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The part of the higher education sector in the United Kingdom in which providers are not publicly-funded (including for-profit, not-for-profit and charitable) has been expanding considerably under Government encouragement. This paper aims to clarify the practical and public policy issues now emerging, by tracing the history of the emergence of this policy in the wider context of trends in higher education policy in the United Kingdom, and with reference to the changes brought about by devolving higher education to the "devolved administrations" of Scotland and Wales. It examines the claims made by alternative provider lobbyists that they will be able to provide something for students which would be different and better. It looks at the mounting evidence, including the findings of the Quality Assurance Agency, the National Audit Office and the Public Accounts Committee, that a number of alternative providers were guilty of bad practice and even fraud in taking advantage of the availability of Student Loan Company funding for their students. The penultimate section describes the attempt by a small group of alternative providers to form an organisation for leaders of the sector and to dissociate themselves from these trends and emerging problems. The article concludes with the implications of the White Paper, "Success as a Knowledge Economy," and the Higher Education and Research Bill, both published in May 2016 for the risks and implications of this significant proposed reconstruction of the system of United Kingdom higher education.

Proposals for legislative change to the regulatory framework of higher education in England, as envisaged in 2011, were delayed, but a comprehensive "operating framework" was designed and a Register of providers created. The Green Paper published in November 2015 includes proposals influenced by the recent work of the Competition and Markets Authority, including the plan to encourage easier and quicker grant to alternative providers of degree-awarding powers and university title. It is recognised that this is likely to lead to the failure of some of these newcomers. For the first time a need to make provision for students to be "taught out" if they are unable to complete their qualifications at the provider they have chosen. This paper looks at the background to this current trend away from reliance on the stability so far of the publicly-funded university and at the implications for students needing "protection" if providers fail.

This article explores recent developments in national policy for academic libraries. It considers the shift from traditional to managerial academic librarianship; the move to "social space" and multi-use systems; changes in the balance between meeting teaching and research needs and in public funding priorities; the difficulty of making decisions about moving to electronic resources and saving space in holdings of paper copies; the consequences of the policies of "deduplication" and disposal of "surplus" copies; "aggregation" of library with other functions; the impact of the Open Access policy.

In November 2010, the British Government, modifying one of the proposals in the Browne Report published in October, decided to allow English universities to charge tuition fees of up to 9,000 British Pounds, while removing almost all the public funding previously provided in the form of a block grant. This had consequences the Government should perhaps have foreseen. HEIs, unsure whether they could remain financially viable if they did not, went for the highest fee allowed. The consequence is that the new system could cost the taxpayer more in providing loans for students at this level than the continuance of direct public funding would have done. Policy was developed to reduce this cost, and one of the ideas which emerged was to allow more providers into the system, including private providers. This has prompted discussion of the resulting value for money, for students and for taxpayers, and then of the meaning of "value", and then of the need to protect the quality of the courses on offer and the "value" of the resulting qualifications. A number of changes seem likely to be necessary in consequence, among them the revision of the rules for granting degree-awarding powers and university title to private providers both profit-making and non-profit-making. This article explores the case for and against these changes.

The sector is entering a climate of future funding cuts and fee rises, which are likely to prompt a growing number and widening range of disputes. This article describes the launch of a new Improving Dispute Resolution Advisory Service. The particular questions raised in this context by the introduction of student charters and the relationship of the "charter" to the "student contract" are discussed.

The doctrine of university autonomy in the UK contains a least two major "fault-lines" where the structure is inherently weak and there is danger of functional breakdown. The first occurs at the junction between the institution and the state, the second within the institution, where the unity in policy-making between academic and financial-and-managerial decision-making, which must underpin any definition of autonomy as the right to run its own affairs, often proves to be illusory and conflict may emerge. This article examines recent indicators of the strains which may be glimpsed at each of these fault-lines with particular reference to the London Metropolitan case and the emerging problems at the chartered University of Sussex.

After its recent Assurance visit from HEFCE, Oxford went through a high profile public debate at the end of which its academic community voted against moving to a governance structure which would have given Oxford a majority of external members on its Council. The Higher Education Funding Council asked Oxford to answer eight questions justifying its governance and administrative arrangements. Cambridge had had a very similar internal "governance" controversy a few years earlier but no HEFCE Assurance visit coincided with it. Cambridge had fewer external members on its Council than Oxford (two to Oxford's four) though that has now moved up to four. The process of the decision-making to bring about this change involved a rough ride for the administration and some strong words from the academic community. Cambridge has now had its own Assurance visit and the result seems to have been a report from HEFCE much less intrusive and not seeking to insist that it make radical and immediate changes to its governance. Apparently Cambridge is not going to have to answer the "eight questions". Perhaps the most interesting feature of the outcomes of these parallel processes of interaction with Oxford and Cambridge respectively is that it appears that HEFCE does not intend to treat them alike. Cambridge's anomalous governance is to be allowed to continue while Oxford is being put under heavy pressure to change its own to comply. HEFCE should perhaps tell us why.

