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He allowed the Navy SEAL team an extra 18 minutes in Osama bin Laden's compound in Abbottabad to collect any computers and papers that might help the CIA deplete the remnants of Al-Qaeda. Lahoud shines a new light on Iran's double-game, detaining some of Al-Qaeda's leadership and some of Bin Laden's family, creating another quandary for the leader. [Extracted from the article]

This document is a collection of abstracts from articles published in the journal International Affairs. The articles cover a range of topics related to the impact of smartphones and digital connectivity on global crises. Some of the topics include information warfare in eastern Congo, the role of smartphones in shaping political dynamics in Mali, and the use of digital platforms in the Somali Horn of Africa. The articles provide insights into the ways in which smartphones and digital technologies are shaping various aspects of global affairs. Additionally, the document includes policy paper executive summaries on topics such as the failures of western foreign policy and the potential of circular economy solutions for European Union strategic autonomy. These summaries offer a brief overview of each paper's main arguments and findings, providing library patrons with a starting point for further exploration of these topics. [Extracted from the article]

The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the recognition of the rising challenge from China have resulted in a closer alignment of American, British and French strategic interests. This policy paper explores how the strategic relationship between the United States, the United Kingdom and France has evolved amid this changed threat environment. The Russia–Ukraine war exposed the limitations of France's policy of 'strategic autonomy' and reasserted the importance of an American role in European security. The war has re-focused attention upon the Lancaster House framework in which the UK and France have the potential to enhance their contribution to European defence. The UK still regards its 'special relationship' with the US as being of critical importance to its foreign policy. But the UK's diminishing military power makes it a less valuable ally to the US whose attention is increasingly upon the Indo-Pacific region. The paper argues that the alignment between the three countries has been closer over the Russian war in Ukraine compared to attitudes towards China, where tensions between France and the 'Anglo-Saxons' persist. France has been unwilling to adopt the American approach towards China and has stuck to its vision of a multipolar world. The AUKUS deal arranged between the US, UK and Australia had the effect of alienating France. The policy paper contends that the temporary alignment between US, UK and French interests will erode as long-standing conflicts of interest re-emerge. In particular, the unpredictability of US leadership will damage the trilateral relationship if Donald Trump regains the presidency in November 2024. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What has happened to the spectre of Russian hybrid warfare that once haunted strategists, policy-makers and scholars? Many of the characteristics of Russia's 2014 invasion of Crimea have been absent in Moscow's current war, prompting some to wonder whether Russia has moved beyond 'hybrid warfare' as it wages a brutal conventional war in Ukraine. Scholars and practitioners should not pack up their hybrid war handbooks just yet, however. The need to limit conflict escalation between nuclear-armed adversaries suggests that non-military asymmetric tools of will increasingly define great power competition in the twenty-first century. Most urgently, scholars must bring some order to the conceptual debate over what is and is not hybrid war. In this policy paper, we propose a classification scheme that can be applied irrespective of the type of conflict, one that illuminates the wide range of political, social, economic and military weapons states may use in future conflicts. This approach not only allows us to move beyond endless debates over which tactics belong in the definition of hybrid war, but it also allows us to describe changes over time in how countries wage multi-domain wars. By describing the 'hybridity' of all conflict along three continuous axes of scale, militarization and centralization, scholars and policy-makers alike can avoid dangerous blind spots that are likely to arise when we try to categorize conflicts into discrete typological bins. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and his government have implemented bold defence, diplomatic and economic policies against the challenges to the status quo order posed by Russia's invasion of Ukraine and increased Chinese assertiveness. What do these policies unveil about Japan's strategy and response to the transformed strategic environment? This article argues that the Kishida government has upgraded Japan to a front-line guardian of the status quo order. To achieve its front-line role, the Kishida government has consolidated Japan's deterrence policy, namely focusing on two main pillars—military and rules. To ensure Japan's frontline role is sustainable, this policy paper makes three recommendations: Japan must develop strategic clarity and clear operational plans on how to respond to a regional contingency, such as the Taiwan Strait; Japan must resolve domestic problems that prevent the increase in defence spending to 2 per cent in the period to 2027. Japan's role as a front-line state