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In this article, we develop a ground monitor capable of detecting anomalous signal-in-space spatial gradients for rising, newly acquired, and reacquired satellites in the ground-based augmentation system using either single or dual frequency. These gradients can be caused by satellite orbit ephemeris faults and ionospheric fronts. The monitor utilizes differential code and carrier phase measurements across multiple reference receiver antennas as the basis for detection. We show that the new monitor significantly improves performance over existing detection algorithms and is capable of meeting Category III precision approach and landing requirements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we describe and evaluate a new monitor that uses inertial navigation system (INS) measurements to detect spoofing attacks on global navigation satellite system (GNSS) receivers. Spoofing detection is accomplished by monitoring the Kalman filter innovations in a tightly coupled INS/GNSS mechanization. Monitor performance is evaluated against worst case spoofing attacks, including spoofers capable of tracking vehicle position. There are two main contributions of this paper. The first is a mathematical framework to quantify postmonitor spoofing integrity risk. The second is an analytical expression of the worst case sequence of spoofed GNSS signals. We then apply these to an example spoofing attack on a Boeing 747 on final approach. The results show that GNSS spoofing is easily detected, with high integrity, unless the spoofer's position-tracking devices have unrealistic, near-perfect accuracy, and no delays. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A new theoretical approach is described to quantify position-domain integrity risk for cycle ambiguity resolution problems in satellite-based navigation systems. It is typically conservatively assumed that all incorrectly fixed cycle ambiguities cause hazardously large position errors. While simple and practical, this conservative assumption can unnecessarily limit navigation availability for applications with stringent requirements for accuracy and integrity. In response, a new method for calculating the integrity risk for carrier phase navigation algorithms is developed. In this method we evaluate the impact of incorrect fixes in the position domain and define tight upper bounds on the resulting navigation integrity risk. Furthermore, a mechanism to implement this method with partially-fixed cycle ambiguity vectors is also derived. The improvement in navigation availability using the new method is quantified through covariance analysis performed over a range of error model parameters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, a methodology is developed to evaluate differential carrier phase navigation architectures subject to reference receiver faults. Carrier phase measurements can be used to provide high accuracy estimates of a user's position. But in applications that involve safety-of-life, such as in precision approach for autonomous shipboard landing, integrity also plays a critical role. One source of integrity risk is the potential for GPS reference receiver failure. Integrity risk in these situations is typically mitigated by equipping the reference station with redundant receivers. However, various approaches to utilize redundant carrier phase measurements from multiple reference receivers are possible. In this paper, we describe two new methods: an averaging approach where different position solutions are averaged in the position domain, and a coupled estimation approach where the measurements from all reference receivers are coupled in the range domain and used to estimate a unified position solution. Furthermore, we investigate the impact of using these methods on accuracy and integrity from several perspectives, including availability performance, cycle resolution capabilities, implementation complexity, and computational efficiency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]