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Contemporary digital platforms have become increasingly infrastructuralized, and started to raise geopolitical tensions with their global expansion. Amidst the heightened geopolitical competition between the US and China, the growing power of Chinese infrastructuralized platforms has made them the center of recent geopolitical dynamics. Drawing from an exploratory case study, this paper discusses Alibaba, one of the most prominent Chinese Internet giants, as an infrastructuralized platform, and highlights its geopolitical struggles. Often perceived as an e-commerce company, Alibaba has become 'infrastructuralized': its now-massive digital empire has moved beyond e-commerce, expanding into almost every aspect of China's and global digital economy such as logistics, finance, offline retailing, and cloud computing. This paper traces three highly visible cases in Alibaba's global journey – its failed deal with MoneyGram in 2017, the uneven global journey of Alibaba Cloud, and the construction of the electronic World Trade Platform – to illustrate three key dimensions of the geopolitics of infrastructuralized platforms – namely, the geopolitics of everyday data, the geopolitics of the visibility-invisibility tension, and the geopolitics of modularity. By doing so, it contributes to the following two areas of scholarship. On the one hand, it contributes to the growing literature on 'infrastructures and platforms' by foregrounding the geopolitical dimensions of Chinese infrastructuralized platforms. On the other hand, it adds to the literature on the 'geopolitics of infrastructures' by bringing in a new type of infrastructure, complementing previous discussions on the geopolitics of traditional material infrastructures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Specialty coffee is increasingly produced and consumed as part of routine life in many cities in modern China, but the social and cultural shifts it has engendered yet to be systematically examined. By examining the intersections between social media and the operations of independent Chinese coffeehouses in the field of taste, this paper puts forward the idea of new taste among Chinese millennials, which comprises individual subjectivity, heterogeneous social relationships, and forms of class distinction. Using taste-oriented keyword searches on WeChat official accounts, 20 articles were returned and analyzed in terms of their textural and visual orientations to examine the processes underlying how taste is influenced in the consumption of specialty coffee in China. Findings suggest the importance of taste makers in this process, from routine creation of aesthetic ambience in the coffeehouses to the construction of affective taste spaces online, and the establishment of taste cycles from online to offline, which all underpin class privilege. Moreover, the emergence of an 'urban café community' appears to be characterized by specific forms of belonging resulting from a productive effect of the interplay between independent coffeehouses and consumers in everyday urban life in which a set of aesthetic boundaries reside. Second, these digital consumers distinguish themselves socially by positioning themselves as having a cosmopolitan taste grounded in coffee appreciation instead of merely consuming coffee for physiological benefits. These findings extend taste propositions through engagement of Chinese digital millennial consumers to uncover the underlying cultural classifications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite extensive studies on ethical data use and algorithms, little is known about the ethical perspectives of tech workers – insiders of a profession that heavily relies on data and algorithms. Nor have there been sufficient cross-national comparisons of their perspectives. Relying on interviews with 98 tech workers in China and the US, this paper is guided by two questions: (1) What are tech workers' perceptions of big data ethics, and (2) what are the cross-national similarities and differences in China and the US? The study found that there are cross-national similarities in tech workers' cautious enthusiasm about the applications of big data in their work, as well as in their complex and ambivalent ethical perspectives on the use of big data in government digital surveillance. The main cross-national differences occur in tech workers' perceptions of whether big data may reinforce social inequalities. US-based tech workers are concerned about the reinforcement of race and gender-based inequalities through the use of big data, whereas their colleagues in China are optimistic that the use of big data may reduce income-based inequalities across geographical regions. The study's findings have implications for how to leverage tech workers' influence and promote the ethical use of data and algorithms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Amid the ongoing pandemic and the so-called 'New Cold War,' physical mobility dwindles and political paranoia surges. China has been increasingly portrayed as a 'black box' in anglophone discourse, scholarly and popular alike. More than ever, digital platforms serve as the sites and means to know 'the Chinese reality.' In this paper, we mobilize insights from Science and Technology Studies (STS), especially its epistemological and ontological reflections on the 'black box' metaphor, to confront the ongoing 'blackboxing' of China and, in tandem, the embrace of digital platform data as 'open source' to penetrate China from afar. Foregrounding the role of