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There is a misalignment between a development community focused on improving the welfare of vulnerable populations and the challenges of addressing widespread illicit drug crop production in drug producing countries. Drawing on the example of Afghanistan, this paper argues that the reasons for the development communities failure to engage is in large part a function of the way that illicit opium poppy and the illicit economy is currently perceived and understood by policy makers, practitioners and scholars. Much of the problem lies with the various statistics used to describe and quantify opium production in Afghanistan, many of them produced by UNODC and cited repeatedly in media coverage and the academic literature. These statistics shape how we have come to understand the scale and nature of the drugs problem, and thereby have informed policy responses. This paper argues that it is critical that policy makers and scholars fully understand the veracity of drug related statistics, including their methodological and conceptual limitations, before using them as the foundations for development programmes or policy responses. Indeed, this paper argues that many of these statistics have presented a simplified and 'profit maximising' model of the factors influencing farmers' livelihoods choices, which has proven deeply misleading and further alienated the development community from engaging constructively with the challenges of illicit drug production in developing countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In April 2023, the Taliban banned poppy cultivation and the trade of all narcotics. This caused a 95% reduction in opium production. Usually, that would be good news. But there is a substantial worry: synthetic opioids might fill the void left by heroin. This is concerning because these drugs have led to health emergencies in areas where they are prevalent. This paper highlights the limitations of the current drug surveillance system in Europe and proposes improvements. It argues that reliance on secondary data is insufficient. Instead, we need to interview a sentinel group of people who inject drugs and adjust city-level sentinel systems, such as wastewater analysis, to specifically track the spread of synthetic opioids. Without these proactive steps, we risk only noticing a transition from heroin to synthetic opioids after it has occurred, with its harmful impacts already in place. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• The Taliban opium ban of 2000–2001 disrupted European heroin supplies. • Effects differed across the seven Nordic and Baltic countries in systematic ways. • Some heroin markets bounced back, although perhaps with less vibrancy. • Other markets substituted to another opioid, either more or less harmful. • Market responses to the 2000–2001 ban may be informative for the new, current ban. The 2000–2001 and the 2022–2023 Taliban opium bans were and could be two of the largest ever disruptions to a major illegal drug market. To help understand potential implications of the current ban for Europe, this paper analyzes how opioid markets in seven Baltic and Nordic countries responded to the earlier ban, using literature review, key informant interviews, and secondary data analysis. The seven nations' markets responded in diverse ways, including rebounding with the same drug (heroin in Norway), substitution to a more potent opioid (fentanyl replacing heroin in Estonia), and substitution to one with lower risk of overdose (buprenorphine replacing heroin in Finland). The responses were not instantaneous, but rather evolved, sometimes over several years. This variety suggests that it can be hard to predict how drug markets will respond to disruptions, but two extreme views can be challenged. It would be naive to imagine that drug markets will not adapt to shocks, but also unduly nihilistic to presume that they will always just bounce back with no lasting effects. Substitution to another way of meeting demand is possible, but that does not always negate fully the benefits of disrupting the original market. Nonetheless, there is historical precedent for a European country's opioid market switching to synthetic opioids when heroin supplies were disrupted. Given how much that switch has increased overdose rates in Canada and the United States, that is a serious concern for Europe at present. A period of reduced opioid supply may be a particularly propitious time to expand treatment services (as Norway did in the early 2000s). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we look at local effects of recent changes in how the international borders of two Afghan provinces, Nangarhar and Nimroz, are governed. Over the past decade Pakistan and Iran introduced changes to border infrastructure and regulation in an attempt to increase state control over both official and informal flows of goods and people. We consider the political rationale behind these decisions, then look at the consequences these changes have had on licit as well as illicit economic activities in the border region. The paper builds on field research conducted in Nangarhar and Nimroz from 2018 to 2020. We find that reducing the permeability of the border has affected life in the neighbouring Afghan borderlands in different ways. In Nimroz, an informal local economy existing between historically interwoven Baluch communities on all sides of the border is being crowded out by boom-town dynamics, external land acquisition and selective control of the border by foreign states. The impact of border enforcement is direct and drastic, damaging the survival economy of border communities and accelerating demographic change. In Nangarhar, we find a more diverse and adaptive local cross-border economy, with a history of utilising both official and informal border crossings for trade in licit and illicit commodities. However, measures taken on the Pakistani side have led to shifts in informal trade, and changes to patterns of competition and control over the most lucrative routes and hubs. In both cases, illicit cross-border flows did not cease, but they changed in character from more broadly accessible horizontal activities to professional and hierarchical activities using fewer trading hubs and corridors. The drug trade is not exceptionally violent or disruptive, but is part of a commodity market embedded in a wider, often violent, political economy dominated by local political entrepreneurs and their networks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]