to protect the status quo order is very much dependent on the availability of resources that would be provided by this increase in defence spending; Japan should re-energize its efforts towards east Asia through a sustained diplomatic, economic and security means. This is important in securing support for Japan's preferred vision of regional and global order from not only like-minded partners and friends in east Asia, but also China. Japan's approach should underscore how the extant status quo order benefits all states, including China, especially in terms of spreading economic prosperity, development and connectivity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although firmly established as a global norm, the Women, Peace and Security Agenda (WPS) has been largely driven by the global North attempting to solve insecurities in the global South. Postcolonial feminist research shows that this western-centrism and colonial legacies continue to dominate both WPS practices and knowledge production. This article focuses on WPS in central Europe, a previously ignored 'non-region' that remains outside the North–South divide. Combining postcolonial and decolonial approaches with feminist institutionalism, we interrogate what WPS becomes in the Czech, Polish and Slovakian contexts characterized by illiberal populist and anti-gender governance and politics. Building on interviews with key stakeholders, on document analysis and our own encounters, we argue that the three countries understand WPS as key to their western belongingness and reliability as international partners. As a result, they replicate rather than challenge 'western' WPS thinking. The resulting National Action Plans are centred around women's participation and security problems 'out there'. This lack of localization enables them to stay immune to the anti-gender alliances, but limits the engagement of feminist civil society. Amidst Russian imperial aggression, central Europe's WPS agendas serve as mere paper tigers and are failing to address the multitude of domestic and regional gendered insecurities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1939-45 an economic group for the discussion of postwar economic order was established at Chatham House, gathering a transnational community of economists and scholars at 10 St James Square in London. Papers were written and seminars were held before-and following-the conference held in Bretton Woods in 1944. Polish-born economist Paul Rosenstein-Rodan (1902-1985) coordinated the group, which invoked investment-led growth and new international institutions for development. Chatham House played a role in making sense of, and disseminating, this new culture of international development. To be clear, this 'new' culture was not entirely new, and had its roots in the interwar years, including colonial development policy. Nor was Chatham House the only hub of this culture. This article aims at filling a gap in our understanding of the role of economic research done at Chatham House during the Second World War. In addition, by looking to the past, it may also help at broadening our views on how to globally reignite growth today. Policy-makers seem to have learnt some of the monetary lessons of the 1930s, but not the development ones of the 1940s. This article is based on sources from the Chatham House archive and brings to special attention articles published in International Affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The UK's departure from the European Union (EU) represents a major shift in the diplomatic strategy of one of Europe's leading economic, diplomatic and security players. This article limits its focus to the UK's European diplomatic strategy. The article argues that the UK's future relationship with the EU will condition the UK's broader diplomatic approach to Europe. But in exiting the EU the ambitions and modalities of the UK's other bilateral and multilateral relationships in Europe will undergo a recalibration. With the UK government having struggled since June 2016 to provide comprehensive detail on its ambitions for its future economic, political and security relationship with the EU, the development of the broader aspects of the UK's post-Brexit European diplomatic strategy has been retarded. However, through analysis of key speeches, government white papers, and other supporting documents and statements (and the experience of negotiating Brexit with the EU27), the outlines of a nascent post-Brexit UK European diplomatic strategy can be discerned. Whether this strategy will be adequate to provide the UK with a significant degree of influence on Europe's international relations and whether it gives the UK sufficient ability to addresses the key challenges that it will face in Europe is less certain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The term 'world order' is perhaps the most enticing, consequential and vague concept in the diplomatic lexicon. There are countless scholars, analysts and policy-makers wrestling over its theoretical and practical dimensions. But often taken for granted in these examinations is the philosophical aspect—in other words, those fundamental reflections on the very purpose and nature of order across regional and international systems. Using a historical precedent as an example of this mode of thinking, this article makes the case for why questions related to political philosophy and political theory are essential to abstract and practical considerations of future world order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Structural realists