technological infrastructures, research positionality, and power relations in knowledge production, we situate this phenomenon in broader shifts in geopolitics and academic ecology. We then suggest alternative routes for empirical investigation: (1) to reembed Chinese platform data in their sociotechnical contexts, (2) to approach a 'networked China' at and across different scales, and relatedly, (3) to attune to obscured positionalities in fieldwork and analysis. Ultimately, we urge communities of China researchers to attend to the politics and materiality of knowledge production and resist the pervading 'New Cold War' framing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the algorithmic era, both users and the platform battle for visibility. Chinese fans are savvy users who explore the hidden algorithms behind platform functions. With the collectively developed algorithmic imaginary, digital fandom communities negotiate with the platform over algorithms to optimize the visibility of celebrities they endorse. Drawing from participatory observation and semi-structured interviews in Chinese online fandoms of an idol group, INTO1, we detailed how fans as digital users collectively explore, interpret, and creatively utilize algorithms to increase their idol's visibility. We conclude that visibility, as a representation of algorithm power, is co-defined through the constant push-and-pull between digital users and the platform. This paper contributes to both algorithm and fandom studies by describing large-scale non-professional users' daily construction of the algorithmic imaginary in the unique context of Chinese fandom and beyond. It also discusses broader civic implications of fans' algorithmic practices to wider digital users in China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While there is a large literature on the determinants of generalized trust, few studies have explored the impact of internal migration and attempted to tackle potential endogeneity issues. Using nationally representative data from the latest five rounds of the China General Society Survey, this paper estimates the impact of internal migration on generalized trust by exploiting arguably exogenous, historical changes in the GDP growth target set by the government and the share of migrants at the county level. We find evidence of a significant negative impact of internal migration on generalized trust. We also investigate the moderating role of Internet use, and find that whilst Internet use significantly attenuates the negative impact on generalized trust of internal migration, this moderating effect is much stronger for urban-to-urban migrants than it is for rural-to-urban migrants. The results further indicate that internal migration in China has led to the deterioration of subjective well-being, changing perceptions of fairness, increased likelihood of downward social mobility, and deterioration in social relations, which we interpret as potential mechanisms behind our findings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Through document analysis and interviews, this paper examines the patent narratives of Transsion, a Chinese company dominating Africa's smartphone market and a leading innovator in facial recognition technologies (FRTs) optimized for darker skin tones. We identify two major narratives concerning Transsion's FRT patenting practice. First is 'empowerment', through which Transsion argues that there are 'blind spots' in conventional AI technologies and presents its AI camera as a remedy and an empowerment tool for dark-skinned users by 'seeing' their beauty. Second is the 'warfare' narrative, which is shaped by the heightening market competition and accelerating patent races among Chinese phone makers. As the battle for tech supremacy intensifies in Africa, Transsion expresses a strong sense of crisis and considers its FRT patents as 'weapons of competition' in preparation for a future smartphone warfare in Africa. This study makes two contributions. Empirically, through analyzing patents, we examine a relatively less-known Chinese tech company that has tremendous impact in the Global South. Theoretically, we interrogate the possibility of algorithmic empowerment against racist AI and technological independence through patents, although developing AI as weaponry, in the China-Africa context, also hampers the politics of decolonization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Beginning in 2014, Chinese Internet-users can purchase care and concern online. Customers can hire both male and female virtual lovers (xuni lianren) to talk to them while the lovers perform character roles of their choice. By examining why female customers consume virtual loving services, we argue that women hire male virtual lovers to assuage the frustrations that they accrue in their daily lives, and not to look for offline romantic partners. Inspired by the concept of 'emergent masculinity' (Inhorn & Wentzell, 2011. Embodying emergent masculinities: Men engaging with reproductive and sexual health technologies in the Middle East and Mexico. American Ethnologist, 38(4), 801–815), we coin the term emergent femininity. This term describes how, after a century-long process where the individual breaks free from familial and societal strictures, present-day young and urban Chinese women now exhibit a novel mode of womanhood characterized by historically unprecedented self-confidence, a willingness to openly articulate and purchase what they want, and a high degree of mediatization. Hence, this paper illuminates the appearance of 'new women' in