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The literature on global climate change governance frequently refers to the 1997 Kyoto Protocol as a "top-down" instrument, often in unfavourable comparison with the 2015 Paris Agreement, described as "bottom-up". However, the meaning ascribed to "top-down" is often left undefined, contributing to a surprisingly widespread misunderstanding that the Kyoto Protocol, and in particular its emission targets, were imposed on governments. Against this background, this paper seeks to answer the following research question: To what extent can the Kyoto Protocol's emissions targets be justifiably referred to as having been imposed through a "top-down" process? To answer this question, the paper reviews the literature on the Kyoto Protocol, with particular attention paid to the historical record and authoritative accounts of the negotiations. Having found evidence that denoting the Kyoto Protocol as "top-down" without further explanation is misleading, to the point of caricature and misrepresentation, the paper takes on a second research question: What factors lie behind the misleading characterisation of the Kyoto Protocol as "top down"? In answer to this question, the paper points to confusion between process and substance. It also invokes a wider tendency to unduly discredit the Kyoto Protocol, along with strategic efforts to emphasise differences between the Protocol and the Paris Agreement in order to legitimise the latter. The paper ultimately finds that the "bottom-up/top-down" metaphor obscures more than it illuminates, and that our understanding of both the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement would be best served by abandoning it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contributions to the climate governance literature have highlighted the importance of recognizing its new polycentric nature, which includes roles for non-state and subnational actors in climate change mitigation and in leadership for climate action. Yet, the literature is missing a normative cartography—that is, a mapping of the distribution of moral duties in the real world—which is tailored to a context of polycentric governance. This paper answers the question: how can moral duties be distributed in a context of polycentric climate governance such as to diminish the problem of non-compliance? This implies the following question: do duties change in situations of non-compliance in a context of polycentric governance, and if so how? Acknowledging polycentric governance is the key to an effective distribution of moral duties, as it allows for a more accurate mapping of non-state and subnational actors' duties in leading the charge against climate change. Correspondingly, a normative cartography fitted to this context will be instrumental in showing how morally informed climate governance can diminish the problem of non-compliance. This paper focusses on the distribution of moral duties in a context of polycentric governance as a contributing factor to inducing agents to act according to the collective goal. It argues that a more fine-grained distribution of climate duties, tailored to polycentric climate governance, contributes to addressing the problem of non-compliance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reviews the national environmental agenda of Arab countries in the Middle East and Africa in an attempt to determine coherence of local efforts with the international environmental commitments these countries have made by signing and ratifying the Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework and Convention on Climate Change. The paper succinctly summarizes the impacts of climate change on the countries of the region and the responses of individual countries to the eminent environmental threats. Using country specific data, the paper identifies the mitigation and adaptation measures that individual governments communicated in their initial Nationally Determined Contributions to combat climate change and support concomitantly the realization of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals pertinent to climate impacts. Furthermore, this paper evaluates the overall environmental commitment and performance of the Arab countries and compares them to the average global performance. The findings indicate that most of the Arab countries are heading toward severe water shortages due to deteriorating water supply and growing water demand. The paper concludes that the Arab countries, individually and collectively embrace the Paris Agreement and engage in necessary measures to combat and/or adapt to climate change. Furthermore, the paper presents supporting evidence to show that the Arab countries are at par with the rest of the world when dealing with climate change issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The access to goods and their allocation (who gets what, when, where and how) is one of the analytical problems of the 2009 Earth System Governance (ESG) Science and Implementation Plan (Biermann, in: Earth System Governance project report, IHDP no. 1, International Human Dimensions Program, Bonn). The 2009 Science Plan distinguishes three dimensions of access: fair outcomes, adequate pathways and effective reallocation. This paper answers the question: how have scholars used concepts related to access and allocation in their research related to international aid, trade and investment. In other words, what have we learnt from the environmental governance literature about who gets what, when and why in the areas of international trade, aid or investment? To date there has not been an attempt to synthesise the findings of this research and this is the gap that this paper addresses. The paper first highlights the key themes in the literature on access and allocation from a justice perspective. It analyses the literature of the ESG and related communities over the last 10 years on international aid, trade, and investment, drawing out the important issues and findings. This study found that most papers applied empirical case study methodologies, highlighted how governance deficits contributed to environmental injustice and were normatively premised on the need to solve the particular and case based problems of global inequality related to resource use and distribution. However, existing studies fell short of identifying the conceptual preconditions and ideal parameters for fair access and allocation of environmental resources in international economic systems. Future research is needed on the extent, nature and causes of the underlying normative and structural elements of the international economic systems that entrench unfair access and allocation of environmental goods and services; on the nature and protagonists of environmental rights and duties and on the elements of governance that may guarantee fair access and allocation in international trade, aid and investment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While it becomes apparent that the sustainable development goal for water will likely not be met by 2030, the first UN Water Conference in almost half a century has produced a large number of non-binding commitments and pledges, thus falling short of closing the global governance gap that is widening through climate change. This article adopts a risk governance perspective and provides reflections and recommendations on the need for coordination, critical evaluation, integration and a deeper understanding of risk perceptions and responses related to the water SDG across public, private and civil society actors. Drawing on van Asselt and Renn, the paper proposes a water risk governance framework applying the principles of communication and inclusion, integration, and reflection, to assessing progress toward the water SDG. Focusing on the transformation of water services, it discusses who is represented, whose risks are perceived and responded to, and who is responsible for providing evidence and scaling innovation. It concludes that for scaling up four elements are necessary, including institutional innovation, financing mechanisms, monitoring, as well as social and policy uptake. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The private sector is one of the sources of finance included in developed countries' pledge in the UN climate negotiations to mobilise $100 billion annually by 2020 to support developing countries' efforts to address climate change. For adaptation in particular, it remains unclear what mobilised private finance is. Research so far has focused on its potential and experiences in developing countries, but not on the arguments of those who introduced and continue to advocate private adaptation finance: developed countries. This paper investigates the positions of developed countries and development banks and agencies. In particular, it aims to identify whether those actors can reach a common understanding of private adaptation finance that minimises norm conflicts in a fragmented climate finance system. Empirically, the paper examines the Biennial Reports and submissions on Strategies and Approaches for Mobilising Scaled-up Finance of six developed country parties, as well as data from interviews with experts from development banks and agencies. The analysis finds a number of discrepancies between these sets of actors, for example on motivations for and modes of private sector involvement. This discrepancy is the result of ambiguity around the concept of private adaptation finance in a highly fragmented climate finance architecture. This ambiguity is problematic when the aim of mobilising private adaptation finance is to contribute to the $100 billion commitment. However, if the aim is adaptation in practice, both ambiguity and fragmentation might actually make the climate finance system more inclusive and innovative. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate clubs have been suggested as a gateway to substantial reductions in global emissions. The club approach begins with a small number of enthusiastic countries. This paper asks under what conditions such clubs are likely to evolve into effective cooperation through side-payments to new members. The question is addressed through a range of formal thought experiments using numerical simulations. The model is calibrated using empirical data on countries' emissions, GDP, populations, and vulnerabilities. It is simple and stylized, but allows for complex and dynamic interactions between actors. Basic equity considerations can be accommodated. The results indicate that side-payments' theoretical potential for facilitating effective clubs is large. One or two large emitters can initiate a club that grows to cover a substantial share of global emissions if the global benefit-cost ratio for mitigation is around 3 or larger. The size of stable clubs is larger if new members contribute to making side-payments, and somewhat lower if equity considerations constrain the set of possible transfers. Side-payments' effect is enabled by the large asymmetries between countries. Total side-payment flows range from tens to hundreds of billions of US dollars annually. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Biodiversity loss remains one of the most pressing issues for global governance. This situation can be seen in Argentina and Chile through the effects of biodiversity loss caused by the introduction and expansion of beavers in Southern Patagonia. This case is interesting because, despite the Beagle conflict (i.e., the border dispute) between these countries some decades ago, nowadays Argentina and Chile are facing shared environmental problems and both are actively seeking solutions. The main question in this paper is, how did Argentina and Chile search for a solution to shared environmental problems caused by the expansion of beavers in Southern Patagonia? This paper tackles this question and presents the results of the conducted qualitative research. The results indicate that, in order to understand what Argentina and Chile are doing to achieve a solution to their shared environmental problems, research cannot be exclusively focus on domestic affairs. Instead, this issue requires taking into account how international dimensions influenced domestic policies. As this paper argues, in Argentina and Chile, international cooperation is a method of influencing biodiversity governance through funds granted by international organizations and international expert recommendations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Once marginal in climate governance, supply-side policies which seek to restrict the production of climate warming fossil fuels are now gaining greater prominence. From national level bans and phase out policies to divestment campaigns and the creation of 'climate clubs' such as the Beyond Oil and Gas Alliance, an increasing number of such policies are being adopted by governments, cities and financial actors around the world. But why would states voluntarily relinquish potentially profitable reserves of fossil fuels? How can we account for the rise of supply-side policies, the form they take and the sites in which they are being adopted? What conditions and contexts are most conducive to the adoption and sustainability of 'first mover' bans and phase out policies? This paper seeks to build an interdisciplinary account fusing insights from diverse theoretical traditions from international political economy, political science, sociology and the literature on socio-technical transitions in order to capture the interaction of political, economic and socio-cultural drivers in national and international settings which can provide the basis of a more integrated and multi-dimensional understanding of supply-side policies. Such an account, we suggest, helps to understand the origins and evolution of supply-side policies and, more critically, the conditions which might enable the expansion of supply-side climate policies to new sites. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To achieve the climate goals of the Paris Agreement, the bulk of identified fossil fuel resources cannot be burned and have to stay in the ground. This fact leads to a situation where a significant part of the fossil fuels already recorded in company balance sheets will become stranded assets in the near future. Since 2015, central banks have identified climate change as a large risk for financial stability, stranded assets constituting a significant element of this risk. To protect the economy from this risk, central banks need novel tools. The aim of this paper is to outline a new "climate bailout" tool which would enable fossil fuel industry actors, both in the Global North and Global South to sell their potentially stranded assets to central banks (mainly from the Global North) upon committing themselves to invest the received money into new and additional renewable energy (RE). Multilateral development banks and other development finance institutions would support this process, while central banks would take a new kind of long-term, low-yield green climate asset onto their balance sheets. The newly financed RE would substitute for lost fossil fuel energy supply and stabilise related prices. We demonstrate that a climate bailout would not only be in line with the general mandates of central banks, namely maintaining price stability and preserving the stability of the financial sector, but would also provide a new tool for central banks to counter fossil fuel price shock-induced inflation (fossilflation). We show how countries both from the Global South and the Global North could benefit from the implementation of this new financial tool. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the decades of international climate negotiations and several landmark agreements, global efforts to date to restrict fossil fuel production in line with climate targets have been unsuccessful. As national and international policies continue to fall short of phasing out fossil fuels, increasing attention has been paid to non-state actors, like pension funds, as a potential source of more ambitious climate action. As major asset owners, large shareholders in fossil fuel companies, and historically activist investors, pension funds are theoretically well-placed to contribute to phasing out fossil fuels. Despite growing recognition of this potential role for pension funds and other major investors in climate change mitigation, there has been little attention to pension funds' historical record on climate change, or to how their climate strategies have developed and changed over time. This paper examines how the climate strategies of the largest US and European pension funds have evolved in relation to key developments in international climate agreements and the extent to which these strategies contribute to restricting fossil fuel supply. Through an analysis of the annual, governance, and sustainability reports of 6 pension funds from 1997 to 2022, we examine the strategies pension funds have adopted to address both climate change and fossil fuels. Pension funds have demonstrated responsiveness to the signals of international climate agreements, adopting a range of strategies with respect to climate change (amongst others, integrating ESG principles, increasing their sustainable investments, and setting net zero goals). Their explicit attention to fossil fuels and contribution to supply-side interventions take the form of systematic shareholder engagement, (selective) divestment, and lobbying policymakers. While pension fund climate action is growing , the ambition of their strategies is not aligned with a rapid fossil fuel phaseout; their efforts are often focussed on improving disclosure and transparency and demonstrate complacency with minimal improvements from fossil fuel companies. If pension funds are to significantly contribute to phasing out fossil fuels, redefining pension fund responsibilities and the traditional shareholder role will likely be required. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on the no significant harm principle as applied to shared waters in Central Asia (CA): the Aral Sea basin shared by Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan; the Irtysh basin shared by China, Kazakhstan and Russia; and the Chu-Talas basin shared by Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. These transboundary basins are under increased pressure from growing population and economies, unsustainable development and the impact of climate change, making it essential to cooperate and enhance legal regulation. The paper seeks to contribute to a better understating of the nature of legal principles applied to transboundary waters in CA by analyzing whether and how transboundary harm is addressed in relevant treaties in the selected river basins. The paper finds that in most regional treaties the no-harm principle is phrased as a due diligence obligation, without defining a transboundary harm and specifying its threshold and potential activities that might cause it. In addition to improving the quality of regional agreements and enhancing procedural cooperation, the participation of countries in MEAs can offer a supportive legal framework to specify no-harm related obligations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Researching socio-ecological justice issues in earth system governance can be operationalized through an Access (securing minimum needs) and Allocation (allocating the remaining resources, responsibilities and risks) framework. This paper synthesizes the review articles in this special issue. It concludes that (a) although international trade, investment and aid aim to enhance access, efficiently allocate resources and reduce risk, in practice the volume of trade and investment, the geographical distance between production and consumption, the pursuit of competitiveness and use of market instruments have concentrated wealth at great cost to socio-ecological justice; (b) research on food, water, energy, climate change and biodiversity reveal multiple linkages among the sustainable development goals, underlining the limitations of sectoral and incremental approaches to socio-ecological justice, for example, for smallholders; (c) while access issues are becoming difficult for politicians to ignore, allocation issues are being side-stepped because they draw too much attention to the underlying causes of inequality and poverty, (d) corrective justice is not enough, substantive justice approaches are needed emphasizing a rights-based framework and allocation cannot be exclusively left to market forces and mechanisms when it concerns public and merit goods; and (e) the terms access and allocation, although individually used, are not popular as a paired framework in the socio-ecological justice literature, but remain highly salient and cover the key justice issues for improving earth system governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As part of the Special Issue on Access and Allocation, this paper explores how reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions worldwide raises a number of access and allocation issues and identifies the possible solutions to the existing problems. The access elements include the right to development and basic needs satisfaction and the allocation issues include distribution of resources, risks and burdens and the assignment of responsibilities. The development pathways for many developing countries will be constrained by national level GHG emission reduction commitments as well as sub-national efforts. Yet, the current level of commitments is not sufficient to keep global temperature increase below 1.5 °C. Hence, an important question is what does a decadal review of the relevant literature tell us about how to conceptualize and define access and allocation in the area of climate change mitigation governance? The paper concludes that access and allocation issues of climate change mitigation are inextricably interlinked; calling for holistic strategies for mitigating environmental impacts while addressing social problems. The access issues can be governed through market mechanisms, in combination with an equity and justice approach for the poorest communities, and technology and social innovation, while allocation issues are governed by public policies, institutions, bottom–up decision making, mainstreaming of climate policies and international cooperation. The main characteristics of developing countries have not been adequately incorporated in present-day mitigation models. Further multidisciplinary research is needed to foster efficient and equitable climate, energy and forest governance which should be consistent with sustainable, inclusive and low carbon development pathways. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Paris Agreement on climate change recognizes, reluctantly albeit, the importance of 'climate justice' in its Preamble. Despite a change from a top-down burden-sharing approach to a bottom-up pledge and review regime, concerns of distributive justice remain central to the evolution of climate research, regime, and policy. The Paris Agreement also proposes a new market-based mechanism to promote ambition. Reasserting the unavoidability of 'climate justice' concerns, and responding to the suggestion that the proposed new market-based mechanism could learn from the experience of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), this paper argues that such a recommendation should be tested against a comprehensive understanding of compatibility between justice and the market. This paper postulates that both justice and the market have institutional underpinnings, which embed them into deeper, and interconnected, layers of values and relations. Arguing that 'climate justice' is best understood as 'an agreed ensemble of values,' we propose that the architecture of the UNFCCC in which these values are articulated, negotiated, and agreed upon needs to be conceptualized as consisting of four distinct, but evolving, institutional spheres: ambition, obligations and entitlements, mechanisms, and deliberation. The approach is illustrated using the case of the CDM, and implications are suggested for the proposed market-based mechanism under the Paris Agreement. The paper argues that the concerns of 'climate justice' have multiple institutional dimensions, and the market-based mechanisms may contribute to realizing certain dimensions of 'climate justice,' while considerably subverting others. The extent of both outcomes depends greatly on the 'agreed' conception of justice, design of mechanisms, and capabilities of the participants. Our findings suggest a judicious combination of non-market mechanisms with the market-based mechanisms would better serve the desired goal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reducing emissions from forest degradation and deforestation, conserving and enhancing forest carbon stocks, and sustainably managing forests (REDD+) has emerged as one of the most anticipated climate change mitigation tools. This paper aims to understand and identify the underlying discourses that have dominated the emergence of REDD+, by identifying the key story lines in the policy and academic debates on REDD+. As such, this paper takes a step away from the 'fine-tuning' of policy recommendations and instead studies REDD+ from a more theoretical approach with the intent to provide a critical analysis of the ideational structures that shape the policies that have emerged around REDD+. The analysis shows that ecological modernization and its accompanying story lines constitute a dominant notion of REDD+ as being able to manage the complexities of forest in a synergetic way, combining cost-efficient and effective mitigation with sustainable development. The paper also identifies the critical counter discourse of civic environmentalism, which criticizes this notion of REDD+ and instead promotes issues such as equity, the importance of local knowledge, and the participatory process. It argues that reducing deforestation involves trade-offs between economic, ecological, and social dimensions, also arguing that REDD+ fits overwhelmingly with the interest of the global North. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Emerging climate change regimes, such as the mechanism for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+), are increasingly aiming to engage developing countries such as those in Africa, in sustainable development through carbon markets. The contribution of African countries to global climate negotiations determines how compatible the negotiated rules could be with the existing socioeconomic and policy circumstances of African countries. The aim of this paper is to explore the agency of Africa (African States) in the global climate change negotiations and discuss possible implications for implementing these rules using REDD+ as a case study. Drawing on document analysis and semi-structured expert interviews, our findings suggest that although African countries are extensively involved in the implementation of REDD+ interventions, the continent has a weak agency on the design of the global REDD+ architecture. This weak agency results from a number of factors including the inability of African countries to send large and diverse delegations to the negotiations as well lack of capacity to generate and transmit research evidence to the global platform. African countries also perceive themselves as victims of climate change who should be eligible for support rather than sources of technological solutions. Again, Africa's position is fragmented across negotiation coalitions which weakens the continent's collective influence on the REDD+ agenda. This paper discusses a number of implementation deficits which could result from this weak agency. These include concerns about implementation capacity and a potential lack of coherence between REDD+ rules and existing policies in African countries. These findings call for a rethink of pathways to enhancing Africa's strategies in engaging in multilateral climate change negotiations, especially if climate change regimes specifically targeted at developing countries are to be effective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the process of coalition formation for issue-specific coalitions. I use the Alliance of Small Island States and the Coalition for Rainforest Nations as case studies to inductively create a framework on coalition formation. This framework is tested against two coalitions, both advocating for mountain issues in the UN climate negotiations. These two coalitions differ in the type of coalition sought, the strategies deployed thus far, and the type of support they have received, including the role of non-state actors. The framework helps identify significant gaps in the efforts of the two coalitions, including capturing the most salient link between climate change and mountains, translating technical input into negotiating positions, and identifying the most appropriate form of the coalition and forum to pursue these interests. In doing so, this paper provides insights into the limits of linking issues to the climate change agenda ('climate bandwagoning'), issue proliferation and its implications for coalition management for actors like the Group of 77 and China, and the nature of multi-scalar interactions in regime complexes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Multilateral development banks (MDBs) are increasingly supporting climate change mitigation efforts. However, little is known about how and why this role in climate finance has evolved, and how MDBs are managing this change internally. This paper addresses these questions through an analysis of energy support provided by the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The paper maps trends in the number and monetary value of ADB energy projects and technical assistance activities, presenting descriptive statistics on five categories of energy between 2000 and 2014. The results indicate that ADB while decreased its support for fossil fuel interventions, this sector continues to enjoy substantial funding support. At the same time, support for sustainable energy projects has also increased, reflecting the Bank's evolving priorities and providing a rough proxy for its entry into the climate finance system. These new insights enhance understanding of the changing dynamics of multilateral climate finance and its complex relationship with development finance institutions. Given their financial resources and policy influence, it is essential for MDBs to support the goals of the new global climate finance architecture. But to be considered a serious actor in the climate finance system, ADB has to revisit its policy architecture, strengthen its accounting procedures, and coordinate its efforts with those of other actors across this fragmented system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Climate change is a global crisis that requires countries to act on both domestic and international levels. This paper examines how climate policies in these two arenas are related and to what extent domestic and international climate ambitions are complementary or disparate. While scholarly work has begun to assess the variation in overall climate policy ambition, only a few studies to date have tried to explain whether internationally ambitious countries are ambitious at home and vice versa. According to the common view, countries that are more ambitious at home can also be expected to be more ambitious abroad. Many scholars, however, portray the relationship instead as disparate, whereby countries need to walk a tightrope between the demands of their domestic constituencies on the one hand and international pressures on the other, while preferring the former over the latter. This study uses quantitative methods and employs data from the OECD DAC dataset on climate finance to measure international climate ambitions. Overall, the present work makes two major contributions. First, it provides evidence that international climate financing ambition is complementary to domestic climate ambition. Second, the article identifies the conditional effect of domestic ambition—with regard to responsibility, vulnerability, carbon-intensive industry and economic capacity—on international climate ambition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper uses agency theory to analyse the incentives that a donor (principal) and recipient (agent) face as actors in an accountability regime for the financing of international climate change projects in developing countries. We address the following question: What accountability measures serve to align the incentives of the donor with those of the recipient in climate change financing? We focus on the relationship between the Green Climate Fund as a donor and one of its Accredited Entities as a recipient. We examine the consequences of misaligned incentives and asymmetric information, looking at a specific set of accountability measures, including performance indicators, penalties for poor performance, as well as the role of pressure exerted by civil society organisations (CSOs). We find that the use of imperfect performance indicators can reduce the risk of project failure if they are strongly correlated with adaptation and mitigation impacts. Penalties can have a positive impact on project outcomes, but impose risks upon the agent, which could lead him to refuse the contract for the implementation of the climate change project. The pressure of CSOs was found to have the potential to motivate donors and recipients to become more efficient and effective in their delivery of projects but could also lead to the donor choosing to finance lower-risk projects with fewer climate change benefits. We suggest that accountability requirements need to be carefully balanced with other objectives, including having a diverse set of entities willing to bid for the delivery of projects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The role of developing countries in climate negotiations has been changing over time, evolving from spectators to main actors. Accordingly, this paper provides a descriptive analysis of the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), the formal documents containing mitigation and adaptation efforts voluntarily set by each country, submitted by developing countries. In particular, the purpose of the paper is to analyse the contents of NDCs moving from the regional analyses provided by most of literature to the examination of NDCs among countries that are similar and that might share common negotiating positions. The analysis of the documents focuses on both mitigation and adaptation actions, together with an evaluation of the financial efforts required. From the descriptive analysis, specific needs and priorities emerge, as well as the need for external support in the form of technology transfer, capacity-building and financial support. In this respect, the analysis identifies a gap between supply and demand for climate funding. Trying to fill this gap would represent one of the main challenges in future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Efficient use of transboundary rivers under climate change requires periodic adaptation of their governing regime to the hydrological realities of the basin. Applying a short-term time horizon to an agreement on water allocation can make it easier for the riparian states to update the terms of their cooperation periodically, and thus, adapt them to changes in water availability resulting from climate change. However, agreements with a pre-agreed termination date can only increase the efficiency of water use if they lead to a stable cooperation. In this paper, I analyze how riparian states’ previous knowledge of the termination date of a water allocation agreement affects the agreement’s stability. The results show that when riparian states are aware of the agreement’s termination date, there is a higher chance for them to free-ride. However, certain cases may occur in which previous knowledge of the agreement’s termination date can contribute to the stability of an agreement by enforcing compliance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When do states allow nonstate actors (NSAs) to observe negotiations at intergovernmental meetings? Previous studies have identified the need for states to close negotiations when the issues under discussion are sensitive. This