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This paper offers a theoretical analysis of Self‐Determination Theory (SDT) and its claims regarding human autonomy. Self‐determination theorists have advanced a form of self‐regulated, engaged behavior (i.e., autonomy), founded upon on a consilient account of human motivation that assumes multiple, hierarchical levels of organization and causation (e.g., biological, psychological, and social). Autonomy, from this perspective, is taken to emerge from underlying biological mechanisms, but also able to exert its own causal effects in the world as a unique psychological phenomenon. We contend that in theorizing this way, self‐determination theorists have invoked a mixed discourse of mechanism and autonomy that leaves important questions unanswered, perhaps most importantly those concerning how autonomy as a kind of volition can fit coherently in the mechanistic account of world that they advocate. We then offer an alternative perspective based upon the work of various hermeneutic‐phenomenological thinkers in philosophy and psychology. This alternative perspective conceptualizes human phenomena such as autonomy and motivation in agentic terms, emphasizing meaningful participation in possibility‐laden contexts of everyday practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ultimate values can be defined as abstract rules or goals transcending specific contexts and defining the utmost purposes of existence. Although the literature about human values is vast, several fundamental questions about ultimate values remain open. What are the processes responsible for the formation of ultimate values? What is the impact of inbuilt affective processes and of learning, respectively? Regarding learning, what is the role of society? Empirical evidence shows dramatic variability in ultimate values pursued by different people. Why? These open questions suggest that a precise picture of ultimate values is lacking. This paper offers a computational theory of ultimate values. The key idea is that our brain represents values along a hierarchy where ultimate values are built upon experiences with inherent affective nature (basic values). Based on these representations, the proposal is that the brain infers the rules that foster basic values in a variety of contexts. These would become ultimate values and drive human behaviour independent of the ongoing context. We discuss how the theory can contribute to understanding a variety of aspects of human values, including morality, to what degree values are innate or culturally determined, and how values shape and are shaped by society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The vast majority of empirical hypotheses in psychology, or in the social sciences more generally, are directional whereas in other sciences, such as the physical sciences, there are more point or narrow‐interval empirical hypotheses. Characteristics of theories and auxiliary assumptions play a role in the difference. Given that psychology research strongly features directional predictions, it is important to question the extent to which these provide convincing tests of theories that they are designed to test. The present work aims to provide a nuanced view that considers the complex interaction between the obviousness of directional predictions, the obviousness of the theory from which they derive, and the quality of the auxiliary assumptions that push towards directional predictions. Then, too, there is the related issue of vulnerability of directional predictions to alternative explanations and how to address them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In following Marxist and psychoanalytic theory, we can understand ideologies as social processes that obscure the contradictions (i.e., how an object is not at one with itself) inherent to individual subjectivity and social structures. Despite claiming to be non‐ideological, mainstream psychology has, throughout its history, served the ideological interests of elite classes (e.g., by pathologizing political resistance). Working within the liberation psychology paradigm, I attempt in this article to elaborate on the notion of de‐ideologization (i.e., the politically committed retrieval of people's experiences beyond the ideological reference points of elite classes) through a consideration of contradiction. To do this, I explore how de‐ideologization can connect with contradiction through processes of re‐symbolization, solidarity‐making, and mobilizing progressive ideologies. Considered together, these three processes allow us to use contradiction to understand interlocking currents of oppression, divergent visions of emancipation, the development of insurgent subjectivities, and the building of an intersectional socialist politics. In conclusion, I consider some of the directions that theoretical and praxis‐oriented work on de‐ideologization may take, as well as some paths it may wish to avoid. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since its emergence in the 19th century, academic psychology has striven to become accepted as a scientific discipline. This emphasis on "science" has led to many unprecedented advancements in the understanding of human behavior. However, the view that psychology must be approached as a science has become ingrained in the field over time, and critically discussing the implications of this notion has turned into a taboo. In this article, I examine the benefits and limitations of applying the scientific paradigm to psychology, and I propose when it is not optimal to approach psychology as a science if the field is to maximize its potential. Importantly, I do not imply that practicing psychology as a "non‐science" means practicing it as a pseudoscience. Quite to the contrary, I argue that not always enforcing the scientific viewpoint can prevent pseudoscientific practices and make the field more scientific in the long run. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]