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This article looks at the small number of British subjects who visited China and North Korea during the Korean War with a view to influencing British opinion. Although none were brought to trial, all experienced some form of punitive action, whether the loss of employment, loss of passports, or damage to their reputations. The subject is placed in the context of the Cold War, and the wider concerns about disloyalty on the Left at the time, as well as the controversies surrounding the Korean War in Britain. It concludes that the actions of these individuals have to be understood in terms of their alternative loyalties (such as to the 'new' China, or to an alternative vision of the United Nations), which ultimately outweighed allegations of disloyalty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using the private papers of Lord Killearn in conjunction with official government documents from the British national archives and the French colonial archives, this article builds upon previous historical scholarship to highlight the importance of Killearn's South-East Asian diplomacy to the resolution of the international food crisis following the Second World War. As Britain's senior diplomat in South-East Asia Killearn had little choice but to become entangled in various international disputes often centred upon French Indo-China - Killearn's failure to do otherwise would not have preserved adequate international rice supplies. Therefore this article not only demonstrates the magnitude of Killearn's concern for South-East Asian rice production during the immediate post-war food crisis but it also reveals the depth of Killearn's frustration towards the chaotic priorities emanating from French Indo-China, and thus it substantiates a more significant and complex understanding of Killearn's diplomatic mission to South-East Asia than has been formerly stated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Hungarian Revolution and the military phase of the Suez Crisis occurred virtually contemporaneously in the last week of October and the first week of November 1956. While a great deal of historical research and writing has been done on the two crises individually, there has been relatively little investigation of the interconnection between the two episodes. The interconnections were of particular importance in influencing the Soviet decision to use brutal military force to suppress the Hungarian Revolution and in explaining the depth of bitterness in the rift between Britain and the United States over the Suez Crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discusses the role of propaganda in both the mobilization of women in Great Britain during World War II and in postwar employment patterns. Remobilization campaign of the government in 1947; Special difficulties faced by the Ministries of Labor and Information in propagandizing women; Inadequate publicity about both the criteria used to categorize immobile women and the types of employment deemed essential; Examination of film propaganda.

Discusses how the Dardanelles campaign of Great Britain in 1914-15 began. Start of the campaign as if it was to be no more than a large-scale punitive expedition against the recalcitrant Turkish regime; Observation that until the failure of the April 25 military landing to bring about the swift collapse of Turkish resistance it was confidently expected that they would put up only a token fight; Sharp drop in Britain's estimation of the Turks after the Young Turk revolution in July 1908.

Discusses the British occupation policy of Germany after 1945 which had the various elements of political re-education, responsible government, the federation of Germany and European partnership. Gradual process of post-war planning which involved various offices, departments, ministries, committees and sub-committees; British plan based on Germany's willing acceptance of a democratic order and of peaceful cooperation with the rest of the world.

The Conservative Party was in government for almost all of the decade after the First World War, during which it faced not only economic problems but also the political threat of the advance of the Labour Party. Socialism raised the challenge of a greatly extended role for the state, and in response to this and to tackle the difficulties of industry and the high level of unemployment, which Conservatives attributed to the free trade economy, the party returned in 1923 and 1930–2 to its pre‐war advocacy of a system of tariff protection linked to imperial preference. These factors have previously been viewed from separate perspectives, and accounts of the development of the British state have treated Conservative attitudes as simply negative. This article explores the more varied strands of Conservative opinion about the role of the state in the inter‐war period, and links these to the party's governing practice in key aspects of economic policy in the decade after 1918, and its attempts to introduce protective tariffs in 1923 and 1930–2. It is based upon contemporary discussions of Conservative principles and policies by active politicians and propagandists, and upon the private correspondence of the party's parliamentary leadership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]