paper argues that sensitivity alone cannot adequately explain the dynamic of closing down negotiations to observers. Questions that have received little attention in the literature include which issues are considered sensitive and how the decision is made to move the negotiations behind closed doors. This paper examines the practices of NSA involvement in climate diplomacy from three analytical perspectives: functional efficiency, political dynamics, and historical institutionalism. Based on interviews and UNFCCC documents, this paper suggests that to understand the issue of openness in negotiations, institutional factors and the politics of NSA involvement need to be better scrutinized. The paper shows that each perspective has particular advantages when analyzing different dimensions of the negotiations, with implications of how we understand the role of NSAs in global environmental governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the face of water scarcity, growing water demands, population increase, ecosystem degradation, or climate change, transboundary watercourse states inevitably have to make difficult decisions on how finite quantities of water are distributed. Such waters, and their associated ecosystem services, offer multiple benefits. Valuation and bargaining can play a key role in the sharing of these ecosystems services and their associated benefits across sovereign borders. Ecosystem services in transboundary watercourses essentially constitute a portfolio of assets. While challenging, their commodification, which creates property rights, supports trading. Such trading offers a means by which to resolve conflicts over competing uses and allows states to optimise their ‘portfolios’. However, despite this potential, adoption of appropriate treaty frameworks that might facilitate a market-based approach to the discovery and allocation of water-related ecosystem services at the transboundary level remains both a challenge and a topic worthy of further study. Drawing upon concepts in law and economics, this paper therefore seeks to advance the study of how treaty frameworks might be developed in a way that supports such a market-based approach to ecosystem services and transboundary waters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Geoengineering—the deliberate interference in the climate system to affect global warming—could have significant global environmental and social implications. How to shape formal geoengineering governance mechanisms is an issue of debate. This paper describes and analyses the geoengineering governance landscape that has developed in the absence of explicit geoengineering regulation. An Earth System Governance perspective provides insight into the formation of norms resulting from an overlap in international treaties and from the actions of engaged non-state agents. Specifically, the paper explores the instruments and actors having effect in existing formal and informal geoengineering governance mechanisms. It finds that geoengineering is subject to a form of ‘governance-by-default’. This is due to a situation in which state actors have not resolved the tension between two legal norms: that of ‘precaution’ and that of ‘harm minimisation’. This governance-by-default is characterised by uneven regulation from existing multilateral agreements established for other purposes, an absence of regulation specifically focused on geoengineering, guidance from an international ambition to hold global average warming below 2 °C and to achieve net-zero emissions in the second half of the century, and strong normative engagement by the research community. Governance-by-default is likely to be a stopgap development until more enduring and focused governance emerges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Paris Agreement is built on a tension between the common goal of limiting warming to 1.5 °C and the differentiation that follows from the principle of equity. Scientific expertise is commonly seen as providing important means to overcome this tension, for example in the Agreement’s “global stocktake”, which is said to be undertaken “in the light of equity and the best available science”. This raises the question of how scholarly communities best can contribute to deliberations on equitable differentiation in the effort required to meet common temperature goals. To discuss this question, the paper looks to the literature within Science and Technology Studies on the role of science in policymaking, where disagreement exists over the merits of “heating up” controversies through politicization, versus “cooling down” issues by seeking consensus. It assesses two cases in which scientific expertise has engaged with questions of equitable effort-sharing in international climate politics: The “Bali Box” of the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report, and the “Civil Society Equity Review” undertaken prior to COP21 in Paris. Based on a comparison of the two cases, it is argued that scientific contributions should not shy away from highlighting conflicts in values and interests, and that “heating up” discussions about climate justice may be a valuable contribution to overcoming the tensions of the Paris Agreement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The implementation of the sustainable development principle of integration implies that economic laws should not be designed solely for the purpose of maximizing financial profits, but also with the object of improving human well-being, and addressing social and environmental concerns. International organizations, in which international treaties are being negotiated and created, will have to support this type of cross-disciplinary approach. International institutions, however, were not originally designed to cope with such a cross-disciplinary effort. Rather, most international institutions have emerged in line with the premise of 'functionalism', according to which their role is limited to supplying specialized services, usually as a solution for emerging needs and as a result of historical events. These specialized institutions have thus emerged with little coordination or common planning and have resulted in a global structure that has been referred to as an 'accident of history'. The role that international organizations should and do fulfil with respect to the implementation of the principle of integration is reviewed in this paper. This paper concentrates on trade and investment organizations (the World Trade Organization and the Energy Charter Treaty); it reviews the channels through which non-trade/investment considerations may, or may not, penetrate the decision-making processes of these organizations; the ways these International organizations engage with interdisciplinary issues and how the objectives of other institutions are reflected in their work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Global governance on climate change experienced institutional fragmentation by the generation of a competing institution, the Asia- Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP), in 2005, outside the previously dominant institutions of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol. Why was a competing institution created beside the extant dominant institutions in a singular international issue area? This puzzling question on the genesis of institutional fragmentation has been theoretically explored through international relation theories. However, a full-fledged answer has not come yet. This paper explains the genesis of institutional fragmentation on the theoretical grounds of constructivism's normative contestation for strategic social construction. Results show that the APP was created by a norm entrepreneur as an organizational platform to embody normative contestation and diffuse the competing normative interpretations of climate change norms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Finance ministries are increasingly involved in UN climate finance negotiations, yet this development received very limited attention in the literature on climate finance or climate negotiations. It is not obvious from the literature on bureaucratic politics how these ministries will position themselves on climate finance: they may frame climate finance as expenditure to be limited or as an instrument for correcting the market failure of climate change. This paper investigates which frames have characterised the positions of finance ministries on key issues in the climate finance negotiations, and whether the use of a given frame corresponds to particular factors. Case studies of Denmark, India, Indonesia and the USA based on official documents and interviews show that the position of each finance ministry is generally consistent with one particular frame. The Indonesian and Danish finance ministries predominantly framed climate finance as a way of correcting a market failure. The Indian Ministry of Finance emphasised Common but Differentiated Responsibilities, which fits with the budget frame. The US Treasury's position similarly fits with the budget frame while sharing elements of the market