The need for reform of university governance has recently come into question with a series of high profile examples of the apparent failure of the standard "sector norm" model among the post-1992 universities, at London Metropolitan, Leeds Metropolitan and East London Universities. This article takes forward the discussion in two previous (Evans, 2008, 2009). The Leadership Foundation for Higher Education and the Committee of University Chairmen have produced reports and recommendations seeking to make the present model work better. The article examines the genesis of this model and its emerging shortcomings. It considers the implications of trends towards the diminution of student and academic staff participation and the results of Government initiatives, and suggests that a more radical review is needed.

In a previous article (Evans, 2007) I explored some of the challenges HEFCE has recently presented to Oxford and Cambridge governance. These are far from over, with HEFCE insisting that Oxford answer eight "questions" later this year and Cambridge throwing down the gauntlet, with a ballot on the modest attempt to raise the number of external members on the Council from two to four (Cambridge, 2008). But Oxford and Cambridge are also unlike any other universities because of the special features of their "collegiate" structure, which is now creating unprecedented problems in striking a balance between the funding of teaching and research, in which teaching does not suffer.

The Lambert Review of Business-University Collaboration proposed a business model for universities in 2003. Pressure to change university governance to make it match the business model remains strong, and it is being most actively applied to Oxford and Cambridge. The Oxford and Cambridge governance debates (which began in the 1990s) open up the deeper questions which affect all universities in ways which are not possible in connection with the running of any other type of university. This article examines the emerging structural fundamentals and their apparent pros and cons in a attempt to clarify the issues within a framework less narrowly-conceived than Lambert's review of university-business collaboration.

Discusses the 1992 British Education Reform Act and identifies weaknesses in the existing accountability structures in both old and new universities and related implications for academic freedom. Argues that reviewing the quality of the administration may be as important reviewing the quality of teaching and research. (DB)