might reasonably predict that foreign policy elites in countries like Japan and Australia would view China's economic and military rise as a potential threat and seek to balance against it. However, the actual policy behaviour of Japanese and Australian policy elites has been quite complex—pushing forward at times, hesitating at others and generally uncertain if an explicit counter-coalition against China through bilateral security cooperation is the right policy path. Why is this? This paper explains the puzzle by focusing on the perceptions of policy-makers regarding the risk of provoking China; entrapment with the other; and entrapment with the United States. The paper demonstrates how policy-makers' concerns regarding entrapment or abandonment related to their mutual US ally—as well as concerns about potentially provoking China—have had an instrumental effect on the degree to which Japan and Australia have strengthened their security commitments to each other. While the rise of China—and the relative decline of US power—has shaped the overall direction of Japan–Australia security ties, such structural imperatives are of course also complicated by how domestic actors think about the tactical aspects of understanding and surviving these structural features. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do actors weaponize water in intrastate conflicts? Existing typologies of water weaponization make deterministic differentiations between state and non-state actors and invoke opaque labels like 'terrorism'. Furthermore, these typologies ignore how various actors engaged in violent conflict also cooperate over water, and whether water weaponization occurs beyond war. I propose a new typology for water weaponization in an analysis of the case of Syria, drawing on the leaked 'ISIS papers' as well as primary sources and interviews. The study begins by charting how the Ba'athist regime used water as a weapon of domination and legitimacy against its Kurdish population with infrastructure that would later facilitate the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria's (ISIS) ability to take hold of northeast Syria. I then turn to how non-state armed groups like ISIS and the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD) have adopted strategies of water weaponization similar to the Syrian government by targeting and channelling water systems with major tactical implications. Finally, I show how enemy parties such as ISIS and the al-Assad regime weaponized cooperative water agreements to advance their mutual interests with violent implications for civilians. As such, I sort strategies of water weaponization into four categories: domination and legitimacy, military tools, military targets, and cooperation. In doing so, this new typology makes three main contributions, by: 1) accounting for how water is weaponized in state-society relations outside conflict; 2) refining existing definitions of water as a military tool and target; and 3) appraising the weapon-like effects of water cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The past decade has seen a push for 'gender sensitive' approaches within nuclear policy-making. Yet the significance of this approach, and how it understands 'gender sensitivity' are unclear and have not been studied. This article asks the question: how does work done on 'gendering' nuclear policy to date understand what a gender sensitive approach to nuclear weapons means and requires? The article provides an overview of the movement to include gender in nuclear policymaking before conducting an analysis of the discourse on gender in a core institution of nuclear politics, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Through qualitative analysis of five years of NPT texts, we find that dominant understandings of a 'gender sensitive approach' centre on the inclusion of women. We further find that there is almost no mention of men and masculinity in the NPT discourse; women are constructed as a homogenous category of outsiders; and women's inclusion is understood mainly as a means of increasing institutional efficiency. We suggest that the next steps in 'gendering' nuclear policy engage more with feminist policy analysis and the experiences of those already working within the policy space, and consider further how and if one can meaningfully link gender sensitive approaches to the practice of nuclear deterrence. The findings of this study also have significance beyond nuclear weapons, illuminating the broader dynamics and challenges of 'gendering' international security spaces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Scottish government's white paper on independence, Scotland's future, sets out its defence blueprint following a 'yes' vote. It makes clear that its defence plans would be subject to a Strategic Defence and Security Review in 2016, as well as negotiation on the division of assets with London. However, it also provides a strong indication of how it envisages its defence posture as an independent state-a major pillar of which is founded upon strong and continued defence cooperation with the rest of the United Kingdom. Is this a realistic assumption? And, if so, how would it work in practice? Contextualized by the increased emphasis on defence cooperation which sits at the heart of NATO's Smart Defence initiative, as well as the European Defence Agency's 'pooling and sharing' programme, the article assesses the benefits and challenges that might be encountered in a defence cooperation agreement between an independent Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom in the event of a 'yes' vote in September's referendum. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International Relations scholars have long recognized that technology plays a critical role in power transitions, but the field lacks a framework to understand how technology and innovation strategies generate rivalry between dominant and rising states. With an empirical focus on contemporary United States-China relations, this paper addresses that gap. We identify the 'innovation imperative' that drives rising states to pursue technological modernity, and highlight two ways in which this pursuit can challenge the strategic interests of the dominant state. First, the dominant state experiences a significant impairment of its security environment: negative security externalities. Second, the dominant state experiences a threat to its preferred international order: negative order externalities. We further explain how the dominant state responds to the negative externalities generated by the rising state's pursuit of innovation. By theorizing the technological rivalry between rising and dominant states, we move beyond the traditional focus on military conflict in power transitions and offer new insight into the current dynamics in US-China relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Through its ambivalence towards its global security alliances, abrogation of free trade treaties and questioning of globalization, the Trump administration has argued that the United States-led liberal international order is too burdensome. How accurate is this portrayal? Drawing on theories of hegemonic leadership, the paper argues that the US national interest became globalized in the postwar international system and the US-led liberal order has given it enormous positional advantages. These include the capacity to shape the international preferences of other states, externalize domestic economic crises and construct the kind of international economy it wanted. Despite growing international competition, the US still has essentially the same global interests. However, neo-liberal globalization has weakened the domestic consent for American leadership among large sections of the American working class, who have rationally rejected continued US commitment to a system that has deepened economic inequality in the US. Trump has ridden the wave of this discontent, and although US elites may wish to return to the status quo after President Trump, these structural issues will remain. Trump may well do irreparable damage to the liberal order and thus, more broadly, to the West. While imperfect, the liberal order is still the 'best of a bad bunch' in terms of forms of systemic order on offer, and if the luxury of choice remains after Trump, a new domestic and international social contract is needed to revive US global leadership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This document is a collection of abstracts from various articles on the topic of peacekeeping. The articles cover a wide range of aspects related to peacekeeping, including the impact on contributing countries and troops, the politics and motivations behind peacekeeping armies, the experiences of soldiers, and the role of peacekeeping in shaping domestic security procedures. The articles also examine peacekeeping efforts in specific countries such as The Gambia, China, Latin America, Russia, Ethiopia, and Bangladesh. Additionally, there is an article that discusses the intersection of climate change and peacebuilding. These abstracts provide diverse perspectives and insights into the complex nature of peacekeeping. The research agenda also highlights the importance of climate change in peacebuilding efforts and aims to guide future studies. The agenda covers various topics, including child soldier rehabilitation in Sri Lanka, the Western response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, deterrence in the Taiwan Strait, international relations theory, the United Nations' engagement with China's Belt and Road Initiative, and new approaches to peace. Policy papers explore the evolving strategic relationship between the US, UK, and France, Sweden's foreign policy, global AI governance, and Japan's response to the changing strategic environment. [Extracted from the article]

Decapitation strategies have often been linked to counterterrorism. The existing literature suggests the results of these strategies are mixed. Previous studies suggest that the death of a prominent leader may not necessarily end the crisis; it all depends on the group's infrastructure, ideology, leadership traditions, and extent of its penetration in society. This article takes a critical look at the impact of a recent leadership decapitation in Nigeria. Abubakar Shekau, the leader of the Boko Haram movement in the Lake Chad Basin countries, was killed on 19 May 2021 by a faction of the movement known as the Islamic State of West African Province (ISWAP). This article argues that Shekau's case has paradoxically helped to strengthen ISWAP's position, giving it new recruits and other resources and perhaps most importantly reinforced its position with local communities. This has implications for the Nigerian state, its neighbours and, because of Boko Haram's links to ISIS, the wider war on terrorism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents information on Columbia International Affairs Online, an online service launched by the Columbia University Press in August, 1998. Address of the online service; Why it was developed; Initial target for the service.

