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The 2017 US tax legislation—widely referred to as the Tax Cut and Jobs Act (TCJA)—fundamentally transformed the US system of international taxation. It ostensibly ended worldwide taxation but introduced, for instance, a new tax on "Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income". This paper surveys the emerging empirical literature on the impact of the TCJA's international provisions. It documents five robust findings in this empirical literature. First, the TCJA led to a general decline in US MNCs' foreign acquisitions. Second, the TCJA increased US MNCs' investment in routine foreign tangible assets. Third, the reform did not lead to any change in profit shifting by US MNCs beyond the magnitude that would be expected based on the TCJA's tax rate reduction. Fourth, The TCJA appears to have reduced the market value of US MNCs relative to domestic US firms. Fifth, the TCJA does not appear to have had any detectable impact on domestic US investment and wages (although there are some contrary results for capital expenditures). The welfare implications of these findings depend crucially on whether US MNCs' are viewed as having engaged in too much or too little foreign activity prior to the TCJA. This depends on the choice of theoretical framework and the relevant normative benchmark, and cannot readily be resolved empirically. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we analyse the passthrough from corporate taxes to investments by including two novel channels into a DSGE model for a small open economy. We capture both how foreign firms relocate and invest in the country when corporate taxes are reduced and how the inflow of FDI increases exports which spills over to domestic firms, that then increase their investment further. Our extended model allows us to study the importance of both transmission mechanisms and how they interact through crowding out effects. The corporate tax cut becomes self-financed when FDI-export spillovers are included, but only if other countries do not follow suit and lower their corporate tax rates. The largest self-financing contributions come from increases in various labor and consumption tax bases. A reduction in profit shifting further contributes to financing the tax cut. Our findings suggest that corporate tax levels internationally are not in equilibrium and that there are large fiscal incentives to further cut corporate taxes and reap the benefits from increased tax bases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines corporate tax avoidance involving Dutch special purpose entities (SPEs), or shell companies. We use unique data of the SPEs including the origin and destination country of dividend, interest, and royalty flows passing the Netherlands. First, we present descriptive statistics of these flows which amount to 140 billion euro in 2016. Second, we collect national tax data on the corporate income tax and fiscal treatment of these flows. By combining tax parameters with bilateral flows, we can assess the potential tax gains for multinational enterprises using Dutch SPEs. We find massive tax savings for royalties when Dutch SPEs are used as an intermediate station compared to direct flows between the origin and destination country. We measure this tax gain at almost 3 billion euro in a single year. However, we do not find such tax savings for dividends and interest. We explain where we lack information and hence cannot measure possible tax gains. In regression analysis, controlling for country characteristics, we find that tax differentials partially explain the geographical patterns of income flows diverted through the Netherlands. This paper is one of the first using bilateral income flows as dependent variables instead of FDI stocks or flows. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Multinational investors often reduce tax on dividends by using indirect investment routes. This paper constructs a tax rate matrix to represent a real-world network of tax treaties between 70 countries and develops a computation algorithm to study the structure of tax-minimizing (direct or indirect) investment routes in the tax treaty network. The treaty shopping rate, defined as the difference between the foreign tax rates of the direct route and a tax-minimizing route, is about 3.66 percentage points on average. This paper also examines the relationship between FDI and the structure of tax-minimizing routes. Empirical results show that the existence of a tax-minimizing direct route is positively and significantly related to FDI. The inward FDI stock via a tax-minimizing direct route is about 2.14 times larger than the inward FDI stock via a direct route that is not tax-minimizing. By making a direct route tax-minimizing, countries can encourage FDI via the direct route and reduce treaty shopping. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many multinationals divert Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) through conduit countries that have a favorable tax treaty network, to avoid host country withholding taxes. This is referred to as tax treaty shopping. The Netherlands is the world’s largest conduit country; in 2009, multinationals held approximately €1,600 billion of FDI via the Netherlands. This paper uses microdata from Dutch Special Purpose Entities to analyze geographical patterns and structural determinants of FDI diversion. Regression analysis confirms that tax treaties are a key determinant of FDI routed through the Netherlands. The effect of tax treaties on FDI diversion partly arises from the reduction of dividend withholding tax rates, which provides strong evidence for tax treaty shopping. