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Online petitions have become a widespread vehicle for contemporary political participation. While research tends to focus on individual factors for potential petitioners that influence signing, less attention has been paid to the influence of the actual text of petitions. This paper uses data from an original web-based survey experiment in Australia and Germany to test the influence of content factors: narratives (i.e., stories based on individual experiences and emotions) and popularity cues (i.e., high numbers of signatures) across two issues: climate change and welfare policy. We find that narratives within petition texts involve readers through the mechanism of transportation and motivate them to sign petitions, as do popularity cues. The effects of narratives were found across both countries but tended to be stronger in Germany than in Australia. We argue that our novel framework can be used for future research on how the presentation of issues shape contemporary political participation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For some time now, media regulators in Germany and beyond have been trying to cope with the rise of digital intermediaries like social networks and search engines. In this context, the German Network Enforcement Act ('NetzDG') has become the epitome of the concept of new-school speech regulation: the increasing co-optation of intermediaries for governmental content moderation – with all its potential harms to free expression and democratic discourse. Contrary to this trend, however, recent legislative measures in Germany, including the Interstate Media Treaty (IMT), suggest that the country is exploring new avenues in digital intermediary regulation. Not only does the new German legislation focus on procedural instead of substantive aspects of content moderation, offering a case study for concepts promoted by recent literature on platform regulation. By introducing a positive bias for certain 'content of value,' the country also includes the role of beneficial content in its regulation. This paper analyzes the new German countermovement against new-school regulation and presents its potential impact for future regulatory concepts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does the content of so-called 'fake news' differ across Western democracies? While previous research on online disinformation has focused on the individual level, the current study aims to shed light on cross-national differences. It compares online disinformation re-published by fact checkers from four Western democracies (the US, the UK, Germany, and Austria). The findings reveal significant differences between English-speaking and German-speaking countries. In the US and the UK, the largest shares of partisan disinformation are found, while in Germany and Austria sensationalist stories prevail. Moreover, in English-speaking countries, disinformation frequently attacks political actors, whereas in German-speaking countries, immigrants are most frequently targeted. Across all of the countries, topics of false stories strongly mirror national news agendas. Based on these results, the paper argues that online disinformation is not only a technology-driven phenomenon but also shaped by national information environments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous research has acknowledged the use of social media in political communication by right-wing populist parties and politicians. Less is known, however, about its pivotal role for right-wing social movements which rely on personalized messages to mobilize supporters and challenge the mainstream party system. This paper analyzes online political communication by the right-wing populist movement Pegida and German political parties. We investigate to which extent parties attract supporters of Pegida, to which extent they address topics similar to Pegida and whether their topic use has become more similar over a period of almost two years. The empirical analysis is based on Facebook posts by main accounts and individual representatives of these political groups. We first show that there are considerable overlaps in the audiences of Pegida and the new challenger in the party system, AfD. Then we use topic models to characterize topic use by party and surveyed crowdworkers to which extent they perceive the identified topics as populist communication. The results show that while Pegida and AfD talk about rather unique topics and smaller parties engage to varying degrees with the topics populists emphasize, the two governing parties CDU and SPD clearly deemphasize those. Overall, the findings indicate that the considerable attention devoted to populist actors and shifts in public opinion due to the refugee crisis have left only moderate marks in political communication within the mainstream party system. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article compares the communication strategies of party and candidate accounts on Instagram during the 2017 German federal election. Building upon previous research, we conceptualize how the digital architecture of the platform determines its communication norms and how the actual communication practices implemented by parties and candidates follow or violate these norms. Therefore, we analyze how Instagram is used to implement different campaign strategies, focusing on (1) the use of network-related Instagram features-like Hashtags-, (2) text-integrated images, (3) dominant visual themes, (4) visual personalization, and (5) the addressing of policy issues. Since Germany's voting system rewards both candidate- and party-focused campaigning, the country is an ideal case study for an appropriate comparison of party and candidate accounts. We conducted a quantitative content analysis of all 581 posts published on party and candidate accounts during the four weeks before the election. The results suggest that parties and candidates used complementary communication strategies instead of relying on a single tactic. We are able showing that parties in parts strategically violated Instagram's communication norms to convey hard-to-visualize policy messages while candidates prefered to post professional personalized posts. The presented findings provide a starting point for future studies on the perceptions and behavioral outcomes of different campaign strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the wake of the digital revolution and connected technologies, societies store an ever-increasing amount of data on