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In this article, I address the particular narratives and discourses that respond to increased feelings of uncertainty, anxiety, and fear, so-called ontological insecurities, and their connections to the postcolonial imaginaries of populist politics. Recent focus on post-truth politics and alternative facts point to some underlying questions concerning the emotional appeal of particular social imaginaries, such as the appeal and resonance of certain discourses and narratives, as well as the ways in which specific discourses and narratives grip and take an emotional hold of a subject. Of particular importance in terms of populist politics is why specific imaginaries ultimately come together in the imagined object of the other—in this case, the immigrant and/or the refugee other. To understand how power works through emotional discourses and narratives, I discuss how they come to naturalize colonial fears and postcolonial melancholia, played out in myths about “the nation,” “the people,” “the establishment,” and “the immigrant others,” but also how such myths justify the imagined ills of Western society and how they constitute both remedies to and origins of ontological insecurities.

In this article, we explore emotions as a relational mechanism that affects the stability of political movement groups by activating or weakening identities, social ties, and movement boundaries. Our goal is to specify the dynamics by which personal emotional experiences are linked to wider group processes. In this way, emotion serves as an analytic bridge, connecting the micro levels to larger social structures. We draw on data from former violent white supremacists to understand the personal/interpersonal (micro) and group (meso) level emotional dynamics in this extremist movement, especially how emotional experiences affect social movement dynamics. We draw on our evidence to build models of how emotional dynamics create trajectories of development and decline in white supremacist group membership. To demonstrate the analytic leverage provided by a focus on emotional dynamics, we then examine three findings from our study that are difficult to explain through more common frameworks of individual cognitive processes or group structure.

Emotions are prevalent in the rhetoric of populist politicians and among their electorate. We argue that partially dissimilar emotional processes may be driving right- and left-wing populism. Existing research has associated populism with fear and insecurities experienced in contemporary societies, on the one hand, and with anger, resentment, and hatred, on the other. Yet there are significant differences in the targets of right- and left-wing resentment: A political and economic establishment deemed responsible for austerity politics (left) and political and cultural elites accused of favoring ethnic, religious, and sexual out-groups at the expense of the neglected in-group (right). Referring to partially different emotional opportunity structures and distinct political strategies at exploiting these structures, we suggest that right-wing populism is characterized by repressed shame that transforms fear and insecurity into anger, resentment, and hatred against perceived “enemies” of the precarious self. Left-wing populism, in turn, associates more with acknowledged shame that allows individuals to self-identify as aggrieved and humiliated by neoliberal policies and their advocates. The latter type of shame holds emancipatory potential as it allows individuals to establish bonds with others who feel the same, whereas repressors remain in their shame or seek bonds from repression-mediated defensive anger and hatred.

Scholars working from the political opportunity approach have upheld the notion that the political context sets the grievances around which activist mobilizes. Inspired by Tarrow and colleagues plea to explain political activism by analyzing how activists are mobilized, this article focuses on the individual protester. The research question in this article reads how are activist’s protest emotions shaped by characteristics of the political context, specifically by their political alliances? We focus on the emotional constellation evoked by environmental issues (e.g., climate change and nuclear energy) with Green Parties as movement allies and anti-austerity issues with Social Democratic parties as movement allies. Specifically, the parliamentary position of these allies is linked to the relative stake anger and frustration have within the emotional constellation of demonstrators. Results are based on survey data collected among 6,598 demonstrators, and their emotions dispersed over 28 demonstrations in seven European countries. We conclude that having a politically well-connected friend seems to matter more to demonstrators’ emotional constellation than the ideological support provided by that friend.

Religious right leaders and voters in the United States supported Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential election for the same reason that all blocs vote as they do: They believed that the candidate offered them the best opportunity to protect and extend their power and create their preferred government. The puzzle of their support, then, is less whythey chose Trump and more howthey navigated the process of inserting Trump into their story of themselves as a “moral” majority. This self-understanding promotes and exploits feelings of entitlement, fear, resentment, and the desire to dominate to encourage political action. Because Trump’s speeches affirm these feelings, religious right voters were open to writing a plot twist in their story, casting Trump as a King Cyrus figure, as their champion if not a coreligionist. This article analyzes appeals to and expressions of entitlement, fear, resentment, and the desire to dominate from more than 60 sermons, speeches, and books by religious right authors, Donald Trump, and Trump surrogates. Using open coding, it identifies themes in how these emotions are recognized, affirmed, and invoked by speakers, focusing on Trump’s Cyrus effect.

How does the study of emotions help us understand engaging in or abstaining from violent and illegal political behaviors in the context of the Eurozone economic crisis? This question sits at the core of our article. We focus particularly on anger, fear, and hope hypothesizing that combined with perceptions of self-efficacy, these emotions fuse in complex affective blends of resentful or ressentiment-fulaffectivity, which in turn determine the path of citizens’ political engagement. We test this using data from a three-wave cross-sectional survey from Greece, which contains measures of emotions and unique items of engagement with illegal and violent political actions. We show that such behaviors rest on complex clusters of resentful affectivitypointing to particular actions and reactions. Our theoretical and empirical framework can be useful for understanding political developments outside Greece manifested as grievances, anti-immigration demands, anti-establishment sentiment, anti-expert skepticism, and support for populist parties, extending previous theoretical and empirical work, which currently employ discrete measures of emotions.