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Religion is permitted in China, but its practice is tightly regulated by the state. This paper uses individual‐level longitudinal data to investigate the association between religious regulation and religious outcomes in China. Measures of regulation are constructed from instances of state action against Christians as well as Christian perceptions of unfair treatment by the government. In summary, as regulation increases, an individual is less likely to identify with a religion and less likely to say that religion is important. For those individuals without religious identification in either wave, regulation is negatively associated with religious importance. Yet, for those individuals with identification in one or two waves, regulation is either unassociated or even positively associated with importance. These findings contribute to research on regulation of religion and religion in China. More broadly, they demonstrate the state can wield considerable power over people's private lives but also that this power has limits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The operation of a religious organization under an oppressive regime, such as in communist countries, differs from that in a free society. There is extensive literature on the effects of regulation on competition in religious markets and on the religiosity of a population. Less attention has been given to the effects of oppressive regulation that aims to control and possibly eliminate religion rather than to promote a particular religious group. This paper focuses on the specific question of how churches deal with oppressive regulation, particularly how they choose between legal and illegal operation. It proposes that both the official and the black‐market way of supplying religious services have some advantages and disadvantages, and that dual operation is advantageous where the regulation is severe. The paper examines the operation of the Catholic Church in Central European countries under communist rule, particularly Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Ukraine, and the different strategies adopted by the Church concerning official and underground operation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research examines the social actors and interactions that facilitate seminary students' sense of calling. Drawing from 36 in‐depth interviews with first year Masters of Divinity students, we introduce six ideal typical social others who play a formative role in the early stages of a call to ministry: instigators, exemplars, interpreters, affirmers, challengers, and codiscerners. Together, these findings demonstrate that the call to ministry, while deeply personal, emerges through social interactions that facilitate and make plausible a person's sense of calling and that sustain it over time. Extending Richard Pitt's conceptualization of the "horizontal call," this paper argues that social others help evoke and solidify—not merely legitimate—a personal sense of call. This research also highlights differences in the social structuring of call by gender. Despite considerable gains in the ordination of women, we find that many still face obstacles to experiencing and embracing a call to ministry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous research has found that women are more likely than men to report belief in nonmaterial paranormal phenomena (e.g., psychics). There are inconsistent findings about whether men are more likely than women to report belief in material paranormal phenomena (e.g., bigfoot/sasquatch), and no prior survey research has examined gender expression (as masculine or feminine) as it relates to paranormal beliefs. This paper asks: How do gender identity and gender expression relate to reported paranormal beliefs? It answers this question using a large sample (n = 2504) of Canadians. Femininity helps explain differences between cisgender women and men on reported beliefs about foreseeing the future and telekinesis, but less so about reported belief in ghosts. Intriguingly, reported gender atypicality is associated with reported belief in all paranormal phenomena among cisgender women and among cisgender men. The results highlight the importance of measuring gender expression for beliefs that science cannot verify. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given popular religiosity, the presence of religious parties, and the politicization of religious issues, it is highly likely that politicians with varying levels of personal religiosity are active in politics. Yet, our knowledge of how politicians' religiosity influences their political choices is still limited, particularly for developing countries. In this paper, I use data from a survey experiment fielded to Pakistani politicians in 2018 to study whether and how politicians' personal religiosity influences their political risk preferences. Scholars debate whether religiosity is correlated with higher or lower risk aversion among citizens; however, no study has examined this relationship among politicians. I find that higher religiosity systematically predicts which politicians are more risk‐averse and highly religious politicians' decisions under uncertainty are inconsistent with expected utility maximization and prospect theory. These findings suggest that in contrast to existing assumptions of elite decision‐making, politicians' religiosity systematically influences their risk preferences and choices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We compile an original database of 130,000 American clergy across 40 denominations, which we link to public voter registration data. We then link these data to mass surveys and a survey of pastors' own churches. This paper has two purposes. First, it introduces a new methodology for learning about religious communities by scraping information from denominational find‐a‐church websites. Second, the paper presents several short analyses that focus on the political affiliations of pastors and how they relate to congregants. We demonstrate that denominational affiliation is highly informative of a pastor's party registration but not a congregant's. Yet, the weak relationship for congregants masks a stronger underlying relationship between denominational affiliation and issue positions. We also demonstrate that many congregants, particularly in conservative churches, are politically unaligned with their pastor. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Homophobia in the black community has been largely attributed to the Black Church's conservative views concerning sexual orientation. Prior research demonstrates that black congregations are generally nonaffirming of nonheterosexuality; however, few studies have investigated black congregants' responses to their churches' climates regarding sexuality. Using in‐depth interviews, this paper examines the extent to which black Christians are content with their congregations' nonaffirming climates. Findings indicate that although some black parishioners are content with or indifferent to their churches' climates, most respondents advocate for a change in how their congregations address sexual orientation, specifically calling for open conversations about sexuality. Furthermore, an examination of the language respondents used to evaluate congregational climates suggests discussions of sexuality in churches that humanize and encourage empathy for nonheterosexual identities may help facilitate such conversations. These results challenge assumptions of ideological homogeneity within religious organizations and could inform strategies to promote nonheterosexual inclusion in congregations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although scholars have often described faith‐based universities in America as "church‐related," we argue this classification tells us virtually nothing about how the Catholic identity influences the mission, rhetoric, curriculum, or policies of Catholic institutions. Although Morey and Piderit (2006, Catholic higher education: A culture in crisis) created a more sophisticated four‐part typology of Catholic institutions, we find that students, parents, administrators, and scholars, particularly scholars interested in institutional secularization, need a better means of empirical analysis to determine the degree to which the Catholic identity of an institution influences key administrative decisions of the university. Thus, we propose a method of content analysis that can quantify how the Catholic identity shapes key administrative, curricular, and cocurricular decisions and thereby places Catholic institutions upon a continuum. We then apply our new Operationalizing Faith Identity Guide (OFIG) to Catholic institutions in the United States to demonstrate the helpfulness of its application. Replication: The data needed to duplicate and replicate the findings in the paper will be made available immediately following publication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Whether religious groups advance or limit human rights has been a topic of recent debate among human rights scholars. This article studies the conditions under which religious leaders advance human rights in the context of Argentina's Jewish community during the country's 1976–1983 military dictatorship. Three major influences on religious support for human rights—autonomy from a religious community's establishment, a missionary‐reformer identity, and congregational mobilization—are highlighted. Original archival research from the papers of U.S.‐born rabbi Marshall T. Meyer illustrates his defense of human rights in Argentina, contrasting his work with the inaction of a major established Jewish organization. Quantitative cross‐national analysis extends the case study findings by showing a relationship between religious institutions' autonomy from the state and defense of human rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite prayer's central role in religious life, quantitative research on prayer typically focuses on its frequency without regard to the total amount, to why, to whom, or for what a person might be praying, nor how people feel when they pray. In this paper, we broaden our understanding of the prayer practices of American adults by focusing on their (1) quantity of prayer, (2) style of prayer, (3) purpose of prayer, (4) prayer target, and (5) emotional state during prayer. Using the Baylor Religion Survey (N = 1248), collected January–March 2021, we present frequencies and findings from factor analyses of key conceptual dimensions of prayer and then indicate how prayer dimensions correlate with each other and vary by basic religion and demographic variables. Our findings provide a detailed picture of these relationships and also provide researchers with best practices in how to measure the various dimensions of prayer in future studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The negative relationship between religiosity and cognitive ability is well documented though most research on the connection between religion and cognitive factors has largely ignored how social positions like race and gender may inform the association. This paper explores how race and gender intersect with the association between religious factors and verbal ability. Using data from the General Social Surveys, I examine racial differences in the impact of religious identification, religious participation, and beliefs about the Bible on verbal ability. The analyses show that the association between religious factors and verbal ability varies significantly across racial groups, and points to some gender differences in the association between religious factors and verbal ability by race. The findings highlight the importance of an intersectional approach and suggest that psychological theorizing about the relationships between religion and cognitive ability is underdeveloped. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The work of W.E.B. Du Bois highlights the significance of Christian religion in Black American life. According to Du Bois, the Black Church serves as a site of self‐formation and affirmation, and the White Church as a source of racist beliefs and justifications for inequality. In this paper, we expand Du Bois' inquiry about the influence of religion with a study of Black Americans who belong to a predominantly White religion. For those whose religious experience is almost wholly within the "white world," what role does religion play in their lives? We analyze a set of 52 public accounts by Black Americans discussing their experiences as members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter‐day Saints (LDS). We find that for many Black LDS, membership in the LDS Church is characterized by contrast and contradiction, yielding spiritual conviction, joy, and meaningful communion on one hand, and racism and isolation on the other. We also find that Black LDS respond to these contradictions in a variety of ways. We classify these agentic responses into five types and examine the sociological significance of the observed variation. We conclude with a discussion of implications for scholarship on race and religion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines a civil war brewing among evangelicals on the college campus over racial justice—calls for greater racial equality, equity, and inclusion—in the era of Black Lives Matter (BLM). It examines how the white evangelical right are framing their resistance to racial justice and redrawing the color line in the contemporary college evangelical landscape not with distant "social justice warriors" in broader secular society, but with those right inside their evangelical community who, at varying levels, are coming out in support for racial justice in 2020s America. To do this, I first examine the varied campus evangelicals that support racial justice and how they express and frame their support as proper religious practice. I then explicate how the white evangelical right utilize a strategy of colorblind‐othering to fight against these co‐evangelicals that support racial justice. Data for the study come from the Landscape Study of Chaplaincy and Campus Ministry (2019–22). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper unites disparate literature to test the influence of religious belonging and behavior characteristics along with secular welfare boundaries on anti‐immigrant attitudes. We suggest that welfare states varied in their religious foundations during the transition from religious‐based solidarity to modern state‐based solidarity and formulate a novel analytical framework to hypothesize effects across individuals and welfare regime types. Using eight waves of the European Social Survey (2002–16), we find that religious effects are strongest in welfare states with the most religious foundations, the Southern European welfare states, and weak in the universalist welfare states, which lacked historical state‐church tensions. Other welfare types show a mix of religious effects, with some challenging expectations. Furthermore, Christian majority membership is often associated with heightened anti‐immigrant attitudes, most consistently in contrast to the non‐Christian minority. For welfare‐based forms of inclusion, we find consistent institutional trust effects and two competing logics for secular boundaries: a propensity for welfare chauvinism and a culture of inclusion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the late 20th century, public discourse in Muslim‐minority countries has centered around the question of how to classify Muslims. In this paper, we compare the state, academic, and self‐classification of Muslims in two countries: the United Kingdom and Germany. We propose that the historical experience of anti‐Semitism makes religion a more salient master category to understand Muslims in Germany, while the history of both anti‐Semitism and anti‐Black racism largely resulting from colonial domination means that religion together with race are master categories used to understand Muslims in the United Kingdom. Through this multilayered ethnographic and historical analysis, we challenge taken‐for‐granted assumptions in both the political and academic milieu about what it means to be Muslim, emphasizing the importance of the interplay between sociopolitical categories and self‐identifications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines religious change of immigrants from Poland, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Spain in the first years after their arrival in the Netherlands––one of the least religious countries in the world. Religiosity is measured by attendance, praying, and subjective religiosity. Multiple‐group latent growth models are estimated based on four waves spanning a total of 4 years (n = 3354 at Wave 1) to identify religious trajectories. Results show an initial increase in attendance that levels off and ultimately reverses and a steady decrease in subjective religiosity across all immigrant groups. A group‐specific pattern is visible on the praying dimension: Turks show an initial increase that levels off over time and then reverses, whereas the other groups show no substantial change. The analysis suggests that differences in opportunities to attend and exclusion experiences are unlikely to be the main drivers of the immigrants' religious trajectories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper first evaluates the impact of a two‐decade‐long Islamization policy carried out by a pro‐Islamist party, which came to power in 2002 in Turkey, on the attitudes of Turkish people toward religious values, religious practices, and clergy. In this regard, how the importance of religion, frequency of going to mosques, and trust in the clergy have changed among Turkish Muslims between 2002 and 2018 were examined by using World Values Survey data and employing logistic regression analysis. Estimation results indicated a reduction in belief in God, attendance to mosques, and trust in clergy, which imply the failure of the Islamization policy. Second, we explored what caused the failure by using the same data set and methodology. Our estimations suggested that the symbiotic relationship between the pro‐Islamist government and religious clergy and institutions may explain the failure. As the government is identified with religion in the eye of the public, dissatisfaction with the government turned to dissatisfaction with religious values. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In societies where the populace exhibits a wide range of religiosity, social conservatives (religiously devout or socially traditional) feel their beliefs and way of life threatened, even where others in their society (secular, or socially liberal) have no desire to threaten them, or to discriminate against them, or even to proselytize. Examples include devout English Pilgrims in liberal 16th century Holland and devout Muslims in liberal 21st century Western Europe. We suggest that this is because diversity in religiosity itself poses a threat to conventional personal morality (attitudes on abortion, divorce, euthanasia, suicide, prostitution). The consequences of societal diversity in religiosity (the centrality of religion to one's life) for individuals' endorsement of conventional personal morality have been neglected in prior research. This paper shows that diversity in religiosity at the national level undermines individuals' endorsement of conventional personal morality, net of an individual's own religiosity, net of the average levels of religiosity and socioeconomic development in the individual's society, and net of key individual‐level controls. Data are pooled from the World Values Surveys/European Values Surveys, 1981–2008, with 90 countries, 200+ surveys, and 300,000+ individual respondents. Analysis is by multilevel methods (variance components models with fixed effects and random intercepts, estimated by generalized least squares [GLS]). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For decades, the annual numbers of exits of members from the Catholic Church and Protestant Church have been increasing. Closer inspection of diocese‐level data shows that the time‐series pattern of exits is nonlinear with a series of intermediate peaks. This paper uses an event study approach to model the impacts of various scandals on church exit rates. We find that sexual abuse and financial scandals located in the Catholic Church contribute to increased exit rates not just in that Church but also, by way of spillover effects, to higher exit rates of Protestant Church members. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the effect of religious affiliation on individual well‐being. Using Gallup's U.S. Daily Poll between 2008 and 2017, we find that those who are engaged in their local church and view their faith as important to their lives have not only higher levels of subjective well‐being, but also acyclical levels. We show that the acyclicality of subjective well‐being among Christians is not driven by selection effects or the presence of greater social capital, but rather a sense of purpose over the business cycle independent of financial circumstances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This question on how religious beliefs shape attitudes about guns has received little attention in the literature. We use the religious concept of supernatural evil, or beliefs about Satan, Hell, Armageddon, and demons, to provide context for ideas about gun ownership and the development of attitudes toward gun policy. While this has been explored quantitatively using national survey data, we argue that an in‐depth qualitative approach provides necessary nuance. As part of an ongoing ethnography in Northeastern Kansas, we conducted interviews with 55 women and 7 men who own and shoot guns. For this paper, we report on a religion module subsample that probes religiosity, spirituality, and gun ownership. Based on the rich contextual information from the interviews, we illuminate a package of beliefs that come together as an ethic, a set of moral principles guiding gun ownership for a subset of gun owners. We suggest the spirit of gun ownership is a bundle of duties that guide individual gun owners to stress the need to protect, be diligent, and defend. Moreover, belief in supernatural evil is bound up in policy attitudes that protect or expand gun rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The nature of secularization is of enduring interest in the social science of religion. Numerous recent papers have established downward cohort trends as characterizing religious change. We examine potential mechanisms by assessing cultural participation and secular engagement during the formative period of one cohort. We provide estimates of active and nominal religiosity, nonreligion and religious belief for those born between 1933 and 1942, using multiple surveys fielded between 1957 and 2018. We model the association between religiosity and secular cultural and social participation for this cohort in 1957, then examine how cultural socialization in childhood relates to religiosity in their later adulthood using surveys fielded between 2005 and 2007. Increased secular competition is found to be associated with less active religiosity. These trends were underpinned by an ethic of increasing autonomy for the young. We conclude by affirming the link between increasing secular competition, long‐run modernization, and changing cultural socialization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To what extent has the growth of Evangelicalism in Latin America contributed to political participation across the region? A number of scholars of religion and politics in the United States have suggested that Evangelicalism promotes the development of civic skills necessary for political engagement, while the Catholic Church, due to its hierarchical structure, provides fewer opportunities for skill acquisition. In this paper, we apply this debate to Latin America to test whether civic skills developed in Catholic and Protestant church activities lead to differential participation rates in 18 countries. We utilize the 2014 Pew Religion in Latin America survey to test these effects, and find that Protestant churches do indeed promote skill‐developing activities at higher rates, but that Catholics, when involved, are more likely to translate this religious participation into political action. We conclude that political scientists must better understand the organizational role of religion in promoting political engagement worldwide. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While traditional masculinity and fathering behaviors are seemingly associated, few studies have considered the conditions under which masculine norms may influence fathers' behavior. Religiosity is an important factor to consider, given its association with both the endorsement of traditional gender attitudes and father involvement. This paper addresses the independent effects of traditional masculine norms and religiosity on fathering behaviors and considers whether religiosity moderates the relationship between masculinity and men's parenting behaviors. Using a national sample of fathers with children aged 2–17 in the United States, the results suggest that masculinity is negatively associated with father involvement, while religiosity is positively associated with father involvement. Yet, both highly masculine and highly religious fathers are more likely to engage in harsh discipline. Moreover, results suggest that religiosity attenuates the negative relationship between masculinity and active father involvement, while exacerbating the positive relationship between masculinity and harsh punishment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research note advances the religious coping literature by testing whether belief in an evil world conditions the stress‐moderating role of scripture reading. Hypotheses are tested with original data from a survey of black, Hispanic, and white American churchgoers from South Texas (2017–2018; n = 1,115). Our findings show that reading scripture for insights into the future attenuates the positive association between major life events and psychological distress, but only for congregants who do not believe the world is fundamentally evil and sinful. For congregants who believe the world is evil, scripture reading amplifies the association between life events and distress. Whether scriptural coping is beneficial for mental health could be contingent on a believer's broader assumptions about the nature of the world we live in. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper uses the occasion of the Secular Coalition for America’s first-ever Congressional briefing as a case study for demonstrating the political advantages a polysemous secular affords secular lobbyists. The briefing, conducted primarily for the benefit of staff members from the U.S. House of Representatives, offers a rare public forum in which the Secular Coalition tried to strike a balance between the two halves of its mission: advocating for non-theists and promoting secular government. In its efforts to fulfill this mission, the Secular Coalition conflates and distinguishes between four distinct meanings of the secular and secularism: the separation of church and state, the secular public sphere, the ideology of nonbelief, and a nascent secular identity. By studying the ongoing efforts of secular activists to redefine the place and meaning of the secular and the religious in American life, this paper contributes to the study of how the secular gets made, who makes it, and why.

The article offers information on the editorial staff of the periodical.

Research shows most Western societies became less religious over recent decades. But we know much less about the rest of the world. Is the non‐Western world also becoming less religious, as some varieties of secularization theory would lead us to expect? Using 1981‐to‐2020 World/European Values Survey data from 103 countries, this study describes, and uses mixed‐effects models to rigorously estimate, religious trends in eight world regions and five former Soviet and Eastern Bloc (FSEB) subregions. Results indicate that religious decline occurred in Latin America, Central and Baltic Europe, and (recently) in the Mideast and North Africa. But there is little evidence of such decline elsewhere in Asia, Africa, or the FSEB—despite the broad reach of many modernizing social trends. These findings do not lend support to a strong version of secularization theory but may be consistent with some versions of the idea that modernization can make people less religious. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines whether and how the association between religious homogamy (i.e., whether spouses have the same religious affiliation) and marital satisfaction varies across religious affiliations by utilizing a unique context that four large religious groups (i.e., Buddhists, Protestants, Catholics, and religious nones) coexist in South Korea. Our results show that while religious homogamy has a positive relationship with marital satisfaction among Protestants and Catholics, there is no such association among Buddhists. This study also reveals that higher levels of religious attendance intensify the positive relationship between religious homogamy and marital satisfaction only among Protestants. Moreover, religious heterogamy is positively associated with marital relationships among religious nones compared to religious homogamy. However, this pattern held only for religious nones who married Buddhists or Catholics. We discuss the implications of our findings for research on religion and marriage from cross‐cultural perspectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous research suggests an angry God image is a narrative schema predicting support for more punitive forms of criminal justice. However, this research has not explored the possibility that racialization may impact one's God image. We perform logistic regression on Wave V of the Baylor Religion Survey to examine the correlation between an angry God image and the belief that police shoot Blacks more often because Blacks are more violent than Whites (a context‐specific form of cultural racism). Engaging critical insights from intersectionality theory, we also interact angry God image with both racialized identity and racialized religious tradition. Results suggest that the angry God schema is associated with this form of cultural racism for White people generally as well as White Evangelicals, yet for Black Protestants, belief in an angry God is associated with resistance against this type of cultural racism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Are religious leaders unusually unhealthy? This question has long occupied scholars interested in the study of religious institutions, and a significant body of research has examined the causes, correlates, and effects of poor health among clergy. In this study, we aimed to: (1) outline the development of, and bias inherent to, the scholarly understanding of clergy health over the past 50 years; (2) test, using a recently collected nationally representative sample of clergy, the standing assumption that clergy are an especially unhealthy vocational group, specifically in terms of depression, obesity, and self‐rated health; and (3) identify the major correlates of health among clergy using these data. Contrary to the recent tenor of scholarly research on this subject, our research revealed that clergy are not a particularly unhealthy group. We suggest potential pathways forward to ameliorate the bias inherent in the research into clergy well‐being. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prior research tends to find a positive relationship between religiosity and political participation. Explanations of this relationship have focused mostly on religiosity‐generated organizational resources (e.g., civic skills), while paying less attention to psychological resources. We simultaneously examined different aspects of religiosity (belief, behavior, and belonging) and political participation (electoral and nonelectoral) in a structural equation model with two psychological resources as mediators: (1) "transcendent accountability"—seeing oneself as responsible to God or a higher power for one's impact on other people and the environment, and (2) "religiopolitical awareness"—perceiving the influence of one's religion and/or spirituality on one's political views and activities. Results from analyzing survey data from a US representative sample showed that transcendent accountability and religiopolitical awareness, whether together or awareness only, mediated positive relationships between religiosity (belief, private and public behaviors, and membership) and political participation (voting and other political activity), highlighting key psychological motivators of political participation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Investigating both the causes and initial triggers for disaffiliation from Orthodox Judaism is an important part of understanding the complex lived experiences of exiters. This study documents an extensive number of causes for leaving Orthodox Judaism, as well as initial triggers, a less‐often investigated, yet important component of disaffiliation. Using an online survey, over 700 open‐ended responses were collected from 303 participants who self‐identified as having grown up practicing Orthodox Judaism but had since stopped practicing. Content analysis was used to organize responses, resulting in distinct categories that fit into two themes: intellectual and social‐emotional, the former more often reported by males and the latter by females. The most commonly reported causes and initial triggers, respectively, were issues with the community and lack of belief in Torah and Orthodoxy. Our results give voice to exiters by documenting nuanced accounts of the full disaffiliation journey, beginning with the initial trigger. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Emerging research shows the COVID‐19 pandemic has made substantial changes to the religious climate of several nations. Surprisingly, China, the outbreak center of the pandemic, has been scarcely researched. Our study investigates how the COVID‐19 pandemic has evoked new religious disaster responses and provided psychological coping mechanisms during the pandemic. We also explore how the pandemic explains surprising rates of religiosity in China. Scholars have long proposed that religious resurgence in China has been a result of individuals seeking stability in turbulent times. We bridge parallel Literatures in these areas and treat the pandemic as a natural experiment for evaluating religious behavior over time as conditioned by heightened risk perception. Utilizing a difference‐in‐differences estimation strategy with panel data, our study reveals that the pandemic has led to a significant increase in religiosity in China, particularly in religious areas most affected by the pandemic. We propose that even in a highly regulative religious environment, with most of its population being religiously unaffiliated, religion is a significant resource for coping in China. We take an innovative approach to demonstrate this by utilizing online search data. Our research speaks to the sociology of religion, the social psychology of risk perception, and makes application to emerging research on the unfolding COVID‐19 pandemic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine how local religions influence derivative usage in the hedge fund industry. Measuring religiosity by the ratio of religious adherents in the county of a U.S. hedge fund headquarters, we find that religiosity is negatively related to the probability of hedge funds using derivatives for speculative purposes. In contrast, funds in regions with higher ratios of Catholics to Protestants are more likely to engage in speculation‐based trading of derivatives. Finally, we show that the effects of local religion are more pronounced if the hedge fund size is small. Overall, our study highlights the significant role of local religion in shaping the purpose of hedge fund derivative usage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research shows that perceived workplace discrimination shapes an individual's job satisfaction and intent to leave a job. This study considers whether these impacts may be attenuated if an individual views their work as a spiritual calling. Using data from a nationally representative survey (N = 9,907), our analysis shows that perceived work discrimination due to race, gender, and religion are all independently associated with less job satisfaction net of a variety of other measures. Viewing work as a spiritual calling is associated with greater job satisfaction, even when accounting for traditional measures of religiosity. The negative impact of perceived discrimination on job satisfaction is weaker among those who view work as a spiritual calling. These findings provide evidence of the mechanisms underlying job satisfaction and have implications for understanding how religion