China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China is the largest foreign information and communications technology (ICT) investor in Africa, and Chinese telecommunication companies including Huawei, CloudWalk, and Transsion have brought a range of artificial intelligence (AI) technology to Africa, from face recognition to smart cities. Existing analysis of China's AI impact in Africa, however, habitually falls into a Cold War-style narrative of 'authoritarianism' against the backdrop of 'liberal democracy.' This article calls for going beyond the oversimplified paradigm and proposes to examine the new phenomenon through a more sophisticated and critical lens. First, I show how (English language) media's investigations and academia's analysis of China's AI policy and its global impact (particularly in Africa) usually concentrate on a deep concern about the exportation of authoritarianism from Beijing. The article then demonstrates that the 'authoritarianism vs liberal democracy' model is problematic, if not outdated, and particularly insufficient to capture the multi-layered and overlapping realities of authoritarian and democratic moves by states around the world and the distinguishing properties of AI technologies. Based on a critical appraisal of the notions of surveillance capitalism and data colonialism and the recent empirical evidence from Africa in the third and fourth sections, I propose that these two concepts are more productive analytical frameworks for understanding what is going on in Africa related to the presence of China's AI, as well as for updating and moving forward the debates about whether China is colonizing Africa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In China, the live-streaming industry boasts 587 million users worth 961 billion yuan in 2020 [Yimei Zixun (2021, 16 March). 2020–2021 Zhongguo zaixian zhibo hangye niandu yanjiu baogao. ]. With so many live-streamers clamoring for fame and fortune, the sheer competition catalyzes the rise of 'live-streaming guilds' (zhibo gonghui) that help members elevate themselves in the performance charts of the various live-streaming apps. In this article, we conducted ethnographic research in one such guild that contracted its business from the live-streaming platform Zhubei. By conceptualizing these guilds as collectives of manipulating 'algorithmic experts' [Bishop, S. (2020). Algorithmic experts: Selling algorithmic lore on YouTube. Social Media + Society, 6(1), 1–11. https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305119897323], we argue that they optimize their live-streamers' performance according to algorithmic parameters that the platforms themselves reveal. However, guilds manipulate audience affects more, going so far as to use heterosexual male workers to masquerade as female live-streamers to entice straight male audience members to tip generously. As such, we challenge the still-prevalent epistemological assumption that live-streamers work alone, and the received wisdom that platform algorithms are unknown and unknowable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While it is increasingly recognised that commercial social media platforms are not neutral tools for online activism, our knowledge of how such platforms concretely intervene in user activities and shape the dynamics of online activism remains limited. This article focuses on analysing the strategies and mechanisms that have been used by Sina Weibo to manage online contention. Based on interviews with Weibo operators and opinion leaders, and analysis of relevant cases and documents, this article finds that in its early days Weibo actively facilitated the production and spread of online contention to establish itself as a key avenue for users to discuss and follow the development of unfolding incidents. Meanwhile, subtle strategies were applied to mitigate the tension between engaging users and conducting censorship. By showing how Weibo managed online contention in order to advance its own commercial interests, this article contributes to a deeper understanding of the role social media platforms play in online activism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the current digital era, crucial questions include whether and how nondemocratic regimes retain information control in the face of proliferating new communication technologies. The scholarship has long cited China as a prime example of how authoritarian regimes implement internet censorship. Echoing emergent studies that have called attention to the highly fragmented nature of China's censorship agencies, which operate at different government levels, this research addresses local censorship agencies and their practices. Combining participatory observations and in-depth interviews conducted in a district in H City, one of China's digital economy hubs, this research explores how the local censorship regime deploys soft forms of maintaining control over information. Based on an institutional approach, the findings show that the local censorship regime has adopted proactive strategies to build a reciprocal relationship with local news start-ups, forming a variant of 'contingent symbiosis'. The local censorship regime uses policy and economic stimulus to co-opt news start-ups, inducing them to distance themselves from politically sensitive issues and local negative news and boost local propaganda agendas. These internet organisations have attempted to sustain positive relationships with the local censorship regime to acquire government resources and patronage, which would ensure their stable operation