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Examining India's official thinking on international order over the past quarter-century, this article maps the shift in the country's preference from liberal internationalism to the rules-based international order (RIO). It argues that despite Delhi's current narrative of a 'New India', the country's order conception shows continuity in being essentially reformist and mostly consistent with the pillars of the 1945 order. While its marked unease with liberalism is a consequence of the changes afoot in India's domestic politics, this development is consistent with, and contributes to, the decline of liberalism as a global force. The current Indian preference for economic protectionism also reflects the larger trend of economic deglobalization. The description of India as a resurgent civilizational state rather than a liberal democracy, while discursively arresting, does not indicate a divergence with the West on the grand strategic question of order-building. Upon reconstructing the Indian iteration of the RIO, the article finds it to be geographical—focused on Asia and the Indo-Pacific—rather than universal. Finally, it posits that India's persisting problem of inadequate power and its risk-averse responses to great power revisionism are likely to undermine its efforts to effectively partner with democracies to shape the emergent RIO. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article considers civilizational politics at the interface between nationalism and internationalism. It does this by focusing on some key trends in India's engagements with UNESCO and its flagship conventions for culture. The article builds on existing scholarship regarding the political appropriation of key religious and heritage sites within India by critically examining how Hinduism is presented to UNESCO and other organizations as a religious and civilizational heritage for global recognition and endorsement. We argue that UNESCO's programmes and conventions are being co-opted via a rewriting of history and in the creation of heritage imaginaries of a Hindu nation. From there, the discussion extends previous critiques regarding the conjoining of Hinduism to a Harappan civilization heritage by showing how this geographically extends outwards via a programme of Indian Ocean diplomacy conceived around environmental and historical connectivities. In pulling these various threads together, the article demonstrates the ways in which Hindu civilizational discourses circulate at the international level in seemingly benign and banal ways, and, yet, simultaneously advance the domestic cultural politics now familiar to the Hindutva movement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Claims to civilizational exceptionalism have long been part of how states manoeuvre international affairs. While scholarly attention has started to move beyond the civilizational claims of western powers by engaging with those of states beyond the West, few accounts provide in-depth examinations of specific cases or bring these into dialogue with one another. This article offers a comparative analysis of how and why India and Turkey are positioning themselves as civilizational forces in global forums and international cooperation initiatives. Under the Narendra Modi regime, civilizational framings in India have found expression in the seemingly benign discourse of Hindu internationalism. In Turkey, successive governments under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan have linked their engagement abroad to the legacies of the Ottoman Empire. While there are clear differences in their respective civilizational antecedents, both countries draw on a combination of moral superiority and responsibility—India as vishwaguru (the world's guru) and Turkey as dünyanın vicdanı (the world's conscience)—as the legitimizing base for their assumed (normative) exceptionalism on the international stage. Overall, we argue that Indian and Turkish claims to civilizational exceptionalism serve two distinct but interrelated political projects: attempts to overcome centuries-long international marginalization, and efforts to buttress competitive authoritarianism domestically. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thus, the ICI helped to embed the racist subjugation and impoverishment of the global South, for the economic and political betterment of the (mostly white) ICI members. It traces the rise and lasting influence of the International Colonial Institute (ICI), which was founded in Brussels in 1893 and remained active until 1982. Florian Wagner's new book, I Colonial internationalism and the governmentality of empire, 1893-1982 i , is a valuable contribution to imperial and colonial historiography. [Extracted from the article]

An introduction is presented in which the editor discusses various reports within the special issue on topics including the U.S.-led liberal international order (LIO), the survival of liberal internationalism, and China's effort to recast the international order to serve its own interest.

