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The EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was conceived of as an area ill-suited for full judicial review by the Court of Justice of the European Union. The Lisbon Treaty confers on the Court limited jurisdiction which the recent case law has interpreted in broad terms. This article will place this case law in the broader constitutional setting of the EU legal order and will provide a critical analysis of its implications for both the EU's and domestic courts. The analysis is structured on the basis of three main themes. The first is about the position of CFSP in the EU's constitutional architecture: the article will analyse the constitutional ambivalence that characterizes this position and how it is conveyed by the provisions of the Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union governing the Court's jurisdiction. The second theme is about the recent case law, and the integrationist approach that the Court of Justice has adopted to the scope of its jurisdiction. The third theme is about national courts: the article will argue that recent case law has been too quick to dismiss them, and that primary law renders them an essential part of the judicial review system governing CFSP.

The jurisdictional framework of the Singapore courts has become more nuanced with the establishment of the Singapore International Commercial Court (SICC) on 5 January 2015 and the signing of the Hague Convention on the Choice of Court Agreements 2005 (Hague Convention) on 25 March 2015. Although the Hague Convention has yet to be incorporated in domestic law, it is expected this will happen in the near future. The SICC project, on the other hand, is part of Singapore's strategy to promote the jurisdiction as an international dispute resolution hub. In essence, the SICC is a domestic specialist court established to deal with international commercial litigation. Adapted from the arbitral model but underpinned by judicial control, central to the SICC framework are party autonomy and flexible procedural rules. The Hague Convention complements the SICC project by increasing the number of jurisdictions in which Singapore judgments will be recognized and enforced. These 2015 developments—key to establishing Singapore as the regional hub for dispute resolution—requires careful working out and an evaluation is needed of the jurisdictional regime that applies to the SICC and the internal allocation of jurisdiction as between the SICC and the Singapore High Court sans the SICC, as well as the impact of the Hague Convention. This article focuses on explaining the in personam jurisdictional rules of the Singapore High Court that now includes the SICC division. Its chief objective is to offer the international community an overview of the working framework of Singapore's version of an ‘international’ commercial court.

The Moçambique rule provides that an English court may not adjudicate on title to foreign immovable property. This article considers the primary exception to that rule: where the court assumes jurisdiction in personam to enforce a contractual or equitable claim concerning foreign immovable property against a defendant subject to the court's personal jurisdiction. It addresses two questions: how should the English court decide whether to assume jurisdiction in relation to foreign land, and if the positions are reversed, should an English court recognize or enforce the order of a foreign court affecting English land? As to the first question, this article argues that the orthodox English approach is anachronistic. English law applies the lex fori exclusively to determine whether an obligation exists which the court has jurisdiction to enforce. Instead, modern conflict of laws principles demand that the court should apply the proper law of the substantive claim in determining whether a sufficient equitable or contractual obligation exists. As to the second question, this article argues that despite the prevailing view that foreign non-money judgments are not enforceable in England, foreign orders in relation to English land are in principle entitled to recognition in a subsequent action in England by the successful claimant.

In this article the scope for dialogue between UK courts and the European Court of Human Rights is considered in theory and in practice. Having demonstrated that meaningful dialogue does take place in certain circumstances, the author considers the impact of dialogue and questions whether or not there can be any further expansion in dialogue whilst avoiding negative outcomes such as confusion over the creation of human rights norms and a loss in legitimacy for national courts adjudicating upon human rights issues.

The Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (‘the RTC’) is an attempt on the part of a group of Caribbean States to respond in a collective manner to the pressing challenges posed by the forces of globalization and liberalization. The RTC seeks, inter alia, to deepen regional economic integration through the establishment of a Caribbean Community (‘CARICOM’) including a CARICOM Single Market and Economy (‘CSME’). The States in question—Antigua & Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Montserrat, St Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad & Tobago—are for the most part former British colonies that gained their independence in the 1960s and 1970s. The RTC signals yet another important step in the tortuous path taken by these Anglophone Caribbean States ‘to avoid the looming threat of marginalization’1 following the failure in 1962 of the West Indies Federation.2 Significantly, this latest step is being taken side by side with the non English speaking civil law States of Haiti and Suriname thereby adding a new and interesting dimension to the integration process.

