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This paper proposes a way of integrating the concepts of habitus and mood. The purpose of this conceptual move is to enrich Pierre Bourdieu's treatment of habitus with a better recognition of its affective aspects. The paper draws on phenomenological studies of psychic disorders and applies the concept of existential feeling to specify what moods are and do. The framing proposed distinguishes between dispositions that function in the foreground and in the background of habitus. Thereby it is possible to regard moods as background dispositions of habitus. This paper also discusses what this idea of moody habitus can do for research in habitus and human practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Affect Theory of Social Exchange (ATSE) research program has produced cumulative insights on how instrumental exchanges lead to the development of affectual attachments. With its focus on task responsibilities, ATSE leaves space to interrogate how factors not related to task execution are at play in the production of interpersonal bonds. In this paper, we integrate insights from social psychology, cultural sociology and organizational research to develop a theoretical framework suggesting (a) why and how cultural tastes contribute to social cohesion and (b) the conditions under which cultural tastes remain a source of strategic advantage or, worse, symbolic exclusion. Our theory rests on the basic proposition that shared cultural tastes increase the likelihood of experiencing positive emotions, which in turn are key in the development and maintenance of affectual attachments. Variations to this proposition are subsequently introduced, considering culture in declarative and nondeclarative forms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the question of the relations between emotions and personhood, with a view to advancing a critical realist account of the role of emotions in social life. It is argued that the constitution of persons has to be approached from an ontological perspective, and that this raises questions about how sociology has addressed the meaning and role of emotions. Margaret Archer's critical realist perspective on them as commentaries on human concerns is broadly endorsed, but some significant correctives are proposed, especially with respect to the important distinction between primary and secondary emotions. To this end, it is argued that the affect spectrum theory advanced by Warren TenHouten can be fruitfully appended to a critical realist theory of emotions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The theory of emotion developed by William James has been subject to four criticisms. First, it is held that Jamesian emotion is without function, that it plays no role in cognition and behavior. Second, that James ignores the role of experience in emotion. Third, that James overstated the role of physical processes in emotion. Fourth, that James' theory of emotion has been experimentally demonstrated to be false. A fifth point, less an explicit criticism than an assumption, holds that James has nothing to offer a social psychology of emotions. It will be shown in this paper that not one of these criticisms of James' theory of emotion can be sustianed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Vygotsky, at the end of his life, advanced a new representation of a psychological system that was ruled by a cognitive-emotional unity, a theorization that remains inconclusive due to Vygotsky's early death. This article discusses the advances made by Vygotsky in the comprehension of human motivation through his concepts of sense and perezhivanie at the end of his work. Through these concepts, he further advanced the discussion of motivation, despite the fact that these concepts have only very recently been considered a relevant part of his legacy in both Russian and Western psychology. This paper discusses the departure from and the historical presentations of the concept of motive in the following two main approaches of Soviet psychology that were mistakenly equated in Western interpretations: Vygotsky's approach, mainly at the first as last moment of his work, and Leontiev's Activity Theory. Based on the final theoretical positions of Vygotsky and of other Soviet authors, and further developing this legacy, this article proposes a new definition of motivation as a specific quality of subjectively configured systems and defines motive as intrinsic to the functioning of all psychological function defines subjective functions as subjectively configured processes. This new proposal of human motivation within a new way of defining subjectivity defines new categories as subjective senses and subjective configurations on which the author bases a specific approach for advancing the topic of subjectivity and motivation within a cultural-historical framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Self-interest is widely accepted as a powerful motivator by both academics and laypeople alike. However, research surrounding the self-interest motive paints a complicated picture of this most important psychological construct. Additionally, research on the social desirability of self-interest has revealed that despite its widespread acceptance, people do not readily accept that self-interest drives their own behaviors. This paper reviews the literature on self-interest and reveals several curious features surrounding its actual effect on helping behaviors, political attitudes and voting, and people's apparent ambivalence toward self-interest as a motive. It is possible that norms against the expression of self-interestedness evolved, creating ambivalence towards this widely accepted construct, subsequently affecting its expression on many human behaviors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues the Wittgensteinian point that we can undo the psychologizing of psychology by conceiving of mental life as lived in the space of reasons. It is argued that mental life -- human action, feeling and thinking -- is constituted by normative connections and necessities rather than causal ones. The consequence is that mental life is irreducibly moral, and if the sciences of mental life are to become adequate to deal with their subject matter, they should construe themselves as what was once referred to as moral sciences. It is argued that the source of the normativity of mental life is found in historically evolved social practices, although not all normativity is conventional or historically contingent. Finally, some objections to the idea that mental life is normative are discussed; first, that this idea represents an intellectualist or rationalist fallacy, and second that it violates our conception of mental illness as something mental, yet outside the space of reasons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents abstracts of articles on social psychology, published in the "Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour." "What is Emotionally Authenticity," by Mikko Salmela; "Perspectival Selves in Interaction With Others: Re-reading G.H. Mead's Social Psychology," by Jack Martin; "A Critical Epistemology of Analytical Statistics: Addressing the Sceptical Realist," by Wendy Olsen and Jamie Morgan; "Emotion and Social Structures: Towards an Interdisciplinary Approach," by Christian vom Scheve and Rolf von Laede.

