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The article presents instructions for all the authors of the journal "Human Studies." The periodical is a quarterly journal dedicated primarily to advancing the dialogue between philosophy and the human sciences. In particular, such issues as the logic of inquiry, methodology, epistemology and foundational issues in the human sciences exemplified by original empirical, theoretical and philosophical investigations are addressed. The journal prefers the submission of papers in LaTeX, however, papers submitted in AMSTex, LAMSTeX and for conventional typesetting is also accepted. Manuscripts should be typewritten on A4 or US Letter bond paper, one side only, leaving enough margin on all sides to permit remarks by the reviewers. Subheadings should be in, lower case and capital letters and they must be identified by the use of numbers separated by decimals to indicate sections and subsections. References to books, journal papers, articles in collections and conference or workshop proceedings, and technical reports should be collected in a list at the end of the paper and listed in alphabetical order.

In 1979 the author spent the summer at a National Endowment for the Humanities summer seminar at Princeton with Richard Rorty, an experience which had numerous consequences, including a very Rortyan paper subsequently published in Human Studies called "Social theory," without wholes. Over this summer he has also worked on a manuscript that grew out a long article published in Human Studies on Max Weber and the fact-value distinction entitled "The limits of reason and some limitations of Weber's morality." The research that he was doing in the Princeton library was primarily concerned with filling in the context in which Weber had made his famous statements about fact and value, and also with examining the sequel of those writings in subsequent philosophy. This topic represents an important and distinctive strand in the tradition of continental philosophy, something that has now increasingly come to be recognized.

The article presents information on the comments of the editor for the journal "Human Studies." This special issue began with an idea proposed by George Psathas over lunch an intentionally open and broad call for papers to all contributors, editors and friends of "Human Studies." The present volume displays the many different ways that call was answered. As a sociologist have generally found it advisable to reject what in traditional academic circles is called interdisciplinary but in practice seems a way for one discipline to steal, and often distort in the process, ideas from other disciplines and claim them as their own. When, for instance, sociologists make use of psychological theories to explain children, rather than displaying interdisciplinarianism, they, from perspective, simply fill in gaps neglected by sociologists by stuffing in handy ideas from psychology, doing justice to neither.

The article reports that the publication of the lectures of sociologist Harvey Sacks has been started by the journal "Human Studies," which begins a process which will eventually make publicly available all, or virtually all, of the lectures by Sacks on conversation and related topics in social science. Most of the lectures in this larger corpus were originally delivered to classes at the University of California, first to sociology classes at the University of California in Los Angeles campus, and then after 1968 to classes in the School of Social Science at the Irvine campus of the University. When he wrote papers, Sacks imposed standards of formality and precision that were extremely hard for him to meet to his own satisfaction. Most of the papers he published on his own were work-ups of lectures, for example, the paper on story-telling, the paper on puns, etc. He drafted on his own as papers he was never sufficiently satisfied with to publish. Sacks' 1964-65 lectures can be furnished two sorts of intellectual reference points, one is his own intellectual development and ones in the intellectual context around him. Several features of these landmarks in Sacks' intellectual terrain, and of the early lectures, display some of the most potent influences on his thinking at that time. These lectures, then, have more than merely historical interest as embryonic versions of later developed work. These series of lectures began a most remarkable, inventive and productive presentation of a strikingly new vision of how to study human sociality.

The April 1988 issue of the journal "Human Studies" contains a diverse collection of papers. With the exception of sociologist Paul Tibbetts' essay, a critical discussion on the sociology of scientific representation which helps to specify the context of inquiry for the other studies--papers examine particular texts and activities. Authors investigate a number of different kinds of representation: visual and graphic documents of laboratory data, textual figures, biographical accounts of scientific problems, instructions for novices, and "artificially intelligent" programs. While there are some "family resemblances" between themes discussed in articles of the journal, their very diversity serves to demonstrate what people take to be a key "finding" about representation in science: the heterogeneity of representational order. This includes more than the evident diversity in kinds of representational device, as it covers the theoretic principles and functions of representation as well, resemblance, symbolic reference, similitude, abstraction, exemplification, expression. An emphasis on the heterogeneity and discontinuity of representational formats, and on the local and contextual basis of their production, has become a familiar refrain in postmodernist critiques of traditional views on science and language. The word-object relationship, once the paradigm of representation, is displaced by lateral and reflexive relations between communicational elements in seemingly anarchistic fields.