and survival under stiff competition in a precarious institutional environment. This research further explains the conditions of fragmented governance and platformisation under which this contingent symbiosis forms and the routinised practices that sustain it. This relational governance is covert and brings new challenges to the free flow of information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this introductory essay, the editors consider the current challenges in understanding a networked China. We consider how the digital media landscape has changed just since an earlier collection of research in 2015, subtitled 'global dynamics of digital media and civic engagement.' We take up this orienting concept of civic engagement to explore emerging mediated spaces for cultural production through global connectivities. Beyond an area studies contribution, we focus on China more broadly as a complex global assemblage: an intersection of technology, norms, and socio-cultural structures. Our contributors were invited to consider 'what' and 'where' is China, and 'how do we know China?' Along with logistical challenges of fieldwork involving constraints of geopolitics and pandemic, we encouraged an epistemic reflexivity around reliance on certain paradigms, concepts and kinds of data. This research is further complicated by sensitivities around by the very vocabulary often involved, including public, civil society, and civic engagement itself. In the search for digital China, contributors consider how to think about China and how to locate a digital China. In exploring digital production and performance of and in China, we include analyses of fandom, idols, and the curation of collective pandemic memories. Together, this collection provides a rich set of deeply researched cases and imaginative new strategies to understand how the contradictions of digital China – between connectivity and control – are playing out, with important implications for the changing nature of public life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study problematizes the paradox of coexisting market dynamisms and the strong state in China's ICT industry through an empirical inquiry into the history and practices of ICT entrepreneurship in Beijing's Zhongguancun (ZGC), an alternative geo-imaginary to that of Silicon Valley. Drawing on archival research as well as interviews and participant observations between 2015 and 2020, we situate the post-2008 rise of ICT entrepreneurship in ZGC in the history of its decades-long transformation. We highlight two new ways in which the state has become intertwined with the market in the ICT sector. First, state agents at various levels have transformed themselves into 'market agencies,' acting through the market instead of governing it at a distance. Second, the state has increasingly taken a financialized approach to ICT governance, assuming the role of a capital investor to guide and facilitate rather than directly managing a market-driven entrepreneurial economy. We show how these macro political economic shifts have shaped mezzo level institutional changes and the micro, lived experiences of entrepreneurs variously situated along the elite-grassroots spectrum in ZGC, who rode waves of 'mass entrepreneurship and innovation' under the current Xi-Li administration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The goal of this article is to reflect on and challenge some key presumptions in the existing research on digital China, and to critically extend this line of inquiry by engaging with the transnational perspective. We argue that the transnational lens, while acknowledging the vital role of the state, can reveal a more diverse set of actors and their dynamics. Theoretically, we borrow from critical studies that conceptualize and repackage Chinese-ness as Sinophone communities and expression, a more progressive, inclusive, and grounded perspective. To substantiate our arguments, we introduce two cases derived from our own empirical studies: the multi-faceted border transgression of platform game workers, as well as the transnational production and boomerang diffusion of disinformation to undergird the less visible service and content supply chain. We propose that future research should recenter the fluid and intersectional identities of actors involved in the digital presumption, and utilize a multi-platform and relational approach to shed light on the dynamic evolution of transnationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chinese idol fans have been identified among the main forces in cyber nationalist activisms in recent years, acting as the nationalist fans protecting the state as an idol in response to external political shocks. Their skills in acknowledging, involving, and even reinventing the image of the state and national pride in cyber nationalist activisms do not emerge in a vacuum. This article examines how idol fans involve and reinvent the nationalist discourse in their everyday fan activities – idol promotion. We focus on the pandemic in 2020 as it provides a specific social and political context that allows us to understand better the interaction between idol fans and the state in their mundane fan activities. We construct our analysis under the computational grounded theory framework with over 6 million fan posts collected from Weibo and 11 in-depth interviews with active idol fans. Our findings show that when engaging in pandemic-related discussion, idol fans actively borrowed official discourse on nationalism and strategically responded to key political and social events in their idol promotion activities. The idol images they built are not only positive but also nationalist. Therefore, they play not only the commercial logic commonly seen in the Japanese and Korean K-pop/idol culture but also the political logic propagated by the state in China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

