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An unusual combination of factors meant that Northern Ireland featured prominently in British Conservative thinking during the course of the extended efforts by the UK governments led by Theresa May and Boris Johnson to implement Brexit, following the 2016 referendum. Opposition among Conservative backbenchers to the differential treatment of Northern Ireland under the proposed 'backstop' arrangement contributed to the defeat of the Withdrawal Agreement negotiated with the EU by May. However, after Johnson became Prime Minister, a deal involving greater divergence between Great Britain and Northern Ireland secured overwhelming support from these same Conservative MPs. This paper explores the origins of, and influences upon, these debates on Northern Ireland within the parliamentary Conservative Party. Drawing on interviews with decision-makers and advisers, it identifies the lines of thinking that shaped Conservative positions on Northern Ireland after the party returned to government in 2010. It argues that two distinct modes of thinking about Northern Ireland co-exist within the party's collective mind: the notion it constitutes a 'place apart' from Great Britain, and the belief it remains integral to the UK. The circumstances of 2018–19 meant Conservative MPs were forced, reluctantly, to choose between the implications of these ultimately incommensurable perspectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Individuals in Ireland are among the most enthusiastic supporters of European integration since European Union (EU) accession in 1973, and are often labelled 'good Europeans with a pro-integrationist attitude'. The 2008 financial crisis is regarded as a turning point in Ireland's relationship with the EU as a result of the economic downturn and the widening of economic disparities experienced by individuals. Meanwhile, Brexit poses significant and specific challenges to Ireland and has the capacity to impact Irish attitudes towards the EU. Using a combination of Standard Eurobarometer data from 2007 to 2018 and a variety of opinion polling data, this paper examines how the economic crisis and Brexit have shaped Irish attitudes towards the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In post-conflict societies, traumatic experiences can have a profound effect on electoral behaviour. In Northern Ireland, Westminster elections between 2001 and 2017 were marked by the rise of hardline parties, but the 2019 election saw a significant shift towards the centre. The centre ground vote soared, resulting in the lowest level of political polarisation since the early 2000s. What are the factors underlying this transition to a moderate vote? Drawing on public opinion surveys and electoral data, we find that Brexit played a crucial role in incentivising voters to support parties prioritising non-sectarian constitutional interests. The findings suggest that voters employ party competition as a balancing mechanism. Our article contributes to the understanding of how individuals in post-conflict societies navigate the complex relationship between violence, politics, and peacebuilding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Debate on Irish unification has increased in recent years, yet public attitudes on the processes that might lead to it are underexplored. This article examines the results of an online public consultation carried out in Northern Ireland in the summer of 2020 on how any future referendums on the unification question would best be conducted. It shows that hopes and fears on this question exist across society in Northern Ireland. It also reveals that public views are yet to crystallise on many of the design features of a referendum. There are some exceptions to this: there is a widespread feeling that the Brexit referendum process should not be replicated; and there are signs of divergent views emerging between communities on the franchise, referendum threshold, and use of citizens' assemblies. Nevertheless, we conclude that the lack of hardened views on most questions of process points to an opportunity for policymakers and impartial observers to foster agreement on how a referendum process should be conducted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At face, Ireland's economy had staged a remarkable recovery by 2020 since the devastating impact of the Global Financial Crisis. The economy was the fastest growing in Europe, unemployment had reached record lows, and Ireland's debt was back to its lowest level since 2009. The traditional economic voting model assumes voters punish outgoing governments for poor economic performance by voting against them but rewards incumbents for a sound economy by voting for them. Nevertheless, Irish voters delivered a stunning rebuke to the Fine Gael government in 2020, registering an incumbent administration's sixth-worst performance since 1932, raising questions about the applicability of the economic vote. Using the 2020 Irish National Election Study, our contribution unpacks this apparent puzzle. We uncover that macroeconomic conditions were less rosy than at first sight, a pattern recognised by voters. We find the economic vote was alive and well, with voter economic perceptions, and their views on income redistribution (and taxes/spending) having a