests resources from Bonhoeffer by which a non-rivalrous church-state relationality - both mutually-constituting and mutually-limiting - may be configured. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper traces the concept and phenomenon of generosity from Aristotle to Emannuel Levinas and beyond. The question motivating this investigation is: must the generous act be restricted by a rational calculation of correct, or prudent, giving? Answers to this question vary. Aristotle and Kant would answer in the affirmative, while Emerson and Levinas would (apparently) not. The bulk of this paper is dedicated to Levinas's characterization of excessive generosity as a condition for the fundamental ethical relation, namely, the generous welcome of the Other. I end by considering the phenomenon of generosity from the point of view of the mid-20th century Mexican philosopher, Emilio Uranga. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the origin of Barth's understanding of sin and grace in his reading of Dostoevsky in 1915. It is essentially the theological portrait of Sonya & Raskólnikov ( Crime & Punishment) that regrounds Barth's understanding of sin and grace in an orthodox forensic model, which in turn develops into the mature doctrine we see in Die Kirchliche Dogmatik IV. The young Barth is exposed to many influences in his move away from nineteenth-century neo-Protestant liberal theology (characterized by a sociological-humanistic model of sin). Mediated by his theological colleague Eduard Thurneysen, Dostoevsky is one such influence amongst many. Barth's reading has a profound effect on him: sin becomes defined by and in relation to God – eritis sicut deus. This sublapsarian perspective can then be discerned in his seminal paper ‘Die Gerechtigkeit Gottes’, delivered within months of his reading of Crime & Punishment, particularly in the Dostoevsky motif of the Tower of Babel (this reading occurs five to seven years prior to the generally accepted period of the influence of Dostoevsky). Barth's understanding then develops through his study of Romans ( Der Römerbrief ) and by rediscovering a traditional approach in the Reformed Confessions in the 1920s; however, it is his reading of Crime and Punishment that initiates this model of sin and grace. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although St. Thomas Aquinas holds that the transcendentals are convertible with being, one may question whether they all follow upon the metaphysical principles of a creature in the same way. Aquinas raises the question when he says that creatures are one by essence but good only by being. This paper examines the ground of truth according to Aquinas, considering his distinction between types of truth as well as his distinguishing kinds of knowers. To advance this investigation the essay compares truth and goodness; it also includes a discussion of unity. Clearly there is a close parallel between goodness and ‘the truth of a thing’, but must the truth of the intellect – truth in the primary sense – be grounded in the extramental being of a creature? This paper argues that, for Aquinas, human knowledge of composite beings is attained through encounters with their real instances and is reflected in necessarily true yet nonanalytic statements about these creatures, statements that can be explained by St.Thomas's theory of predication, to which the theory of an influential contemporary thinker is strikingly similar. God's knowledge of finite essences, and hence truth concerning them, does not assume the actual existence of their instantiations from all eternity, but it does assume their real existence at some time. The requirement of real existence for the human mode of knowing, and, as explained, for divine knowing, underscores the value of finite being and thus harmonizes with Aquinas's claims that composite beings, as what they are, possess being more truly in themselves than as in the mind of God, and they are known properly by God only when grasped as actually existent particulars. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Crossing the Threshold of Divine Revelation, William Abraham offers a rich, subtle defense of an epistemology of divine revelation. In this paper, I focus on a cluster of metaepistemological claims made by Abraham. Specifically, I argue that Abraham's remarks about epistemic fit and the epistemic standards we bring to bear in making evaluations of divine revelation claims commit him to a species of epistemic relativism. I suspect, however, that Abraham does not think of himself as an epistemic relativist. If this is the case, then I believe Abraham needs to rethink his metaepistemological commitments that imply epistemic relativism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is common for scholars sympathetic to religion – from Friedrich Schleiermacher to the present – to describe the modern critics of religious experience as reductionist. By this they mean these critics do not respect religion for what it is; they rather ‘attempt to assimilate religion to nonreligious phenomena’, 1 say, primitive science or metaphysics. Needless to say, these scholars consider this incorrect. Into this scene strides Wayne Proudfoot. In his award-winning book Religious Experience 2 he sets out to scrutinize this accusation and rehabilitate the modern critics. He dismisses this accusation as a protective strategy to render religious claims immune to rational critique. His rehabilitation program is based on a distinction he draws between two kinds of reduction – descriptive and explanatory. This distinction has so caught the imagination of philosophers that it has found its way into textbooks. 3 On the other hand, the book is also controversial; needless to say, its claims are problematic for believers. The purpose of my paper is not to offer a comprehensive critique of his book, but only of his methodology, or the lack thereof, where methodology is understood as an integrated set of tools used for inquiry. I argue that although he proposes description and explanation as appropriate instruments for the study of religious experience, the two do not constitute a methodology, because his descriptions play no role in his explanations; rather, both go their separate ways. I argue that explanation must be guided by description. Moreover, I distinguish three kinds of inquiry, each calling for a different kind of description. The kind of description Proudfoot recommends is appropriate for genetic inquiry into how particular experiences came about, but not for a conceptual inquiry into the constitutive elements of religious experience. He knows lots of trees (particular experiences), but misses the wood (the nature of religious