This article argues that the biggest challenges facing the post-1945 liberal international order are the need to genuinely embrace ethno-racial diversity and to reduce class-based inequalities. However, this is problematic because the liberal international order's core foundational principles, and principal underpinning 'theory' (liberal internationalism), are Eurocentric, elitist and resistant to change. Those core principles are subliminally racialized, elitist and imperial. They are embedded in post-1945 international institutions, elite mindsets, and in the institutions of the US foreign policy establishment--which are seeking to incorporate emerging power elites, willingly, into the US-led order. As illustration, this article considers examples that bookend the US-led system: wartime elite planning for global leadership; the role of the United Nations in Korea from 1945 to 1953, where it served as the primary instrument for the creation and incorporation of (South) Korea into the US-led order; and several US state-linked initiatives in China over the past several decades, including the Ford Foundation. The article compares the contemporary and historical evidence to liberal internationalist claims, as well as to claims implied by work on 'ultra-imperialism', based on Karl Kautsky's and Antonio Gramsci's ideas of hegemony. The article concludes that elite incorporation--by a combination of coercion, attraction and socialization--is the principal goal of the US-led order, as opposed to embracing diversity and moving towards genuine change felt at a mass level. Hence, we should expect domestic and international political crises to deepen. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The future of liberal internationalism will be influenced increasingly by the re-emergence of China as a major power on the world stage and by the way the United States is reacting to China's growing influence. In this article, we discern three possible scenarios: one of inevitable conflict, one of gradual co-optation and a hybrid scenario of coexistence. We argue that in order to understand the development of the Sino-US relationship and the sometimes-contradictory outcomes and dilemmas this generates, we need to take into account the social and domestic sources of foreign policy within these two major powers, and the distinctive state--society models that they represent. Crucially, this includes how the domestic political economy is dynamically interrelated with the global political economic context. In our approach, foreign policy elites form a key nexus here and a vital prism through which to analyse foreign policy strategies. From this critical political economy perspective, we will describe how China's re-emergence as a world power is partly shaped by its distinctive 'statist' state--society model, to then analyse US strategy towards rising China through the lens of the close nexus between America's corporate elite and the state. In our concluding section we will return to the three scenarios. Based on the findings presented, and in light of the radical shift that seems to be occurring due to the Trump presidency, we will reflect on the likelihood of these scenarios, the future of the liberal world order and conclude with a research agenda. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

These are not happy times for liberal internationalists. No one can be sure how deep the crisis of liberal internationalism runs. However, in what follows, I argue that despite its troubles, liberal internationalism still has a future. The nature of the crisis is surprising. The threats to liberal internationalism were expected to come from rising non-western states seeking to undermine or overturn the postwar order. In the face of hostile, revisionist states, the United States and Europe were expected to stand shoulder to shoulder to protect the gains from 70 years of cooperation. But, in fact, liberal internationalism is more deeply threatened by developments within the West itself. The centrist and progressive coalitions that lay behind the postwar liberal order have weakened. Liberal democracy itself appears fragile and polarized, vulnerable to far right populism and backlash politics. In recent decades, the working and middle classes in advanced industrial democracies--the original constituencies and beneficiaries of an open and cooperative international order--have faced rising economic inequality and stagnation. Within the West, liberal internationalism is increasingly seen, not as a source of stability and solidarity among like-minded states, but as a global playing field for the wealthy and influential. Liberal internationalism has lost its connection to the pursuit of social and economic advancement within western countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Liberal internationalism has been in crisis for a while now. Yet, until recently, its supporters have argued that its prospects are better than ever, as the successful spread of liberal principles, practices and institutions in the international sphere provides the necessary basis for reform. Alas, recent political developments do not support these expectations. In fact, the Brexit vote, the election of President Trump, and the rise of populism more generally challenge liberalism in the domestic sphere and aim to unravel its international achievements. But the idea that these movements are therefore liberalism's nemeses does not quite follow. Providing a theoretical and historical analysis of liberalism, this article shows that the separation of domestic and international politics is constitutive of liberalism itself. The successful extension of liberal principles into the international sphere undermines this separation and thus liberalism itself. Ironically, therefore, the prospects of liberal internationalism are dependent on the reestablishment of a clear divide between domestic and international politics. And this, I argue, is precisely the goal of contemporary populist movements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can Germany lead on security? This article aims to address this question by looking at recent German contributions to European defence cooperation. In 2013 Germany introduced the Framework Nations Concept (FNC) as a systematic and structured approach towards joint capability development. The concept relies on the idea that bigger nations take the overall responsibility for coordinating the contributions of smaller partners in a capability package. The framework nation model as such is not new but the initiative has been welcomed as a potential game changer in European defence cooperation and as confirmation of Germany's commitment to NATO. In light of the Ukraine crisis, measures to adapt NATO and to strengthen the European pillar of the alliance have become more urgent. Allies and partners increasingly want Germany to extend its role as Europe's dominant economic and financial power to matters of security and defence. The framework nation model allows Germany to take international responsibility, while avoiding debates about leadership and hegemony. Moreover, as a framework nation, Germany can advance flexible cooperation among a smaller number of allies without undermining its commitment to multilateralism. But the FNC initiative also raises further questions: what is the added value of the framework nation model compared to similar formats; what should be the place of smaller groupings in the evolving Euro-Atlantic security architecture; and how reliable is Germany in the role of a lead nation? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents abstracts on international affairs which include the article "Taking sides: cosmopolitanism, internationalism and ‘complex solidarity’ in the work of Fred Halliday," "Advances and impasses in Fred Halliday’s international historical sociology: a critical appraisal," and "Fred Halliday, Marxism and the Cold War,"