Australia has been among the most prominent advocates of the increasingly popular Indo-Pacific concept. This article argues that Canberra's enthusiasm for the concept stems from its appeal to the two dominant traditions of Australian foreign policy—a 'dependent ally' tradition and a 'middle power' approach. While these two traditions are typically seen as being in tension, the Indo-Pacific concept provides a rare point of convergence between them. The article begins by outlining the appeal of the Indo-Pacific concept to each of these traditions. Using a case-study of recent Australian policy toward the South China Sea disputes, however, the article then demonstrates that Australia has in practice implemented its stated Indo-Pacific strategy far less consistently than its very vocal support would appear to suggest. This disjuncture is attributed to the growing influence of a third, generally understudied, 'pragmatic' Australian foreign policy tradition. Because Australia has been such a prominent champion of the Indo-Pacific concept, the article concludes that this divergence between the rhetoric and the reality of Australia's Indo-Pacific strategy threatens to have a negative impact on the concept's broader international appeal and sustainability, particularly among Australia's south-east Asian neighbours. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Feminist interventions in international politics are, more often than not, understood (and visible) as interventions in relation to policy documents. These policies—in this case the United Nations Security Council's resolutions on Women, Peace and Security—often feature as the end point of feminist advocacy efforts or as the starting point for feminist analysis and critique. In this article the author responds to the provocations throughout Marysia Zalewski's work to think (and tell) the spaces of international politics differently, in this case by working with the concept of feminist failure as it is produced in feminist policy critique. Inspired by Zalewski's Feminist International Relations: exquisite corpse , the article explores the material and imaginary spaces in which both policies and critique are produced. It picks up and reflects upon a narrative refrain recognizable in feminist critiques on Women, Peace and Security policy—that we must not make war safe for women—as a way to reflect on the inevitability of failure and the ostensible boundaries between theory and practice. The author takes permission from Zalewski's creative interventions and her recognition of the value of the 'detritus of the everyday'—here a walk from New York's Grand Central Station to the UN Headquarters, musings on the flash of a particular shade of blue, and the contents of a footnoted acknowledgement, begin to trace an international political space that is produced through embodied and quotidian practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In December 1968 Ernest May asked how the US government could gain access to 'long-headed' staffers to provide greater strategic depth to foreign policy. The challenge of long-term strategy persists: how should government be organized to support it, how can the right people be found to staff it and how can political leaders make time for longer-term policy-making given the challenge of the immediate? The policy planning staff in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office have traditionally had the task of supporting longer-range, broader foreign policy. A small group of diplomats-later leavened by externals from the media, non-profit and private sectors-was meant to generate an improved approach to British interests and policy. As Robert Wade-Gery recalls of its role in the 1960s, there was a push to forge fresh links with outside thinking. Did it work? Former policy planners can be circumspect about its achievements. One former British planner said he felt like 'a spare part rattling around in a tin', while former American planners have written about the challenge of injecting fresh thinking when detached from decision-making. Other planners were dragged into operational work or speechwriting. Many planners nonetheless enjoyed the opportunity to think more broadly. Policy planning can be intellectually rich without being the source of actionable strategic thinking about the long-term national interest. This article suggests that a greater focus on people rather than systems might help to foster more strategic, anticipatory and innovative thinking about the national interest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does the rule of law matter to maritime security? One way into the question is to examine whether states show a discursive commitment that maritime security practices must comply with international law. International law thus provides tools for argument for or against the validity of certain practices. The proposition is thus not only that international law matters to maritime security, but legal argument does too. In this article, these claims will be explored in relation to the South China Sea dispute. The dispute involves Chinese claims to enjoy special rights within the 'nine-dash line' on official maps which appears to lay claim to much of the South China Sea. Within this area sovereignty remains disputed over numerous islands and other maritime features. Many of the claimant states have engaged in island-building activities, although none on the scale of China. Ideas matter in such contests, affecting perceptions of reality and of what is possible. International law provides one such set of ideas. Law may be a useful tool in consolidating gains or defeating a rival's claims. For China, law is a key domain in which it is seeking to consolidate control over the South China Sea. The article places the relevant Chinese legal arguments in the context of China's historic engagement with the law of the sea. It argues that the flaw in China's approach has been to underestimate the extent to which it impinges on other