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It is widely assumed that researchers must normally secure informed consent from participants if research is to be ethical. But what exactly are people being asked to consent to? Most obviously, it is to supplying, or providing access to, data; but are they also agreeing that this data can be used in any way relevant to the research, or do they retain a right to control its use? A third question is: are they consenting to themselves being included within the focus of study, so that asking for consent amounts to assigning a right not to be researched? A further question concerns whether there can be group rights not to supply data, to control the use of data, and/or not to be researched? Such claims have been made by spokespersons for the disabled, indigenous groups, commercial organisations, governments, and religious cults. Justifications for these various rights usually appeal to the principle of autonomy, in one form or another. Yet this principle, being universal, must also apply to researchers themselves. So, does this imply that researchers have a right to carry out research? As this makes clear, there are conflicting rights-claims around research. This paper will examine these and their implications.

This paper responds to some recent discussions in the Journal about how interview data can be used. While recognising the value of detailed analysis of the discourse employed in interviews to identify its formal features, it is argued that such analysis is not essential for all the purposes for which interview data can be employed in social research; that informal understanding of everyday language use, built up through ordinary experience and during the course of inquiry, can often be relied upon. It is also argued that practical cautions against taking interview data at face value must not be conflated with philosophical doubts about whether interview data can serve as a source of evidence about anything beyond the interview context. [For the original article, "Beyond Performative Talk: Critical Observations on the Radical Critique of Reading Interview Data," see EJ1259552.]

This article investigates the value of ethnographic re-studies, and some of the theoretical and methodological issues that carrying out a re-study can generate. It is argued that the disputes that arose around some classic examples in anthropology and community studies are particularly illuminating. For example, Mead's work on Samoa and Redfield's study of Tepoztlán, and the re-studies of these, generated considerable discussion, and this still offers lessons for today. Three key functions of re-studies are discussed: replication, mapping change, and producing a fuller portrait of a community or institution. Also explored is the role of the personal characteristics and the theoretical orientations of researchers. It is concluded that re-studies reveal threats to validity that are present in all social research. At the same time, there is a danger that the discrepancies in findings between study and re-study will be exaggerated, indeed that the methodological problems involved will be mistakenly treated as representing a logical impasse.

It is argued in this paper that a significant number of definitions of terms provided in currently available methodological texts are inadequate or positively misleading. Some do not cover the main meaning of the term but focus instead on a non-standard one. Others fail to pick out the distinctive features of what is being defined. There are also those that fail to indicate relationships to related terms or those with similar meanings. Finally, there are some definitions that are simply incorrect in significant respects. It is argued that defective definitions are worse than useless and are a disservice to students.

In some quarters today there are arguments to the effect that research ethics codes should be formulated in terms of principles, rather than specific prescriptions and proscriptions. This derives in part from what is probably the most influential approach to bioethics: principlism. What is provided here is an exploration of the nature of ethical principles as these relate to social research, and of the debates around them. It is argued that principles are useful, so long as they are treated as reminders of what ought to be taken into account, rather than as premises from which specific ethical judgments can be derived. At the same time, it is concluded that any move towards formulating codes in terms of principles is likely to make little difference in practice for researchers under the present regime of ethical regulation.