Fred Halliday's life and work were intimately associated with the theory and practice of internationalism. In his later writings, the notion of 'complex solidarity' emerges as a key component of Halliday's worldview. This article explores the conceptual interconnections between different historical expressions of internationalism, cosmopolitanism and solidarity. It considers the intricate relationship between these categories and their place in our understanding of international affairs, emphasizing the divergence between liberal and revolutionary conceptions of internationalism and cosmopolitanism. The article discusses diverse understandings of 'solidarity' in International Relations, arguing that beyond the cosmopolitan and communitarian approaches, there exist other 'Grotian' and 'republican' ideas of solidarity. Halliday drew on these to present his own defence of universal human rights and solidarity, arguably developing a distinctive brand of republican internationalism. The latter part of the article gives content to 'complex solidarity' by suggesting it is built on three inter-related components: a methodological internationalism, an egalitarian reciprocity and a critique of global capitalism. Overall, these guiding features of complex solidarity deliver a unique rendition of internationalism which reflect Halliday's eclectic combination of radical liberalism with a residual historical materialism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If the G's are the world's steering committee, the step from G7 to G20 deepened the democratic legitimacy of this committee. However, it also shifted influence to a group that share little else other than economic power: they have diverse experiences, challenges, cultural perspectives and starting points. This is particularly the case in the field of financial regulation, where action across these countries in recent months—despite all the language of global regulation—is increasingly local. The prospect of the new global being quite local has dismayed some. But it need not. This article challenges the dichotomy of more global versus more local. It argues that financial internationalism—greater cooperation by nations for the benefit of all—is better served by institutions that help to integrate diverse systems than those which try to enforce one-size-fits-all approach to very different economies. International banks persuaded regulators of the benefits of home country regulation and a level playing field for bankers. But the benefits accrued largely to the banks in the boom and proved an avenue for contagion during the crash. Host country regulation may prove a safer way to regulate financial systems, in particular by allowing regulation to be more responsive to national economic conditions and cycles. It is likely that a shift back to host country regulation will act as a drag on international capital flows. The instinct of economists is that the cost of this is uncertain, suspect and conditional, especially when compared to the costs of financial crashes. Host country regulation does not mean there is no role for international institutions, such as the newly minted Financial Stability Board. Instead, it suggests a more nuanced role, potentially encompassing the policing of international market infrastructure, financial protectionism, information free flow between regulators and the convergence of regulatory principles and the consolidation of regulatory instruments. An informed and collegiate process of integrating different financial systems will be a more resilient system than one which tries to apply a single rule book across inherently different countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Americans have generally seen the principles and objectives proclaimed by President Woodrow Wilson during the First World War as having continued relevance for United States foreign policy. However, they have often differed over their application to specific situations, particularly because there is likely to be a tension between a drive to establish democratic values across the globe and commitment to a universal system of collective security. Rather than seeking a pure, abstract definition of ‘Wilsonianism’, it is more illuminating to examine its origins and evolution in relation to the development of American foreign policy over the years. Tracing this historical process reveals that Wilson committed himself to a postwar league of nations during the period of American neutrality, but it was only as the United States became a belligerent that the spread of democratic government became a policy objective, and then only in a partial and qualified way. A similar pattern has been discernible in subsequent decades. It has been during conflicts, or the run-up to them, that the more ideological and revisionist aspects of Wilsonian principles have come to the fore, whereas it has been in the aftermath of conflicts that there has been the greatest interest in the potentialities of a universal collective security organization. There has also been a broad shift of emphasis over time. As confidence in America's power position has grown, the core of Wilson's legacy has more often come to be seen as the promotion of democracy rather than the strengthening of international institutions. The persistence of both themes may be seen as reflecting basic and enduring elements of the policy-making context—on the one hand, the interests of the United States as a status quo power, and on the other, the demands of domestic American opinion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Jack L. Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner are influential academics in American debates on international law. Their recent book, The limits of international law, is appraised in this review article. It discusses the exclusion in their analysis of the possibility that states have a real or perceived interest in complying with international law per se. It explains that this is at odds with the authors' subjective approach to state interests, and essentially guarantees their conclusion that international law compliance is solely instrumental. Furthermore, the article discusses the problem that the authors fail to engage with relevant scholarship that provides a counterpoint to theirs, in particular with regard to constructivism. On the basis of these critiques the review concludes that the book is flawed and cannot be considered to have made its case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discuses the concept of ‘civil society’ and how it has been used by the international community to promote democratization. It addresses some of the dimensions and side-effects of the policy, such as the relationship with traditional societies and power networks. It also addresses the importance of attending to the conditions of implementation, political issues such as nationalism and Islam, and political actors who may only have recent democratic credentials. Political democratization—free elections—is clearly popular in the Greater Middle East and Central Asia. During the last two years people have voted every time they have had the opportunity, despite the dangers. The debate concerning the compatibility of Islam and democracy overlooks the fact that the main obstacle to democratization in the area is usually not a religious but a secular authoritarian regime. The difficulty of building a democracy with people we do not consider to be democrats is discussed. There can be no democratization process without taking into account the mainstream Islamist parties and without acknowledging the importance of nationalism. There is a clash between the ‘war on terror’ approach and the call for elections: one cannot put Hamas and Hezbollah on the terrorist list and call for free elections in which both would emerge as legitimate and representative political movements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents several books on foreign relations of the United States. "The Bush Betrayal," by James Bovard; "The Obligation of Empire: United States Grand Strategy For a New Century," by James Hentz; "God Willing? Political Fundamentalism in the White House," by David Domke.