states' national interests in the maritime domain, interests they conceptualize in legal terms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores how the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence's (MoD) institutional vision of the potential future character of conflict is reflected in current defence policy decision-making and future force development planning. On the face of it, institutional arrangements in the MoD suggest that the results of 'horizon-scanning' and 'futures' analysis guide long-term defence planning in the design and development of the UK's future military roles and force structure. Our analysis points to the opposite. It suggests that it is the unchallenged assumption that the UK will remain a 'Tier One' defence power capable of deploying military power on a global scale and the MoD's long-term planning cycle that shape long-range forecasts of the future operating environment, rather than the other way round. Our explanation for this inversion is derived from the 'New Institutionalism' approach to public policy analysis. In taking this approach, we suggest that the outcomes of UK defence policy formation are strongly influenced by path dependency in the form of baked-in institutional ideas about the 'appropriate' role of Britain as a military power ('what should be done'), along with historical capability investments underpinning UK defence that are costly to reverse ('what can be changed'). By extension, we argue that if these embedded path dependencies explain the development of previous and current UK defence policy, then it should come as no surprise that the current ends, ways and means in UK defence are projected forward in the MoD's institutional view of potential future operating environments, resulting in limited change within established paths. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Americans have generally seen the principles and objectives proclaimed by President Woodrow Wilson during the First World War as having continued relevance for United States foreign policy. However, they have often differed over their application to specific situations, particularly because there is likely to be a tension between a drive to establish democratic values across the globe and commitment to a universal system of collective security. Rather than seeking a pure, abstract definition of ‘Wilsonianism’, it is more illuminating to examine its origins and evolution in relation to the development of American foreign policy over the years. Tracing this historical process reveals that Wilson committed himself to a postwar league of nations during the period of American neutrality, but it was only as the United States became a belligerent that the spread of democratic government became a policy objective, and then only in a partial and qualified way. A similar pattern has been discernible in subsequent decades. It has been during conflicts, or the run-up to them, that the more ideological and revisionist aspects of Wilsonian principles have come to the fore, whereas it has been in the aftermath of conflicts that there has been the greatest interest in the potentialities of a universal collective security organization. There has also been a broad shift of emphasis over time. As confidence in America's power position has grown, the core of Wilson's legacy has more often come to be seen as the promotion of democracy rather than the strengthening of international institutions. The persistence of both themes may be seen as reflecting basic and enduring elements of the policy-making context—on the one hand, the interests of the United States as a status quo power, and on the other, the demands of domestic American opinion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In December 2006 the British government released a White Paper announcing its intention to begin the process of replacing its current Trident nuclear weapons system, thereby allowing it to retain nuclear weapons well into the 2050s. In March 2008 the government released its National Security Strategy that stressed the long-term complexity, diversity and interdependence of threats to British security with a clear focus on human rights, justice and freedom. This article asks how the threat to kill tens if not hundreds of thousands of people with British nuclear weapons fits into the National Security Strategy's world view and questions the relevance of an instrument of such devastating bluntness to threats defined by complexity and interdependence. It argues that the government's case for replacing the current Trident system based on the logic of nuclear deterrence is flawed. First, Britain faces no strategic nuclear threats and the long-term post-Cold War trend in relations with Russia and China—the two nuclear-armed major powers that could conceivably threaten the UK with nuclear attack—is positive, despite current tensions with Moscow over Georgia. Second, the credibility and legitimacy of threatening nuclear destruction in response to the use of WMD by ‘rogue’ states is highly questionable and British nuclear threats offer no ‘insurance’ or guarantee of protection against future ‘rogue’ nuclear threats. Third, nuclear weapons have no role to play in deterring acts of nuclear terrorism whether state-sponsored or not. Fourth, British nuclear threats will be useless in dealing with complex future conflicts characterized by ‘hybrid’ wars and diverse and interdependent sources of insecurity. The article concludes by arguing that the government's fall-back position that it must keep nuclear weapons ‘just in case’ because the future security environment appears so uncertain, makes no sense if British nuclear threats offer no solution to the causes and symptoms of that uncertainty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The extreme volatility of global energy markets since the early 2000S has prompted the Commission of the European Communities to issue a new Green Paper, 'A European strategy for sustainable, competitive and