The expansion of claims of extended territorial and extraterritorial criminal legislative jurisdiction and the increasing facility with which States are able to obtain custody over defendants by way of more effective extradition arrangements is leading to a new problem in transnational criminal law. The result of these developments is that more than one State may have legitimate jurisdiction to legislate for the same conduct and the courts of more than one State may be entitled to exercise judicial jurisdiction over those persons charged with crimes arising from that conduct. For prosecutors, the problem may present itself as one of prosecutorial efficiency—how may the case be proceeded with expeditiously, in particular, in which jurisdiction is a conviction most likely to be secured? Considerations such as the availability of witnesses or the admissibility of evidence may influence the prospects of conviction and prospective punishments may be a factor when deciding in which system prosecutors prefer the case to go ahead. Defendants have different perspectives. In many cases involving extradition to face a charge based on an exercise of extended jurisdiction, the defendant will be removed from the place where he lives and works to another State. There may be adverse consequences for him compared to facing a trial where he is usually located. Criminal proceedings abroad will be in an unfamiliar legal system; bail may be harder to obtain because of a perceived greater danger of flight; the impossibility to continue working during the period in which the trial is being prepared may impose financial hardship; defendants will be removed from their families and social networks for considerable periods.

The fact that the International Criminal Court has not been granted universal jurisdiction exercisable proprio motu has often been criticized on the basis that it will leave some offences beyond its power to prosecute. This article investigates whether the drafters of the Rome Statute were necessarily wrong in deciding not to grant the court such jurisdiction. It concludes that to have given the Court universal jurisdiction would have been lawful under current international law, and would have provided a welcome reaffirmation of the concept. Still, the nature of the cooperation regime and of the Prosecutor's investigatory remit, would mean that such jurisdiction would be difficult, if not impossible, for the Court to use. As the Court has to operate in a world of sovereign States, not all of whom are sympathetic to it, the drafters' choice was a prudent one.

The purpose of this article is to consider the scope of the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice in the field of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, as set out in the Treaty on European Union. Pursuant to Article 46 TEU, the ECJ has virtually no competence over foreign policy and security matters—although some limited scope for judicial supervision may be derived from the combined effect of this provision with Article 47 TEU, which prevents encroachment by EU law on Community competence, with respect both to reviewing the choice of legal basis and to determining any violations of EC policy-making procedures. It is submitted that the absence of judicial control over the exercise of powers by the Union and its Member States in this area of potentially sensitive action does not guarantee the preservation of the institutional balance established by the EU Treaty. It may also prove incompatible for individuals to have a legal remedy in the event of a breach of directly effective CFSP provisions.

Various recent developments within and without the United Kingdom have strengthened the arguments in favour of the adoption of general nationality based criminal jurisdiction. These arise from problems in the application of territorial jurisdiction, increasingly frequent crime-specific reference to nationality based jurisdiction, the development of European Union law, the ever-greater mobility of nationals, the ability to commit crimes remotely, the incorporation of the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms into United Kingdom law, an evolution in the citizen-state relationship, and the increasing internationalisation of criminal law. It is not suggested that territory should no longer find a central place in the criminal law rather that the original and present arguments in its favour have been greatly weakened and, at the same time, the arguments in favour of nationality based jurisdiction have been strengthened. This article details the present nature of criminal jurisdiction, highlights the deficiencies with territorial jurisdiction and outlines the case in favour of a general nationality based criminal jurisdiction.

It is my intention to appeal to scholars of a younger generation to undertake research on the thesis which, on the basis of my experience at the International Court of Justice–and I have been a serving Member for almost a quarter of a century–I shall be presenting in this paper. In my view, one subject missing from contemporary studies on the function and work of the International Court of Justice is a pragmatic examination of the manner in which certain contentious cases presented to the International Court of Justice have disappeared from view and of whether a judgment, once handed down, has actually been complied with by the parties to the dispute.