Discusses the pressure for universities to respond to international and global trends. Implications of internationalization for student composition, professional standards, research orientation, research competitiveness and facilities; Argument that factors external to the university may inhibit and not promote the fulfillment of its international responsibilities.

Examines the lack of analysis of the implications of the Northern Ireland conflict in international relations thinking. Lack of debate on whether the conflict is a small war, a struggle or simply violence; Argument that the study of the conflict has been intellectually interned from influences at work in the wider academic world; Scarcity of analysis of the military dimension of the conflict.

Focuses on globalization which presents similar challenges to government and to business. Analyis of the mixed success of the corporate and political response to globalization; Arguments pertaining to globalization; Details on the best response to globalization.

Discusses the current Italian thinking about the course of the country's foreign policy in terms of a division between tendencies towards re-nationalizing foreign policy and internationalism. Issues in the future of the European Union and the enlarge of NATO; Examination of the issues in the European integration process and relations with Slovenia and Croatia.

The subject-matter of the academic discipline of international relations is often thought of as being very much a question of facts: tracing the foreign policy of one country here, the relations between states in a particular region there. More loosely it can be described as the reflective analysis of current affairs. These elements are all, or should be, of interest to the academic study of international relations; but they do not constitute what one may term the core of the discipline as it has developed in universities since the first departments were established after the First World War. Rather, the core of international relations is constituted by two other, more general, concerns.
One is the question how and with what concepts to analyse relations between states and across frontiers. What regularities can be observed, what causes can be divined, what analytical categories can best explain such phenomena as inter-state conflict, the impact of nationalism, the role of the economic in international contexts?
The second is the question of value, of the normative. When is it legitimate to intervene or use force; what are our obligations to the states in which we happen to be born or find ourselves as opposed to other, international, entities; what forms of international economic relationship are preferable on grounds of justice; what forms of association and solidarity, and at what cost, is it appropriate to argue for? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]