humans, their preferences, and behavior. These modern technologies create a trust challenge, insofar as individuals have to trust data collectors such as private organizations, government institutions, and researchers that their data is not misused. Privacy regulations should increase trust because they provide laws that increase transparency and allow for punishment in cases in which the trustee violates trust. The introduction of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) in May 2018 – a wide-reaching regulation in EU law on data protection and privacy that covers millions of individuals in Europe – provides a unique setting to study the impact of privacy regulation on trust in data collectors. We collected survey panel data in Germany around the implementation date and ran a survey experiment with a GDPR information treatment. Our observational and experimental evidence does not support the hypothesis that the GDPR has positively affected trust. This finding and our discussion of the underlying reasons are relevant for the wider research field of trust, privacy, and big data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Search engines are important political news sources and should thus provide users with diverse political information – an important precondition of a well-informed citizenry. The search engines' algorithmic content selection strongly influences the diversity of the content received by the users – particularly since most users highly trust search engines and often click on only the first result. A widespread concern is that users are not informed diversely by search engines, but how far this concern applies has hardly been investigated. Our study is the first to investigate content diversity provided by five search engines on ten current political issues in Germany. The findings show that sometimes even the first result is highly diverse, but in most cases, more results must be considered to be informed diversely. This unreliability presents a serious challenge when using search engines as political news sources. Our findings call for media policy measures, for example in terms of algorithmic transparency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Histories of cybernetics, at least those in the English language, concentrate almost exclusively on its origins in the United States and UK, associated primarily with Norbert Wiener and colleagues, and in particular with the series of Macy conferences from 1946 onwards. Independent work was, however, carried out elsewhere. In Germany, Hermann Schmidt introduced the notion of Allgemeine Regelungskunde [general control theory] in the early 1940s, which bore many similarities to the almost exactly contemporary work of Wiener and colleagues. Schmidt's work was subsequently largely neglected during the rapid post-war dissemination of cybernetics ideas until it was, to a certain extent, rediscovered in Germany in the 1960s. There Schmidt is often credited, alongside Wiener, as one of the two 'fathers' of cybernetics. This article presents the nature and background of Schmidt's contributions and assesses their significance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite initial optimism, a gender gap seems to exist in online political engagement. In this article, we focus on online political discussion and show that women use the internet to discuss politics significantly less than men. We propose that this is a 'new' gender gap and not a simple reflection of the traditional gender gap in offline political discussion activities. A unique dataset from Germany facilitates an empirical comparison of online and offline political discussion and their explanatory factors. We contend that the online environment imposes additional obstacles to women's willingness to discuss politics as the result of a hostile environment and distinct socialization patterns. The resulting gap is visible in terms of specific personality traits that women, in comparison to men, require to discuss politics online. Using the 'Big Five' personality trait repertory, we show that women that score high on agreeableness are significantly less likely to discuss politics online than men with the same trait. We also find significant differences in the way the personality traits extraversion and openness influence both women's and men's participation in online and offline discussion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Vote shares for populist radical right parties (PRRPs) have increased considerably in recent years, and this advancement of PRRPs has been attributed in part to social media. We assess the affinity between social media and populist radical right parties by examining a) whether more frequent social media use for news enhances the willingness to vote for a PRRP (exposure effect) as well as b) whether individuals who have voted for a PRRP in the past use social media more frequently to access news (selection effect). To address these research questions, we analysed data of a two-wave survey study that was conducted in Germany, focusing on the party Alternative for Germany (AfD). Binary logistic regression highlighted that social media use increased the likelihood of supporting the AfD. Pre-registered multinominal analyses, however, showed that this effect was driven by specific party comparisons. That is, using the AfD as a reference category, social media use reduced intentions to vote for parties that expressed similar positions as the AfD on the issue of immigration and with which the PRRP competes over votes. Social media selection effects were not supported. