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We consider an environmentwhere players need to decide whether to buy a certain product (or adopt a technology) or not. The product is either good or bad, but its true value is unknown to the players. Instead, each player has her own private information on its quality. Each player can observe the previous actions of other players and estimate the quality of the product. A classic result in the literature shows that in similar settings, informational cascades occur, where learning stops for the whole network and players repeat the actions of their predecessors. In contrast to this literature, in this paper, players get more than one opportunity to act. In each turn, a player is chosen uniformly at random from all the players and can decide to buy the product and leave the market or wait. Her utility is the total expected discounted reward, and thus, myopic strategies may not constitute equilibria. We provide a characterization of perfect Bayesian equilibria (PBEs) with forward-looking strategies through a fixed-point equation of dimensionality that grows only quadratically with the number of players. Using this tractable fixed-point equation, we show the existence of a PBE and characterize PBEs with threshold strategies. Based on this characterization, we study informational cascades in two regimes. First, we show that for a discount factor $\delta$ strictly smaller than 1, informational cascades happen with high probability as the number of players $N$ increases. Furthermore, only a small portion of the total information in the system is revealed before a cascade occurs. Second, and more surprisingly, we show that for a fixed $N$ , and for a sufficiently large $\delta < 1$ , when the product is bad, there exists an equilibrium where an informational cascade can happen only after at least half of the players revealed their private information, and consequently, the probability for a “bad cascade” where all the players buy the product vanishes exponentially with $N$. Finally, when $\delta =1$ and the product is bad, there exists an equilibrium where informational cascades do not happen at all. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We consider both finite-horizon and infinite-horizon versions of a dynamic game with $N$ selfish players who observe their types privately and take actions that are publicly observed. Players’ types evolve as conditionally independent Markov processes, conditioned on their current actions. Their actions and types jointly determine their instantaneous rewards. In dynamic games with asymmetric information, a widely used concept of equilibrium is perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) which consists of a strategy and belief pair that simultaneously satisfy sequential rationality and belief consistency. In general, there does not exist a universal algorithm that decouples the interdependence of strategies and beliefs over time in calculating PBE. In this paper, for the finite-horizon game with independent types, we develop a two-step backward–forward recursive algorithm that sequentially decomposes the problem (w.r.t. time) to obtain a subset of PBEs, which we refer to as structured Bayesian perfect equilibria (SPBE). In such equilibria, a player's strategy depends on his/her history only through a common public belief and its current private type. The backward recursive part of this algorithm defines an equilibrium generating function. Each period in the backward recursion involves solving a fixed-point equation on the space of probability simplexes for every possible belief on types. Using this function, equilibrium strategies and beliefs are generated through a forward recursion. We then extend this methodology to the infinite-horizon model, where we propose a time-invariant single-shot fixed-point equation, which in conjunction with a forward recursive step, generates the SPBE. Sufficient conditions for the existence of SPBE are provided. With our proposed method, we find equilibria that exhibit signaling behavior. This is illustrated with the help of a concrete public goods example. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we consider a delay differential inclusion $\dot{x}(t)\in F(t,x_t)$ , where $x_t$ denotes the history function of $x(\cdot)$ along an interval of time. We extend the celebrated Filippov's theorem to this case. Then, we further generalize this theorem to the case when the state variable $x$ is constrained to the closure of an open subset $K\subset \mathbb {R}^n$. Under a new “inward pointing condition,” we give a relaxation result stating that the set of trajectories lying in the interior of the state constraint is dense in the set of constrained trajectories of the convexified inclusion ${\dot{x}(t)\in \mbox{co}\,F(t,x_t)}$. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Information delays exist when the most recent inventory information available to the Inventory Manager (IM) is dated. In other words, the IM observes only the inventory level that belongs to an earlier period. Such situations are not uncommon, and they arise when it takes a while to process the demand data and pass the results to the IM. In this paper, we establish that the average cost optimal policy is of state-dependent basestock type with respect to the reference inventory position. We show that the optimal base stock depends on the age and the magnitude of the latest observed delay. We illustrate the results by solving an example with delays of 0 and 1, for which we are able to obtain formulas/bounds for the basestock levels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]