It is widely assumed that researchers must normally secure informed consent from participants if research is to be ethical. But what exactly are people being asked to consent to? Most obviously, it is to supplying, or providing access to, data; but are they also agreeing that this data can be used in any way relevant to the research, or do they retain a right to control its use? A third question is: are they consenting to themselves being included within the focus of study, so that asking for consent amounts to assigning a rightnot to be researched? A further question concerns whether there can be group rights not to supply data, to control the use of data, and/or not to be researched? Such claims have been made by spokespersons for the disabled, indigenous groups, commercial organisations, governments, and religious cults. Justifications for these various rights usually appeal to the principle of autonomy, in one form or another. Yet this principle, being universal, must also apply to researchers themselves. So, does this imply that researchers have a right to carry out research? As this makes clear, there are conflicting rights-claims around research. This paper will examine these and their implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper responds to some recent discussions in the Journal about how interview data can be used. While recognising the value of detailed analysis of the discourse employed in interviews to identify its formal features, it is argued that such analysis is not essential for all the purposes for which interview data can be employed in social research; that informal understanding of everyday language use, built up through ordinary experience and during the course of inquiry, can often be relied upon. It is also argued that practical cautions against taking interview data at face value must not be conflated with philosophical doubts about whether interview data can serve as a source of evidence about anything beyond the interview context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is argued in this paper that a significant number of definitions of terms provided in currently available methodological texts are inadequate or positively misleading. Some do not cover the main meaning of the term but focus instead on a non-standard one. Others fail to pick out the distinctive features of what is being defined. There are also those that fail to indicate relationships to related terms or those with similar meanings. Finally, there are some definitions that are simply incorrect in significant respects. It is argued that defective definitions are worse than useless and are a disservice to students. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article investigates the value of ethnographic re-studies, and some of the theoretical and methodological issues that carrying out a re-study can generate. It is argued that the disputes that arose around some classic examples in anthropology and community studies are particularly illuminating. For example, Mead’s work on Samoa and Redfield’s study of Tepoztlán, and the re-studies of these, generated considerable discussion, and this still offers lessons for today. Three key functions of re-studies are discussed: replication, mapping change, and producing a fuller portrait of a community or institution. Also explored is the role of the personal characteristics and the theoretical orientations of researchers. It is concluded that re-studies reveal threats to validity that are present in all social research. At the same time, there is a danger that the discrepancies in findings between study and re-study will be exaggerated, indeed that the methodological problems involved will be mistakenly treated as representing a logical impasse. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In some quarters today there are arguments to the effect that research ethics codes should be formulated in terms of principles, rather than specific prescriptions and proscriptions. This derives in part from what is probably the most influential approach to bioethics: principlism. What is provided here is an exploration of the nature of ethical principles as these relate to social research, and of the debates around them. It is argued that principles are useful, so long as they are treated as reminders of what ought to be taken into account, rather than as premises from which specific ethical judgments can be derived. At the same time, it is concluded that any move towards formulating codes in terms of principles is likely to make little difference in practice for researchers under the present regime of ethical regulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article notes the increasing attention given to research ethics in recent years and focuses on two of the reasons for this: the growth in ethical regulation and the emergence of some kinds of qualitative research that foreground ethical ideals. It is argued that both involve forms of moralism or ethicism, in other words 'the vice of overdoing morality': they treat values that are external to the task of research as if they were central to it; and/or they require that researchers observe 'the highest ethical standards'. The misconceptions and dangers involved in each of these sorts of moralism are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ethical regulation of social research has increased considerably in the UK in the past few years, not least as a result of the ESRC's Research Ethics Framework. This article questions whether ethics committees are capable of making sound judgments about the ethics of what is proposed and practised in particular research projects. In addition, the legitimacy of such regulation is questioned, on ethical grounds. Finally, it is argued that increased regulation will not raise the 'ethical standard' of social science and will probably worsen the quality of what it produces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Educational research in Britain has been subject to substantial government intervention in recent years. The rationale for this has been the demands made by a model of evidence‐based policymaking and practice that carries implications for other fields of social research as well. In this paper, the growing influence of this model is sketched, and it is argued that it relies on some very questionable assumptions about what research can offer policymakers and practitioners. It is concluded that the consequences of enforcing this model are likely to be negative for both sides, but especially for research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reflects on the relationship between the past, present, and future of qualitative research. Association of negative connotation with being backward-looking; Major traditions of ethnography; Details on the urban settlement from the perspective of social control; Opinion of the author on a conference that celebrates the past.

The distinction between basic and applied social research continues to be influential. Problems with this distinction are identified, and an alternative typology is presented. This distinguishes, first of all, between scientific and practical research, in terms of their audience and mode of validation. Further distinctions are then made within each of these categories, between theoretical and substantive scientific research, and between contract-based versus autonomous, and dedicated versus democratic, practical research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A letter to the editor is presented in response to an article in the previous issue related to the collaboration between academic researchers and voluntary agencies by Lisa Harker.

The article presents a response to a research paper that introduced a quantitative tool for supporting thinking on sample sizes for thematic analyses. Topics discussed include the use of thematic analyses in sociological research, the need to determine the sample size, and the proposal for researchers to choose the prevalence of the least common theme of interest. The qualitative research approach of funding bodies and or ethics committees is then examined.