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The DVB standard does not mandate the use of authentication and integrity protection for transport streams. This allows malicious third parties to replace legitimate broadcasts by overpowering terrestrial transmissions. The rogue signal can then deliver a malicious broadcast stream to exploit security vulnerabilities on Smart TVs (STVs) in range. We implemented a proof-of-concept attack based on a malicious Hybrid Broadcast Broadband TV app, able to acquire permanent system-level access to an STV over the air, in less than 10 s. These attacks, however, are severely limited in range due to required co-channel protection ratios (CCPRs), which is in direct contradiction to previous publications. We present evidence for these limitations in form of laboratory experiments, extensive simulations, and field measurements. To this end, we developed an automated, low-cost method for CCPR determination, as well as a method for non-disruptive attack range measurements based on a gap filler and the resulting channel impulse response. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

For decades, broadcasters have heavily relied on specialized hardware appliances for media transport and processing. However, new architectures, where media transport is realized using IP networking and general-purpose compute hardware is used to run Virtual Media Functions (VMFs), are increasingly being adopted in the broadcast industry. To truly exploit the benefits of these architectures, efficient resource allocation algorithms are needed. Hence, we have proposed an algorithm to optimize a media service’s VMF Forwarding Graph (VMF-FG) prior to deployment. To deploy media services, two VMF Placement and Chaining (VMF-PC) algorithms– Next-Fit Placement and Chaining (NFPC) and $k$ -cut Placement and Chaining ($k$ -cutPC) are proposed. The presented evaluation results compare the performance of the two VMF-PC algorithms along with highlighting the improvement in resource allocation as a result of VMF-FG decomposition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]