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The consensus in the recent literature is that the gains from international monetary cooperation are negligible, and so are the costs of a breakdown in cooperation. However, when assessed conditionally on empirically-relevant dynamic developments of the economy, the welfare cost of moving away from regimes of explicit or implicit cooperation may rise to multiple times the cost of economic fluctuations. In economies with incomplete markets, the incentives to act non-cooperatively are driven by the emergence of global imbalances, i.e., large net-foreign-asset positions; and, in economies with complete markets, by divergent real wages.

In a two-country DSGE model, the effects of foreign demand shocks on the home country are greatly amplified if the home economy is constrained by the zero lower bound on policy interest rates. This result applies even to countries that are relatively closed to trade such as the United States. Departing from many of the existing closed-economy models, the duration of the liquidity trap is determined endogenously. Adverse foreign shocks can extend the duration of the trap, implying more contractionary effects for the home country. The home economy is more vulnerable to adverse foreign shocks if the neutral rate is low – consistent with "secular stagnation" – and trade openness is high.

The macroeconomic implications of oil price fluctuations vary according to their sources. Our estimated two-country DSGE model distinguishes between country-specific oil supply shocks, various domestic and foreign activity shocks, and oil efficiency shocks. Changes in foreign oil efficiency, modeled as factor-augmenting technology, were the key driver of fluctuations in oil prices between 1984 and 2008, but have modest effects on U.S. activity. A pickup in foreign activity played an important role in the 2003-2008 oil price runup. Beyond quantifying the responses of oil prices and economic activity, our model informs about the propagation mechanisms. We find evidence that nonoil trade linkages are an important transmission channel for shocks that affect oil prices. Conversely, nominal rigidities and monetary policy are not.

The Barro-Gordon inflation bias has provided the most influential argument for fixed exchange rate regimes. However, with low inflation rates now widespread, credibility concerns seem no longer relevant. Why give up independent monetary policy to contain an inflation bias that is already under control? We argue that credibility problems do not end with the inflation bias and they are a larger drawback for flexible exchange rates than usually thought. Absent commitment, independent monetary policy can induce expectation traps---that is, welfare ranked multiple equilibria---and perverse policy responses to real shocks, i.e., an equilibrium policy response that is welfare inferior to policy inaction. Both possibilities imply that flexible exchange rates feature unnecessary macroeconomic volatility.

Several methods have been proposed to obtain stationarity in open economy models. I find substantial qualitative and quantitative differences between these methods in a two-country framework, in contrast to the results of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003). In models with a debt elastic interest rate premium or a convex portfolio cost, both the steady state and the equilibrium dynamics are unique if the elasticity of substitution between the domestic and the foreign traded good is high. However, there are three steady states if the elasticity of substitution is sufficiently low. With endogenous discounting, there is always a unique and stable steady state irrespective of the magnitude of the elasticity of substitution. Similar to the model with convex portfolio costs or a debt elastic interest rate premium, though, there can be multiple convergence paths for low values of the elasticity in response to shocks.

We propose a model to study monetary policy under discretion. We focus on Markov perfect equilibria, ruling out trigger strategies. The model is simple enough that the determinants of monetary policy under discretion are clear. We also find that for all parameterizations with an equilibrium inflation rate around 2%, there is a second equilibrium with an inflation rate just above 10%. Thus the model can simultaneously account for the low- and high-inflation episodes in the U.S. experience.

A large class of international business cycle models admits multiple locally isolated deterministic steady states, if the elasticity of substitution between traded goods is sufficiently low. I explore the conditions under which such multiplicity occurs and characterize the dynamic properties in the neighborhood of each steady state. Models with standard incomplete markets, portfolio costs, a debt-elastic interest rate, or an overlapping generations framework allow for multiple steady states, if the model features multiple steady states under financial autarchy. If the excess demand for the foreign traded good is increasing in the good's own price in a given steady state, the equilibrium dynamics around this steady state are unbounded. Otherwise, the dynamics are bounded and unique. By contrast, with Uzawa-type preferences, the steady state is always unique and the associated equilibrium dynamics are always bounded and unique. The same results obtain under complete markets.