The article presents information on the comments of the editor for the journal "Human Studies." This special issue began with an idea proposed by George Psathas over lunch an intentionally open and broad call for papers to all contributors, editors and friends of "Human Studies." The present volume displays the many different ways that call was answered. As a sociologist have generally found it advisable to reject what in traditional academic circles is called interdisciplinary but in practice seems a way for one discipline to steal, and often distort in the process, ideas from other disciplines and claim them as their own. When, for instance, sociologists make use of psychological theories to explain children, rather than displaying interdisciplinarianism, they, from perspective, simply fill in gaps neglected by sociologists by stuffing in handy ideas from psychology, doing justice to neither.

"Human Studies," is regularly cited as a source of inspiration in these original pursuits. "Human Studies," has been an important factor in their finding a community of scholars with whom to place their creative and innovative phenomenological work. The article presents information on the author's experiences with the periodical "Human Studies," in different phases of life. The periodical is the official journal of the Society for Phenomenology Each of the first four stages is manifested by writing a scholarly article, the first published in "Qualitative Sociology," and the next three in "Human Studies." George Psathas, the journal's founder and editor since its inception. George's gentle and strong presence, his sense of intellectual integrity, has not changed in twenty-five years. He continues as an elegant, gentle, yet intellectually rigorous and consistently supportive figure. It was due to George's element suggestion that is submitted in the first paper of "Human Studies."

The article provides an introduction by the author to readers to provide a foundation for a natural observational science of sociology. The aim is to offer the reader an argument, an intuitive basis for the understandability of findings for a natural observational science of sociology. The construction of this foundation has several aims. It is in the first place directed to show that these findings are relative to social action and evolution. Secondly, the foundation is limited in its aims along the following lines. For sociology, the most central findings of the two papers of the author published in the December 1, 1989 issue of the journal "Human Studies," first the detailed ways in which actual naturally occurring social activities occur are subjectable to formal description. Second, such description permits to see non-trivial ways that actual activities in their details are simple. These findings, have very large significance for what it is that sociology can aim to do, and for how it can proceed. In brief, sociology can be a natural observational science.

Presents an introduction to the April 1986 issue of the journal "Human Studies."

This article focuses on aims and scope of the journal for philosophy and social science, "Human Studies." It is a quarterly journal dedicated primarily for advancement of the dialogue between philosophy and the human sciences. In particular, such issues as the logic of inquiry, methodology, epistemology and foundational issues in the human sciences exemplified by original empirical, theoretical and philosophical investigations are addressed. Phenomenological perspectives, broadly defined, are a primary, though not exclusive, focus. This journal is attractive to scholars in a variety of fields seeking to provide a forum for those who address these issues in attempting to bridge the gap between philosophy and the human sciences. Contributions from sociology, psychology, anthropology, history, geography, linguistics, semiotics, ethnomethodology, political science and of course, philosophy, are especially welcome. The article also presents instructions for authors regarding proof and reprints.

Presents an introduction to articles published in the July 1991 issue of the journal "Human Studies."

Presents an introduction to the January 1983 issue of the journal "Human Studies."

In this article, the author presents his views on the criticism of his article related to discursive psychology by Jonathan Potter and Derek Edwards, which was published in an earlier issue of the journal "Human Studies," as of July 2004. The author challenged the claim that there is a genuinely coherent and distinctive project for "discursive psychology." Not knowing quite how to understand what Potter, Edwards and others mean by the notion of "psychology" in their various writings, it is very difficult to ascertain what set of analytical problems and purposes they are putting in the place of post-Cartesian ones. Potter and Edwards fail consistently to distinguish between three separable issues. The first is the requirement to subject Cartesian and cognitivist theorizing to technical critique when it is advanced by professionals in the human sciences. The second is the extension of any such critique to lay persons who happen to deploy a version of such theorizing. The third, and more contentious point, is the notion that, somehow or other, Cartesian theorizing is built into some of our uses of language for non-theoretical purposes.

