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Vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communications is an important technology in vehicular ad hoc network (VANET) to support autonomous data exchange among vehicles. Multiple V2V communications modes have been investigated for VANET, including dedicated short-range communications (DSRC) based on IEEE 802.11p and LTE-V2X, which are suitable for different packet transmission cases. In order to fully exploit the strengths of various modes, hybrid V2V communications strategies are designed in this paper, where each vehicle is allowed to choose different modes for different kinds of transmissions in separate frequency bands for transmission throughput improvement. Furthermore, since it is usually impractical to decide all the vehicles’ communications strategies globally due to high computational complexity and heavy overhead to broadcast the decisions, we model the selection of hybrid V2V communications strategies for vehicles as an evolutionary game. A strategy selection algorithm is then proposed, where each vehicle can select its hybrid V2V communications strategy locally based on its evaluation of the payoffs for different strategies and limited signalling from the base station. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed algorithm can converge to an asymptotic stable state, which can improve the transmission throughput of vehicles, and is robust to the slight evaluation errors of payoffs and the strategy mutations of a few vehicles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In wireless multicast systems, cooperative multicast, in which successful users help to relay received packets to unsuccessful users, has been shown to be effective in combating channel fading and improving system performance. However, this mechanism requires the users' voluntary contributions, which cannot be guaranteed since users are selfish and only care about their own performance. Furthermore, users may have heterogeneous costs (which are their private information) to forward packets, and they may lie about their costs if cheating can improve their utilities. To address these problems, in this paper, we model the interaction among users in the wireless multicast system as a multiseller multibuyer payment-based game, where users pay to receive relay service and get paid if they forward packets to others. A simplified case with homogeneous users that have the same cost to forward packets is investigated first. Then, for the case with heterogeneous users, to encourage users to tell their true costs, we use the second-price sealed-bid auction, which is a truth-telling auction, since bidding the true cost is a weakly dominant strategy. To analyze the multiseller multibuyer payment-based game, we observe that under different selected prices, the game can converge to different equilibria, resulting in different user free-riding probabilities and system throughput. We also study the price selection problem and derive the optimal price that maximizes the system throughput. Simulation results show the effectiveness of our proposed mechanism. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]