might help mitigate the negative consequences of perceived discrimination in the workplace, or allow discrimination to potentially go unaddressed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Motivation significantly influences students' learning outcomes. Changing their learning motivation improves their performance. This study used an exploratory sequential mixed methods approach, with the participation of 140 adolescents attending retreats at three Zen monasteries belonging to the Truc Lam (Bamboo Forest) Zen sect, to examine how they changed their motivation, what made them change, and how the change improved their learning outcomes. The study also evaluated the effect of gender and age on changes in motivation. The results indicated that many teenagers had changed from extrinsic to intrinsic motivation thanks to Dharma lessons, teacher support, and leisure activities. Compared to students who maintained their extrinsic motivation unchanged, they had better learning outcomes. Age, but not gender, had a considerable effect on changes in teenagers' motivation. These findings provide more evidence for extending Buddhist education and conducting further research on young Buddhist learners' motivation in various contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does a major external shock that potentially threatens the community and the individual impact religiosity in the context of ongoing secularization? Do individuals in a rich and secularized society such as Germany react to potential community‐level (sociotropic) and individual‐level (egotropic) threat with heightened religiosity? We estimate multilevel regression models to investigate the impact of sociotropic and egotropic existential security threats associated with the COVID‐19 pandemic on individuals' religiosity. Our data come from a rolling cross‐sectional online survey conducted in Germany among 7,500 respondents across 13 waves in 2020. Our findings suggest that a global health pandemic such as COVID‐19 increases individuals' perception of existential and economic threat, which, in turn, leads to an increase in religiosity. However, this relationship is only true for egotropic existential security threat but not for sociotropic threat. We discuss the theoretical implications of these findings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

South Korea provides an ideal setting for studying religion and gender because Western and local religions are both prominent, and Confucianist beliefs still shape gender norms. Using the 2018 Korean General Social Survey, this study examines the extent to which two dimensions of gender traditionalism in South Korea–Confucian patriarchal ideology (i.e., belief in the subordination of women for Confucian patriarchy) and separate spheres ideology (i.e., belief that men are better suited to work and women to domestic responsibilities)—vary across Buddhists, Catholics, Protestants, and the nonaffiliated. The findings show that Christians have the lowest endorsement for Confucian patriarchal ideology while supporting separate spheres ideology as much as Buddhists, who are most gender traditional in both dimensions. The results illustrate the dynamics between religion and gender norms in South Korea's context, demonstrating how Christianity combines Western modernization with gender‐essentialist traditionalism, while Buddhism maintains Confucian patriarchal values. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social surveys normally assume that respondents adhere to a single religious faith in belonging, believing, and practicing congruently. Some surveys even take religious identity as the singular measure of religiosity and examine its relationship with other variables. This practice, however, fails to capture nonexclusive and hybrid religiosity, which is arguably the traditional and normal pattern in East Asia while becoming increasingly common in the West. We have developed a new set of survey questions and conducted a survey among East Asian international students at an American university. The findings show that multiple religious belonging, believing, and practicing are quite common, the level of believing and participating in religions varies substantially, and no confession‐based single measure of religious identity or practice is sufficient for measuring religiosity. We recommend this set of improved measures of religiosity be adopted in future surveys in East Asia and probably in the West as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social scientists have long been interested in how intergroup contact or elite messaging can reduce or eliminate racial biases. To better understand the role of religious elites in these political questions, we show how a church location's income and racial characteristics interact with racial and economic ideologies to shape the political content of sermons. Testing our theories through both quantitative and qualitative analysis of an original data set of more than 102,000 sermons from more than 5200 pastors, we show that contact is only effective as a means of decreasing prejudice to the extent that actors—in our case, pastors—are ideologically capable of reconciling their potential role in economic inequality. White Evangelical pastors rarely preach about issues of poverty or racial justice overall, but the context of the preaching matters. We find that the greater the share of Black population there is in a church community, the less likely White Evangelical pastors are to mention issues of poverty or racial justice, and when they do mention it, they hold to ideological commitments that avoid blaming systems for racialized economic inequality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study addressed internal secularization in the Catholic Church by testing the role of several factors in priests' assessments of the state of the Church in the United States, priests' views of whether the Church's situation is getting better or worse, and their attitudes toward Pope Francis. Comparisons with identical questions fielded in 2002 revealed a striking pessimistic turn among priests over the last two decades. In addition, regression analyses using the 2021 Survey of American