potent effect on the vote. Brexit, as an economic issue, however, was not influential in shaping the vote. The Fine Gael challenge, and the answer to the conundrum, was most voters perceived the economy was lackluster and the government was on the wrong side of economic policy preferences of most voters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines how UK, English, Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish unionisms and unionists are responding to the Brexit crisis in the state. The United Kingdom faces a dual territorial sovereignty crisis, externally through Brexit in its relations with the European Union, and internally concerning the shape and survival of its own political union. Four constitutional trajectories are plausible: a breakup of the UK, a renegotiated UK, a differentiated UK, and a federal UK. Together with a related crisis in its central political institutions, this is a constitutional moment for the UK. After surveying how unionists perceive and frame these challenges to their unionisms, the article concludes with an assessment of how effective their responses are. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article considers unionism as a set of ideas that informs political movements, situating it theoretically within the broader field of territorial politics, showing the dimensions on which it converges with or diverges from nationalism, outlining a preliminary typology of unionisms and showing the limits on the capacity of each type to respond to challenge and conflict. It shows the relevance of this for study of contemporary unionism in Northern Ireland. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The emergence of majority unionism represents a threat to the stability of a union. Majority unionism drives policy and this is often met with centrifugal responses. This is a matter of institutional design, since institutional mechanisms to prevent such majoritarianism can and should be built into agreements on unions. The intensity of disputes between the centre and smaller region over policy and the viability of alternative political arrangements effect how great a threat to the union is posed by majority unionism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Support for Brexit in Northern Ireland has been substantially associated with the unionist community, and has evolved against a backdrop of changing patterns of relationships between Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom, and between Northern Ireland and the Republic. But the shape taken by the Brexit project is such that it also offers an existential threat to the Union. Is the phenomenon of the unionist Brexiteer simply an unexpected conjunctural development, or might it be explained by reference to distinctive features of unionist ideology? This article provides an initial overview of the comparative and historical context in which unionism responded to major political restructuring in the last century. It asks if the very quest to uphold the Union in contentious times leads to strategies that appear to have the opposite effect. It suggests that the phenomenon of the Brexit-supporting unionist may derive from a distinctive strand of Ulster unionist ideology, one which prioritises the symbolic interests of the 'imagined community' in Northern Ireland. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2019 UK general election had huge implications for Brexit, and in turn for Northern Ireland. The British Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, was championing a renegotiated UK-EU Withdrawal Agreement that had been strongly opposed by all political parties in Northern Ireland, the part of the UK it would most effect. At the same, the region had been without a devolved government for nearly three years. Both factors led to unprecedented outcomes. The dominant parties, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and Sinn Féin, both lost votes and seats, whilst the moderate Social Democratic Labour Party (SDLP) and cross-community Alliance Party both made significant gains. The end result, for the first time in the history of Northern Ireland, was that unionist candidates formed a minority amongst the region's elected representatives for Westminster. Notwithstanding the particular circumstances of the 2019 general election, social and political trends in Northern Ireland suggest that this is unlikely to be an electoral blip, but rather the beginning of a significant realignment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With echoes of the dividing lines of the United Kingdom's 2016 referendum, a majority of voters in Northern Ireland supported pro-Remain candidates in the 2019 European Parliament election. However, whereas the results in many parts of the UK reflected a highly polarised electorate, voters in Northern Ireland appeared more receptive to compromise: a majority of their newly elected MEPs expressed support for the Withdrawal Agreement negotiated by the UK government with the EU – the only constituency in the UK where this was the case. The comfortable re-election of Diane Dodds and Martina Anderson affirmed the Democratic Unionist Party and Sinn Féin as the dominant unionist and nationalist parties respectively. However, a surge in support for the Alliance Party, which saw Naomi Long win a seat at the