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While there is much theoretical and academic discussion of human security, as well as regional expressions of human security by the Organization of American States, African Union, and the European Union, little of this is translated into substance except for Japan, which has incorporated human security into foreign policy. This paper examines Japan's definition and aspiration for human security, especially its plans to expand development aid through this modality in Southeast Asia. This scrutiny will encompass Japanese human security foreign policy and its substantive action through the Japan International Cooperation Agency and the UN Trust Fund for Human Security. Thus, the potential for Japanese human security cooperation with Southeast Asian partners will be reviewed in light of Japan's projected trajectory. The paper concludes by positing that bilateral engagement might be expected for the considerable future and suggests policy consolidation before regional engagement can be effected. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The goal of this paper is to examine the process by which rapes and other acts of sexual violence lead to changes in international relations. This paper focuses on the rape of an Okinawan schoolgirl in 1995 because it presents a mysterious puzzle: given the changing international structural and epistemic environment, why did the US and Japanese governments fail to answer local calls for measures to prevent future rapes and other crimes by soldiers, perhaps by reducing the size of US forces deployed in Okinawa? By looking into factors that affected the decision-making process within the US and Japanese governments, this paper tries to explain why the issue of US bases in Okinawa evolved in the way it has since 1995. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using hitherto underutilized Japanese material, this paper systematically analyzes two competing theories of military doctrine formation that account for the construction of the 1976 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO), postwar Japan’s first military doctrine. It demonstrates that, on balance, available evidence on the policy preference of two key civilian policymakers, Michio Sakata and Takuya Kubo, is more consistent with the interpretation drawn from Posen’s balance‐of‐power theory than with that from Kier’s domestic culturalist theory. While by no means ignored by these policymakers, domestic political concerns neither dominantly shaped, nor gave a specific direction to their policy action. Rather, the policymakers were motivated to formulate the best response possible to Japan’s new international strategic conditions. This finding relates the hitherto neglected significance of the NDPO case to the larger, ongoing realist–constructivist debate on the formation of military doctrine. It also leads us to a more sophisticated understanding of NDPO formation, which focuses on the process of how a combination of political leadership and ideas triggered the breakthrough in Japanese security policymaking. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article re-examines Japan's entry into international society, focusing on leading Japanese diplomats. It has been believed that Meiji leaders' interpretation of international society and diplomacy was characterized by power-political and zero-sum thinking, and they took a realistic approach in an imperialistic system. However, the present article demonstrates that Japanese diplomacy in and after the 1890s was basically guided by interest-oriented and non–zero-sum thinking which was closely tied to the international order. Leading Japanese diplomats, who learned from their experiences in diplomacy with Western countries, understood the significance of norms as well as the importance of military power, and pursued Japan's national interests within the rules and norms of international society. These findings offer a new image of the principles of modern Japanese diplomacy, the mechanisms of Japanese imperial expansion, and the process of the spread of norms in international society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan has steadily extended its military reach from a domestic zone of defense against territorial invasion in the late 1950s, through regional security policy in the late 1970s to what has now become a globally scaled military role. This re-expansion is perceived by some as evidence of revived militaristic ambitions, and by others as subservience to the US global strategy. However, taking the cue from Japan's 2004 National Defence Programme Guideline (New Taikō), this paper assesses the role globalization has played in this territorial expansion. The impact of globalization is evident in the double expansion of Japan's national security conception in geographical terms and self-defense forces roles in global security. These ‘expansions’ are studied through two key elements of globalization – the deterritorialization of complex relations of interdependence between states (security globality) and the inter-penetrating nature of these relations blur the boundary between foreign and domestic spaces (intermestic space). [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

A common view of Japan's International Relations (IR) studies in the post-World War II period is that they are characterized by pacifism and historical approaches. This paper argues that while pacifism has continued to serve as the basis of them, the approaches adopted by researchers have become increasingly diversified. Specifically, although the main issues for Japanese IR studies in the postwar period (i.e. defense strategy, world political economy, and global issues) have been consistently addressed by researchers on the basis of pacifism, the theoretical orientation of researchers has continually become stronger. Finally, this paper argues that both changing and continuous characteristics of IR studies in Japan have been supported by global developments, and concludes that this trend will continue into the near future. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper examines news coverage of overseas natural disasters in Japan and the United States and assesses the extent to which that coverage affects amounts and types of emergency assistance provided by each country's ODA program. The comparison between the two cases allows for the examination of the different effects of media on foreign policy as well as the different ways in which those effects are filtered through institutional arrangements within the aid policy-making apparatus in each country. Following up comparative work on media impact on development aid programs in five countries, this paper argues that the organization of emergency assistance programs is a key determinant in explaining media impact on aid policy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In a rapidly changing geopolitical and strategic environment in which the current US administration is willing to demonstrate to the world that the pursuit of its national interest will not be encumbered by multilateral forums, what role will US bilateral alliance partners such as Japan and Australia play in redefining the international order, especially in their area of primary interest – East Asia? This paper examines an Australian proposal for establishing an informal security dialogue at the ministerial level comprising the United States and two of its bilateral allies in the Asia-Pacific. While the dialogue process has begun, the success of any such structure, however, will be largely coloured by accommodating the very different histories and strategic cultures that have developed within these countries, and the very different expectations other regional states have of them. Through the examples of the war on terror and the war against Iraq, this paper argues that there is little evidence of structured co-operation at the ministerial level in place. Further, any exclusive high-level security dialogue which forms around this troika will incur the suspicion of many East Asian nations, as it may be seen as a platform for unrestrained US unilateralism and exceptionalism, which may in turn have negative implications for Japan and Australia's continuing role in Asia. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The debate surrounding Samuel Huntington's influential Clash of Civilizations thesis has been focused too narrowly on the accuracy of his categorization of civilizations. This focus has left the problem of the alleged inter‐civilizational order incompletely theorized. In particular, two theoretical issues have been overlooked: first, can we really assume that civilizations are capable of and prone to clashing as if they were states and, second, surely a theory of global civilizations must be subject to itself, as a product of one such civilization. This paper explores the model of the inter‐civilizational order theorized outside the ‘West’, by Nishida Kitarô in interwar Japan. A comparison with Huntington's vision demonstrates some radical differences in these models and their consequences for the role of Japan in the so‐called ‘new world order’ of the 21st century. The conclusion suggests a need to theorize inter‐civilizational relations as seriously as inter‐national relations, but on different philosophical foundations, since the two describe qualitatively different aspects of coincident world orders. In particular, this paper calls attention to the special practical importance of non‐Western traditions of political thought in an inter‐civilizational world. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

As states jostle to attract and entice others by deploying a range of innovative strategies, a ‘soft’ power competition era looms possibly in the Asia-Pacific. This paper argues that reflecting on this period of competitive policy innovation provides a valuable opportunity to re-assess the theory and practice of Joseph Nye's ‘soft’ power, given its conceptual and empirical frailties: how theoretically precise are the policies commonly described as projecting ‘soft’ power? To do so, it undertakes a comparative evaluation of Japan's and China's ‘soft’ power strategies. By paying close attention to the theory–practice linkage, it illuminates the disparities in their understanding of Nye's ‘soft’ power. Rather than a one-size-fits-all concept, ‘soft’ power strategies with distinctively Japanese and Chinese characteristics are emerging, bringing different advantages and weaknesses. The proverbial magic mirror would conclude that by more closely matching Nye's formulations and displaying a less competitive streak, Japan appears the ‘softer’ power. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Since the late 1990s, China, Japan, and South Korea – the core states in Northeast Asia – have gradually engaged in various initiatives and institutions for regional cooperation. Such initiatives extend from summitry to functional cooperation in finance, environmental protection, logistics, and other areas. Furthermore, the three countries have shown their willingness to vitalize cross-border economic activities by concluding commercial arrangements. Given these evolutions, this article seeks to address the following questions: what features are found in trilateral cooperative initiatives and how these features are evaluated in terms of ‘regional governance’? The paper advances two propositions. First, regional cooperation in Northeast Asia can be characterized as weak neoliberal orientation and intensive business involvements in cooperative projects in state-directed policy networks. Second, regional governance in Northeast Asia has gradually intensified the nature of regulatory governance in which the governments of the three countries sought to harmonize standards and regulatory systems through trilateral cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