British cases used to be widely relied upon to show that courts were entitled to hear criminal proceedings against defendants brought before them without having to enquire into the process by which custody over them had been obtained: and specifically, that there was no bar to proceeding where the allegation was made that custody had been obtained in breach of international law.1 The consistency of the doctrine was breached by Mackeson2 when the English court refused to hear the case against a defendant who, it accepted, had been brought to England by a collusive process between the English and Zimbabwean authorities, which arguably breached both national laws, even if it did not involve a breach of international law. While the previous orthodoxy soon reasserted itself in Driver,3 the edifice of authority was substantially undermined in Bennett4 when the House of Lords acceded to the claim of the applicant that proceedings against him would be an abuse of process, given the circumstances in which his presence in the United Kingdom had been achieved. Outside the United Kingdom, the practice in other States continued in different directions, sometimes confirming the old position of male captus, bene detentus,5 sometimes the reverse.6

The conclusion and adoption of the Statute of a permanent International Criminal Court2(“Statute”) in Rome in July 19983represent a turning point in the enforcement of legal norms regulating armed conflict. Th e Rom e Conference was the latest, and most important, chapter in a long saga concerning the broader issue of the conclusion and adoption of a Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, an important part of which was the establishment of an international criminal court to try such crimes.4The International Law Commission (ILC), the UN organ responsible for the preparation of the Code,5decided to separate the two objectives and to proceed with the drafting of a statute for an international criminal court that was distinct from the Draft Code of Crimes: the ILC envisaged a court that would exercise jurisdiction in respect of crimes of international concern which existed as such in various treaties already in force.6This approach is reflected in the provisions of the Statute adopted at Rom e concerning the jurisdiction of the Court, as explained below.7

There are numerous publications on the interpretation of Article 30 of the EC Treaty by the European Court of Justice1which for the last 20 years has been one of the most controversial issues in EC law. It is, however, surprising that there is much older, yet strikingly similar, case law of the US Supreme Court which has remained almost unnoticed in Europe. In this article the respective case law of the two courts will be compared. Such a comparison is not only of interest as such, but can also contribute to the discussion about the correct scope of Article 30—which has certainly not yet been exhausted.

In looking at the role and influence of the International Court as it advances on towards and beyond the millenium, one is struck by the variety of perspectives from which one may view that institution. These include those adopted by the Court itself, academic theorists, practitioners both private and governmental, states more generally, international organisations and individuals. Each of these manifests its own methodology, needs and interests. Academics, for example, are keen to examine the intellectual basis and consistency of decisions and to infer, analyse and criticise the existence and nature of rules and institutions. Practitioners seek to equip themselves with the knowledge and tools necessary in order to enable their clients to win before the Court. States cautiously seek to uphold the dispute resolution role of the Court in general terms without losing any cases or putting themselves in a position where this is a possibility. International organisations and individuals look at the Court with keen and hopeful eyes.

The last time this column appeared 1 there was considerable discussion about the proposals being considered at the then ongoing intergovernmental conference (IGC). Not surprisingly the proposals of the UK government in its Memorandum on the Court of Justice were not adopted in the Treaty of Amsterdam. No institutional changes have been made in relation to the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance. So the approval of their Rules of Procedure is still subject to the approval of the Council and their terms of office are still six years but can be renewed.

PRIOR to 1982 the provision in the Court's Statute for chambers of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) was practically a dead letter. Before 1982 there had been only two cases before the chambers of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ)' (or in fact one, because the second of these related to the interpretation of the judgment in the first). The present decade has seen a change in the attitude of litigants: so far two cases have been settled by the chambers,2 and two more will shortly begin.3 Solving disputes by means of chambers of the ICJ is a new instrument of international adjudication. It also represents one more attempt to overcome the lack of confidence shown in the Court ever since its establishment.

