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Sociological theories of space have so far not provided an in-depth analysis of online spaces. The paper addresses this issue by means of Löw's relational theory of space. As this theory mainly focuses on material spaces, it is necessary to embrace the phenomenological perspective in order to apply it to the virtual realm. More recent phenomenological research has highlighted the ongoing mediatization or virtualization of the life-world. These theories, and presence research more generally, are useful for examining the layers of virtual presence. This paper focuses on two emblematic types of spaces: multiplayer online role-playing games and Skype video chats. The first represents an online version of a Schutzian finite province of meaning, while Skyping is an example of how the paramount reality of everyday life expands into the virtual realm. Albeit differently, actors in both cases constitute hybrid, virtual-material spaces with various forms and degrees of virtual presence. User experiences in these spaces are in line with contemporary sociological diagnoses indicating the vanishing experience of living in space and the general tendency of late modernity to question previous social forms of modernity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is initially striking about Alfred Schutz's phenomenological account of the musical experience, which encompasses both the performance and reception of music, is his apparent dismissal of the corporeal and spatial aspects of that experience. The paper argues that this is largely a product of his wider understanding of temporality wherein the mind and time are privileged over the body and space, respectively. While acknowledging that Schutz's explicit or stated view is that the body and space are relatively insignificant to his account, the paper reveals how they actually feature significantly in the latter, but in ways that remain largely implicit. First, the analysis demonstrates that the mental and temporal aspects of Schutz's phenomenology of the musical experience cannot be considered independently of their interrelations with the equally important, albeit under-examined, corporeal, and spatial aspects. Concepts from Nietzsche's early aesthetics are recruited to fulfil this task. Second, the analysis challenges Schutz's dismissal of space in his theory of music perception. Lastly, it reveals the crucial, yet implicit, role of the body and space in his key examination of the intersubjective phenomenon he terms 'making music together'. By presenting the above arguments, the paper aims to draw out the implicit dimensions of Schutz's phenomenology of music and thereby enrich his influential account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The problem of the other was one of the central problems for the founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl. He investigated the other as the alter ego intensively in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation, in which he introduced the conceptions of "analogical apperception'' and "pairing'' as fundamental forms of "passive synthesis.'' Although it is no doubt Husserl who investigated the other most seriously and intensively, there is an aporia in his theory of the other. If the other is an object of ego's intentional consciousness, the other turns out to be no more than a modification of the ego. In the face of such an aporia, some phenomenologists embarked upon inquiry into the other. This paper focuses primarily on Alfred Schutz's discussion of the "other'' in general and about the "stranger'' in particular. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will discuss the correlation between the world of everyday life, finite provinces of meaning, and religion. To this end, the paper will start out by explaining Schutz' considerations on 'paramount reality' of the world of everyday life as well as the theory of 'multiple realities' and 'finite provinces of meaning'. Schutz' considerations will then be elaborated upon and taken a step further in a discussion of the various 'realnesses' of the multiple realities. Special attention will be paid to a finite province of meaning only mentioned in passing by Schutz: religion. The paper will first analyze the special features of religion as a finite province of meaning and highlight the correlation it enters with the world of everyday life. Subsequently, hereafter and paradise conceptions will be described as 'ultimate provinces of meaning,' and it will be shown how their realnesses connect to the world of everyday life. Finally, the 'fundamental anxiety' will be studied as the motor of the relevance structures of the world of everyday life, the finite provinces of meaning as well as the hereafter conceptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Alfred Schütz is often credited with providing sociology with a firm ground derived from phenomenology of science and justifying it as a science operating within natural attitude. Although his project of social science draws extensively on Edmund Husserl's theory of attitudes, it would be incorrect to assume that Schütz shares with the founder of phenomenology his conception of science. This paper compares Husserl's and Schütz's views on the structure and meaning of science and traces the roots of their radical divergence. Whereas Husserl increasingly emphasises the importance of phenomenological reduction for the genuine human science, Schütz eventually rejects reduction and restricts the social science to a specific system of relevancies within the reality of the lifeworld. This paper presents the argument that Schütz's conception eliminates the possibility of a phenomenological justification of social science, as it implies that there are no rationally justifiable grounds to pursue science. In this way, Schütz's views substantially differ from the phenomenological theory of science and become open to the phenomenological critique of naivety. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents the concept of the idealization of the interchangeability of phases of life as an enhancement, or rather as a further development of Alfred Schutz's general thesis of the reciprocity of perspectives. It claims that the according figure of thought is a constitutive part of acts of understanding in everyday life where, in order to understand each other, individuals of different age-groups have to overcome the difference of perspectives that are attached to their particular ages. This is accomplished by a specific assumption that is also applied in the case of intrasubjective, autobiographical understanding. By discussing its sociological significance as well as its philosophical background, this paper introduces the idealization of the interchangeability of phases of life as a fundamental and universal figure of understanding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers a critique of the special issue of Human Studies (vol. 40) on "Alfred Schutz and Religion". Following a line similar to that of Dominique Janicaud I call into question the very phenomenological status of the "phenomenology of religion" developed across the various contributions. Appealing to the Husserlian principle of freedom from presuppositions my critique focuses on the way these phenomenologies of religion talk about "religion". At their core, the failure contained within these contributions is the failure to properly consider a question which begins any undergraduate Religious Studies program—what is "religion"? I charge that because these contributions take it as "self-evident" what religion "is" they allow a metaphysical assertion into their phenomenology which breaches the "neutrality" demanded of the principle of freedom from presuppositions. Drawing on the work of the Critical Religion project in Religious Studies I further highlight how this metaphysical assertion predicates an unavoidable ideological assertion, one which serves colonial mechanics of exclusion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to explore the relations between Schutzian theory and hermeneutics. After presenting the connections between hermeneutic thought and Schutz’s work from a historical point of view, it will argue that despite its significant differences from hermeneutic theory, Schutzian theory can be utilized as a kind of proto-hermeneutics. By now, the heterogeneous movement of the interpretive social sciences has reached an established position, but with their growing reliance on the impulses coming from philosophical hermeneutics, the latent problem comes to the foreground: the former demand for an action-theoretical grounding has faded away. Currently, action theory itself is no more dominated by the work of interpretively minded authors, but by the theories of rational choice. This results in a false opposition between the explanatory models, which base their arguments on historical, cultural, and linguistic factors, and those, which focus on the plane of the decisions of individuals. Bypassing the objectivism present in both the rational choice approach and hermeneutics, Schutz’s pragmatic theory of the life-world, originating from both interpretive and pragmatic intellectual influences, may be useful to overcome this opposition, and can serve as a proto-hermeneutical point of departure: that is, as a theory which cannot alone take over the duty of hermeneutics, but which can complement hermeneutics on a fundamental level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we draw on Alfred Schutz’s theoretical framework to better understand how oppression is enacted through discriminatory acts. By closely examining the role of typifications and relevances in our experience of others, and by supplementing this analysis with contemporary social scientific resources, we argue that a Schutzian perspective on oppression yields important phenomenological insights. We do this in three key steps. Firstly, we contextualise Equality and the Meaning Structure of the Social World within Schutz’s broader body of work, elucidating his central conditions of discrimination. Secondly, we highlight the limitations of Schutz’s account, in how it fails to capture more peripheral, subtle, and implicit oppressive practices. Finally, we introduce two underexplored insights derived from Schutz’s framework: the role of relevances in understanding the motivational underpinnings of implicit biases, and the connection between self-typification and stereotype threat. With this multidimensional approach, we hope to enhance our understanding of oppression whilst bridging gaps in Schutz’s original conceptualization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines Alfred Schutz’s insights on types and typification. Beginning with a brief overview of the history and meaning of typification in interpretive sociology, the paper further addresses both the ubiquity and the necessity of typification in social life and scientific method. Schutz’s contribution itself is lacking in empirical application and grounding, but examples are provided of ongoing empirical research which advances the understanding of types and typification. As is suggested by illustrations from scholarship in the social studies of social science, studies of social identity associated with membership categorization analysis, and constructionist social problems theory, typification can be found to be central to social research whether it is taken up as a largely unacknowledged resource or whether it is addressed by different names. The overview and illustrations suggest the continuing, widespread, and indeed foundational relevance of Schutz’s insights into types and typification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper outlines Schutz’s phenomenology of law in the context of the transformation of positivistic practices in a post-totalitarian society. His major contribution is seen in the disentanglement of social phenomena from any form of naturalness by incorporating the dimension of meaning and interpretation into them. This philosophical gesture is made possible by renouncing any theory of transcendent ground(s) of a pre-formed order (Section 1) and leads to an interpretive concept of law, in which the reciprocity of perspectives play the major role. The conclusions are pointing toward a phenomenological concept of law able to take our freedom seriously. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the present paper, I analyze the complex relationship of tension between Critical Theory and phenomenology from a sociological-theoretical perspective. I start from two theses. The first one is that one of the primary reasons for the antagonism between these two paradigms lies in their ideal-typically opposed assessments of the role of ‘meaning-adequacy’ in social research. The second one is that in recent years, there has been a strong rapprochement of Critical Theory with (social) phenomenology. This shift, fundamentally embodied in Hartmut Rosa’s work, can be understood as the culminating point of a progressive turn towards meaning-adequacy within the Frankfurt School. In order to unfold these two theses, I will proceed in three steps. First (1), I will present the main outlines of the relationship of tension between the two traditions from both a historico-intellectual and a systematic perspective. Second (2), I will focus on the contemporary readings of the Schutzian notion of ‘meaning-adequacy’ and discuss their value for better understanding the historical opposition between the two paradigms, as well as their recent rapprochement. Third (3), I will sketch the key features of Rosa’s sociology of world-relations, understood as a phenomenological Critical Theory that shows a strong commitment to a radicalized version of the meaning-adequacy postulate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper lays the groundwork for developing a thorough-going phenomenological description of different phenomena of violence such as physical, psychic and structural violence. The overall aim is to provide subject-centered approaches to violence within the social sciences and the humanities with an integrative theoretical framework. To do so, I will draw primarily on the phenomenological accounts of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Alfred Schutz, and thereby present guiding clues for a phenomenologically grounded theory of violence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mediation services arise in contexts where the notions of community cohesion, relationship integrity and social order are valued over their opposites (disorder, dissent, conflict etc). Yet it is not at all clear whether and how the mediation of conflict works to re-establish harmony or consensus. Indeed it is not at all clear that mediation is always effective or just. It has even been suggested that some conflicts (e.g. work-place, commercial and sexual assault) are either not resolved or not resolved justly by mediation. On the other hand, advocates maintain that mediation can bring resolution and repair to ongoing relationships, promote community harmony, and empower people to be self-determining in the construction and maintenance of their resolutions. Whether mediation is adjudged positively or not, all mediation is instantiated in, indeed performed through, talk. In this paper I examine mediations from an Australian mediation program, and use Conversation Analysis to expose the practical methods by which mediators achieve consensus between disputants. I then examine a case in which mediation has failed to produce the sought-after consensus, and explore one way of understanding the failure of mediation in that case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article re-examines the relationship between the works of Alfred Schütz and Harold Garfinkel, focusing on their respective approaches to temporality in interaction. Although there are good reasons to emphasize the differences between Schütz's notion of individual projects of action and Garfinkel's interest in communicative sequencing, there is also an interesting historical connection. In order to elucidate this connection, the article provides a close reading of the steps that lead Schütz from his premise of 'egological' time consciousness to his understanding of the reflexive and interactive process of meaning establishment and interpretation developed in his first book, The Phenomenology of the Social World (1967 [1932]). The article reflects further upon which aspects of Schütz's considerations resonated with Garfinkel in his formative years and how Garfinkel related to them variously in his later development of ethnomethodology. Hence, it appears that Garfinkel's ethnomethodology successively departs from many of Schütz's premises while simultaneously incorporating and further developing some of his notions on the sequential organization and temporal flux of interactive processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The problem of the other was one of the central problems for the founder of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl. He investigated the other as the alter ego intensively in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation, in which he introduced the conceptions of "analogical apperception'' and "pairing'' as fundamental forms of "passive synthesis.'' Although it is no doubt Husserl who investigated the other most seriously and intensively, there is an aporia in his theory of the other. If the other is an object of ego's intentional consciousness, the other turns out to be no more than a modification of the ego. In the face of such an aporia, some phenomenologists embarked upon inquiry into the other. This paper focuses primarily on Alfred Schutz's discussion of the "other'' in general and about the "stranger'' in particular. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What attributions must any actor make to an other in order to engage in face-to-face interaction with that other? Edmund Husserl's use of "analogues" suggests that actors use their own experiences of themselves as a starting point in making such attributions. Alfred Schutz and Erving Goffman claim that for face-to-face interaction to occur, an other must be recognized as copresent and reciprocity must be established. I assert here that the means for determining that these conditions have been met will vary. I explore a variety of actors and in particular their differing identifications of interactionally available others and I take as problematic the establishment of co-presence and reciprocity. Taking others to be "analogues of ourselves" serves as a useful starting point, but worthy of detailed analysis is how and with whom an actor draws the analogy, under what circumstances it comes in for revision, and the interactional consequences of the decisions made. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we reflect on the particular temporal structure of pregnancies and prenatal entities with the aim to contribute to the field of the sociology of pregnancy. Medical models and technology shape today's notion of pregnancy as a linear, nine-month developmental process that leads to the birth of a child. Through ultrasound technology and prenatal examinations, prenatal entities have thus historically gained a present 'being' as a developing, unborn child. While these ideas undoubtedly greatly influence the participants' interpretations, a culturalistic perspective on time alone does not do justice to the phenomenon's lived tensions and the temporal complexity of the phenomenon. From a Schutzian perspective of time, we have worked out how practices of pregnancy and the production of meaning are shaped by an interwoven back and forth between orientations to the past, present and future. Drawing on relevant works from the sociology of pregnancy, we work out five modes of temporal references that mold the phenomenon of pregnancy: joint imagination of the couple, in which the (un)born is anticipated as fantasies of the future (1), passivities of pregnancy, in which the desired future is experienced as unable to influence (2), the presentification of the unborn in and through visual and bodily-somatic contact moments (3), its futurization through the cultivation of a 'not-yet' (4) and prenatal losses, as a critical rupture with the anticipated and desired future (5). Our analysis underlines the potential of a time sociological perspective on pregnancy and the constitution of relationships and persons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article honors aspects of George Psathas' life achievement. In particular, it describes his commitment to "Human Studies" and places his social phenomenological research work in dialogue with Alfred Schütz and Harold Garfinkel. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous work in Game Studies has centered on several loci of investigation in seeking to understand virtual gameworlds. First, researchers have scrutinized the concept of the virtual world itself and how it relates to the idea of "the magic circle". Second, the field has outlined various forms of experienced "presence". Third, scholarship has noted that the boundaries between the world of everyday life and virtual worlds are porous, and that this fosters a multiplicity of identities as players identify both with themselves-offline and themselves-in-game. Despite widespread agreement that these topics are targets for research, so far those working on these topics do not have mutually agreed-upon framework. Here we draw upon the work of Alfred Schutz to take up this call. We provide a phenomenological framework which can be used to describe the phenomena of interest to Game Studies, as well as open new avenues of inquiry, in a way acceptable and useful to all. This helps to distinguish the core of the field from the supplemental theoretical and critical commitments which characterize diverse approaches within the field. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this text, I discuss the concept of culture that ethnomethodology suggests. First, I will review the sources that Garfinkel refers to: While he draws heavily on Parsons' conception of culture, he also criticizes it with reference to Schütz. I start the second part with examining Garfinkel conception of ethnos—that suffixes 'ethnomethodology'—to then present six salient dimensions of the ethnomethodological conception of culture: (1) recognizability; (2) normatively interspersed knowledge and cooperative continuation; (3) familiarity and trust; (4) indexicality and vagueness; (5) practice; and (6) fractality and fragmentation. The text ends with some thoughts comparing the ethnomethodological notion of culture to other conceptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The statement that an important dualism runs throughout sociological literature belongs to what can be called extended 'sociological common sense'. In this context, Alfred Schutz's phenomenology is often used critically as a paradigmatic example of subjectivism, as it supposedly places exclusive emphasis on actors' 'subjective' interpretations, thereby neglecting 'objective' social structures such as power relationships. This article proposes that not only do those characterizations have dualistic grounds, but they also disregard the explicit intention of phenomenology to overcome the dualism between subjectivism and objectivism. The various criticisms directed at the Schutzian paradigm will be confronted with an analysis of the phenomenon of power based on Schutz's theory of the life-world, in particular his theory of relevance. This theoretical perspective will be replenished by reflections on power as a meaning selection, which specifically allow the hiatus of subjectivism and objectivism to be overcome. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Garfinkel's dissertation, 'The Perception of the Other,' was completed and defended 15 years prior to the publication of Studies in Ethnomethodology. This essay seeks hints of the familiar ethnomethodological themes (indexicality, reflexivity, accountability) within his thesis. It begins by examining the contributions of earlier social theorists, particularly Talcott Parsons and Alfred Schütz, to Garfinkel's thought. It then examines the dissertation itself seeking evidence to support the claim that Garfinkel was already moving in the direction of an 'incommensurable, asymmetric, and alternate' program of sociological inquiry well before the term 'ethnomethodology' had even been coined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Schutz's references to literature and arts in his theoretical works are manifold. But literature and theory are both a certain kind of a finite province of meaning, that means they are not easily accessible from the paramount reality of everyday life. Now there is another kind of referring to literature: metaphorizing it. Using it, as may be said with Lakoff and Johnson, to understand and to experience one kind of thing in terms of another. Literally metapherein means 'to carry over'. Metaphorizing in this view is then a specific kind of border-crossing between different provinces of meaning. That poses two questions: 1. What means finiteness of those provinces of meaning, what kind of border crossings are possible? What is the ground for metaphorizing meaning? 