expense of the Ulster Unionist Party, marked a notable shift towards the ethno-national centre-ground: one in five first preference votes went to a candidate aligned with neither nationalism nor unionism. This report contextualises the election campaign and considers the implications of the results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Otherwise routine local elections in Northern Ireland on 2 May 2019 were bestowed unusual significance by exceptional circumstance. A prolonged stalemate between the two largest political parties had left Northern Ireland without a devolved government for over two years; meanwhile, arrangements for the border between Ireland and Northern Ireland had been central in the turbulent 'Brexit' process engulfing the UK government. Meaning, that the local elections in 2019 would be a litmus test of public opinion in Northern Ireland at a time when the place more often spoken about than spoken for. In the event, results were mixed; there were signs of electoral continuity and others of political flux. Two trends will likely be significant in the long term. First, the consolidation of ethno-nationally defined electorates on the part of the DUP and Sinn Féin following the continued decline in support for the moderate unionist UUP and moderate nationalist SDLP. Second, a surge in support for the cross-community Alliance Party and a notable increase in support for the non-aligned Green Party and People Before Profit Alliance, alongside Independent candidates, suggests diversification in the issues directing Northern Irish voters' allegiance, and at least a partial decline in the electoral salience of the constitutional question. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ireland has remained broadly immune to pressure for convergence resulting from EU membership in the fields of climate and environmental policy. Neither the Global Financial Crisis nor the impending ecological crisis has significantly impacted its status as a 'laggard' country when it comes to implementation of EU legislation and policies in the field of climate change and environment. The reasons suggested for this are similar to those in other EU states where European environmental law has been inadequately implemented: lack of institutional capacity on accession, mismatch between national and supranational regulatory structures, significant veto players, and rapid economic growth. In the field of climate policy, Ireland repeatedly tops lists for worst performance among EU member states, though there has been some success in the field of renewable energy. While Brexit represents a new crisis for both Ireland and the EU, and the UKs departure may well have implications for EU climate policy, we argue that it is unlikely to impact on the approach taken in Ireland. The few recent positive developments in the field of climate policy appear to be driven by increased domestic concerns about the impact of climate change, as opposed to the impact of EU membership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article considers the impact of the 2008–10 financial crisis and the UK's 2016 Brexit decision as a 'dual crisis' which impacted significantly on Irish foreign policy over the past decade. It argues that though Ireland's foreign policy has remained remarkably consistent over time, the 'dual crisis' placed considerable pressure on state capacity and institutional resources. Ireland's financial implosion carried with it potentially catastrophic consequences for the Eurozone and thus successive governments placed a particular priority on restoring Ireland's tarnished reputation within the European Union. At the same time, Irish foreign policy was 'rebooted' to take on a more muscular promotion of Irish economic interests across the globe. Brexit constituted an existential threat to the island of Ireland, and, in particular the peace process marked by the 1998 Good Friday Agreement. The Brexit crisis set in train a determined effort by Irish policy-makers to both confirm the EU as Ireland's 'geopolitical centre of gravity' and re-position the country within the Union, as the need for new allies and coalition partners became evident following the United Kingdom's planned departure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2016 referendum in Northern Ireland on the United Kingdom’s membership of the European Union took place in the familiar context of historic and political divides. At the same time, perspectives on European integration, long-standing and evolving, were to the fore as political parties, lobby groups and various organisations campaigned around key issues such as the economic impact, migration, sovereignty, North–South relations, the reintroduction of a ‘hard’ border and the EU budget. The Remain campaigners in Northern Ireland were successful in winning the overall majority of votes cast but they found themselves on the losing side of the overall UK result. With a 62.69 per cent turnout, the outcome in Northern Ireland saw 55.8 per cent voting to remain and 44.2 per cent voting for the UK to leave the EU. This article draws on campaign literature, party activity, media coverage, governmental and specialist reports to assess the run up to, the result and the aftermath of the vote in Northern Ireland. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]