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This article examines how the European Court of Human Rights has clarified its jurisprudence on how the 1980 Hague Child Abduction Convention Article 13 exceptions are to be applied in a manner that is consistent with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It also analyses recent case law of the European Court of Human Rights on how the courts in the EU are to handle child abduction cases where the courts of the habitual residence have made use of their power under Article 11 of Brussels IIa.

In this article the scope for dialogue between UK courts and the European Court of Human Rights is considered in theory and in practice. Having demonstrated that meaningful dialogue does take place in certain circumstances, the author considers the impact of dialogue and questions whether or not there can be any further expansion in dialogue whilst avoiding negative outcomes such as confusion over the creation of human rights norms and a loss in legitimacy for national courts adjudicating upon human rights issues.

This article analyses the contribution made to the effective implementation of international environmental law in the EU by the ECJ invoking direct application and effect of international treaties. It considers the requirements of these doctrines in international law, distinguishing them from related doctrines in EU law. It reviews jurisprudence and literature and evaluates future potential. Implications for direct application and effect from the EU doctrine of primacy and for the principle of effective judicial protection are examined, and alternatives to full transposition, implementation and enforcement explored, including non-compliance procedures.

This short article considers the two primary legal frameworks that can operate to control decisions by a State, in this case the UK, to deploy troops to conflict or post-conflict zones—British constitutional law and international law, and how they have both been thrown into sharp relief by the continuing debate about the possible adoption by the House of Commons of a non-statutory war powers resolution.

This comment discusses three recent judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in the cases ofMcElhinney v Ireland, Al-Adsani v UK,andFogarty v UK. All three applications concerned the dismissal by the courts of the respondent States of claims against a third State on the ground of that State's immunity from suit. They thus raised important questions about the relation the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention)—especially the right to a fair trial and access to court enshrined in Arcticle 6(1)—and the law of State immunity.

Britain's Trident nuclear missile programme has long been politically controversial. In 1999, the controversy entered the judicial arena in Scotland, in two cases involving ‘direct action’ against Trident installations by anti-nuclear activists. In both cases, the actions were intended not as protests against Britain's nuclear-weapons policy, but rather as actual operations to disable the weapons themselves. The acts were, in other words, in the nature of acts of sabotage. Both incidents led to criminal prosecutions. In both cases, the accused parties sought to use international law as a defence. In both cases, the Appeal Court of the High Court of Justiciary—the highest court for criminal cases in Scotland—rejected the defence. In the process, however, the Appeal Court had occasion to expound upon some controversial points regarding nuclear weapons. Each of these cases will be discussed in turn.

In his seminal work The Multinational Challenge to Corporation Law Professor Phillip Blumberg assets that, “jurisdiction continues to be one of the most litigated areas involving the clash of enterprise and entity.”1 Indeed, in a world where business is increasingly conducted through the medium of economically integrated multinational enterprises (MNEs), the question of whether a forum has jurisdiction over disputes arising out of the operations of non-resident entities of the MNE brings into contrast the mismatch between the territorial reach of the legal system and the transnational reach of the enterprise. In terms of corporation law this raises the further matter of whether, and how far, the legal organisation of the MNE into distinct legal entities, in distinct legal jurisdictions, should affect the applicable rules of private international law as to the reach and scope of forum jurisdiction. Such issues have recently been aired before the English courts in a series of cases, arising out of the asbestos mining and milling operations of the British based MNE Cape plc in South Africa, which culminated in a judgment given by the House of Lords on 20 July 2000. It is the purpose of this paper to explore the issues of jurisdiction over non-resident entities of MNEs, first, through an examination of these cases in the light of Cape's industrial and management structure. It is striking how little such matters are addressed in the Anglo-American legal literature pertaining to private international law. Rather than considering the economic realities of the cases in issue, and developing new doctrines to deal with them, lawyers have tended to rely on legal concepts—in particular, the territorial nature of legal jurisdiction and the single unit corporate form—to lead them to often unsatisfactory results that would appear to a lay person not to accord with justice. A clearer understanding of the economic realities of group operations thus seems essential for the development of law in this area.

There are numerous publications on the interpretation of Article 30 of the EC Treaty by the European Court of Justice1which for the last 20 years has been one of the most controversial issues in EC law. It is, however, surprising that there is much older, yet strikingly similar, case law of the US Supreme Court which has remained almost unnoticed in Europe. In this article the respective case law of the two courts will be compared. Such a comparison is not only of interest as such, but can also contribute to the discussion about the correct scope of Article 30—which has certainly not yet been exhausted.