failure frame. Finance ministries that had the lead on climate finance were more likely follow the budget frame. The use of both frames cuts across the divide between industrialised and emerging economies. With the exception of the USA, left- and right-wing governments were equally likely to adopt either frame. These findings indicate that strengthening finance ministry forums built around the market failure frame can be a way of reducing norm fragmentation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Intact ecosystems across jurisdictional boundaries are of growing importance as the world continues to experience the impacts of climate change. International boundaries have, however, been drawn for political rather than ecological reasons. Ecosystem components often occur in more than one nation and are consequently subject to conflicting management and land-use practices. This research integrates the legal, institutional and environmental management components of transboundary biodiversity conservation to propose a comprehensive framework for evaluating the potential effectiveness of transboundary conservation regimes. The paper presents twelve criteria for the effective transboundary conservation of terrestrial biodiversity. These criteria can assist in the evaluation of existing initiatives and the design of future ones. The criteria will be of increasing importance as decision-makers seek to adapt to climate change and conserve biodiversity at all scales of political organization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most agree that large sums of money should be transferred to the most vulnerable countries in order to help them adapt to climate change. But how should that money be allocated within those countries? A popular and intuitively plausible answer, in line with the strong standing of the norm of ownership in development aid circles, is that this is for the recipient country to decide. The paper investigates the three most important types of ethical arguments for such 'recipient control': the epistemic argument, the entitlement argument, and the legitimacy argument. It is argued that there is a good case for recipient control in democratic countries, because such countries can be expected to act in the name of the people to whom adaptation finance is ultimately owed. However, the three arguments do not support, even if taken jointly, recipient control in nondemocratic countries. This is a significant result seeing as the majority of the most vulnerable countries are nondemocratic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), to provide financial and technology support to developing countries, the Technology Mechanism (TM) and the Green Climate Fund of the Financial Mechanism (FM) were established in 2010. Since the notion of linkage between the TM and the FM first appeared in 2011, there have been two conceptual approaches to defining this linkage: one posits it as funding arrangements between the TM and the FM to implement the former, while the other frames it as institutional linkage, relating to technical and policy advice on funding activities under the Convention. Though cognizant of the necessity of linkage between the TM and the FM, developed and developing countries contest the specific design of this linkage, particularly over the design of funding arrangements for the flow of financial resources from the Green Climate Fund to the TM. Drawing on international relations theory concerned with institutional interaction, this paper explores why political contestation occurs and continues on the TM–FM linkage design. Because the linkage between or among thematic bodies under the UNFCCC is crucial for climate technology financing, resolution of political contestation over the design of the TM–FM linkage is especially important. Based on its theoretical exploration, policy recommendations to resolve contestation are considered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At the 22nd Conference of the Parties in 2016, the roles of non-state actors in global climate change were emphasized with a particular focus on international frameworks for corporate activities. Frameworks are intended to serve as international governance to help regulate corporate actions. However, companies' climate-related activities are voluntary and produce several issues. The current research addresses the following questions: How do international business frameworks work for governing and enforcing the practical implementation of corporate activities? In the future, what functions are expected to work for business sectors ensuring the 2050 goals? This study examines the function of international business frameworks from different perspectives according to socio-environmental challenges, enforcement measures, organizers, and embedded problems. First, the development process of the motivation of corporate activities is examined, from Corporate Social Responsibility to the long-term vision. Second, we conduct a thorough review of the public and private regimes and identify three key components of private regimes to achieve effective, legitimate, and compliant functions: participation, accountability, and norms. These three components are not ensured by one regime, but by different types of international frameworks: industry associations, international organizations, and third parties. This study illustrates how these three types of frameworks work with the key components for enforcement. Furthermore, with increasing expectations for corporate actions, companies are creating their own visions and principles to attain the 2050 global goal. This paper demonstrates that the function of international frameworks is expected to strengthen in terms of supporting and governing a company's actions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the increasing relevance of cross-border flows of goods, capital and people in shaping risks and opportunities today, we still live in a "bordered" world, where the nation state plays a key role in planning and governance. Yet, climate change impacts will not be contained within country borders, meaning that climate change adaptation governance should also consider "borderless climate risks" that cascade through the international system, in relatively simple or highly complex ways. In this paper, we demonstrate how the notion of borderless climate risks challenges the dominant territorial framing of adaptation and its problem structure. To advance knowledge, we ask: why has a territorial framing and the national and sub-national scales dominated adaptation governance? How do borderless climate risks challenge this framing and what are possible governance responses? We draw on constructivist international relations theory and propose that the epistemic community that developed to interpret climate change adaptation for decision-makers had certain features (e.g. strong environmental sciences foundation, reliance on place-based case study research) that established and subsequently reinforced the territorial framing. This framing was then reinforced by an international norm that adaptation was primarily a national or local responsibility, which has paradoxically also informed calls for international responsibility for funding adaptation. We conclude by identifying types of governance responses at three different scales—national and bilateral; transnational; international and regional—and invite more systematic evaluation by the IR community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract??Climate change is a security problem that requires global solutions. Despite some important recent advances, current international responses to climate change are inadequate. This paper assesses whether the United Nations Security Council possesses sufficient legal authority to compel states to address the causes and consequences of climate change. While not advocating the immediate adoption of coercive measures, this paper initiates discussion of this issue, with the goal of developing an institutional framework within which to respond to this emerging threat, if necessary. The paper begins with a brief overview of the clear links between climate change and security, and the inadequacy to date of international remedial efforts. This is followed by a detailed analysis of Security Council legal authority, in particular the UN Charter, including a discussion of its evolving invocation in the context of non-traditional threats. Applying this legal framework to the specific issue of climate change demonstrates the substantial authority of the Security Council to take binding decisions relating to this subject, and its wide range of available enforcement measures, recognizing that political will to exercise and support this authority is required for any successful Security Council efforts to address climate change. The paper concludes that the Security Council has the legal authority to address the causes and consequences of climate change, and that its recent counter-terrorism and non-proliferation measures provide an illustrative institutional framework within which to address this emerging ?threat to international peace and security?. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main objective of this paper is to examine the evolution of European Union (EU) climate strategy, scrutinising in particular developments in EU's views on the so-called flexibility or Kyoto mechanisms. In brief, the paper argues that there has been a gradual change in EU's views, from the role of a sceptic in the run-up to Kyoto towards becoming more of a frontrunner on emissions trading in recent years. The need to 'save Kyoto' and the protracted development of EU climate policy are highlighted as two of the most important drivers behind this process of change. This paper also discusses some of the lessons learned from international negotiations and the development of EU climate policy. Finally, and drawing upon the lessons learned, the paper explores key future challenges for the further development of EU climate strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The pledge-and-review architecture of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change has been praised as a new model of global environmental governance. Instead of internationally agreed-upon emission reduction targets, the agreement relies on countries' repeated, voluntary pledges and actions. A key mechanism for monitoring progress toward shared global goals, putting pressure on countries to live up to their promises, and increasing ambition over time is the global stocktake. The stocktake's twin-purposes to act simultaneously as a review and ambition mechanism render it a global governance innovation. Absent a clear institutional precedent, the global stocktake presents a design challenge for the climate negotiation community. This paper develops a number of lessons for designing the stocktaking process based on a review of relevant scholarship and an analysis of the 2013-2015 Periodic Review as a limited precedent within the climate regime. While we cannot predict what will make the stocktake successful, these design principles could increase the chances for its effectiveness. These lessons offer potential guidance for decision-makers with implications for the future effectiveness of the Paris Agreement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines which factors influence women's descriptive representation in state delegations to the international climate change negotiations. Due to the gendered nature of climate change as an issue, it is important to study the representation of women in the negotiations and to examine its normative and functional implications. Theoretically, I propose to look at institutional, socioeconomic, and cultural factors as potential explanations for the variation in the proportion of women in state delegations across countries. I examine this variation by drawing on a dataset containing all member state delegations to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change negotiations from 1995 to 2011. The theoretical arguments are then tested on these data using a fractional probit model. This is the first comparative study of women's descriptive representation in international environmental negotiations. It contributes to our understanding of the variation in women's representation both over time and across countries. In particular, I find that women's representation is higher in countries that enjoy a higher level of development and a higher degree of political gender equality. The effects of other institutional and socioeconomic factors such as the level of democracy or gender-equal development remain statistically insignificant. Cultural factors measured by regional proxies show that Eastern Europe and Latin America are positively and the Middle East negatively linked with women's descriptive representation in delegations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper points to the significance of some factors of international co-operation in the field of environment and sustainable development as a general framework for understanding of the fundamental goals in international co-operation of the Republic of Serbia (RS). It is especially pointed to the place and importance of the activities that are carried out in the European Union (EU), to the harmonisation of national legislation with EU legislation including regulations in the field of climate change, to the significance of international environmental agreements and various forms of global, regional, subregional and bilateral co-operation as well as to the co-operation with international financial institutions which are important for environment and sustainable development. The paper is based on the thesis that the fundamental goals in international co-operation of RS in the field of environment and sustainable development are mostly determined by the 'European perspective' of RS and in accordance with this, with global trends in the contemporary environmental and sustainable development policy and law. Opening the prospect of the EU membership (potential candidate status and the status of the candidate for EU membership) has resulted in the acceleration of the process of harmonisation of national legislation with the EU's as well as speeding up the process of ratification of the international treaties in the field of the environmental protection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Achieving the 1.5 °C objective of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change in a just manner requires equitably sharing the responsibilities and rights that relate to this objective. This paper examines how international law concerning the Right to Promote (Sustainable) Development can contribute to determining what would be a “just” approach to achieving the 1.5 °C objective. This entails building on both the Right to Development (RtD) and the Right to Promote Sustainable Development (RtPSD). The RtD is a central notion within international human rights law and the RtPSD has been adopted under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Based on a literature review and legal analysis, we argue that, although the two Rights are prima facie different, in the context of the unanimously adopted Agenda 2030, including the SDGs, they partly complement and partly merge with each other. Together they provide a framework for assessing how a just transition towards a low greenhouse gas development process could be achieved and what this means for phasing out fossil fuels especially in the context of prospective oil producing countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers unilateral border measures, as contemplated by a number of developed states in conjunction with domestic emissions reduction schemes, as they relate to international trade and international environmental law. Specifically, I argue that to the extent that WTO-compliance requires strict adherence to the principle of nondiscrimination, as embodied in the national treatment and most-favored nation provisions in the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, there is the potential for conflict with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR), both as a free-standing principle of customary international law and as set out in various multilateral environmental agreements and, in particular in the climate change context, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol. This is insofar as the unilateral imposition of BCAs by developed countries shifts costs of compliance with environmental legislation in developed economies onto the developing world. Such allocation may conflict with the principle of CBDR, which recognizes the unequal contribution to environmental degradation of developed countries as well as their enhanced ability to address the challenges presented by such degradation and, as a consequence, requires that they undertake more onerous obligations with respect to climate change mitigation. The paper concludes with a discussion of the extent to which this conflict is illustrative of a deeper tension between efficiency and equity considerations inherent in the intersection of international economic law and international environmental law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract  The purpose of this paper is to consider how international law has sought to mediate between the promotion of environmentally sound technologies and local community participation. It will be suggested that the paradigm of sustainable development presents the most sensible framework through which to consider these issues. The paper will then present three short case studies centred around various aspects of the ongoing implementation of the Rio Conventions, namely the endorsement of sequestration activities within the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the development of an access and benefit sharing framework under the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity and further encouragement of community participation in the 1994 UN Convention to Combat Desertification. In conclusion, the paper will suggest that community participation must be given comparable status with the promotion of technological advances if long-term success is ever likely to be attained. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Energy policy in the European Union (EU) faces two major challenges. The first challenge is posed by EUs commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to the atmosphere in the context of the international agreement on climate change. The second challenge is to keep ensuring European security of energy supply, while its dependency on external sources of energy is projected to increase. In this paper, two long-term alternative climate change policy scenarios for Europe are examined. In the first scenario, EU reduces carbon dioxide emissions by domestic measures; in the second scenario EU maximizes cooperation with the countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU). Impacts on carbon flows between the EU and FSU and on the external energy dependency of the EU are assessed with an applied general equilibrium model, GTAP-E, whose set of energy commodities is expanded with combustible biomass as a renewable and carbon-neutral energy commodity. The results show that there is a trade-off between economic efficiency, energy security and carbon dependency for the EU. The FSU would unambiguously prefer cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The literature of welfare-maximising greenhouse gas emission reduction strategies pays remarkably little attention to equity. This paper introduces various ways to consider efficiency and equity simultaneously. Lower (higher) discount rates lead to higher (lower) emission reduction. Higher (lower) inequity aversion leads to higher (lower) emission abatement, unless one also considers the negative effects of OECD emission reduction on the exports of developing countries; in that case, the effect of inequity aversion is ambiguous. In the absence of international co-operation, higher (lower) risk aversion leads to lower (higher) emission abatement. With international co-operation, the effect of risk aversion is ambiguous because the higher risk aversion gives more weight to poorer regions and poorer generations. We analyse four ways to introduce compassion in a non-cooperative setting. If observed development aid is a guide, international altruism is small and has little impact on optimal emission control. If countries act as if they 'feel' but not 'physically experience' the climate impact of the most vulnerable country, optimal emission reduction increases, but not substantially so. However, if countries actually have to pay for the damage done, they would prefer to reduce their emissions to much lower levels. Finally, if countries pay as much for emission reduction as other countries suffer from climate change, (that is, if climate policy restores the income distribution to what it would have been without climate change), emissions are rapidly cut to very low levels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The fulfilment of wealthy countries' commitment to mobilise $100 billion a year in climate finance by 2020 will hinge on maintaining domestic political support in contributor countries. Predictability in flows of climate finance is likely to enhance the overall stability of the climate finance system and the broader climate regime. However, at present it remains unclear how the 2020 target will be achieved and little is known about what drives fluctuations in support among contributor countries. This article explores domestic and international factors that may explain fluctuations in national support through a case study of Australia's climate finance from 2007 to 2015. Drawing on documentary analysis and interviews with officials and stakeholders, the paper tracks two domestic factors that may influence support for climate finance-the government's political orientation and public concern about climate change-and two international factors-commitment to multilateral agreements and international peer pressure. While some accounts view climate policy choices as being driven primarily by domestic factors, we find that the government's political orientation on domestic climate policy and aid explains some but not all variations in Australia's stance on climate finance. International peer group effects have moderated the positions of two governments that were otherwise reluctant to act on climate change. National policy reforms combined with improved multilateral oversight and more established replenishment cycles could bolster support in contributor countries and thereby strengthen the capacity of the climate finance system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The African Group of Negotiators (AGN) has become a much more significant bargaining coalition in the global climate change negotiations. It has been participating more proactively and on a much more significant scale, and, as a result, it has had a greater impact on bargaining outcomes, notably in Nairobi, Copenhagen and Durban. Yet, at present, the group remains poorly understood by both scholars and policymakers. Compared to other groups in the climate negotiations, such as the Group of 77 and Alliance of Small Island States, it has received relatively little attention. This paper fills this gap by tracking the evolution of the AGN over the course of the climate change negotiations. In the early years after the Earth Summit, it shows that the AGN faced tremendous difficulties pursing regional objectives effectively, largely due to a number of 'internal' barriers to participation, which compounded the structural barriers that the continent faced by making it difficult to use 'low-power' negotiating strategies such as coalition building, agenda-setting and persuasion. However, in recent years, the group has become much more proactive as a result of greater access to material, ideational and institutional resources. These have relieved, somewhat, the internal barriers that the group faced, making it possible for the AGN to negotiate much more confidently and effectively than before. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Distribution issues have been critical in international negotiations on climate change. These have been framed as a 'burden sharing' problem since the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Three key difficulties are associated with this approach under a cap-and-trade system, namely the lack of consensus over what is equitable, uncertainty over estimates of policy costs, and lack of political realism and economic effectiveness of large-scale international transfers. These difficulties point to the risk of failure of post-2020 negotiations if these are based on the same premises of 'sharing the emission reduction pie' within a cap-and-trade regime. History has shown that different development paths can lead to similar economic performances with contrasted emission intensities. This paper proposes some insights into what could constitute a way forward, by recasting the discussion about emission reductions from a development perspective. It concludes that climate negotiations should depart from the current framework and shift to a debate focused on choosing a development path that would address domestic issues, while aligning pure climate policies with development policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Arctic has rapidly transformed from a 'frozen desert' into a theater for high-level politics. Climate change and socioeconomic interdependencies bring the World more and more to the Arctic and vice versa. Increased geological knowledge, new technologies, and high-energy prices make it possible to develop oil and gas resources in the Arctic; however, the effectiveness of oil spill response techniques remains a key concern. To understand oil and gas exploration in the Arctic governance setting, and especially the authority of Greenland, we combine a multi-level governance framework with the concept sphere of authority from post-international theory. The Arctic sphere of authority on oil and gas consists of many different governance arrangements, of which the most well-known governance arrangement is the Arctic Council. This paper focuses on the authority of Greenland in the changing oil and gas governance arrangements in the Arctic. Crucial is the changing Danish-Greenlandic relationship, in which the development of a Greenlandic oil and gas sector is seen as a tool to become financially independent. It can be concluded that the capacity of the Greenlandic government and civil society actors should be the primary guideline for the pace in which oil and gas activities are being developed. Taking this approach will ensure that the Greenland is retaining its central position and high degree of influence on the governance of oil and gas development in its country. Otherwise, it will lose influence and benefits will flow elsewhere. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented in which the editor discusses articles in the issue on topics including traditional territorial framing of adaptation governance; problem structure of adaptation in cases where it has cross-boundary spillovers; and building an effective regional adaptation strategy.