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This paper conducts a security analysis on an image encryption scheme that incorporates chaos synchronization and DNA encoding techniques. The scheme adheres to the typical Substitution–Permutation structure by introducing the DNA operation as a nonlinear component. Compared to the traditional chaotic ciphers, the designer claims that the scheme achieved better nonlinear properties through the DNA operation. However, the characteristics of the differential between some pairs of plaintexts and the corresponding ciphertexts can be exploited to break the permutation operation. Meanwhile, the substitution operation can also be cracked by checking the mapping between the intermediate variables inversely permuted from ciphertext and the corresponding plaintext. Given the weaknesses of the encryption scheme, we introduce effective strategies for the known-plaintext attack. Both rigorous theoretical analyses and detailed experimental results are provided to demonstrate the effectiveness of the attacks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently, a chaotic secure video communication system based on FPGA is proposed, which essentially encrypts the original image data of each frame in the video in multiple rounds by using the 6D self-synchronizing chaotic stream cipher. In this paper, the security performance of the multiround encryption algorithm is analyzed based on divide-and-conquer attack. In the case of one round encryption, the keys ψ i j (1 ≤ i ≤ 3 , 1 ≤ j ≤ 6) can be deciphered by setting 30 appropriate initial conditions according to known-plaintext attack. After that, according to chosen-ciphertext attack, the chaotic iterative equation of the decryption end is degenerated into a linear one if ciphertexts are all set to zero. Under this condition, the equations between the unknown keys and the plaintext-ciphertext pairs can be obtained by setting 24 appropriate initial conditions, and the keys ψ i j (4 ≤ i ≤ 6 , 4 ≤ j ≤ 6) can be deciphered by solving the equations in Mathematica. Secondly, in order to reduce the multiplication times of the unknown keys in the case of two-round encryption, the number of pixels in an image can be selected as little as possible. According to chosen-ciphertext attack, when the number of the pixels in an image is only one, the keys ψ i j (1 ≤ i ≤ 3 , 1 ≤ j ≤ 6) can be deciphered by setting 30 appropriate initial conditions. Then, when the number of pixels in an image is two, the keys ψ i j (4 ≤ i ≤ 6 , 4 ≤ j ≤ 6) can be deciphered by setting 24 appropriate initial conditions. However, in the case that the encryption round is three or more, the keys cannot be deciphered by the attack method proposed in this paper. The analysis results show that the multiround image encryption algorithm is not secure when the number of encryption rounds is one or two. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As a variant of the substitution-permutation network, the permutation-diffusion structure has received extensive attention in the field of chaotic cryptography over the last three decades. Because of the high implementation speed and nonlinearity over GF(2), the Galois field of two elements, mixing modulo addition/multiplication and Exclusive OR becomes very popular in various designs to achieve the desired diffusion effect. This paper reports that some diffusion mechanisms based on modulo addition/multiplication and Exclusive OR are not resistant to plaintext attacks as claimed. By cracking several recently proposed chaotic ciphers as examples, it is demonstrated that a good understanding of the strength and weakness of these cryptoprimitives is crucial for designing more practical chaotic encryption algorithms in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since John von Neumann suggested utilizing Logistic map as a random number generator in 1947, a great number of encryption schemes based on Logistic map and/or its variants have been proposed. This paper re-evaluates the security of an image cipher based on transformed logistic maps and proves that the image cipher can be deciphered efficiently under two different conditions: (1) two pairs of known plain-images and the corresponding cipher-images with computational complexity of ; (2) two pairs of chosen plain-images and the corresponding cipher-images with computational complexity of , where is the number of pixels in the plain-image. In contrast, the required condition in the previous deciphering method is 87 pairs of chosen plain-images and the corresponding cipher-images with computational complexity of . In addition, three other security flaws existing in most Logistic-map-based ciphers are also reported. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]