Catholic Priests revealed that "in‐house" factors—namely, attitudes toward Pope Francis and perceptions of how well bishops have restored confidence in the Catholic Church following the sexual abuse crisis—most powerfully predicted priests' current pessimism. On top of this, politically conservative priests and priests ordained more recently tended to be most critical of how Francis is handling his duties, signaling a pronounced tension inside the Catholic Church over religious authority, a defining feature of internal secularization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A growing body of literature explores religious expression in workplaces, but comparatively little research examines how religious expression might be shaped by inequality in workplace status. We hypothesize that perceived work autonomy and socioeconomic status (SES) both function as mediating links between organizational status and religious expression. Drawing on a sample of employed adults from a nationally‐representative survey in the United States (n = 8611), we examine three modes of religious expression at work: displaying faith, feeling comfortable talking about faith, and expressing views when observing unfair work practices that conflict with faith. Results revealed that workers at the bottom of their organizations express their religiosity less than those at the top. Religious expression in the workplace is thus not simply a reflection of individual religiosity or religious identity, but also workplace power. Although perceived work autonomy mediated the relationship, SES buffered the relationship. Findings have important implications for workplace policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Religious leaders face unique vocational challenges that place their mental health at risk. As the clergy as a profession has traditionally been male‐dominated, clergywoman experience greater occupational stress than their clergymen colleagues, putting their mental health at additional risk. However, past research offers varied evidence on the gendered nature of clergy health, suggesting that clergywomen may be especially resilient to some difficulties of clergy work. Using panel data from the Clergy Health Initiative, a sample of United Methodist pastors from 2010 to 2021, this study examines clergy‐specific occupational stress and its gendered relationship with depression. I find that, while clergywomen experience higher levels of occupational stress, the relationship between occupational stress and depression is weaker for clergywomen as compared to clergymen. This study thus offers a new perspective on the gendered nature of the pastorate: that clergywomen may be able to more effectively cope with vocational difficulties than clergymen. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing on survey data of Christian students (N = 4261) enrolled at 11 colleges that are part of the Council for Christian Colleges and Universities, we examine color‐blindness, different types of color‐cognizance, and views on race in Christian organizations. We find significant differences between students of color and White students in color‐blindness and color‐cognizance but find racial convergence in the importance of racial reconciliation. Net of controls, greater evangelical orthodoxy is associated with color‐cognizant views that perceive prejudicial treatment against White people, undercut the experiences of people of color, and is associated with more positive views of Christian organizations' roles in race relationships. Concurrently, upper year students differ significantly from first years in their racial attitudes and views on race in Christian organizations, suggesting that Christian education may shape racial views positively. Our findings have implications for theorizing how evangelical Christianity and evangelical colleges maintain and challenge color‐blindness and White supremacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this study, we attempted to determine the cross‐cultural commonalities in religiosity between the U.S. and Japan by measurement invariance. While both countries share many common values and similar social systems, some differences exist in religion. We collected religious propositions/concepts typical in most religions in the two countries. Then, using a mind map tool and database, we prepared 100 mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive religious belief items that do not employ the terminologies of any specific religion. U.S. and Japanese research companies administered the survey via the internet. By differential item functioning (DIF) analysis, we found 23 common items, and five remarkably specific items showing opposing patterns. By multiple‐group confirmatory factor analysis, we found that the two countries share the same structure of religiosity, consisting of three correlated factors: "Supernaturalism," "Psychological Benefits of Religion," and "New Age Spirituality." The factor "New Age spirituality" connects the other two factors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is the relationship between trust in religious leaders and compliance with policies that are costly to the individual? Religious leaders often have the moral authority to affect individuals' willingness to adopt prosocial behaviors. Yet, that influence can be either positive or negative because religious leaders face mixed incentives to encourage compliance and their leadership is often decentralized. We argue that greater trust in religious leaders will increase compliance in countries with a dominant religion and centralized religious authority because religious leaders will offer a coherent message that aligns with state directives. We test our hypotheses using data from surveys fielded in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan during the COVID‐19 pandemic. We find a positive and significant relationship between trust and voluntary compliance only in Kazakhstan, where religious leaders reduced the costs of compliance by enabling adherents to practice their faith while social distancing. We thus identify an alternative mechanism whereby trust promotes compliance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]