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The terms module and modularity are not part of the technical taxonomy in any of the systems engineering standards, which do not regard a module as a part of the formal system breakdown structure. In this paper, we redefine the term module as a unit composed of a set of components with a set of specific interfaces. This unit serves one or more purely nonfunctional goals, such as flexibility, evolvability, manufacturability, testability, and maintainability. According to this definition, a configuration item, a subsystem, an assembly, a subassembly, or a component can all be regarded as modules as they can serve nonfunctional goals. The important assertion here is that a module's boundaries do not necessarily coincide with those dictated by the functional or spatial system decomposition and hierarchy. The aim of this paper is to lay the foundations for the future standardization of various engineering design processes based on modularity for nonfunctional benefits. A clear definition of the terms module and modularity can assist systems designers and developers to optimize the value of a modular system. This research highlights the present inconsistencies in the field of modular system design and puts forward some critical questions, which will shape the future research into this field. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines how multinational corporations (MNCs) protect their intellectual property (IP) when they conduct R&D in countries with weak IP rights (IPRs) protection. Findings from a small-scale survey and three case studies in China show that hierarchical segmentation of the R&D process can provide an effective way for IPR protection. Furthermore, a modular R&D structure adopted by many information technology companies can facilitate the hierarchical segmentation. Because R&D is becoming distributed across locations with varying levels of IPR protection, a center-peripheral R&D organizational structure is emerging within MNCs as R&D globalization proceeds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given their complexity and tight coupling, one of the most serious challenges high-reliability organizations (HROs) face is how to innovate, learn, and adapt without upsetting the internal processes that lead to their reliability. This paper describes the success of the United States Navy in using a "platform strategy" to facilitate modular innovation in its attack submarine program while maintaining high reliability. We compare the United States' submarine development program against that of the Soviets, who innovated by building a number of different types of nuclear attack submarines to test their new design concepts and thereby aggressively push both manufacturing and performance limits. We illustrate that, by adopting a platform strategy, the U.S. development program was able to sustain reliability by controlling factors that derived from four classes of concern: 1) operational; 2) manufacturing and design; 3) resource limitations, and 4) cultural constraints. The use of a platform strategy assists in maximizing systemwide organizational learning, which helps enrich a culture of reliability. However, at the same time, a platform strategy can hinder revolutionary and architectural innovation and reduce op- erational flexibility. Finally, we consider whether an HRO's innovation strategy is partially shaped by its decision-making process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Companies across industries have admired the success of Dell Computersin using modularity as part of a mass customization strategy to achieve build-to-order and a streamlined supply chain. Many companies are attempting to emulate this successful model, including the American automotive industry. This paper focuses on how the auto industry has been attempting to move to modularity, in part, motivated by a desire to build cars to order. This movement has led to major changes in supply chain practices based partly on imitation of successful keiretsu models in Japan and a move toward modules. This study finds significant impact of modularity on outsourcing, product development, and supply chain coordination based on interviews conducted with automakers and suppliers from 2009-2003. Based on our interviews, we observe that modularity has accompanied a major reorganization of the automotive supplier industry. We identify two major issues that appear to block U.S. automakers from gaining most of the advantages possible through modularity. First, most modularity activities appear to be primarily strategically cost reduction driven, leaving the potential of modularity for mass customization largely untapped. Second, the shift in industry reorganization has not been accompanied by changes in the supply chain infrastructure to encourage long-term partnerships. We contrast this to the more gradual approach used by Toyota as it incorporates modularity on a selective basis and moves to a build-to-order model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is concerned with optimizing the configuration of a set of platform products and the associated supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and multiple suppliers using a three-move dynamic game-theoretic approach. The variants in the product family share a common platform for developing/configuring variant modules which are substitutable in the sense that high-end module options can functionally replace low-end ones at higher prices. As the customer in the supply chain, the manufacturer takes its leading role by making the first move to give decisions on platform products development (PPD) and supplier selection. The concerned suppliers make the second move to optimize their decisions including price discounts and their ordering policies. The manufacturer finishes the game by taking the last move to make his ordering decisions. The ranges of the rational reactions for the players are derived from the analyses of their payoff models, and an enumerative algorithm is developed to find the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game through the technique of backward induction. The game model and the proposed solution procedure are illustrated through a series of simulation experiments and sensitivity analyses using a numerical example. The results have allowed us to draw some meaningful interpretations and useful managerial insights. The use of platform commonality and modularity has been found generally beneficial not only to the supply chain as a whole but also to individual players that are eventually configured into the game. Flexibility of the suppliers' capability is also found to affect the PPD decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]