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This study argues that a central factor in the determinants of citizen attitudes toward trade is the social psychology of the individual in question. Namely, we contend that the level of social trust an individual has will condition the degree to which an individual wants to open her country to imports from other countries. Those individuals with lower relative levels of social trust are less likely to support the notion of freer trade. We base this contention on the logic that those people who are distrustful of people in general are more likely to distrust that which comes from people who are unknown to them, such as goods coming into their country from abroad. This argument is a departure from previous studies of public attitudes toward trade, which have focused on various economic utilitarian considerations and xenophobia that shape citizen attitudes toward trade liberalization. To test our argument, we employ data from the 1995-1997 wave of the World Values Survey. Using a logit regression analysis, we find, as predicted, that the more social trust an individual has, the more likely that person is to support the idea of liberalized trade. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article tests systematically the effect of political structures on the credibility of sovereign debtors in advanced economies. It argues that power-sharing and party system polarization have important effects on long-term interest rates. Where collective responsibility is high and polarization is low, the market perceives a more credible commitment on the part of sovereign debtors. These arguments derived from the theory of credible commitments perform much better than alternative accounts of the politics of sovereign debt, namely a market preference for right-wing governments and more flexible polities. The principal data consist of a panel of 23 rich countries between 1970 and 2009. There are tests for robustness to a wider sample and a variety of different measurements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Increasing legalization of international institutions has divergent effects on member countries. Whereas legalization decreases uncertainty and increases convergence of countries’ expectations on international outcomes, it imposes costs on countries by increasing the complexity and difficulty of procedures for them to utilize. Countries with the administrative capacity to follow elaborate procedures reap the benefits of increased legalization. For countries without such capacity—primarily developing countries—the potential benefits are offset by their difficulty in following the procedures. I examine this argument against the institutional changes in dispute settlement procedures that occurred in the transition from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Compared to the GATT era, developed countries—ones with greater capacity—are much more likely to utilize dispute settlement in the WTO than developing countries. Gains from the institutional changes in dispute settlement procedures have accrued to benefit mostly developed member countries in the WTO. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]