China–Japan relations are frequently analyzed either in the light of disputes about different interpretations of history, the consequence of a strategic power shift in the Asia-Pacific resulting from the rise of China or as a conflict between Chinese and Japanese national identities. This paper argues that bilateral relations should be assessed on the basis of a comprehensive approach. It concludes that the current state of bilateral relations can be understood as the result of identity crises of the political systems in Beijing and Tokyo. Owing to the rapidly changing environment in East Asia and their inherent conservative natures, both political systems' perceptions and policies lag behind present realities. This renders it difficult for them to effectively address important domestic and international problems and consequently affects bilateral relations negatively as it complicates the accurate redefinition of the representation of ‘self’ and ‘other’ with regard to foreign relations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In contemporary East Asia, political rivalry between China and Japan is often discussed. However, little has been done to systematically analyze the bilateral relationship and possible conflict escalation. In this paper, I employ the multiple-hierarchy model of regional politics offered by power transition theorists, in order to examine the recent Sino–Japanese relationship. After examining the effect of the factors suggested by the theory, I conclude that China's rise does not pose immediate destabilizing effects on regional security because the relative rise of China's capability is at best moderate. I also argue that the dyadic relationship has been pacified by several factors such as interest similarity and defense-dominant geography, in spite of China's overall rise. Finally, I offer some policy recommendations suggested by the theory-driven analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Historical controversies continue to plague northeast Asian politics today, with Chinese and Koreans protesting Japanese history textbooks and Japanese politicians' visits to Yasukuni Shrine, and Koreans protesting Chinese claims that the ancient Kingdom of Goguryo was Chinese, not Korean. Yet, there is little empirical research exploring what, if any, impact historical beliefs have on threat perception and foreign policy preferences in northeast Asia today. On the basis of surveys of Chinese, Japanese, and South Korean university students, this paper explores the relationships among beliefs about the past, perceived threat in the present, and foreign policy preferences for the future. Results and their implications for northeast Asian security are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

China and Japan used to have good energy cooperation before China switched into a net oil importer in the mid-1990s, but the recent years have witnessed an increasingly intensive competition between the two countries over petroleum supplies. While many saw such competition as inevitable with China's growing energy demands, the paper argues that the energy relationship between the two countries was never separated from political and strategic concerns, and heavily affected by the concern of ‘relative gains’, as suggested by the neorealists. Like the case prior to the mid-1990s when the non-energy factors underpinned the Sino–Japanese energy cooperation, the key factors that prevented the two from continuing energy cooperation today also lay in political and strategic aspects. Being two regional powers in East Asia, China, and Japan need to recognize the fact that their lack of energy cooperation due to mutual political distrust will not only impair their own energy security, but may also have negative implications on regional stability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Telecommunications is a leading industry that occupies a significant part of the contemporary economy and impacts economic development considerably. Since the 1980s, three major trade disputes in telecommunications – the NTT procurement, MOSS/Motorola, and NTT interconnection charge disputes – have developed between the Japanese and US governments. In responding to US pressures, the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT) has generally been receptive to US demands and willing to contain negotiations to a bilateral format, unlike the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, which has become resistant to US pressures and active in utilizing multilateral arrangements. This paper shows that explicit government involvement in the industry concerned, combined with strong US pursuit of negotiations, made it difficult for MPT to resist US pressure and resulted in its enactment of measures conciliatory toward the United States. These findings are then applied to brief analyses of other trade disputes to show the generalizability of the approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers whether an alliance can have a reassurance effect on a third-party. It uses hypotheses derived from balance-of-power realism and a revised version of balance-of-threat theory called balance-of-malevolence theory. Using the revised 1997 US–Japan Defense Guidelines as a primary case, Chinese reactions are found to provide greater support for balance-of-malevolence theory. Side-evidence from Japan's decision in the early 1990s to begin deploying troops overseas to participate in humanitarian and UN peacekeeping operations, and its dispatch of naval ships to the Indian Ocean in the wake of 9-11, confirm the centrality of Chinese concerns about Japan's disposition as a military power and the reassurance value of the US alliance and other ‘containment frameworks’ such as UN peacekeeping. This also suggests that the demonstration effect of benign overseas deployments can be effective in overcoming negative attributions about a state's disposition as a military power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper attempts to analyze Japan's conciliation with the United States regarding national targets on greenhouse gas emissions in the multilateral climate change negotiations (1990–2001) for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and for the Kyoto Protocol to the Convention. Japan's conciliatory proposals had nothing to do with bilateral pressure from the United States. Why, then, did Japan make special efforts to conciliate with the United States, and offer lenient proposals? I focus on three factors: concern for international status, the costs of the climate change regime and domestic politics. My main argument is that the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry used ‘conciliation’ with the United States in its favor as an excuse for making proposals that would emasculate the climate change regime and as a means of receiving support from the United States for differentiation of national targets on greenhouse gas emissions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The United States today dominates the globe and many regional geographical subsystems in an unprecedented way, maintaining a hegemonic order that is in no way similar to the ‘anarchy’ assumed in realist analyses. The global system today is not simply unipolar; it is a hegemonic system that is increasingly globalized, in which the basic concepts of realism (anarchy, self‐help and power balancing) provide little guidance or understanding in explaining state behavior. This paper describes the US hegemonic system, analyzes the roles of China and Japan within this system, and examines how the Bush administration's plans for missile defense might transform the system. The conclusion points to some critical implications from this analysis for realist interpretations of international politics. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper explores the logic behind US and Japanese approaches to regional security and the prospects for a more comprehensive co‐operative security order in the Asia‐Pacific. The current security order in the region bears the marks of long‐established and distinctive American and Japanese approaches. These approaches do hold out some hope in building a more inclusive and co‐operative order, but for years to come the Asia‐Pacific will be a region that will exist somewhere between a balance of power and a community‐based security order. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

I investigate three factors that keep countries from adopting the strategy of cross-domain warfare and launching cyber and military operations at the same time. I do so by disentangling the relationship between international law, cybersecurity norms, and the concept of cross-domain operations. My analysis of Japan's cross-domain vision indicates how difficult it can be for norm-compliant countries to launch cross-domain operations. In Japan's case, the reason for the challenge rests with flaws in its legal system and a long-standing commitment to international legal and normative regulations applied to cyberspace dynamics. The three factors are behind the reason why Japan has never carried out a cross-domain operation, even though other states have essentially done so. The analysis generates several strategic implications for other countries contemplating the use of cross-domain operations within their own legal and international parameters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a recently published article, Allen et al. (Outside the wire: U.S. military deployments and public opinion in host states', American Political Science Review , 114(2), 326–341; 2020) argue that US military deployments nurture favorable attitudes toward the United States among foreign citizens. Their claim is based on social contact and economic compensation theories, applied to a large-scale cross-national survey project funded by the US government. However, their analysis disregards the geographical concentration of US military facilities within the host countries. To examine the relevance of geography and assess both positive and negative externalities, we focus on Japan – a notable case given its status as the country hosting the largest number of US military personnel in the world. We show that residents of Okinawa, a small prefecture hosting 70% of US military facilities within Japan have considerably unfavorable attitudes toward the US military presence in their prefecture. They hold this negative sentiment specifically toward the bases in Okinawa regardless of their contact with Americans and economic benefits and their general support for the US military presence within Japan. Our findings support an alternative theory of not-in-my-backyard. They also shed light on the importance of local foreign public opinion for foreign policy analysis and call for a more balanced scholarly debate on the externalities of the global US military presence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article draws on prospect theory to explain the variation of China's risk propensity during the 2012–14 Diaoyu/Senkaku islands disputes with Japan. China's initial reference point 1.0 regarding the disputed islands was the 'shelving agreement' 'shelving the sovereignty dispute and a tacit acceptance of Japan's de facto exclusive control. So after Japan's 'nationalization' of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, China was clearly in a domain of losses. China was thus highly risk-acceptant by intensifying maritime and air patrolling, engaging in provocative behaviors, and suspending crisis management mechanisms. Meanwhile, China's reference point evolved. Discourse analysis of Chinese official statements and media coverage indicated that regularized patrolling or joint control became China's reference point 2.0. As it started to act from a domain of gains, Chinese behaviors turned risk-averse by scaling back patrolling and resuming negotiations over crisis management mechanisms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Deeping superpower rivalry between the United States and China has created acute strategic dilemmas for secondary powers in the Indo-Pacific such as Australia and Japan. This predicament is exacerbated by their divergent security and economic interests which cut across the superpower divide; a condition dubbed a 'security/economic disconnect'. These two intimately related dynamics preclude clear-cut implementation of conventional balancing/bandwagoning alignment choices and have led to mixed hedging strategies to cope with this situation. To address these issues, the article presents a refinement of the hedging concept in International Relations (IR) that emphasizes its multi-dimensional nature, within a broader interpretation of alignment itself. It applies this to the case of the Australia and Japan with reference to their Strategic Partnership, which is both emblematic of hedging responses to systemic uncertainty, and an institutional mechanism through which to operationalize joint hedging policies. This provides insights into how middle power strategic partnerships are managing strategic risks across the security, economic, and other, domains. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this article is to explore the perspective that the Abe Cabinet's replacement of the 1967 Three Principles of Arms Exports (TPAE) in 2014 will stimulate a change in bringing about the Japan Inc.'s revitalization in the defense sector, at the expense of Japan's postwar pacifist regime. Based on a rationalist firm-centric analysis on Japan's defense industry, this article finds that the firms are rational actors for profit maximization, remaining resilient for such a change, calculating the pros and cons of the new TPAE regime. To establish the argument, the article examines the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI), Kawasaki Heavy Industries (KHI), ShinMaywa, and IHI, in the years of 2010-14. This article also covers the recent F-35, Soryu-class submarines, and US-2 amphibian aircrafts deals, which many point out as the main sources for Japan Inc.'s reinvigoration in the arms building. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China and Japan continue to partly live in the shadow of World War II (WWII) with recurrent expressions of anti-Japanese nationalism in China periodically ebbing bilateral relations. How does the Chinese government manage anti-Japan public manifestations of nationalism and what factors explain it? The government has to walk a fine line by managing the nationalism it has bred without undermining its own rule and considering elite divisions, heightened public nationalism, and the developments in its external environment. Six case studies from the Hu-Wen era provide a comprehensive understanding of what pertains to Chinese nationalism, the means used to express it, and more importantly the way the government chose to tackle them. While nationalism can be a mean of garnering legitimacy and exercising pressure on Japan to bend to its wishes, the Chinese government is embarked on the sinuous task of preventing an escalation beyond its control at both the domestic and international levels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although Norwegian and Japanese fishermen killed almost identical numbers of whales in the last two decades, they were subject to a largely uneven attention from the international community. While Japan was significantly shamed by all actors, the attention on Norwegian whalers was much smaller. Why is that? The article first conceptualizes the gaps in contemporary shaming literature and shows that whereas lots has been written on why and how states shame, much less has been written about why some actors are shamed more and some less. To remedy that, it then adopts post-structural theoretical position and the methodology of discourse analysis to deconstruct anti-whaling campaigns against Japan and Norway. The analysis shows that whereas Japanese culture was often depicted as cruel and barbarous, and its science as faulty and illegitimate, Norway was largely spared of this discourse. I argue that this difference can be ascribed to differing identities between the Euro-American anti-whaling camp and Japan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China and Japan are among the world's top space powers, with significant technical competence in both conventional and 'newspace' capabilities. Since the early 1990s, each country has also taken a keen interest in shaping the governance of outer space activities. But they have done so in remarkably different ways, calling into question Asian states' supposed preferences for soft and informal institutions. Japan has led the Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency Forum, involving both state and nonstate participants, which is guided by a set of principles. China has opted for a high-profile formal intergovernmental design, the Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization, with a Convention and all the trappings of a formal organizational structure. This article assesses the activities of China and Japan in the new space race, discusses how and why the design of their space governance differs, and reflects on prospects for competition and cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Asia-Pacific lacks an environmental leader. Japan, a forerunner of environmental regulation in the 1970s, started to engage in active environmental diplomacy in the post-Cold War era by hosting conferences of parties to multilateral environmental agreements such as the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as well as providing a massive amount of environmental aid. Then, in the 2000s, Japan's initiatives became substantially weakened and have gained a negative international reputation as the country took a considerably passive position to the Paris Agreement, filed many reservations to the CITES listing decisions, and withdrew from the International Whaling Commission. This article explores, through six brief case studies, the factors and structures that systemically impede Japan's environmental leadership and norm internalization. It highlights the constraining factors behind Japan's devolution including its closed bureaucratic system and the lack of positive engagement of Japanese scientists. Finally, it addresses the future prospects of environmental cooperation in the Asia-Pacific. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars have recently commented on Japan's increasing threat perception, either in the context of an 'increasingly complex security environment', or in the context of its use by Japanese elites to advance their political goals. Yet, while references to Japan's threat perception are ubiquitous, conceptual clarity and comprehensive empirical evidence are far less so. This article seeks to address these gaps by conducting a longitudinal study of threat perception in postwar Japan. Data are driven from content analysis of debates in Japan's national parliament over a period of seven decades (1946–2017). The evolution of Japan's threat perception is analyzed, and a revisionist account of Japan's threat perception is put forward. Thus, this study serves both as a metric of threat perception in postwar Japan and as a model for the study of threat perception in international relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 2012, Japan's Prime Minister Abe Shinzō has sought to remake the country's