A lecturer may be conscientious and supportive to students, a great communicator and a star performer, but in higher education that has not been regarded as a sufficient qualification. Since the 1980s in the UK, there has been a repeated insistence at government level that academic staff must have something more to offer in an institution granting degrees and especially one calling itself a university. The 'Lindop principle' which articulated this requirement has been repeated through a series of ministerial statements, and entered the discussion surrounding the passing of the Higher Education and Research Act through 2016 and 2017. The multiplication of higher education providers, and changes in academic employment practices since academic tenure was abolished by the Education Reform Act 1988 have created a widening gap between this theoretical expectation and what is on really offer by way of appropriately qualified teaching to students entering higher education. The arrival of the Teaching Excellence Framework sharpens the importance of the question of who is equipped to teach at degree level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The part of the higher education sector in the UK in which providers are not publicly-funded (including for-profit, not-for-profit and charitable) has been expanding considerably under Government encouragement. This paper aims to clarify the practical and public policy issues now emerging, by tracing the history of the emergence of this policy in the wider context of trends in higher education policy in the UK, and with reference to the changes brought about by devolving higher education to the 'devolved administrations' of Scotland and Wales. It examines the claims made by alternative provider lobbyists that they will be able to provide something for students which would be different and better. It looks at the mounting evidence, including the findings of the Quality Assurance Agency, the National Audit Office and the Public Accounts Committee, that a number of alternative providers were guilty of bad practice and even fraud in taking advantage of the availability of Student Loan Company funding for their students. The penultimate section describes the attempt by a small group of alternative providers to form an organisation for leaders of the sector and to dissociate themselves from these trends and emerging problems. The article concludes with the implications of the White Paper, Success as a Knowledge Economy, and the Higher Education and Research Bill, both published in May 2016 for the risks and implications of this significant proposed reconstruction of the system of UK higher education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Proposals for legislative change to the regulatory framework of higher education in England, as envisaged in 2011, were delayed, but a comprehensive 'operating framework' was designed and a Register of providers created. The Green Paper published in November 2015 includes proposals influenced by the recent work of the Competition and Markets Authority, including the plan to encourage easier and quicker grant to alternative providers of degree-awarding powers and university title. It is recognised that this is likely to lead to the failure of some of these newcomers. For the first time a need to make provision for students to be 'taught out' if they are unable to complete their qualifications at the provider they have chosen. This paper looks at the background to this current trend away from reliance on the stability so far of the publicly-funded university and at the implications for students needing 'protection' if providers fail. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores recent developments in national policy for academic libraries. It considers the shift from traditional to managerial academic librarianship; the move to 'social space' and multi-use systems; changes in the balance between meeting teaching and research needs and in public funding priorities; the difficulty of making decisions about moving to electronic resources and saving space in holdings of paper copies; the consequences of the policies of 'deduplication' and disposal of 'surplus' copies; 'aggregation' of library with other functions; the impact of the Open Access policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In November 2010, the British Government, modifying one of the proposals in the Browne Report published in October, decided to allow English universities to charge tuition fees of up to £9,000, while removing almost all the public funding previously provided in the form of a block grant. This had consequences the Government should perhaps have foreseen. HEIs, unsure whether they could remain financially viable if they did not, went for the highest fee allowed. The consequence is that the new system could cost the taxpayer more in providing loans for students at this level than the continuance of direct public funding would have done. Policy was developed to reduce this cost, and one of the ideas which emerged was to allow more providers into the system, including private providers. This has prompted discussion of the resulting value for money, for students and for taxpayers, and then of the meaning of 'value', and then of the need to protect the quality of the courses on offer and the 'value' of the resulting qualifications. A number of changes seem likely to be necessary in consequence, among them the revision of the rules for granting degree-awarding powers and university title to private providers both profit-making and non-profit-making. This article explores the case for and against these changes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The sector is entering a climate of future funding cuts and fee rises, which are likely to prompt a growing number and widening range of disputes. This article describes the launch of a new Improving Dispute Resolution Advisory Service. The particular questions raised in this context by the introduction of student charters and the relationship of the 'charter' to the 'student contract' are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The need for reform of university governance has recently come into question with a series of high profile examples of the apparent failure of the standard 'sector norm' model among the post-1992 universities, at London Metropolitan, Leeds Metropolitan and East London Universities. This article takes forward the discussion in two previous (Evans, 2008, 2009). The Leadership Foundation for Higher Education and the Committee of University Chairmen have produced reports and recommendations seeking to make the present model work better. The article examines the genesis of this model and its emerging shortcomings. It considers the implications of trends towards the diminution of student and academic staff participation and the results of Government initiatives, and suggests that a more radical review is needed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After its recent Assurance visit from HEFCE, Oxford went through a high profile public debate at the end of which its academic community voted against moving to a governance structure which would have given Oxford a majority of external members on its Council. The Higher Education Funding Council asked Oxford to answer eight questions justifying its governance and administrative arrangements. Cambridge had had a very similar internal 'governance' controversy a few years earlier but no HEFCE Assurance visit coincided with it. Cambridge had fewer external members on its Council than Oxford (two to Oxford's four) though that has now moved up to four. The process of the decision- making to bring about this change involved a rough ride for the administration and some strong words from the academic community. Cambridge has now had its own Assurance visit and the result seems to have been a report from HEFCE much less intrusive and not seeking to insist that it make radical and immediate changes to its governance. Apparently Cambridge is not going to have to answer the 'eight questions'. Perhaps the most interesting feature of the outcomes of these parallel processes of interaction with Oxford and Cambridge respectively is that it appears that HEFCE does not intend to treat them alike. Cambridge's anomalous governance is to be allowed to continue while Oxford is being put under heavy pressure to change its own to comply. HEFCE should perhaps tell us why. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a previous article (Evans, 2007) I explored some of the challenges HEFCE has recently presented to Oxford and Cambridge governance. These are far from over, with HEFCE insisting that Oxford answer eight 'questions' later this year and Cambridge throwing down the gauntlet, with a ballot on the modest attempt to raise the number of external members on the Council from two to four (Cambridge, 2008). But Oxford and Cambridge are also unlike any other universities because of the special features of their 'collegiate' structure, which is now creating unprecedented problems in striking a balance between the funding of teaching and research, in which teaching does not suffer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent highly public debates in th e University of Oxford about its future governance arrangements have raised questions of importance to all institutions involved in the provision of higher education, about public policy and state control and the role of the funding councils. This article begins with an outline of the relevant distinctive features of Oxford governance. It is mainly concerned with the history of the controversy as it has unfolded during the last few years, with particular reference to the part played by HEFCE. It concludes with a note on proposed moves within the University of Cambridge and an appendix comparing the way the direct democracies of the two ancient universities conduct their public debates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Lambert Review of Business-University Collaboration proposed a business model for universities in 2003. Pressure to change university governance to make it match the business model remains strong, and it is being most actively applied to Oxford and Cambridge. The Oxford and Cambridge governance debates (which began in the 1990s) open up the deeper questions which affect all universities in ways which are not possible in connection with the running of any other type of university. This article examines the emerging structural fundamentals and their apparent pros and cons in a attempt to clarify the issues within a framework less narrowly conceived than Lambert's review of university- business collaboration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]