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In this paper, a three-party secure semiquantum summation protocol, which can calculate the modulo 2 addition of the private bits from one quantum participant and two classical participants, is constructed by only using single qubits as the initial quantum resource. This protocol needs none of quantum entanglement swapping, the unitary operation or a pre-shared private key. This protocol only requires the quantum participant to perform the Z basis measurements, the X basis measurements and the Bell basis measurements. Compared with the existing only semiquantum summation protocol (Int J Theor Phys, 60 (2021) 3478), this protocol has better performance in quantum measurements for quantum participant; moreover, it may also have higher qubit efficiency., 11 pages, 1 table

All previous semi-quantum secret sharing (SQSS) protocols have four common features: (1) they adopt product states or entangled states as quantum carriers; (2) the particles prepared by the quantum party are transmitted in a tree-type way; (3) they require the classical parties to possess the measurement capability; and (4) they are only suitable for two-level quantum system. In this paper, we generalize the SQSS concept into the d-level quantum system and propose two multiparty semi-quantum secret sharing (MSQSS) protocols with d-level single-particle states which do not require the classical parties to have the measurement capability. In the first protocol, the particles prepared by the quantum party are transmitted in a tree-type way, while in the second protocol, the particles prepared by the quantum party are transmitted in a circular way. The proposed MSQSS protocols are secure against some famous attacks, such as the intercept-resend attack, the measure-resend attack, the entangle-measure attack and the participant attack.

Quantum private comparison (QPC) aims to accomplish the equality comparison of secret inputs from two users on the basis of not leaking their contents out. Recently, Chen et al. proposed the QPC protocol based on triplet GHZ state and single-particle measurement (Optics Communications 283, 1561–1565 (2010)). In this paper, they suggested the standard model of a semi-honest third party (TP) for the first time, and declared that their protocol is secure. Subsequently, Lin et al. pointed out that in Chen et al.’s protocol, one user can extract the other user’s secret without being discovered by performing the intercept-resend attack, and suggested two corresponding improvements (Optics Communications 284, 2412–2414 (2011)). However, Yang et al. first pointed out that the model of TP adopted by both Chen et al.’s protocol and Lin et al.’s improved protocols is unreasonable, and thought that a practical TP may also try any possible means to steal the users’ secrets except being corrupted by the adversary including the dishonest user (Quantum Inf Process 12, 877–885 (2013). In this paper, after taking the possible attacks from TP into account, we propose the eavesdropping strategy of TP toward Lin et al.’s improved protocols and suggest two feasible solutions accordingly.