foreign and security policy. Abe's agenda, which is increasingly called an 'Abe Doctrine', has prompted considerable debate as to its true nature. Is the Abe Doctrine nationalist, revisionist, or realist? This article contributes to these debates by tracing the competing characterizations of an Abe Doctrine's policy ideas and assessing these against the doctrine's policy prescriptions. It argues that the Abe Doctrine–situated within the long-term evolution of Japanese policymaking – is chiefly realist rather than nationalist in its policy prescriptions. In fact, where the doctrine does constitute a major departure from past policy practice, largely unrecognized until now, is not so much in how it expands Japan's international role but in how it narrows this role. The underlying logic of the Abe Doctrine may therefore be pushing Japan towards a new form of regional realism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan is on the verge of what would be a dramatic shift in defense posture. The 'spear and shield' structure of the US–Japan alliance, at the center of its security policy for most of the postwar era, is being revamped by a move toward autonomous defense. Why would a country confined to a largely passive and Americanocentrist posture for more than half a century suddenly change course? I argue that autonomy is for Japan the only way out of an unprecedented 'entrapment-abandonment dilemma': any attempt to prevent defection by the United States in the face of an increasingly assertive China heightens to an unacceptable level the risk of Japan being dragged into a US-led conflict in the Korean Peninsula, and vice versa. Japan's ability to wield the spear would likely have destabilizing consequences for the whole Asia-Pacific region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International migration and mobility raise a host of economic and security concerns for states in the Global North and the South. The garrison state linked with the trading state in Europe in the 18th and 19th centuries. The 20th and 21st centuries have seen the emergence of the migration state, where managing migration is vital for national security and development. Despite a reputation for social, political, and legal closure and a reticence about admitting immigrants, Japan is making halting moves toward a national immigration policy, what could be a 'Meiji moment' with policy innovation and potential transformation of Japanese society. The Japanese case is instructive for the study of migration policy as the only liberal state that has resisted immigration and paid the costs in terms of sociodemographic, economic, and political challenges. This article lays out a framework for analysis of Japan as an emerging migration state and explores the extent to which Japan has made the transition to a country of immigration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What explains Japan's security behavior? As an economically powerful state without commensurate military capabilities, Japan has long puzzled theorists of international relations. To explain this puzzle, many scholars have put forth arguments focusing on Japanese domestic institutions and anti-militarist ideas. In contrast, I argue that Japan's security 'production' is primarily driven by two key variables: the regional threat environment and the strength of security commitment from its ally and great power patron, the United States. These two factors vary and interact in ways that determine Japan's level of security, which drives its security policy. These arguments are illustrated through a longitudinal analysis of Japan's security behavior, comprised four temporal 'cases' running from 1960 to the present day. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why did Japan begin scientific whaling, a policy that benefits few domestically and alienates many around the world? In this essay, I argue that Japan's scientific whaling regime was formed as a result of a ‘two-level game’ between President Reagan and Prime Minister Nakasone. Although Reagan was faced with a unified, anti-whaling Congress, he himself was not much concerned about the issue. Nakasone was also not particularly concerned about whaling, and he initially was faced with a Diet that was divided on how to deal with whaling (although it became less divided over time). Ultimately, these circumstances led Japan to develop the scientific whaling regime that persists to this day. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article seeks to contribute both to the scholarly debate on Japan's territorial dispute with USSR/Russia and to the broader body of academic literature devoted to the ideational factor in foreign policy. By focusing on the formative years of the dispute and examining the variety of symbolic meanings attached to the Soviet-occupied islands by the domestic actors, this article examines the process of the emergence of the idea of the ‘Northern Territories’ as a national mission. It argues that the formation and institutionalization of the idea of the ‘Northern Territories’ in its present form can be traced to a complex web of power relations among the domestic actors, none of which perceived the return of the territory as its ultimate goal. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Since the 1990s, Japan and the Republic of Korea have chosen dissimilar policy options with respect to the US-led missile defense (MD) systems in East Asia. What explains the two countries' dissimilar MD strategies? Inspired by neoclassical realism, this study introduces a framework of domestic hurdles that combines Randall Schweller's cohesion model and Jeffry Taliaferro's resource extraction model. It sheds light on the degree of elite cohesion and social and economic impediments as key causal determinants that impede balancing against external threats. Although the influence of systemic variables that suppose optimal policy options, such as balancing, domestic hurdles impede or delay such options. This study will provide useful contributions to international relations by offering comparative and theoretical analyses on different paths that Tokyo and Seoul have chosen for their MD policies. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The literature on Japan's international security policy, including overseas interventions, since the end of the Cold War has focused on Japan's emergence as a ‘normal’ state. This discourse is informed by realist theory, which posits that states aim to increase their material power to secure themselves in a hostile anarchical order. This article explores the maritime security role of the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) to elucidate alternative theoretical paths that shed new light on Japan's foreign interventions. Specifically, a critical constructivist approach is applied to demonstrate the unique maritime security responsibilities that the JCG has assumed in line with Japan's pacifist identity and even at the expense of the Maritime Self-defence Forces, as demonstrated in Diet debates on Japan's Anti-Piracy Measures Bill in April 2009. Rather than pressuring states to become ‘normal’, there is much to be gained from understanding how identities inform alternative approaches in International Relations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Japan's vital interests, both its energy security and US alliance, are at stake in the Middle East. Change in Japan's Middle East policy is charted over three periods, from a stance independent of the United States to one increasingly aligned with US policy. This is explained in terms of four variables: level of US hegemony, threats in East Asia, energy vulnerabilities in the Middle East, and normative change inside Japan. Japan's policy in Middle East/North Africa reflects its general move toward a more militarily enhanced version of mercantile realism. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article seeks to enhance our understanding of an East Asian community by focusing on its cultural aspect. The specific focus of analysis is Japanese popular culture, whose elements include J-pop music, TV dramas, movies, manga (comic books), and anime (animations). This article sheds light on the progress of community building in the cultural sphere by demonstrating that Japanese popular culture has been favored by the people in the East Asian region. By so doing, it modifies our common beliefs about the characteristics of an East Asian community and our conventional expectations of the nature of an East Asian regional identity. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article investigates and explains the development of International Relations studies (IRS) in China, Japan, and India. Beginning in early 1980s IRS experienced exponential growth in China and is becoming a separate discipline in that country. Despite early starts, IRS in Japan and India is still an appendage in other disciplinary departments, programs, and centers although growing interest is discernible in both countries. Continued rise of Asian powers along with their growing roles and responsibilities in constructing and managing regional and global orders is likely sustain and increase interest in IRS in these countries and more generally in Asia. Distinctive trajectories have characterized the development of IRS in China, Japan, and India. Distinctiveness is evident in master narratives and intellectual predispositions that have shaped research and teaching of IR in all three countries. The distinct IRS trajectories are explained by the national and international context of these countries as well as the extensiveness of state domination of their public spheres. Alterations in national circumstances and objectives along with changes in the international position explain the master narratives that have focused the efforts of IR research communities. Extensiveness of state domination and government support, respectively, explain intellectual predispositions and institutional opportunities for the development of IRS. IRS in Asia has had a predominantly practical orientation with emphasis on understanding and interpreting the world to forge suitable national responses. That orientation contributed to a strong emphasis on normative–ethical dimensions, as well as empirically grounded historical, area, and policy studies. For a number of reasons including intellectual predispositions and constraints, knowledge production in the positivist tradition has not been a priority. However, IR theorizing defined broadly is beginning to attract greater attention among Asian IR scholars. Initial interest in Western IR theory was largely a function of exposure of Asian scholars to Western (primarily American) scholarship that has been in the forefront in the development of IR concepts, theories, and paradigms. Emulation has traveled from copying to application and is now generating interest in developing indigenous ideas and perspectives based on national histories, experiences, and traditions. Although positivism may gain ground it is not deeply embedded in the intellectual traditions of Asian countries. Furthermore, theorizing in the positivist tradition has not made significant progress in the West where it is also encountering sharp criticism and alternative theories. Asian IR scholarship would continue to emphasize normative–ethical concerns. And historical, area, and policy studies would continue to be important in their own right, not simply as evidentiary basis for development of law-like propositions. It also appears likely that Asian IR scholarship would increasingly focus on recovery of indigenous ideas and traditions and their adaptation to contemporary circumstances. The net effect of these trends would be to diversify and enrich existing concepts, theories, methods, and perspectives, and possibly provide fresh ones as well. The flourishing of IRS in Asia would make the IR discipline more international. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article examines the security relations among the U.S., Japan and Australia in the 1990s. It highlights the establishment of the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) or bilateral security relations between Japan and Australia in 2005. It states that in 1993, the process of alliance redefinition started, after the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) lost the majority in the lower house. The transformation of the defense policy of Japan and Australia from "national defense" to "international security" is discussed.

