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The deployment of special forces in hostile or politically volatile environments in search of strategic/operational intelligence, though not a 21st century novelty, appeared as a distinct military activity in literature only in the early 2000s under the label 'Special Reconnaissance' (SR). This article argues that the concept of SR (a) originated in the biblical Israelite military tradition and is depicted in the Bible as the lapis angularis of military strategy and a practice capable of dictating military and political norms; (b) has been used as a key element of the Israel Defence Forces' (IDF) modus operandi since 1948 thenceforth functioning in an analogous manner. To support these arguments, the theoretical and practical characteristics of Moses' intelligence mission to Canaan as well as the IDF's proclivity to SR are scrutinised under the general theoretical framework of political realism that assumes rational and pro-state interest course of actions. Accordingly, SR emerges as a distinctive common instrument of biblical and contemporary Israeli strategy, a fact that underlines the uninterrupted socio-political and cultural links between the past and the present of the Israeli ontology, this time via the wider concept of the Israeli military ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The dominant view of the American‒Israeli relationship holds that it has been driven primarily by shared interests and values; however, since the 1960s, the relationship has been governed first and foremost by a 'security-for-autonomy' bargain. Under the terms of this bargain, Washington has obtained a significant amount of influence over Israeli foreign policy in exchange for American arms transfers to Israel. The 1969‒1970 War of Attrition clearly illustrates how this bargain has operated in practice. The United States manipulated Israeli military conduct in a manner that accommodated American national interests by withholding or supplying arms at key junctures of the war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Efforts to isolate and delegitimise nations pose a growing danger to state security. The components used in such efforts are, however, not fully understood. This article expands upon existing research by proposing that there are seven areas in which states can face isolation efforts: political, economic, military, sociocultural, media, lawfare, and religious. Moreover, it proposes the idea of ‘destruction-oriented’ isolation, which aims to destroy a state, not merely create change. The ongoing campaign against Israel serves as the case study. Gaining a better understanding of these different tools will allow states to better prepare themselves to withstand these threats. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The Israel Defence Forces (IDF) face continuing challenges concerning joint operations of military services (e.g. air and ground forces) since, as in other militaries, the existence of separate service cultures creates operational difficulties. This article analyses in-depth interviews with commanders from the IDF’s air and ground forces. Its findings reinforce the ‘polarisation assumption’ of ‘us’ (the in-group) and ‘them’ (the out-group) that challenges successful cooperation, reflecting differences in the scripts of expectations and modes of action underlying perceptions of successful joint operations. These scripts create assumptions that are manifestations of a deep-rooted service culture. Such assumptions also have an effect on combat motivation as certain scenarios lead towards greater risk-taking in concrete operational situations. Cooperation between the Israeli Air Force and Special Forces is far more successful and smooth. The analysis of the success of joint operations can aid the armed forces in bridging differences and improving cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Between 1967 and 1973, Israeli governments took no initiative to set a peace process in motion. Instead, they simply responded to proposals that were raised from time to time, and, for the most part, rejected all of them – the Rogers Plan, Sadat’s willingness to sign a peace agreement and his initiative for an interim settlement – with the sole exception being the ceasefire agreement reached in August 1970. While Israeli policy lacked initiative on the political front, it dedicated much effort to convincing the United States that the greater Israel’s military power, the better its deterrence capabilities would be, which in turn would increase the likelihood of achieving peace. Hence, Israeli leaders’ repeated requests to be supplied with advanced aircraft. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines the impact that Operation Spring of Youth, carried out by the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) on 10 April 1973 had on Lebanon. IDF Special Forces infiltrated the heart of Beirut and eliminated three senior members of the Black September organization, perpetrator of the 1972 Munich Olympics massacre. While Israelis celebrated the successful military operation, the Lebanese mourned. Following the Israeli raid, the Lebanese government resigned, and an armed conflict erupted between the Lebanese army and the Palestinian organizations, leading to both domestic and inter-Arab crises. When these clashes ended, the Lebanese government had been unable to enforce its authority over Palestinian organizations, and Lebanon's weakness was publicly exposed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article looks at civil-military relations in Israel, noting that notwithstanding the Israel Defence Force's (IDF) long tradition of predominance in Israeli society and public life, Israel remains a vibrant parliamentary democracy. It examines the real threat to the traditional civil-military balance in Israel. The author points out that the IDF has now become an arena of societal tension rather than an instrument of societal cohesion. It describes the original pattern of civil-military relations in Israel.

The article analyzes the adaptability of the Israel Defense Forces to various forms of warfare and its ability to withstand strategic and tactical surprises. It presents a force design and a development concept that will enable Israel to cope with the growing diversity of battlefield requirements, and especially with technological and doctrinal surprises, better than it has done in the past. It examines what makes the successful prediction of future battlefield technologies and doctrines so elusive.

The article suggests that Israel urgently needs a radically new political-security grand-strategy. It reveals the reason necessitating the crafting of a radically novel breakout political-security-grand-strategy for Israel. It evaluates the radical shift in Israel's geo-strategic realities. It discusses fundamental political-security challenges facing Israel.

This essay explores the societal factors which impact upon the capability of the Israel Defence Forces. The nature of a nation's social fabric may both weaken and enhance its military potential and performance. In order to explore this nexus, military and social developments during the early 1950s are selected as the focus of a case study on the reciprocal influences occurring between these two spheres. In this study, components of Israeli society during the early 1950s will be described and analyzed. On the basis of the data, implications for security in two central areas will then be explored: the first area relates to the concept of territorial defence based on settlement security and the effort to build a "defensive wall" along the borders of the state; the second area pertains to the shaping of the army--its staff and commanders, its various contingents, and its operational capability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper analyzes the political-military implications of the roles played by Lt. Gen. (Res.) Shaul Mofaz who served as the IDF chief of staff and, almost immediately upon retirement was appointed Israel's minister of defence. There were problems not only in Mofaz's sudden transition from military to civilian office, but also in the way that he functioned both in his military role and subsequent civilian position. The two stages in Mofaz's public career are only the latest examples of the complex nature of Israel's civil-military relations, where formalized rules of procedure are absent. They also reflect the attempts of each echelon, the civil and military, to force the other's hand (although it is universally accepted that the army is subordinate to the political leadership). The power struggle is the result of two parallel processes: the army's growing influence in government decision-making on security matters, and the government's waning ability to limit the senior command's influence on security decisions. The main causes of this situation can be traced to the long and arduous process that brought the army to a pre-eminent position on national security issues. Paradoxically, the military's powerful leverage that now appears to threaten the political system is the result of the government's abandonment of the frontlines to the army's responsibility in the first place. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]