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This paper considers the problem of secure parameter estimation when an estimation algorithm is prone to causative attacks. Causative attacks, in general, target decision-making algorithms (e.g., inference or learning algorithm) to alter their decisions in specific scenarios (e.g., distort parameter estimates for specific ranges of the parameter of interest). Such attacks influence the decisions via tampering with the mechanisms through which an algorithm acquires the statistical model of the population about which it aims to form a decision. Such attacks are viable, for instance, by contaminating the historical or training data, or by compromising an expert who provides the statistical model. In the presence of causative attacks, inference algorithms operate under a distorted statistical model for the data samples. This paper introduces a notion of secure parameter estimation and formalizes a framework under which secure estimation can be formulated and analyzed. The central premise underlying the secure estimation framework is that forming secure estimates introduces a new dimension to the estimation objective, pertaining to detecting attacks and isolating the true model. Since detection and isolation decisions themselves are imperfect, their inclusion induces an inherent coupling between the desired secure estimation objective and the auxiliary detection and isolation decisions that need to be formed in conjunction with the estimates. This paper establishes the fundamental interplay among these decisions, and characterizes the general decision rules in closed-forms for any desired estimation cost function. Furthermore, to circumvent the computational complexity associated with growing parameter dimension or attack complexity, a scalable estimation algorithm is provided, which is shown to enjoy certain optimality guarantees. Finally, the theory developed is applied to secure parameter estimation in sensor networks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The basic goal of threshold group testing is to identify up to $d$ defective items among a population of $n$ items, where $d$ is usually much smaller than $n$. The outcome of a test on a subset of items is positive if the subset has at least $u$ defective items, negative if it has up to $\ell $ defective items, where $0 \leq \ell < u$ , and arbitrary otherwise. This is called threshold group testing. The parameter $g = u - \ell - 1$ is called the gap. In this paper, we focus on the case $g > 0$ , i.e., threshold group testing with a gap. Note that the results presented here are also applicable to the case $g = 0$ ; however, the results are not as efficient as those in related work. Currently, a few reported studies have investigated test designs and decoding algorithms for identifying defective items. Most of the previous studies have not been feasible because there are numerous constraints on their problem settings or the decoding complexities of their proposed schemes are relatively large. Therefore, it is compulsory to reduce the number of tests as well as the decoding complexity, i.e., the time for identifying the defective items, for achieving practical schemes. The work presented here makes five contributions. The first is a more accurate theorem for a non-adaptive algorithm for threshold group testing proposed by Chen and Fu. The second is an improvement in the construction of disjunct matrices, which are the main tools for tackling (threshold) group testing and other tasks such as constructing cover-free families or learning hidden graphs. Specifically, we present a better exact upper bound on the number of tests for disjunct matrices compared with that in related work. The third and fourth contributions are a reduced exact upper bound on the number of tests and a reduced asymptotic bound on the decoding time for identifying defective items in a noisy setting on test outcomes. The fifth contribution is a simulation on the number of tests of the resulting improvements for previous work and the proposed theorems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]