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper shows that a small country can have an incentive to tax inbound FDI even in a setting with perfect competition and free entry that is compatible with the Diamond-Mirrlees (Am Econ Rev 61(1):8-27, 1971) framework. While firms make no aggregate profits worldwide due to free entry in this setting, they make taxable profits in foreign production locations because their costs are partly incurred in their home countries. These profits are not perfectly mobile because firm productivity varies across locations. Consequently, the host country does not bear the entire burden of a tax on foreign firms, giving rise to an incentive to tax foreign investors. The standard zero optimal tax result can be recovered in this model under an apportionment system that ensures zero economic profits in each location. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the effects of unilateral tax provisions aimed at restricting multinationals’ tax planning on foreign direct investment (FDI). Using a unique dataset which allows us to observe the worldwide activities of a large panel of multinational firms, we test how limitations of interest tax deductibility, so-called thin-capitalization rules, and regulations of transfer pricing by the host country affect investment and employment of foreign subsidiaries. The results indicate that introducing a typical thin-capitalization rule or making it more tight exerts significant adverse effects on FDI and employment in high-tax countries. Moreover, in countries that impose thin-capitalization rules, the tax-rate sensitivity of FDI is increased. Regulations of transfer pricing, however, are not found to exert significant effects on FDI or employment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the impact of special interest lobbying on competition for foreign direct investment (FDI) in a common agency framework. We argue that special interest lobbying may provide an extra political incentive for governments to attract FDI. We show that compared with the benchmark case where governments maximize national welfare, now (1) an economically disadvantageous country has a chance to win FDI competition; (2) the equilibrium subsidy for attracting FDI is higher than in the benchmark case; (3) allocative efficiency cannot be always achieved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tax authorities worldwide are implementing voluntary disclosure schemes to recover tax on offshore investments. The US and UK, in particular, have implemented such schemes in response to bulk acquisitions of information on offshore holdings, recent examples of which are the "Paradise" and "Panama" papers. Schemes offer affected investors the opportunity to make a voluntary disclosure, with reduced fine rates for truthful disclosure. Might such incentives, once anticipated by investors, simply encourage evasion in the first place? We characterize the investor/tax authority game with and without a scheme, allowing for the possibility that some offshore investment has legitimate economic motives. We show that a scheme increases net expected tax revenue, decreases illegal offshore investment and increases onshore investment, but could either increase or decrease legal offshore investment. The optimal disclosure scheme offers maximal incentives for truthful disclosure by imposing the minimum allowable rate of fine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the effects of double tax treaties (DTTs) on foreign direct investment (FDI) after controlling for their relevance in the presence of treaty shopping. DTTs cannot be considered a bilateral issue, but must be viewed as a network. We define tax distance as the cost of channelling corporate income from one country to another and, by considering treaty shopping through intermediate jurisdictions, we calculate the shortest (i.e. the cheapest) distance between any two countries. We show that relevant tax treaties—which reduce the direct tax distance both over domestic law and the entire existing treaty network—will increase FDI by about 18%. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops a model of a monopolistically competitive industry with extensive and intensive investment and shows how these margins respond to changes in average and marginal corporate tax rates. Intensive investment refers to the size of a firm’s capital stock. Extensive investment refers to the firm’s production location and reflects the trade-off between exports and foreign direct investment as alternative modes of foreign market access. The paper derives comparative static effects of the corporate tax and shows how the cost of public funds depends on the measures of effective marginal and average tax rates and on the elasticities of extensive and intensive investment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reviews the empirical literature on the impact of company taxes on the allocation of foreign direct investment. We compare the outcomes of 25 empirical studies by computing the tax rate elasticity under a uniform definition. The median value of the tax rate elasticity in the literature is around −3.3 (i.e. a 1%-point reduction in the host-country tax rate raises foreign direct investment in that country by 3.3%). There exists substantial variation across studies, however. By performing a meta-analysis, the paper aims to explain this variation by the differences in characteristics of the underlying studies. Systematic differences between studies are found with respect to the type of foreign capital data used, and the type of tax rates adopted. We find no systematic differences in the responsiveness of investors from tax credit countries and tax exemption countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given the growing pressure on donors to curtail foreign aid budgets, analyzing the effectiveness of bilateral official development assistance (ODA) in realizing national interests has become more significant than ever. From the viewpoint of economic interests, prior research has revealed that ODA can help expand donor exports and outward foreign direct investments. This study is the first to provide evidence that ODA can also help firms from donor