The Vietnam War greatly destabilized Southeast Asia and led to almost a decade of fighting by America and its Asian allies. It was fought on the principle that if communism was unchecked it would overrun the region, with the Southeast Asian countries falling under communist control like ‘dominoes’. While countries such as Thailand, South Korea, and Australia provided military support to assist American strategic objectives, Japan, however, was constrained by its peace constitution and thus unable to provide direct military assistance. Nonetheless, under the leadership of the avid anti-communist conservative leadership of Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, Japan still managed to play a role in the Vietnam War. Although Japan initially entertained the notion of facilitating mediation, with Okinawa's reversion hanging in the balance after 1967, Japan's leadership took a more hawkish approach on Vietnam in order to ensure that Washington would agree to reverting Okinawa to Japanese administrative control. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The conventional view in the field of international political economy – that greater economic interdependence creates an incentive for active foreign policy engagement – is hard to reconcile with Japan's foreign economic policy. To explain this counterintuitive outcome, we develop a new model of domestic demand for policy activism that integrates strands of prospect theory, collective action, and interest aggregation. We argue that both the rationale for mobilization and lobbying capacity are essential elements in understanding the domestic demand for significant foreign policy departures. We apply this conceptual framework to Japanese foreign economic policy in two issue areas: finance (Japan's response to the 1980s Latin American debt crisis and the late 1990s Asian Financial Crisis), and trade (Japan's Free Trade Agreement negotiations with Mexico and South Korea). [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This study applies content analysis to Japanese prime ministers' Diet addresses in order to examine the Japanese government's perception of the world after World War II. Since the end of the Cold War, many scholars have revealed more strategic and proactive aspects of Japanese foreign policy by investigating broader issues or longer time periods. Methodologically, these studies as well as conventional studies derive the character of Japanese foreign policy mainly from an examination of documentary sources or case studies, thus further empirical evidence can help these discussions. By investigating the long-term perception focussing on North-South issues as well as East-West issues, we show that there are aspects of Japanese foreign policy with an individual character. We conclude that this method provides empirical evidence and helps to construct a multidimensional perspective for characterizing Japanese foreign policy, and thus contributes to the recent lively discussions on this topic. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Most states have numerous paths to create security for themselves. Foreign policy-makers must recognize that their own security policy will initiate a process that structures the nature of the domestic competition over domestic and foreign policy in other countries. I contend that one state's security alternative can empower or weaken domestic actors and interest groups in opposing foreign powers. I term this process the ‘second face of security’ since it entails a less direct and more nuanced method of creating security (in contrast to the ‘first face of security’). I apply this model to explain the intent of Britain's ‘smart’ or targeted appeasement policy during the 1930s – to strengthen conservative business, government officials, and economic circles in banking, light industry and finished goods, and even heavy industry in order to steer Tokyo and Berlin away from rearmament and extreme autarky. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Constructivists have advanced the study of Japanese national security policy by illuminating how normative factors shape state behavior. At the same time, they have overemphasized the role norms and ideas play while downplaying the structural and material forces that often underlie normative factors. This article seeks to reveal the political foundations of Japanese postwar pacifism. It maintains that explanations based on norms and identities cannot be separated from discussion on material and structural factors when it comes to the question of where norms come from and why they are sustained. Power and interests may not explain everything, but they often account for why certain norms emerge and are sustained to influence policy. By examining the shifts in public opinions and the Social Democratic Party's defense policy, this article argues that Japan's postwar pacifism has been possible in large part because peace was relatively abundant in postwar Japan and that the majority of the Japanese felt that the alliance with the United States contributed to that effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article we argue that since 1945 Japanese foreign policy has evolved through five phases, which will culminate in Japan's re-emergence as a global ordinary power. We then discuss three potential models of ordinary power that are ideal-typical in nature, but which share some qualities with the respective political circumstances of France, Germany, and Britain. We also consider the legitimacy and capacity deficits that Japan possesses, and the way in which recent electoral developments may contribute to the addressing of these deficits. We argue that Japan is using the British model as a foundation for the acquisition of ordinary power status. In doing so it is increasingly binding itself to the United States. But such a move can also provide a platform from which to develop the possibilities that lie beyond bilateralism (plus), in the realm of the German model, and wider regional cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Every international system or society has a set of rules or norms that define appropriate behaviors. These norms are, however, never obeyed in an automatic fashion. Perhaps more than any other setting the international environment is characterized by organized hypocrisy. Actors violate rules in practice without at the same time challenging their legitimacy. In nineteenth‐century East Asia this was true for countries embracing the European sovereign state system of formal equality and autonomy, and the Sinocentric Confucian system of hierarchy and dependency. The West imposed the treaty port system which violated the sovereign principle of non‐intervention. China accommodated the West, tacitly jettisoning demands for ritual obeisance. Japan chose those principles that were most suitable for its material interests. Korea, however, dominated by a literati class whose position was associated with Confucian principles, failed to pursue policies that might have maintained Korean independence. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

It is generally taken for granted that the Meiji Restoration was a watershed event that incorporated Japan into the modern sovereign state system. This conventional wisdom is misleading. The Japanese political system that existed prior to the Meiji Restoration, the so‐called Tokugawa Baku‐Han regime, was comparable with many modern sovereign states in its exercise of public authority and its ability to control cross‐border movements. Furthermore, as Krasner has shown, sovereignty itself is a problematic concept, the fundamental norms and principles of which are frequently violated. A case study of the 1862 incident known as Namamugi Jiken demonstrates how Japan was recognized and treated internationally, revealing that while some aspects of Japan's sovereignty were conveniently violated, other sovereignty norms were certainly respected by the Western nations. These norms constrained the range of choices available to the key actors involved in this incident and thus significantly affected the subsequent course of events, which ultimately led to Tokugawa's collapse in 1868. Hence, it was the complex (hypocritical) nature of Japan's existent sovereignty, and not its absence, that explains why the Meiji Restoration occurred the way it actually did. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]