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In this paper we build on Robert Jervis' concept of strategic triangles, relations between three states where from the point of view of each state the others are pivotal for its security or foreign policy behavior in a given region. We argue that triangles are important in influencing state behavior in the areas of balance of power, deterrence, arms races and status competition, and consider how these dimensions might interact. In this context, this article examines the US–India–China triangle, while also addressing to a lesser extent how other related triangles interlink with it, taking into account how China's rise and increasing economic interdependence impact these relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States has sought over the last two decades to facilitate India's rise as a means of balancing against China's ambitions. Notwithstanding the rich literature that has emerged on Sino-Indian dynamics and the U.S.-India-China triad, there has been remarkably little examination of the ways in which the United States navigates its relationships with these two rising powers. This study poses a simple question: to what extent has the United States' pursuit of its interests with India meant that it has accepted trade-offs with respect to its interests with China? Drawing on government documents, interviews with current and former U.S. officials, and an array of case studies between 2005 and early 2019, this study argues first that the U.S. bureaucracy has long been structured in such a way as to heavily compartment policy decision-making related to South Asia and East Asia, respectively, and to produce a pronounced but largely explicable structural bias toward East Asia; second, that relatively few policy matters have arisen since 2005 that have forced the United States to consider meaningful trade-offs between its India and China equities; and third, that new challenges may arise for Washington as its deals with an increasingly inter-connected Indo-Pacific region, and manages the bureaucratic and policy implications of its renewed emphasis on great power competition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research examines China's official perspectives on, and interpretation of, U.S.-China-India relations by surveying official, quasi-official, and some most relevant scholarly publications. China's official line has always emphasized the bilateral nature of the relationship between China and India fending off any third-party interference, including that from the United States. Neither Chinese leaders nor the regime's official media outlets would speak of China–India relationship with a triangular framework (with a rare exception of the Russia–India–China triangle). In the context of the rapid evolvement of U.S.-India military cooperation, the Chinese official line remains unforthcoming about whether such developments have direct implication for China's security or national interests. Chinese core official media has in fact minimized the popularization of the idea that containing China is the driving force behind any cooperation between India and the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, as China has continued to rise as an economic, political and military power, there has been increasing consideration of its role in shaping US–India relations over the last two decades. However, this article, considering the period 1949–1979, shows that American and Indian perceptions of and policy toward China shaped the US–India relationship even during the Cold War. In doing so, the article seeks not just to bring China back into the story of past US–India relations, but also shed light on the China–India–US triangle of today and of tomorrow. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses the implications of the development of ASAT technologies by India from an Australian perspective. It sets these developments within the context of the future of US engagement in the Pacific in the next 30 years, and especially the way in which China and the US manage their relationship as the relative strength of the former grows and the latter declines. How India responds to and seeks to influence these shifting forces will be determined largely by how India perceives and seeks to assert its place in the region. Australia's approach to space is changing, with 2009 considered to have been a tipping point. Some description of this changing context is provided as background to and rationale for the article's conclusion, which is that the development of ASAT capabilities by India is considered a natural technology progression and a somewhat less important factor in India's emergence as a regional power with the capacity to participate in and influence grand strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]