countries to win infrastructure projects in recipient countries. Employing unique contract data on Japanese overseas infrastructure projects, I estimate a fixed effects Poisson model with a panel dataset for 158 recipients for the period between 1970 and 2020. The results suggest that 17% of the total number of overseas infrastructure projects contracted to Japanese firms during 1970–2020 were attributable to Japanese ODA disbursement. I also explore the potential mechanism, finding that the Japanese ODA-infrastructure link is strengthened when Japanese loans and grants are simultaneously provided to a recipient country. This finding is consistent with the view that pre-investment studies conducted as part of technical cooperation could generate goodwill effects on Japanese firms during their bidding for Japanese yen loan projects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Governments' revenues are lower when multinational enterprises avoid paying corporate income tax by shifting their profits to tax havens. In this paper, we ask which countries' tax revenues are affected most by this tax avoidance and how much. To estimate the scale of profit shifting, we begin by observing that the higher the share of foreign direct investment from tax havens, the lower the reported rate of return on this investment. Similarly to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development's World Investment Report 2015, we argue that the reported rate of return is lower due to profit shifting. Unlike the report, however, we provide illustrative country-level estimates of profit shifting for as many countries as possible, including low-income ones, which enables us to study the distributional effects of international corporate tax avoidance. We compare estimated corporate tax revenue losses, relative to their GDP and tax revenues, of country groups classified by income per capita and we find that there are almost no statistically significant differences across these groups. Furthermore, we compare our results with four other recent studies that use different methodologies to estimate tax revenue losses due to profit shifting. In the first such comparison made, we find that most studies identify some differences across income groups, but the nature of these differences varies across the studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines empirically whether governments behave strategically when setting corporate tax rates and tax bases, and-if so-how they react to changes in other countries' tax rates and bases. Specifically, we estimate the slopes of tax policy reaction functions and examine how marginal changes in trade costs and GDP affect tax policies in the Nash equilibrium. The estimated slopes and comparative static effects can be rationalized in a model in which governments compete for foreign direct investment (FDI). Using estimated policy reaction functions, we demonstrate that observed changes in corporate tax systems are consistent with tougher competition for FDI following regional trade integration. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper assembles a new dataset on corporate income tax regimes in 50 emerging and developing economies over 1996-2007 and analyzes their impact on corporate tax revenues and domestic and foreign investment. It computes effective tax rates to take account of special regimes, such as tax holidays, temporarily reduced rates and increased investment allowances. There is evidence of a partial race to the bottom: countries have been under pressure to lower tax rates in order to lure and boost investment. In the case of standard tax systems (i.e. tax rules applying under normal circumstances), the effective tax rate reductions have not been larger than those witnessed in advanced economies, and revenues have held up well over the sample period. However, a race to the bottom is evident among special regimes, most notably in the case of Africa, creating effectively a parallel tax system where rates have fallen to almost zero. Regression analysis reveals higher tax rates adversely affect domestic investment and FDI, but do raise revenues in the short run. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's new Corporate Income Tax Law was passed in March 2007 and took effect on January 1 2008. It terminates the dual corporate income tax regime by removing the preferential tax treatments offered to foreign investment enterprises (FIEs) and unifies the corporate income tax regime for FIEs and Chinese domestic enterprises (DEs). This paper uses a difference-in-differences approach to determine whether FIEs are responding to the law by reducing their investment in China. Employing the Chinese Industrial Enterprises Database (2002∼2008) to implement the analysis, we find that: (1) FIEs are responding to the law by reducing their investment in China; and (2) the magnitude of the response is larger for HongKong-Macau-Taiwan (HMT) investment enterprises than that for other FIEs, which supports the claim that some Chinese investors engaged in 'roundtripping' FDI. Our confidence in the conclusions are further boosted by the results of a series of placebo tests and two robustness checks: (1) the results of the placebo tests support the claim that the estimated effect is due to the tax reform rather than to other confounding factors; (2) the results of the first robustness check are consistent with the perception that State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) might enjoy more favorable treatments from the Chinese government than Private-Owned Enterprises (POEs); and (3) the results of the second robustness check show that incorporating enterprise-specific time trends into the baseline specification of our econometric models does not change the conclusions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we investigate to what extent tax incentives are effective in attracting investment in Sub-Saharan Africa. We test the neo-classical investment