2. Could this concept used for founding a theory of the constitution of the societal and of society, that overcomes the dichotomy of structure/agency? These questions will be answered with one example in view: Schutz' report to Kaufmann of his first visit of Husserl describing his experience as feeling like Wilhelm Meister at the Society of the Tower. In a first step this metaphor is presented together with some crumbs of metaphor theory. In a second step these crumbs will be connected to Husserl's concept of experience. After developing a short overview over Schutz' 'finite provinces of meaning,' the relation of experience, metaphors to the intersubjectivity of these provinces in their dependence from writing and printing is discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This Alfred Schutz Memorial Lecture discusses the relationship between the phenomenological life-world analysis and the methodology of the social sciences, which was the central motive of Schutz's work. I have set two major goals in this lecture. The first is to scrutinize the postulate of adequacy, as this postulate is the most crucial of Schutz's methodological postulates. Max Weber devised the postulate 'adequacy of meaning' in analogy to the postulate of 'causal adequacy' (a concept used in jurisprudence) and regarded both as complementary and, in the context of sociological analysis, critical. Schutz extracted the two postulates from the Neokantian epistemology, dismissed the concept of causality, and reduced Weber's two postulates of adequacy into one, namely, the adequacy of meaning. I discuss the benefits and shortcomings of this reduction. A major problem, in my view, is that Schutz's reformulation lost the empirical concern that was inherent in Weber's 'causal adequacy'. As a result, the models of economics (which shaped Schutz's conception of social science) are considered to be adequate if they are 'understandable' to an everyday actor, even when they are based on the most unrealistic assumptions. To recapture Weber's empirical orientation I recommend a more restrictive interpretation of the postulate of adequacy that links it to qualitative research and unfolds the critical potential of Schutz's phenomenological life-world analysis. My second goal is to report on some current developments in German sociology in which a number of approaches explicitly refer to Schutz's analysis of the life-world and attempt to pursue 'adequate' empirical research. This lecture focuses on three approaches: ethnophenomenology, life-world analytic ethnography, and social scientific hermeneutics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

George H. Mead and Alfred Schutz proposed foundations for an interpretative sociology from opposite standpoints. Mead accepted the objective meaning structure a priori. His problem became therefore the explanation of the individuality and creativity of human actors in his social behavioristic approach. In contrast, Schutz started from the subjective consciousness of an isolated actor as a result of a phenomenological reduction. He was concerned with the problem of explaining the possibility of this isolated actor’s perceiving other actors in their existence, their concreteness, and the motives for their behavior. I treat these two approaches and their associated problems as equally relevant. My evaluation is based on their success in solving their specific problems. The aim is to decide which of the two approaches provides the more adequate foundation for an interpretative sociology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Erving Goffman's distinctive contribution to an understanding of others was grounded in his information control and ritual models of the interaction process. This contribution centered on the forms of the interaction order rather than self-other relations as traditionally conceived in phenomenology. Goffman came to phenomenology as a sympathetic but critical outsider who sought resources for the sociological mining of the interaction order. His engagement with phenomenological thinkers (principally Gustav Ichheiser, Jean-Paul Sartre and Alfred Schutz) has to be understood in these terms. The article traces basic differences in analytical focus through a range of phenomenological critiques of Goffman and a comparison of salient aspects of Schutz's and Goffman's writings. While the contrasts have perhaps been overplayed, I conclude that Goffman's thinking about others probably owed more to his pragmatist roots than to his later encounters with phenomenology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents information on the concept of world as seen by the author. "World" is a concept which poet Alfred Schutz wrote about. "World" is what one sense as one leave the street and enter a church or a theater or as one study or even merely read about a scientific or philosophical or artistic question or problem. As far as the author know Schutz does not ask how many worlds there are. Here he deviate from Schutz: to him the number of worlds is unacountable, that is, that one change from one to another every moment of one's lives, and that the worlds that Schutz or the author has mentioned, or will mention if asked about examples of worlds, are the products of societies in which they are used or for that matter remembered, they are conventions as language altogether is. But it also is an example of the title, of the author's approach to the world, of him being poetic. He find himself having written prose for a great many lines, prose defined by the length of the line, as he reluctantly defined it in what is thus far his latest effort. "Reluctantly" because it sounded so external, and there must be more to the distinction between prose and poetry. Between prose and the poetic, which is defined as something like the cogtiitive satisfaction of the body.