experience). Thus my title. The paper is divided into three parts. First is a brief presentation of Proudfoot's thesis. A second part analyses three different kinds of inquiry; it shows that genetic and epistemic explanations are logically independent and irreducible one to another. These different types of inquiry call for distinct types of description, and these descriptions in turn guide the explanation that will be considered satisfactory. The context-sensitivity of descriptions, and their relation to explanation is dealt with in the final part. Let us start with Proudfoot's contention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Notoriously, Kierkegaard claims his project to be one of indirect communication. This paper considers the idea that Kierkegaard's distinction between direct and indirect communication is to be accounted for in terms of ambiguity. I begin by outlining the different claims Kierkegaard makes about his method, before examining the textual evidence for attributing such a distinction to him. I then turn to the work of Edward Mooney, who claims that the distinction between direct and indirect communication is to be drawn in just this way. I argue that Mooney misinterprets the type of ambiguity Kierkegaard holds to be involved in indirect communication, and consequently ends up with an unsatisfactory account of Kierkegaard's method. Finally I seek to cast doubt on the very idea that ambiguity might do justice to the claims Kierkegaard makes about his project, and suggest that what is required to do so is a theological interpretation of his work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to introduce to the biblical studies community a little-known philosopher of science and of mathematics, Imre Lakatos, with a view to showing that one can profitably apply the insights of his work on the nature of scientific research programmes to the area of evaluating the hermeneutical role of critical thinking in biblical interpretation. The work of Lakatos, as we shall note, has been suggested as a suitable framework for theological thinking by Nancey Murphy. Here I want to propose that in the field of biblical studies, a hermeneutical proposal may be considered in a parallel way to a scientific conjecture which has observable consequences. The advantage of the conceptuality offered by Lakatos, I shall suggest, is that it moves the discussion beyond matters of personal or theological preference and ingrained predilection, towards some criteria which might permit inter-subjective testing and agreement. After an introduction to the work of Lakatos, I explore some of the key areas of his thought for biblical studies, and then conclude with an example which seeks to show the benefits of this approach: a consideration of the classic theory of Pentateuchal source criticism (JEDP) and some of its strengths and weaknesses. The goal is not to uncover a hitherto neglected essential key to biblical criticism, but is the more modest attempt to suggest that in this case some inter-disciplinary borrowing might shed a little light on some familiar concerns of biblical studies methodology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the ‘Power of Prayer’ objection to Molinism, the insights of the Church's great saints and spiritual directors regarding how best to grow in the spiritual life conflict with Molinism: spiritual growth is best achieved by praying from a Thomistic attitude towards Providence. Thomas Flint has recently replied to this objection as it was raised by Fr. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange. In this paper, I respond on behalf of Garrigou-Lagrange. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is framed as a continuation of a 12th century debate over whether a ‘profane’ account of nature without reference to arbitrary divine acts in its workings ( secundum phisicam) threatens the unity of scriptura et natura that was assumed in the natural philosophy which developed out of the Platonic/Augustinian tradition. Currently this issue takes the form of either a commitment to or circumvention of the protocol of ‘methodological naturalism’ in the explanation of natural history, most clearly with regard to evolutionary theory. The focus of the paper is on the latent disagreement over this issue between two poles of the steering committee which oversaw a series of conferences co-sponsored by the Vatican Observatory. One side i was willing to make a sustained commitment to ‘methodological naturalism’, arguing that while nature was not self-explanatory, its inherent characteristics were sufficient for explaining the course of natural history. The other side ii was initially willing to concede the protocol, but ultimately saw the unity of scriptura et natura threatened. After the introduction, Section II analyzes specific disagreements between the two groups over theological epistemology, theological language, and God as a necessary factor in the explanans of natural history. That analysis becomes the basis in Section III for the assertion that the strategy of the second group involves returning to an older form of natural philosophy with a doxa-episteme progression that allows it to augment the ‘profane’ epistemology of ‘methodological naturalism’ with an esoteric insight in order to recognize what is ‘objectively’ the case. Natural philosophies of this sort permit a ‘semantic variability’ such that the designation of a claim as ‘theological’ can mean that it both is and is not a semantic alternative to claims that follow the protocol of ‘methodological naturalism’. The strength given the claim will depend on the discourse context. The paper concludes with a chart of the multiple and significant differences between the two groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we explore the ontological and theological ground of political institutions in order to then reflect upon the eschatological calling of society. The paper builds on Tillich's ontological insight that love does not simply transcend justice, but that it permeates and drives justice, that justice gives form to love's reunion of the separated. This relation between love and justice is at play in political institutions: these unite human beings under forms of justice that must be transformed ever anew if they are not to lose touch with the dynamic power of love and freeze into increasingly unjust juridicalism. The modern history of Western civilisation bears witness to this ontological tension, and the phenomenon of globalisation is yet another instance of human society's mystical calling. Thus, love heads the dynamic movement that transforms political institutions ever anew. Yet society as a whole must become conscious of its ontology for humanity to truly reach its eschatological potential, and this will require both that theology recovers its ground and that political theory thinks theologically. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Jean-Luc Marion has recently established himself as one of the most important and theologically fertile thinkers within the phenomenological tradition. With his study of ‘the gift’ and ‘the saturated phenomenon’, Marion presents a challenge to theology to rethink revelation in its surprising givenness, as exceeding the boundaries often set up in advance by metaphysics and a priori anthropological foundations. This paper examines Marion's mature thought, particularly within the perspective of Christology. The paper argues that Marion's phenomenological style of reflection, as adapted to theology, is deeply contemplative and markedly Johannine in sensibility. As a strategy for theology, the phenomenological style gives to it important incentives and skills for reading off God's self-revelation in Christ in its surprising and counter-intuitive beauty. Marion's challenge/gift to theology is, however, in need of a balancing emphasis, one that appears too infrequently in his work: the ethical-prophetic dimension of the Christ event. In view of keeping both the mystical and prophetic poles of theology closely linked, the paper argues that just as beauty is a key category for saturated phenomena, so too is the reality of suffering and evil. However, whereas beauty invites a humble receptivity to and contemplative enjoyment of the gift, the inscrutable reality of suffering and evil, which so often exceeds comprehension, touches off a critical and practical response. In broadening the study of saturated phenomena to include the refractory character of experience, especially that which threatens humanity, Marion's valuable contributions to theology require a complementary emphasis from those narrative-practical Christologies that highlight the prophetic aspects of the tradition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At times decisions are made in the field of genetics that are presented as if the ethical debates have been adequately treated and so all moral considerations have been addressed, when the truth is very different. Nor is it always easy or desirable to separate the ethical, legal and social questions posed by new developments. The impact of developments in genetic science upon communities is one field of enquiry that envelops each of these areas. This paper explores the impact of genetics upon communities through focusing, in particular, upon certain developments in reproductive science. After introducing core issues and technologies, it discusses particular ethical concerns in relation to the ‘shadow’ of eugenics over such developments, before exploring the role of legislative debates and procedures in transforming social attitudes, values and hence norms. It then turns to consider debates concerning the ‘quality of life ethic’ now prevalent in healthcare, and moves on to discuss the issue of genetic discrimination – focusing, in particular, upon discrimination against disabled persons as a representative instance of the actual ethical and social/communitarian implications of the foregoing. It ends by highlighting the need to discern the ways in which the ethics of genetics is presently shaped and practised in order to discern better the particular social and communitarian implications of certain technological advances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper begins by tracing the development of the understanding of truth as adjunct to the self in postmodernity. It then proceeds to ask what history is in postmodernity in the light of the reconfiguration of truth, and what kinds of response Christianity, and especially Catholic Christianity might develop to the postmodern situation. Using a critique of Habermas’ speech “Modernity – an incomplete project” it develops a notion of postmodernity as an extreme interpretation of modernity, solely through reference to the self. By analysing the concept of the universal horizon in Habermas and in Hegel it shows how postmodernity both produces and deflects the notion of modernity, so that prior to the postmodern, neither modernity nor postmodernity can really be said to be thought at all. The paper suggests that postmodernity is not really ‘thought’ at all, but rather thinks for us, so that we take it for granted. It then takes a sketch of Nietzsche’s critique of the death of God as a springboard to ask what arenas a thoughtless theological response might be tempted into – especially that of conceiving the world purely and baldly as “sacramental” in structure. Finally it concludes by asking what possibilities postmodernity opens up through a thoughtful discernment of how it constitutes us at all [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article reviews the book "Parmenides, Venerable and Awesome (Plato, Theaetetus 183e)," edited by Néstor-Luis Cordero.

This essay charts the parallel growth of Newman's theory of doctrinal development, and infallibility within that doctrinal development, with its author's movement from a via media in Anglicanism to recognition of the truth in the Roman Church. This essay analyzes the theological need for a theory of doctrinal development, the failure of Newman's via media project, and his role as a creative theologian. Then this essay examines in detailed Newman's 1845 Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine, looking specifically at the second section of the second chapter, 'On the Probability of a Developing Authority in Christianity.' The main body of the paper treats the expansion of the scope and feasibility of infallibility in Newman's 1845 Essay. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper brings together the work of Nicholas Wolterstorff and William Alston in speech-act theory with the aim of providing a deeper understanding of the nature of divine speaking through the medium of Scripture. Despite the fecundity of Wolterstorff's seminal work on the philosophical theology of Scripture, aspects of his speech-act centric account are underdeveloped and would benefit from the contributions of William Alston. In particular, his account of divine speech-acts could be fruitfully expanded by incorporating the concept of 'taking responsibility' that is central to Alston's analysis of the nature of illocutionary acts. This would elucidate both the way in which readers of Scripture encounter divine practical authority in the reading process and the nature of the response of faith that is demanded of them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]