theory prediction that tax incentives, by lowering the user cost of capital, raise investment. Next to tax incentives, we also estimate the impact on investment of other investment climate variables that are under direct control of the government, such as the transparency and complexity of the tax system, and the legal protection of foreign investors. In developing countries these variables might be as important as or even more important than the tax variables themselves. Therefore, we analyze the policy changes in tax incentives and in the other investment climate variables for 12 CFA Franc Zone countries over the period 1994–2006. Because of their common currency (the CFA Franc) and common language (French) these countries constitute an exceptional basis of comparison to evaluate their ‘policy experiments’. The use of panel data econometrics with fixed country and year effects allows us to isolate the impact of the policy changes on investment, as if it were a difference in differences analysis with multiple policy changes. We find no robust positive relationship between tax holidays and investment in the CFA Franc zone. However, increasing the number of legal guarantees for foreign investors and reducing the complexity of the tax system helps to attract investment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can reductions in domestic capital income taxes attract foreign capital and, at the same time, foster economic growth? Using a two-country overlapping generations model with endogenous growth and internationally mobile capital, this paper shows that the effect of domestic capital taxes on the international allocation of capital and on the rate of economic growth do not necessarily go in the same direction. A country can attract capital by reducing its taxes, but this may lower the rate of economic growth depending on the elasticity of saving to the net-of-tax interest rate and on the effect of taxes on domestic factor productivity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the choice of international double taxation relief methods by two small countries that mutually exchange foreign direct investment. At the first stage, each country chooses between the exemption and the credit method (as prescribed by the OECD model treaty) and at the second stage, each country sets nationally optimal non-discriminatory capital tax rates. It is shown that in the subgame perfect equilibrium both countries choose the exemption method. Mutual application of the exemption method is also shown to yield the highest welfare for each country. While the tax export effect generally induces both countries to choose inefficiently high tax rates, this effect is weakest when both countries exempt foreign earned profits from domestic taxation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The effects of bilateral tax treaties on FDI activity have been unexplored, despite significant ongoing activities by countries to negotiate and ratify these treaties. This paper estimates the impact of bilateral tax treaties using both U.S. inbound and outbound FDI over the period 1980-1999. Robust to a wide variety of alternative specifications, we find little evidence that bilateral tax treaties increase FDI activity, contrary to OECD-stated goals for such treaties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the effects of tax policy on the strategic choices of multinationals and on national welfare. Contrary to existing theory, in the absence of foreign taxation, deferral of home-country taxation until earnings on outbound FDI are repatriated is generally superior to including those earnings in current income. This holds even if the home country taxes domestic investment less generously. This is also generally superior to exempting foreign income. Foreign taxes permit foreign governments to capture some of the pre-tax economic rent from the home-country FDI; this reduces the benefit to the home country of more generous taxation of outbound FDI. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper derives welfare equivalence of double taxation rules in a tax competition model with discriminatory home taxes and the ability to finance subsidiary operations with host country capital. For a more general model, we provide sufficient conditions on the number of host sectors and factors that support double-tax-rule equivalence. Examples violating these conditions help identify economic factors under which a home country has strict preferences over double taxation rules. If the home tax rate can influence host factor prices, the home country weakly prefers deductions over credits as in the pure-home-equity financing case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The issue of capital tax competition is viewed to be unproblematic if residence-based capital-taxation exists. However, the sustainability of residence-based capital taxation depends on the exchange of information about foreign financial investments between tax authorities. This paper analyzes the incentives of tax authorities to voluntarily provide information. We show that voluntary information exchange is an equilibrium in a standard small-country model of tax competition, whereas it may not be an equilibrium when the size of the financial sector has a positive impact on the wage structure of an economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the role of tax instruments in affecting foreign direct investment (FDI), paying particular attention on their effect on two forms of FDI strategy, 'horizontal' and 'vertical'. Applying a decomposition of FDI strategies to the universe of cross-border mergers (the dominant form of FDI) over the period 1999-2010, it emerges that taxes have a much more nuanced effect on FDI than frequently suggested; while corporate taxes affect FDI negatively, the tax elasticity varies depending on the FDI strategy (with vertical FDI being in general more responsive), the exact measure of taxation, and