Human Studies is a journal of philosophy and the social sciences, and it has been adopted as the official journal of the "Society for Phenomenology," and the Human Sciences (SPIIS). It also serves as ethnomethodology's unofficial journal. Ethnomethodology is affiliated with no single professional society or academic journal, but Human Studies has been the most consistent outlet for ethnomethodological articles and special issues. Ethnomethodology is not a philosophy of social science, but is, rather, an empirical research program that investigates recurrent topics that have had long-standing interest in philosophy and social theory. These topics include action, argument, meaning, knowledge, perception, description, objectivity, and rationality, among many others.

Political behavioralism was engaged in a methodology pure and simply, a scientism. It tried to emulate natural-scientific methodology, ignoring the ontological difference between two kinds of objects which the natural and the social sciences investigate. A journal for Philosophy and the Social Sciences, intimates the intercept of philosophy and the social sciences, which is the hallmark particularly of Merleau-Ponty and Alfred Heinrich Schutz. As Merleau-Ponty put it, every science secretes an ontology; every ontology anticipates a body of knowledge. The social scientist can agree with the statement that the principal differences between the social and the natural sciences do not have to be looked for in a different logic governing each branch of knowledge. But this does not involve the admission that the social sciences have to abandon the particular devices they use for exploring social reality for the sake of an ideal unity of methods which is founded on the entirely unwarranted assumption that only methods used by the natural sciences, especially by physics, are scientific ones.

In this article, the author presents his comments on the article "Rhythmic Integration in Phone Closings," by P. Auer published in the January 1967 issue of the journal "Human Studies." Auer, who is addressing closings from within a phonetic tradition, is not content to show us that there may be rhythmic integration in the closing section of telephone conversations but also wants to argue that rhythmic integration organises the closing section. A point concerning Auer's remarks about an exchange of terminal elements is that he has not fully understood the order of activities that researchers E.A. Schegloff and H. Sacks are capturing in their description "adjacency pair". This is a description of one way in which participants organise their activities to cohere with one another. There are other ways in which coherence is achieved. The interesting point about adjacency pairs, however, is that the occurrence of a first pair part provides for the occurrence of a second pair part in such a way that its non-production can be heard to be absent. It would then be, to use another formulation, noticeably or officially absent.

The present article focuses on the "selection" and "mathematization" in the visual documentation of objects in the life sciences and scientific publications. Selection concerns the way scientific methods of visualization simplify and schematize objects, and mathematization concerns how such methods attribute mathematical order to natural objects. This study is based on the premise that visual displays are more than a simple matter of supplying pictorial illustrations for scientific texts. Visual displays are essential to how scientific objects and orderly relationships are revealed and made analyzable. This is suggested that people first need to wrest the idea of representation from an individualistic cognitive foundation, and to replace preoccupations with images on the retina or, alternatively "mental images" or "pictorial ideas", with a focus on the "externalized retina" of the graphic and instrumental fields upon which the scientific image is impressed and circulated.

This article deals with illustrations from E.O. Wilson's book "Sociobiology". It was believed that if a child were to look into different kinds of journals, like sociological, linguistic or scientific, the first thing that might strike him or her as important would be that the scientific journal had pictures, while others just had prints. This tries to show, how pictures work when an author wants to appeal to readers outside the immediate discipline in which the convention for reading these pictures are well established. The book is an good example for showing the effective use of photographs and pictures to present the idea more explanatory and clear. Photographs come with apparent self-evidence, because they are taken as mechanical reproductions of an image. The author tries to show how the book links various sorts of pictures together in a sort of montage that parallels but does reflect the book's various text.