(How) are Chinese actors contributing to increased state influence in Internet standard-making? In its open and private-based dimension, the Internet is possibly the twenty-first century's epitome of the liberal international order in its global spatial dimension. Therefore, many see deep normative challenges deriving from the rise of powerful, non-liberal actors such as China. In particular, China and Chinese stakeholders are often portrayed as supporters and promoters of a multilateral Internet governance model based on digital sovereignty aimed at completely replacing the existing multistakeholder, private-based model. Academic views on this topic have become less dichotomous throughout the years, especially as China's position on it has become more nuanced. However, this academic and policy debate is still open. This article analyses Chinese stakeholder actions in the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), the key venue for Internet standard-making. Through network analysis, this article maps the engagement of Chinese stakeholders in selected working groups of the IETF over time. Through expert interviews, this article interprets the drivers, evolution, and impact of such engagement. This research yields two main findings: first, it shows that the Chinese government does not have full control of its domestic private actors, among which there is both collaboration and conflict. Second, it concludes that Chinese stakeholders have increasingly accepted the existing functioning of IETF standard-making as they grew influential within it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This introductory essay summarizes how our understanding of Chinese internets – in the plural – has shifted in the past two decades. The incumbent approach sees 'Chinese tech' as a unitary and statist monolith, an incomplete view whose utility has declined. By contrast, the articles in this special issue collectively substantiate a novel geopolitical approach that analyzes 'Chinese internets' as internally diverse and externally border-crossing; as both public (governmental and non-governmental) and private (e.g., corporate); as discursive and policy entanglements beyond the dichotomy of multistakeholderism and multilateralism; and as global, regional, and local formations that are connected to, but not entirely constrained by, their national counterparts. Pluralist and multilayered, this new approach to analyzing Chinese techno-geopolitics shall provide a better fit for contemporary internet research involving state and nonstate actors in China, including Chinese companies operating both overseas and globally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using an example of China's environmental data activism, this study explores the state–society interactive mode of socialization in the politics of open government data. Drawing on an interactionist approach, this study argues that in this intermediate situation, NGOs are relatively autonomous, organizing their campaigns and initiatives independently instead of partnering with the state. However, these two sides both spur and exploit each other, shaping an 'interactive field.' Data actors use the state's open data agenda as an opportunity to initiate spin-off data activism to counteract the deficiencies of data disclosure by the government. In response, state agencies adjust and enhance their data disclosure practices, thus performing reactive data governance. We identified several dynamics of this interactive field: (1) It involves multiple grassroots data actors in the form of NGOs that attempt to expand the autonomy of their data advocacy by forming activist networks to bargain with state bureaucracy. (2) The interactive strategies mainly involve tactics of 'rightful resistance' but are hybridized with other boundary-spanning strategies that straddle the demarcation of confrontation and non-confrontation. (3) Although the state and nonstate actors are not partnered, they exert mutual influence over each other's actions and strategies. The shrinking of institutional space has caused NGOs to reorganize interactive strategies. Our study also highlights the local geopolitical dynamics that condition such interactions: besides the inter-administrative dynamics that afford political opportunities, the trans-local advocacy network coordinates actors and resources to exercise data counterpower. Also, the selection of advocacy strategies is varied with targeted government agencies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a comparative analysis of how people manage ways of communicating with their social ties. It thereby makes a qualitative contribution to the social ties literature [Granovetter, 1973. The strength of weak ties. American Journal of Sociology, 78(6), 1360–1380. doi:], which is dominated by quantitative approaches. Specifically, the article maps different criteria that people consider when they combine the affordances [Hutchby, 2001. The communicative affordances of technological artefacts. In Conversation and technology, from the telephone to the Internet (pp. 13–33). Polity Press] of various types of communication in their interaction with different social ties. The qualitative analysis is based on ethnographic fieldwork in China, Denmark