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1. DEEP EQUILIBRIUM NETS.

2. APPROXIMATING PURCHASE PROPENSITIES AND RESERVATION PRICES FROM BROAD CONSUMER TRACKING.

3. IDENTIFYING EXCHANGE RATE COMMON FACTORS.

4. EMPLOYMENT ADJUSTMENT AND LABOR UTILIZATION.

5. LEGISLATED PROTECTION AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION.

6. MONEY TALKS? AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF CHEAP TALK AND BURNED MONEY.

7. FIRM DYNAMICS IN AN URBAN ECONOMY *.

8. THE HOME SELLING PROBLEM: THEORY AND EVIDENCE.

9. EFFECTS OF PERMANENT AND TRANSITORY TAX CHANGES IN A LIFE-CYCLE LABOR SUPPLY MODEL WITH HUMAN CAPITAL.

10. JOB MATCHING WITHIN AND ACROSS FIRMS.

11. LABOR MARKET SEARCH AND SCHOOLING INVESTMENT.

12. EFFECTIVE PERSUASION.

13. LIFE-CYCLE LABOR SEARCH WITH STOCHASTIC MATCH QUALITY.

14. WAGE FLOORS, IMPERFECT PERFORMANCE MEASURES, AND OPTIMAL JOB DESIGN.

15. BUYERS, SELLERS, AND MIDDLEMEN: VARIATIONS ON SEARCH-THEORETIC THEMES.

16. NUMERICAL SIMULATION OF NONOPTIMAL DYNAMIC EQUILIBRIUM MODELS.

17. WHEN DOES DETERMINACY IMPLY EXPECTATIONAL STABILITY?

18. ON FISCAL MULTIPLIERS: ESTIMATES FROM A MEDIUM SCALE DSGE MODEL.

19. LAND USE REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTRY: EVIDENCE FROM THE TEXAS LODGING INDUSTRY* LAND USE REGULATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTRY: EVIDENCE FROM THE TEXAS LODGING INDUSTRY.

20. MARKET ACCESS, INVESTMENT, AND HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS* MARKET ACCESS, INVESTMENT, AND HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS.

21. TAX COMPETITION IN A SIMPLE MODEL WITH HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS: HOW LARGER MARKETS REDUCE PROFIT TAXES* TAX COMPETITION IN A SIMPLE MODEL WITH HETEROGENEOUS FIRMS: HOW LARGER MARKETS REDUCE PROFIT TAXES.

22. AN EQUILIBRIUM SEARCH MODEL OF SYNCHRONIZED SALES* AN EQUILIBRIUM SEARCH MODEL OF SYNCHRONIZED SALES.

23. INCENTIVES AND THE COST OF FIRING IN AN EQUILIBRIUM LABOR MARKET MODEL WITH ENDOGENOUS LAYOFFS* INCENTIVES AND THE COST OF FIRING IN AN EQUILIBRIUM LABOR MARKET MODEL WITH ENDOGENOUS LAYOFFS.

24. AN EMPIRICAL MODEL OF LEARNING UNDER AMBIGUITY: THE CASE OF CLINICAL TRIALS* AN EMPIRICAL MODEL OF LEARNING UNDER AMBIGUITY: THE CASE OF CLINICAL TRIALS.

25. NONSTATIONARY RELATIONAL CONTRACTS WITH ADVERSE SELECTION* NONSTATIONARY RELATIONAL CONTRACTS WITH ADVERSE SELECTION.

26. FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE SOURCES OF GROWTH AND CONVERGENCE* FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE SOURCES OF GROWTH AND CONVERGENCE.

27. DERIVATIVE IDEAS AND THE VALUE OF INTANGIBLE ASSETS* DERIVATIVE IDEAS AND THE VALUE OF INTANGIBLE ASSETS.

28. PROFITABILITY OF PRODUCT BUNDLING PROFITABILITY OF PRODUCT BUNDLING.

29. SCHOOL DISCIPLINE: A SOURCE OR SALVE FOR THE RACIAL ACHIEVEMENT GAP?* SCHOOL DISCIPLINE: A SOURCE OR SALVE FOR THE RACIAL ACHIEVEMENT GAP?

30. MONEY, CAPITAL, AND EXCHANGE RATE FLUCTUATIONS* MONEY, CAPITAL, AND EXCHANGE RATE FLUCTUATIONS.

31. ACCOUNTING FOR THE TIMING OF FIRST MARRIAGE* ACCOUNTING FOR THE TIMING OF FIRST MARRIAGE.

32. GOVERNMENT POLICY IN MONETARY ECONOMIES* GOVERNMENT POLICY IN MONETARY ECONOMIES.

33. FIRM HETEROGENEITY, RULES OF ORIGIN, AND RULES OF CUMULATION* FIRM HETEROGENEITY, RULES OF ORIGIN, AND RULES OF CUMULATION.

34. VEHICLE CURRENCY* VEHICLE CURRENCY.

35. THE EFFECTS OF THE 1978 PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT ON FEMALE LABOR SUPPLY* THE EFFECTS OF THE 1978 PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT ON FEMALE LABOR SUPPLY.

36. SPATIAL PANELS: RANDOM COMPONENTS VERSUS FIXED EFFECTS* SPATIAL PANELS: RANDOM COMPONENTS VERSUS FIXED EFFECTS.

37. FISCAL EXPANSIONS, UNEMPLOYMENT, AND LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION: THEORY AND EVIDENCE* FISCAL EXPANSIONS, UNEMPLOYMENT, AND LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION: THEORY AND EVIDENCE.

38. PROFIT SHIFTING AND TRADE AGREEMENTS IN IMPERFECTLY COMPETITIVE MARKETS* PROFIT SHIFTING AND TRADE AGREEMENTS IN IMPERFECTLY COMPETITIVE MARKETS.

39. A DEFENSE OF THE FOMC* A DEFENSE OF THE FOMC.

40. HOW MANY FIRMS SHOULD BE LEADERS? BENEFICIAL CONCENTRATION REVISITED* HOW MANY FIRMS SHOULD BE LEADERS? BENEFICIAL CONCENTRATION REVISITED.

41. THE WELFARE IMPACT OF REDUCING CHOICE IN MEDICARE PART D: A COMPARISON OF TWO REGULATION STRATEGIES* THE WELFARE IMPACT OF REDUCING CHOICE IN MEDICARE PART D: A COMPARISON OF TWO REGULATION STRATEGIES.

42. MATCHING MARKETS WITH MIXED OWNERSHIP: THE CASE FOR A REAL-LIFE ASSIGNMENT MECHANISM* MATCHING MARKETS WITH MIXED OWNERSHIP: THE CASE FOR A REAL-LIFE ASSIGNMENT MECHANISM.

43. MODEL UNCERTAINTY AND EXCHANGE RATE VOLATILITY* MODEL UNCERTAINTY AND EXCHANGE RATE VOLATILITY.

44. THE PARETO PRINCIPLE OF OPTIMAL INEQUALITY*.

45. GLOBAL BUSINESS CYCLES: CONVERGENCE OR DECOUPLING?*.

46. OPTIMAL MIGRATION: A WORLD PERSPECTIVE*.

47. BUSINESS CYCLES IN THE EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF LABOR MARKET SEARCH AND SELF-INSURANCE*.

48. REFERENCE NORMS, STAGGERED WAGES, AND WAGE LEADERSHIP: THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE*.

49. LEARNING AND THE GREAT MODERATION*.

50. OPTIMAL CONTROL OF EXTERNALITIES IN THE PRESENCE OF INCOME TAXATION*.

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