international tax considerations (double taxation, withholding taxes). Sales taxes also affect FDI, but only horizontally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An increasing share of world FDI is carried out by multinationals from developing countries. These investors may have objectives and constraints that differ from their developed country counterparts. In this paper we focus on differences in attitudes to corruption, and how these may shape the competition for the right to extract resources in a developing country context. We show how differences in the investors' level of technology and differences in the host country government's trade-off between bribes and taxes determine who wins the competition for the resource and the winning price. One finding is that competition from a bribe-willing investor may induce a bribe-averse investor to enter into corruption. Surprisingly, however, we also find that competition with a bribe-willing investor may induce the bribe-averse investor to increase its tax payments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper shows that vertical fiscal inefficiencies impede federally organized countries in successfully attracting foreign direct investment. Such countries, particularly if characterized by weak institutions, are disadvantaged in the process of bidding for firms and in their ability to commit to a low overall tax burden. The interaction of these problems deteriorates their competitive position vis-à-vis unitary states in the competition for foreign direct investment. These theoretical considerations are in line with recent empirical evidence that suggests that the number of government layers of host countries has significant and sizeable negative effects on the amount of foreign direct investment inflows. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented in which the editor discusses various reports within the issue on topics including foreign direct investment (FDI), tax subsidiarity and fiscal neutrality.

Based on a panel of bilateral FDI flows among 11 OECD countries over 1984–2000, we show that, although agglomeration-related factors are strong determinants of FDI, tax differentials also play a significant role in understanding foreign location decisions. We further investigate non-linearities in the impact of tax differentials, and explore the impact of tax schemes. Our results are consistent with the imperfect competition literature which underscores the possibility of tax differentials across countries in equilibrium. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study the tax/subsidy competition between two countries to attract the FDI projects of two firms. We assume that governments lack the capacity to target every potential inward investor such that each can only bid for a single firm. When the characteristics of the two countries are common knowledge, subsidy competition never arises in equilibrium. Both governments may target the same firm if there is uncertainty as to the more profitable location for that firm's plant, such that both governments believe they may win the competition. We also explore how such uncertainty affects the firms' after-tax profits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The international corporate tax system is considered a network. Just like for transportation, “shortest” paths are computed, which minimize tax payments for multinational enterprises when they repatriate profits. We include corporate income tax rates, withholding taxes on dividends, double tax treaties, and double taxation relief methods. We find that treaty shopping leads to an average potential reduction of the tax burden on repatriated dividends of about 6% points. An indicator for centrality in the tax network identifies the UK, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands as the most important conduit countries. Low-tax havens do not have a crucial role in reducing dividend repatriation taxes. By contrast, tax haven financial centres do. In the regressions we find that the centrality measures are robustly significant explanatory variables for bilateral FDI stocks. This also holds for our treaty shopping indicator. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a two-period dynamic model in which a single country attempts to attract two large investors endowed with capital with varying rate of returns, we show that the result of Kishore and Roy (Econ Lett 124:88-92, 2014) that a country has incentives to commit to a non-preferential regime to circumvent a dynamic inconsistency problem does not hold. The tax revenue of the government may be higher under a preferential regime compared to a non-preferential regime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Though it is often claimed that bilateral tax treaties promote foreign direct investment (FDI), previous empirical studies do not support this view. Indeed, the literature provides mixed results where bilateral tax treaties have a positive impact on FDI flows in some studies and a negative impact in other studies. Using US FDI outflows disaggregated into financing modes, equity capital, reinvested earnings, and inter-company debt, we estimate fixed-effects quantile regression models that include controls for new tax treaties, existing treaties (in place prior to the start of the sample period), and the total number of tax treaties a host country has in effect. Results, in general, indicate that both new and existing US bilateral tax treaties are associated with lower FDI outflows to the host country, while the total number of treaties a host country has in place is associated with greater US FDI outflows to the host country. These results also hold for reinvested earnings flows and equity capital flows. For debt flows, however, existing treaties are associated with greater flows, while new treaties and the total number of host treaties show no consistent statistically significant effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We