THE purpose of this article is twofold. As the title indicates, the explicit topic is the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany ("the court") over cases of a particular type. These are the individual constitutional complaints [Verfassungsbeschwerden] which, it would seem from the face of the legislative provisions authorising them, might be lodged with the court by any person nursing a grievance. This study sprang from a sense of dubiety that any court could survive as an institution under the pressure of an unchecked stream of complaints. Thus the investigation is focussed upon how, despite some rather clear statutory language considered in the body of this paper, the court has managed to protect itself from being overwhelmed. If this were all, this article would have served merely to alleviate a mild feeling of curiosity and, perhaps, to provide a useful manual for any would-be litigant before the court who might chance upon it. But its approach has been influenced by the broader consideration of gaining some insight into the jurisprudential workings of the court. To be sure, there is no dearth of studies devoted to precisely this task. Such studies fall essentially into two groups. First, and most numerous, are those which delve into particular cases of some notoriety to draw conclusions about the court's role as a political and policymaking institution.' Secondly, there are articles setting out in some detail the jurisprudential difficulties entailed in particular areas of the court's endeavours. 2 The present paper must be included in the second category, but differs in certain respects from the approach adopted elsewhere. Writers in this vein to date have largely been judges of the court or professors at German Universities. 3 The former have tended to concentrate on what they think the court is doing in its decisions, the latter on what they think the court ought to be doing. In all of this, any awareness of what the court is doing gets a trifle

IN October 1976 the European Court in Luxembourg gave judgment in the first cases involving the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments.1 After the entry into force of the Protocol to the Convention on Interpretation by the Court of Justice,2 decisions by the Court were eagerly awaited. So far the Convention, which imposes uniform solutions, has had a considerable impact on municipal conflict systems, and difficulties in its interpretation and application by municipal courts could easily be foreseen. The decisions of the European Court in preliminary rulings on the interpretation of the Convention constitute, therefore, an essential instrument for the achievement of uniformity in its application in EEC member countries.

v. Maclaren 1 that a corporation " may, for the purposes of jurisdiction, be deemed to have two domiciles.... The places of business may, for the purposes of jurisdiction, properly be deemed the domicile," 2 England has recognised the validity of the theory that a corporation can be in several states at once, wherever it is doing business.3 There is no problem relating to service of process against a foreign corporation doing business within the jurisdiction, nor of execution of judgment against the corporation. The common law has not, however, exploited the full import of a theory of juristic entity. Unlike many Continental countries, the common law has conferred legal personality only upon the body which has undergone prescribed steps to acquire this status, and the results have been restricted to what has come to be known as corporate personality.4 The common law has never given the partnership full juristic personality. The partnership is a group of persons each having his given legal status, but the sum of them does not amount to one overriding legal entity. Contemporary civil procedure has provided an admirable patchwork to remedy many of the consequences which result from an inadequate theory of juristic personality, but a new theory has not been supplied. Consequently, the basis of the modern law continues to be that of non-juristic personality for groups not enjoying the status of the corporation. England had by the end of the nineteenth century succeeded in discarding the last important ramifications of the nonentity of partnerships by reaching the position that service of a writ may be issued against the foreign partnership in the partnership name, proceedings may be carried

THE object of this article is to give a generalised but accurate picture of the machinery of law enforcement in those African territories which are or have until recently been under British rule. The method that has been used is to compare the legal systems of nine selected territories, obtaining an historical as well as a comparative perspective by selecting territories at differing stages of development. The territories selected comprise the three East African territories of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika; the three components of the Central African Federation, Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland; and three West African countries, Ghana, Sierra Leone and the Eastern Region of Nigeria. Since 1954 Nigeria has been a federation with an independent court system in each Region. The territories discussed thus cover a wide field geographically, while politically they range from Sierra Leone, a most backward colony, to Ghana, a State independent within the Commonwealth. As will be seen, the tempos of legal and political development are closely linked. All these territories with the exception of Sierra Leone have codified their substantive criminal law.2 All have codes of criminal