and the US, adopting and adapting a shared interview-diary-interview method in each field site (Lai, S. S., Pagh, J., & Zeng, F. H. (2019). Tracing Communicative Patterns. Nordicom Review, 40(s1). https://doi.org/10.2478/nor-2019-001.). Despite apparent sociocultural and infrastructural differences between the national contexts, we find that people, guided by universal aspects of sociality, share five criteria, namely efficiency, sensibility, ephemerality, insistency, and availability, that ground their everyday communications with both strong and weak ties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The existing literature on labor control of on-demand platforms primarily concentrates on algorithmic management. Based on the case study of Didi Chuxing, China's ride-hailing giant, this article introduces some additional complexities into the dominant storyline by bringing two managerial elements to the fore, namely, labor intermediaries and communication technologies. Although both have long been integral to the control of flexible labor forces in the post-Fordist era, they remain underexplored in the context of the on-demand economy. I argue that labor intermediaries emerge as quick solutions to the indeterminacy of labor mobility power, a critical problem inherent in the just-in-time labor strategies that challenge on-demand platform companies. Communication technologies are crucial for the functioning of this mediated relationship, formulating a virtual space where daily managerial practices take place. Ultimately, I stress that, while the labor process of on-demand platforms represents a shift towards fluid workspace, it does not mean the elimination of the organization-based control that usually occurs in a physical and formal workspace. This case study urges scholars to understand labor control of on-demand platforms as a regime of hybridity that features both continuity and renewal of the various forms of managerial strategies common to flexible production. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our study gives voice to socially marginalized women from the Global South whose struggles with sexual harassment are largely invisible in the #Metoo movement. Employing an ethnographic approach, this study examines the digitized resistance of Chinese rural–urban migrant women (n = 41) against sexual harassment faced in their workplaces. We adopt the lens of intersectionality to reveal the nuanced impacts of mobile communication practices negotiated in the context of gender, class, and the organizational structure across informal and formal economies. We find contrasting pictures of bottom-up disruption in the informal labor market and top-down transformation occurring in the modern factory. Migrant women working in the unregulated market restructured the existing patriarchal culture by deploying mobiles to establish collaborative groups for job information sharing. This mobile-mediated sharing enabled the rise of self-employed entrepreneurship, thus avoiding male intermediation in their livelihoods and thereby reducing the chances of encountering harassment. However, these benefits were uneven, with digitally-challenged women missing out. In contrast, migrant women employed in a registered factory with established rules actively negotiated top-down transformation of patriarchal culture. Female managers, in newly gained leadership roles, exercised their professional authority to encourage female workers to re-shape the discursive gender power of mobile spaces shared with male workers. Women actively confronted sexually provocative behavior of men on chat groups. We argue that subtle and covert mobile practices, in addition to visible and direct ones, allow for the construction of digitized female resistance culture as part of broader societal change influenced by mobile communication. We conclude with comments on the complexity and dynamism of mobile-mediated gender transformation in the context of rapid socio-economic development in the Global South. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based upon thirteen months of ethnographic fieldwork in South China, this study employs Lauren Berlant's concept of cruel optimism to examine how Chinese rural migrant workers – an economically and culturally disadvantaged group – use digital dating services and select dates. It juxtaposes the rural migrant workers' encouraged engagement with digital dating with interview accounts which reveal that digital dating presents a large sum of obstacles to the fulfilment of sexual and romantic desire. Our research shows that these obstacles (both 'virtual' and 'real') are highly gendered, which is partly related to a cultural shift towards materialism in the Chinese society. Specifically, rural migrant men have described themselves as being harshly excluded or exploited on the dating scene, whereas rural migrant women have reported that they have unwittingly dated men with deceptive profiles or developed romantic relationships that were dashed by economic turmoil. Hence, the study empirically extends the literature on digital dating beyond its traditional focus on Western contexts. It also clearly demonstrates that, while digital dating ignites a sense of possibility and desire, particularly among individuals of lower socioeconomic status, it fails to support these users in tackling the structural inequalities obstructing realization of their desire. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the areas that the advent of the Internet has changed most profoundly is the relationship that human beings have with their past. Sources that would once have been barely accessible after a difficult and taxing search are now available to one and all, and can be compared to more traditional texts. The article sets out to show how knowledge of Mao's China and the Cultural Revolution in particular will benefit significantly from the immense pool of recordings and video clips available on the Internet. With the resources afforded by the Web, a brand–new way of linking up words and images, text and visual sources, has become possible, providing the study of history and memory with unexplored tracts of promising terrain. But the importance of this emerging material is not just to do with historical knowledge and methodology. Its main contribution is political: the persecutors and the victims of those years have spoken out, they have deposited their memories online, exercising a faculty that the Cultural Revolution and post–Maoist political institutions had denied them for decades. Through the bottom–up perspective that the Internet provides, the historical protagonists have been able to bear witness in potential perpetuity without needing the researcher's mediation. By speaking directly to the public, the witnesses cease to be merely pieces of the past. They are not just victims or perpetrators who condemn past deeds, but, as the actors who made and endured history, they can turn themselves from passive historical figures into active political agents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Globally, mainstream digital gaming has long been marked by compulsory (hetero)sexuality and hypermasculine gender norms, making it an ideal arena for exploring gendered power relations. This article critically examines how the participation of Chinese women digital gamers has taken on a distinctive shape in the context of newly emerging local online games that serve as an extension of the market mechanism. We examine the players' experience of two games: namely, a multiplayer online battle arena (MOBA) game, King of Glory (wangzhe rongyao), and an otome love simulation game, Evol LoveR (lian yu zhizuoren). Results of 31 in-depth qualitative interviews with Chinese women gamers show that Chinese women's gaming experience has been profoundly shaped by both changes and continuities in the norms governing Chinese women's participation in play, romance and sex. We conclude that Chinese MOBA and otome games are not isolated new media products, but actually part and parcel of a broader digital media economy which provides audiences and players with information and cues that reinforce the dominant view that women and men have fundamentally different characteristics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Artificial intelligence (AI) has become a prominent public issue, particularly in China, where the government has announced plans to turn the country into a global AI power. This study analyses public discourse about AI in China through the conceptual lens of public spheres theory and counter-public spheres. It compares the official AI narrative on People's Daily Online with public discussion about AI on the social medium WeChat, where we assumed that official views would be challenged. Using a combination of qualitative and computational methods, 140,000 AI-related articles published between 2015 and 2018 were studied. Findings reveal that AI-related discourse on WeChat is surprisingly similar to that on People's Daily Online. That is, it is dominated by industry and political actors, such as government agencies and technology companies, and is mostly characterised by discussions about the economic potential of the technology, with strongly positive evaluations, and little critical debate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Few studies have examined how non-verbal functions are implicated in online communication and in non-Western contexts. Addressing these lacunae, this article analyzes interviews with Hong Kong youth to interrogate how likes are exchanged in online interactions within the context of guanxi. This article discovers that likes are reimagined as a digital gift of renqing representing targeted attention from specific giver-identities that generates circuits of likes exchanged between participants for tie-maintenance and tie-formation. For weak ties, lower frequency of reciprocity and sense of obligation were reported, whereas strong ties engendered reports of higher frequency of reciprocity and sense of obligation. However, across all dyadic guanxi ties, participants felt a constant renqing debt demanding repayment. As such, participants felt the need for some baseline frequency of like exchange and offended when alters neglected reciprocity altogether, yet continued giving likes for fear of damaging their reputation and relationship. Thus, mianzi is reconceptualized as embedded in interpersonal evaluations of one's reputation based on how well they maintain relationships and bound up in the social interactive tendency to exchange renqing over time. These webs of meaning and exchange encircle the objective of maintaining relationships by invigorating their emotional content. Here, the non-verbality of likes deepened their ability to replicate the raw, emotive charge of renqing: stripped of the burdensome complexities of verbal communication, likes convey a simple, one-dimensional, powerful sentiment of agreement that, in participants' experiences, is useful to generating future exchanges of likes and improving online relationships enough to create relationships offline as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]