In Scotland, like England, possession plays a part in landownership. In Scotland a non-owner may acquire a title to land by the operation of prescription;1 in England the title of an owner may be lost by limitation2 but an easement can be acquired by prescription,3 as can a servitude in Scotland.4 Because the acquisition of ownership in Scots law is by the operation of prescription, both a title and possession are necessary,5 whereas in England only possession is required. Although the theory behind and the purpose of adverse possession are different in each jurisdiction, as are the periods of possession, the result in many cases will be similar. The purpose of this article is to look at the similarities and the differences, and to consider recent cases on possession in each jurisdiction to show to what extent, if at all, one jurisdiction may learn from the other. The Prescription & Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973 codified the law and, although it shortened the period of prescription, cases decided under the previous law, notably those on the requisites of possession, are still relevant.

SCOTS law derives its law on promises from civilian sources and distinguishes between a promise and a contract. The result is a system which enforces a promise without (a) acceptance of the promise or (b) consideration. Scots law demonstrates how a system of voluntary obligations can operate without features often regarded as essential by theoreticians in a common law system. A promise in Scots law is a statement by a party which is a unilateral obligation requiring neither acceptance nor mutual consent. An offer, on the other hand, requires acceptance to make it binding and a contract involves mutual consent. No specific words are necessary for a promise. A statement in the form "I promise to pay X ?10" is an example of a promise which will be enforceable provided that certain requirements are satisfied.

The last time this column appeared 1 there was considerable discussion about the proposals being considered at the then ongoing intergovernmental conference (IGC). Not surprisingly the proposals of the UK government in its Memorandum on the Court of Justice were not adopted in the Treaty of Amsterdam. No institutional changes have been made in relation to the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance. So the approval of their Rules of Procedure is still subject to the approval of the Council and their terms of office are still six years but can be renewed.

THE DEVELOPING "jurisprudence" of the Court of Justice of the European Communities relating to "general principles of European Community Law" and its increasing reference to the European Convention on Human Rights and other sources of fundamental rights as forming an integral part of that law suggests that the European Convention may have been accommodated into the corpus of European Community law.' This "communitisation" of the European Convention may well endow its substantive provisions with special Community law features in relation to national law, thus radically altering the Convention's status in the domestic law of the nine member States.2 In the words of the former President of the Court of Justice of the European Communities (the Luxembourg Court): Just as Community law has become effectively established thanks to national courts, so the [European] Convention [on Human Rights] can become part of national legislation by means of the combined compulsory force of the decisions of the Court of Justice and national judgments. By interpreting Community law in the light of the Convention, the Court of Justice would place the efficacy of its decisions at the latter's disposal. Direct effect, uniformity, the primacy of community law could also help the rights safeguarded by the Convention to penetrate both into the Community and each of the member States. 3

To choose and prepare a subject worthy of the objectives of those who established this lecture is a formidable task, not least for one who follows the lecturers chosen for previous years. I confess that I took advice. It was suggested on the one hand that it would be an appropriate tribute to take as a theme "Money in Community Law"; and on the other that it would be safer and more comfortable for a former member

THERE has been a variety of legislative schemes directed to the issue of how the financial costs and benefits of public planning of the use of land shall be identified and distributed. The crucial element in any such efforts is the operation of the market for land, and any planning approach that leaves an untrammelled market in land is obliged to accept that influence through laws will be limited to negative controls on private initiatives for development. A " negative " planning system has the subsidiary and exiguous role of umpire for a continuing game conducted by landowners, developers and finance companies, while the alternative of" positive " planning depends, in the ultimate analysis, on powers of compulsory acquisition; more particularly does it depend on a comprehensive and purposeful exercise of such powers. But compulsory acquisition for planning purposes is the exception rather than the rule and a very considerable burden on public funds. If a planning system is attuned to a high degree of public development this gives public authorities sufficient control over the financial aspects to guarantee that they are in the box seat on all development and that compulsory acquisition is a routine, and not an unusual exercise of power. In McAuslan's phrase " a consideration of the problem of land values in an age of comprehensive planning is a consideration of the waxing and waning of the emphasis placed on public development and positive planning." 1 This article is a consideration of existing and proposed legislative schemes for dealing with development value in the United Kingdom and Australia. As will be seen the central problem is a free market in land, so it is not surprising that any attempt to keep up with the fluctuating legal situation is as difficult as following a sharp exchange of volleys at the net of the centre court at Wimbledon.

Kingdom in this organisation; at the same time we may record the increasing interest in common law concepts which the British delegations have met or provoked 2 at this Conference. Let us deal first with the Conference's functions and scope, and with its organisation, and touch on a few matters discussed in the past.3 In the second part the Conference's activities since its revival after 1945 may be briefly examined, in the course of which we shall mention especially a few matters in which Great Britain has showed an interest; here again the Conference sometimes seems to have played a part in stirring discussion in that country.