analyse the choice of commodity tax base, when countries set their taxes non-cooperatively in a reciprocal dumping model of homogeneous goods trade with horizontal foreign direct investment (FDI). We show that the consumption base (destination principle) weakly welfare-dominates the production base (origin principle) for a large range of plant fixed costs. When integration is complete, the destination principle dominates the origin principle for all levels of plant fixed costs below which FDI occurs under the origin principle. This contrasts with much of the existing literature which has tended to support the origin principle under imperfect competition with a fixed market structure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine how the bidding environment may affect the outcome of tax competition between two countries (or two regions) in attracting a firm's foreign direct investment (FDI). We compare the equilibrium location choice and payoffs from an English auction, with both complete and incomplete information, relative to those in the traditional setting of a sealed-bid first-price auction. We find that an English auction leads to more aggressive bidding in 'race beyond the bottom,' where the nations may bid beyond their own valuations of the FDI. We also discuss the roles of auction protocol and information asymmetry on the auction outcome. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Inefficient competition in emissions taxes for foreign direct investment creates benefits from international cooperation. In the presence of cross-border pollution, proximate (neighboring) countries have greater incentives to cooperate than distant ones as illustrated by a model of tax competition for mobile capital. Spatial econometrics is used to estimate participation in 110 international environmental treaties by 139 countries over 20 years. Empirical evidence of increased cooperation among proximate countries is provided. Furthermore, strategic responses in treaty participation vary across country groups between OECD and non-OECD countries and are most evident in regional agreements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does the international distribution of firm ownership affect the outcomes of tax/subsidy competition for mobile plants? As corporate ownership becomes increasingly globalised, this question becomes increasingly important for policy. We prove a strong invariance result in the context of the tax/subsidy competition between two host countries for a monopoly firm's plant. Both the equilibrium plant location and the equilibrium tax/subsidy offers are independent of the international distribution of the firm's ownership. The reason is that the tax/subsidy competition equalises the firm's post-tax profits across countries, making owners of capital indifferent towards the location of production. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tax competition and tax exportation have contrary implications for the efficiency of capital taxation. We provide a simple condition for the dominance of either force, which depends on the mobility of foreign investment. We use this condition to evaluate the relative importance of both forces in the US and in the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate how the quality of the host-country governance and a bilateral US income tax treaty affect the rates of return that US companies require on their foreign direct investment (FDI). Using indexes of corruption and political instability, we find that poor governance causes the companies to require significantly higher rates of return. This lends support to earlier authors who have concluded that poor governance discourages both local investment and inward FDI. After accounting for the quality of host-country governance, however, no evidence could be found that an income tax treaty has any effect on the required rates of return. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bilateral tax treaties are an important method of international tax cooperation. I survey the existing literature on these agreements, highlighting the differences between the standard view that treaties increase foreign direct investment and the empirical evidence that finds little support for this. I also discuss the key differences in treaty formation between developed countries relative to that between developed and developing nations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We expand the traditional tax incentive redundancy argument by investigating the implications of allocating incentives primarily to firms that would have invested even in the absence of special tax treatment. Incorporating government revenue constraints, pliable tax officials, endogenous tax liabilities, and firms with heterogeneous before-tax returns, we show that tax incentives, if given to the 'wrong' firms, are not only ineffective in stimulating FDI, but result in a form of tax shifting and may reduce FDI. Data from countries of the former Eastern Bloc suggests that tax incentive schemes have significantly negative impacts on FDI in countries that poorly target firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We consider the impact of taxation when investors face a discrete choice between two or more mutually exclusive projects; in particular we consider the location choice of multinationals. Such choices depend on an effective average tax rate. We propose a precise measure of this rate, which is shown to be equal to a weighted average of an effective marginal tax rate and an adjusted statutory tax rate, where the weights depend on the profitability of the investment. Estimates of the distribution of this measure are presented and compared for domestic and international investment in the USA, France, Germany and the UK. We analyse the impact of harmonising corporate tax rates in Europe on incentives to locate in France, Germany and the UK. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]