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The digital divide gained new importance since the outbreak of COVID-19 pandemics. However, the phenomenon is far from being fully conceptualized or effectively measured. The key question, whether digital divide is a mere extension of other social inequalities, or it has significant new meaning, remains largely unanswered; a reason is the lack of effective instruments of quantitative study of the phenomenon that would capture its complex nature. The present paper addresses both conceptualizing and measurement issues, suggesting that separation of supply- and demand-side considerations is crucial in understanding the digital divide and introducing a composite Digital Life Index, measures separately the digital supply and demand across seven independent dimensions. The Index is based on Internet-borne data, a distinction from traditional research approaches that rely on official statistics or surveys. Though the empiric part of the paper is focused on the sub-national digital divide in Russia we argue that its methodology can be applied on many other levels and its conceptual findings are relevant to understanding the phenomenon globally. The hierarchical regression analysis is used to determine the relative importance of factors like income, human capital, and policy in shaping the digital divide. The result of the analysis suggests that the digital divide is driven more by the differences in demand than in supply; the role of income is insignificant, and the quality of policy and human capital is the key determinant of the divide. The paper advances the existing conceptual and methodological literature on the issue and can also inform practical decision-making regarding the strategies of national and regional digital development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article advances extant research that has audited search algorithms for misinformation in four respects. Firstly, this is the first misinformation audit not to implement a national but a cross-national research design. Secondly, it retrieves results not in response to the most popular query terms. Instead, it theorizes two semantic dimensions of search terms and illustrates how they impact the number of misinformative results returned. Furthermore, the analysis not only captures the mere presence of misinformative content but in addition whether the source websites are affiliated with a key misinformation actor (Russia's ruling elites) and whom the conspiracy narratives cast as the malicious plotters. Empirically, the audit compares Covid-19 conspiracy theories in Google search results across 5 key target countries of Russia's foreign communication (Belarus, Estonia, Germany, Ukraine, and the US) and Russia as of November 2020 (N = 5280 search results). It finds that, across all countries, primarily content published by mass media organizations rendered conspiracy theories visible in search results. Conspiratorial content published on websites affiliated with Russia's ruling elites was retrieved in the Belarusian, German and Russian contexts. Across all countries, the majority of conspiracy narratives suspected plotters from China. Malicious actors from the US were insinuated exclusively by sources affiliated with Russia's elites. Overall, conspiracy narratives did not primarily deepen divides within but between national communities, since – across all countries – only plotters from beyond the national borders were blamed. To conclude, the article discusses methodological advice and promising paths of research for future cross-national search engine audits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Massive efforts have been dedicated to studying political search engine bias in democratic contexts, and a growing body of literature has scrutinized search engine censorship in authoritarian China. By contrast, very little is known still about political search engine bias within Russia's slightly more open authoritarian media system. In order to fill in this gap, this study asks: How has Russia's leading partially state-controlled search engine Yandex mediated a large-scale anti-regime protest event (anti-corruption protests on 26 March 2017) in the twenty months thereafter? The study analyzes a data set of 30,471 results, retrieved in regular intervals for nine query terms from four platforms: Yandex.ru, News.yandex.ru, Google.ru, and News.google.ru. As the findings demonstrate, both Yandex algorithms (by comparison with their Google counterparts) referred users to significantly fewer websites that contained information about the protest event (reference bias). In a similar vein, both Yandex algorithms forwarded users to fewer websites that regularly featured criticism of Russia's authoritarian leadership (source bias). Moreover, Yandex algorithms tended to be particularly biased in the event's immediate aftermath. In the first week after the protests, for instance, the difference in reference ratios between Google and Yandex Web searches were massive (mean difference: 23% points), while they were less pronounced during the remaining time period studied (mean difference: 7% points). These findings are highly politically relevant because rapid diffusion of information about protest events can be considered of key importance to further protest mobilization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How are extensive internet control, surveillance and restricted online anonymity reconceptualized into virtues of effective state governance, rather than violations of civic rights? The Russian government has instrumentalized ostensibly sound legitimations – countering terrorist and extremist propaganda, combatting child pornography – to bring about a dramatic decline in internet freedom. While these policies have been widely studied, scholarship examining how the Russian government legitimates and cultivates popular support for restricting online freedoms remains scarce. This article therefore studies how restrictions of internet freedom are framed in political and media discourses. It focuses on the case of Telegram, a popular messaging application that was banned in Russia in April 2018 for its refusal to provide the FSB with access to encrypted messages in compliance with anti-terrorism legislation. It finds that media framing of the ban was more diverse than the official governmental line. While national security framing was important, the 'rule of law' frame occurred most frequently, and conspiracy framing was markedly infrequent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Today, a number of high-profile initiatives across the globe are concrete implementations of the 'digital sovereignty' principle: i.e., the idea that states should 'reaffirm' their authority over the Internet and the broader digital ecosystem, to protect their citizens, institutions, and businesses from the multiple challenges to their nation's self-determination in the digital sphere. According to this principle, sovereignty depends on more than supra-national alliances or international legal instruments, military might or trade: it depends on locally owned, controlled and operated innovation ecosystems, able to increase states' technical and economic independence and autonomy. Presently, digital sovereignty is understood primarily as a legal concept and a set of political discourses. As a consequence, it is predominantly analyzed by political science, international relations and international law. However, the study of digital sovereignty as a set of infrastructures and socio-material practices has been comparatively neglected. This article explores how the concept of digital sovereignty can be studied via the infrastructure-embedded 'situated practices' of various political and economic projects which aim to establish autonomous digital infrastructures in a hyperconnected world. Although the article focuses primarily on outlining the agenda for a wider and comparative research program, I will place a specific focus on Russia, subject of an ongoing research project, as a pilot case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]