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While a plethora of previous studies have described extremist propaganda content that seeks to radicalize individuals, there has been a lack of research on how individuals who have become Islamists perceive and describe the propaganda they have used. To address this issue and to explore the personal drivers and circumstances of propaganda usage, we conducted in-depth interviews (n = 44) with radicalized Muslim prisoners and former Islamists in Germany and Austria. Our results found that several types of propaganda are used in sequence as individuals undergo cognitive and behavioral radicalization. Propaganda during cognitive radicalization is characterized by religious frames, which strictly advocate Islam as the 'right' way, while propaganda used during the behavioral radicalization phase is characterized by suggestions that violence is effective, urgent, and the only way to help Muslims. This use of different kinds of propaganda can be explained by individuals' needs and the professionalism of Islamist leaders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The distrust of mainstream media expressed in the slogan 'the liar press' ('Lügenpresse') is often used as an example of a populist, anti-establishment attitude that is currently winning terrain throughout the Western world. In combination with the rise of alternative media (especially online), it poses a serious challenge for 'old media'. But how do those who are most suspicious and critical relate to the mainstream media in their own media channels? In this article, we have compared the official Facebook pages of the PEGIDA movement in Germany and Austria, in order to describe their use of references to traditional/mainstream and alternative media. The results indicate that references to mainstream and alternative media are distributed almost equally. Furthermore, when there are references to mainstream media, they are generally of an affirmative nature. These findings are relevant for the debate about cyberbalcanization, echo chambers, filter bubbles and the impact of alternative media on public discourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The smartphone app market is a prime example of a digital market where consumers are tasked with selecting one option among a plethora of alternatives, at times indistinguishable from one another. Building upon findings on information processing and decision-making, we postulate that consumers follow simple (rather than complex) heuristic rules to navigate the app market. In particular, we focus on two such strategies: the recognition heuristic and the majority vote heuristic. App privacy information was also considered as a potentially salient cue in the decision-making process, given the personal data stored on smartphones. Results of a mixed-method design (behavioral analysis and think-aloud protocols) study with German (N = 18) and US (N = 25) students find a dominance of the recognition heuristic. Decisions are further supported by majority vote heuristics. Privacy information is largely disregarded, particularly by US participants. Implications for app market design and engagement are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research examining the impact of social media use on the well-being of digital natives has resulted in a myriad of opposing outcomes indicating both positive and negative effects. Focusing on positive effects only, this study examines whether there is a boundary between online and offline realms in cohorts of student digital natives and what differences exist between German and US populations. Using data collected in 2013 and 2014 we find that social grooming activities in social networking sites (SNS) significantly increase positive emotional outcomes and indirectly increase subjective well-being. We also conclude that there is a significant impact of online social grooming activities on offline social activities. But this impact is significantly moderated by cultural aspects: only within the subsample of US students is this effect of spreading social capital from online to face-to-face interaction significant. This striking result can be attributed to the stronger separation of communication activities between online and offline life among German students. Further, these differences can be explained by differences in underlying usage motives, which do also differ between US and German students. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

User comments allow ‘annotative reporting’ by embedding users’ viewpoints within an article's context, providing readers with additional information to form opinions, which can potentially enhance deliberative processes. But are these the only reasons why people comment on online news and read these comments? This study examines factors that motivate, or demotivate and constrict, such participation by surveying nearly 650 commenters, lurkers, and non-users in Germany. From a normative perspective, the results are ambivalent. The results show that commenters are driven by social-interactive motives to participate in journalism, and to discuss with other users. However, the data suggest that commenters do not obtain cognitive gratifications to the desired extent. Presumably, their exchange is socially and not deliberatively motivated. Reading comments is fuelled by both cognitive and entertainment motives, but regression analyses show that the entertainment dimension − a dimension that is not usually considered to be linked to deliberation processes − is the more stable one. A low standard of discussions not only increases the frequency at which comments are read, but also reduces lurkers’ satisfaction. Similarly, non-users are even more frustrated by the low quality of discussions. They consider such participation activities to be a waste of time, and are not willing to register. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article applies instruments of social network analysis to a study of communication networks within the Italian and German extremist right. Web links between organizational websites are used as a proxy. Indeed, extremist groups increasingly use and abuse the Internet for their propaganda and their recruitment, and also for their internal communication. The analysis includes both political parties and non-party organizations, even violent groups. In a macro-, micro-, and meso-analysis, the various specificities of the two national political sectors are demonstrated and linked to the offline reality. The Italian network appears to be very fragmented, highly diversified, and difficult to be coordinated ('policephalous network'), whereas the German network is denser and much more concentrated on a few central actors ('star structure'). These differences are mainly due to political opportunity structures in the two countries. Additionally, whereas the Italian network structure allows for the construction of a typology of sub-groups of organizations, the German communicative structure seems to be more erratic and less coordinated. The article also highlights the function of websites which are not related to any specific group. Indeed, these are of special importance for the far right as a political arena which is usually banned from the dominant societal discourses (if not even legally forbidden). Considering this, new modes of communication can be of greater use for extremist groups than for more traditional political actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]