secure energy'. This important document seeks to identify the main steps EU members need to take to enhance their energy outlooks. The first section in this article discusses the concept 'energy security'. This is followed by an examination of Europe's energy mix (oil, natural gas, coal, nuclear power and renewables). The third section analyses European efforts to establish and strengthen energy partnerships with Russia, the Caspian Sea region and the Middle East. In other words, the article seeks to examine Europe's efforts to diversify its energy mix and energy sources. The main argument is that stability and predictability in energy markets are shared goals between producing regions and major consumers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article has been developed and updated from a paper delivered at the Grossbritannien-Zentrum, Humboldt University at Berlin, June 2000. Traditionally, sport has been marginalized, even treated as an irrelevance, in the study of International Relations (IR). The 2002 World Cup Finals raised yet again questions about the realism of continuing to write sport out of IR, and particularly to ignore its impact upon such relationships as those between Britain and Germany. Football's role in mirroring, influencing and articulating British perceptions of Germany, at least at the popular and media level, is presented as a case-study, since the football field proved another important British_German battleground throughout the twentieth century. This trend continues. Already, three high profile football internationals played during 2000–1 as well as rivalry to host the 2006 World Cup tournament have illuminated the problematic state of the British-German relationship, particularly the fact that history, most notably world war imagery, imparts en enduring extra-sporting sub-text for any England-Germany footballing encounter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is concerned with how practices of knowledge production relate to the international politics of transitional justice (TJ). It argues that quantitative scholarly studies—called for in response to the anecdotal and normative studies that prevailed in early TJ scholarship and which, it is argued, continue to shape TJ sub-fields such as the study of local justice—are themselves committed to the normative framework and the goals of TJ that they seek to provide the tools to challenge. Applying a 'politics of methods' lens, the article foregrounds the interpretive work of surveys and the methodological choices of large-N impact studies which circle these works back to narrowly defined ideas of what TJ ought to be. The conclusions show how these 'politics of methods' contribute to the decontestation of an inherently political choice and practice, and predetermine what policy and practice options are considered useful, relevant and even imaginable. As such they shape that which they claim only to examine. Contributing to both critical methodological debates in International Relations and nascent scholarship on the research–policy–practice nexus in TJ, the analysis provides an under-examined example of the co-constitutive relationship of what is considered to be detached knowledge production and politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Knowledge production in peace and conflict research is marked by a disconnect between its 'expertise-driven' research inquiries and lived realities of people across the world. In focusing on what knowledge and whose knowledge counts as legitimate among the diverse stakeholders, the article locates the raison d'être of this gap in the epistemic erasures inflicted by imperial knowledge and its lasting legacies, especially that of privileging the primacy and autonomy of the political over the social institutions in maintaining order. This, along with the limiting epistemes of western modernity explain the state-centrism in governmental and academic expertise, especially in post-colonial societies. The article makes a case for historicizing and decolonizing its epistemes and tools of research, and illustrates how this can be done by drawing on the Kashmir conflict as it unfolded in the early 1990s in the Indian part of Jammu and Kashmir state. In a point of departure from the much-acclaimed question asked by Gayatri Spivak: 'can the subaltern speak?', the article argues that the subaltern can speak and has indeed never been silent. So, the question it poses is: can we, the experts, listen? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why did Putin decide to invade Ukraine in 2022? Structural realists regard it as a preventive war with a strategic rationale in response to NATO's eastward expansion. However, as many scholars suggest, Putin's decision-making is riddled with various irrationalities, which can be better framed as overbalancing and the classical realist concept of 'hubris'. Lawrence Freedman and others argue that a key to explaining Putin's overbalancing is applying the concept of self-deception in evolutionary psychology, which can be the scientific foundation of hubris in classical realism. Thus, Freedman's argument of Putin's self-deception and others' general theses of self-deception as a cause of overconfidence led to the introduction of self-deception into classical realism to solve the puzzle of overbalancing in international affairs. Thereby, the novel balancing concept of 'hubris balancing' was developed: irrationally aggressive balancing that exceeds what is achievable in practice. There are three causal pathways (cognitive, emotional and social) to hubris balancing as ideal types: overconfidence, anger and nationalism. As a plausibility probe, hubris balancing is illustrated by analysing Putin's decision to wage war against Ukraine. The result shows that, as the logic of hubris balancing suggests, driven by overconfidence and anger towards western liberalism, Putin decided to invade Ukraine by driving exclusive nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]