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In this paper, spectrum sharing incentive for legitimate wireless information surveillance at the physical layer is investigated. The concept behind this is that authorized government agencies want to eavesdrop the communication between a suspicious source-destination pair, and stimulate the help of another source-destination pair (referred to as secondary users) looking for transmission opportunities. We thus propose to let the secondary receiver act as a monitor to eavesdrop the suspicious communication and let the secondary transmitter act as a friendly jammer to improve the eavesdropping performance, such that they are granted to share the spectrum of the suspicious users, as a reward. To guarantee the eavesdropping performance, the successful eavesdropping probability is required to be larger than that with passive eavesdropping. The problems of jointly optimizing the transmit power of the secondary transmitter and the successive interference cancellation (SIC) decoding order at the secondary receiver to maximize the average secondary transmission rate and minimize the secondary transmission outage probability are investigated. Two scenarios are considered for the availability of the channel state information (CSI). The first scenario assumes perfect CSI, and the optimal strategies for the transmit power control and the SIC decoding ordering are derived. The second scenario assumes partial CSI, where the instantaneous CSI of the secondary transmission link and the statistical CSI of the links related to the suspicious communication are available, and the optimal strategies for maximizing an approximate average secondary transmission rate and minimizing an approximate secondary transmission outage probability are proposed. Extensive simulation results validate the effectiveness of the proposed strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we study the network average power consumption minimization problem in a two-tier heterogeneous network by optimally tuning the activation ratio of micro base stations (BSs) under the quality of service (QoS) constraints of the network mean queueing delay and the network signal-to-interference ratio (SIR) coverage. With the consideration of dynamic packets arrivals, each BS can either be busy or be idle depending on its queueing status. The network performance is thus critically determined by the traffic intensity of each BS. With the assumption of universal frequency reuse, the average traffic intensity of each tier is characterized by a set of fixed-point equations, which can be solved by a proposed iterative method. By using the approximation that BSs of the same tier have the same SIR coverage, the cumulative distribution function of the traffic intensity of each tier is further obtained. On that basis, the network average power consumption per area, the network mean queueing delay, and the network SIR coverage are characterized. Numerical results demonstrate that if the idle power coefficient is below a certain threshold, then the optimal activation ratio equals the one to minimize the network average power consumption per area; otherwise, the optimal activation ratio can be obtained according to the QoS constraints. It is further shown that universal frequency reuse outperforms spectrum partitioning in terms of both the network average power consumption and the network SIR coverage in the considered scenario. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In wireless device-to-device (D2D) networks, devices are reluctant to forward packets because of limited energy and possible delays for their own data. The incentive mechanisms that motivate devices to constitute direct communication for wireless multimedia quality optimality in D2D systems have been overlooked in the past. In this paper, we propose a new low-complexity distributed game-theoretic source selection and power control scheme that enhances the multimedia transmission quality with latency constraints. This approach has two major contributions. First, the proposed approach optimally selects the most beneficial source devices by analyzing the interactions between the base station's (BS's) rewarding strategies (denoted by price) and the devices' contributing behaviors (denoted by transmission power) using a Stackelberg game model. Second, optimal transmission power is adjusted for each selected source device in D2D networks by deriving Stackelberg equilibrium, wherein the BS and the device both achieve maximum utility. Computer simulations demonstrate that significant improvement in D2D multimedia transmission quality can be obtained by deploying the proposed scheme. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]