All relevant sources agree that weeping is a human universal. There is disagreement, though, as to whether tears experienced during episodes of happiness or joy derive from the experience of joy itself, or whether such tears result merely from incidental physical constriction of the lacrimal gland (]) or from a“sadness rebound” induced by anticipated loss of the source of joy (];]). It is argued here that adult weeping does not exclusively express suffering but rather is an emotional and physical register of changes in self, both positive and negative. In outlining the argument concerning weeping the paper also presents an account of the registration and consolidation of changes in self-identity and self-feelings, and therefore provides an account of the internal process of transformation of self. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Explores the sociological study of emotion, contrasting constructionist and psychoanalytic accounts of envy as an emotion. Relationship between sociology, biology and emotion; Discussion on social action, agency, gender and the embodiment of the emotions; Explanation on the tension between biology and social constructionism in relation to the study of emotion.

One question in moral psychology concerns the role of emotions to motivate moral action. This question has recently become more urgent, because it is now clearer that cognitive developmental theories cannot offer a complete explanation of moral functioning. This paper suggests that emotion, as is typically understood in psychology, cannot be seen as the basis for an acceptable explanation of moral behaviour and motivation. However, it is argued that it is possible to understand emotions as embedded in agentic processes, and regulated by conscious concerns. So understood, emotions acquire an important role in the person's moral life. These conclusions are reached through an extensive review of psychological and philosophical conceptions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Linguists have often remarked upon the polysemous nature of love, whereby the term encompasses a wide diversity of emotional relationships. Several typologies have been constructed to account for this diversity. However, these tend to be restricted in scope, and fail to fully represent the range of experiences signified by the term ‘love’ in discourse. In the interest of generating an expanded typology of love, encompassing its varied forms, an enquiry was conducted into relevant concepts found across the world's cultures, focusing on so‐called untranslatable words. Through a quasi‐systematic search of published and internet sources, 609 relevant words were identified. These were organised through a version of grounded theory into 14 categories, representing 14 different forms or ‘flavours’ of love. The result is an expanded theoretical treatment of love, allowing us to better appreciate the nuances of this most cherished and yet polysemous of concepts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This section presents abstracts of articles related to social behavior including "What's Social About Social Emotions," "On Acting Against One's Best Judgement: A Social Constructionist Interpretation for the Akrasia Problem" and "Moving Beyond a Functional View of Language in Discourse Analysis."

Presents abstracts of articles about social science. 'Back to Basics: On the Very Idea of 'Basic Emotions',' by Robert C. Solomon; 'Identity in Whose Eyes? The Role of Representations in Identity Construction,' by Caroline Howarth; 'Agency and Community: A Critical Realist Paradigm,' by David L. Harvey.

Presents abstracts of several studies on social behavior. "Weeping and Transformation of Self," by Jack Barbalet; "Taking a Position: A Reinterpretation of the Theory of Planned Behaviour," by Andrew J. Cook, Kevin Moore and Gary D. Steel; "Deviant Action and Self-Narration: A Qualitative Survey Through ATLAS.ti," by Patrizia Patrizi.

Presents abstracts of articles published in the 2003 issue of the 'The Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour.' 'Guilt and Shame in Chinese Culture: A Cross-Cultural Framework From the Perspective of Morality and Identity,' by Olwen Bedford and Kwang-Kuo Hwang; 'Psychoanalytic Sociology and the Interpretation of Emotion,'by Simon Clark; 'Realism, Regularity and Social Explanation,' by Stephen Kemp and John Holmwood.

Presents abstracts of several issues concerning the theory of social behavior. Account giving strategies; Social psychological theories; Emotions.

Presents several abstracts of articles on social behavior. `Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, and the Reformulation of Social Theory,' by T. J. Berard; `Conceptual Problems in the Development of a Psychological Notion of `Intuition,' by Lisa M. Osbeck; `William James' Theory of Emotions: Filling in the Picture,' by J.M. Barbalet.

Presents abstracts of articles on psychology. `Emotions and Moral Motivation'; `Splitting Difference: Psychoanalysis, Hatred and Exclusion'; `Direct Perception and Symbolic Forming in Positioning'; `The Concept of consciousness: The General State of Meaning.'

Procrastination is frustrating. Because the procrastinator's frustration is self-imposed, procrastination can also be quite puzzling. I consider attempts at explaining, or explaining away, what appear to be genuine cases of procrastination. According to the position that I propose and defend, genuine procrastination exists and is supported by preference loops, which can be either stable or evanescent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a common view in contemporary philosophy, psychology, sociology, and gender studies that associates emotional authenticity with spontaneity and sincerity. Nevertheless, I shall provide reasons for rejecting this view, since it passes unintuitive verdicts on the authenticity of two significant emotional phenomena: recalcitrant emotions and managed emotions. These anomalies reflect a general problem in the 'sincerity view': sincerity is a psychological concept, whereas authenticity is a normative notion. As an alternative, I shall put forward an 'integrity view' of emotional authenticity. In this view, authenticity is analyzed as coherence between the emotion and one's internally justified values and beliefs. However, sincerity is a necessary condition of authenticity because an authentic emotion must be psychologically real even if it need not emerge spontaneously. Moreover, authenticity is a regulative and open-ended ideal as our spontaneous emotions frequently challenge the coherence of our present emotions, values, and beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This contribution presents an integrative and interdisciplinary approach to emotions and social structures. Combining theoretical accounts from the neurosciences, psychology, and sociology, the role of emotion in the micro-macro link is investigated and the social components of emotion on different levels of analysis are examined. Micro-level analysis explores societal influences on the interaction of cognition and emotion, emphasizing the role of appraisals and of emotion circuits on the brain level. Analysis of the meso-level investigates how emotions are elicited and expressed in social interactions and macro-level investigation scrutinizes how instances of social structural configurations affect the processing and regulation of emotion. The authors conclude with a conceptualization of emotions as a bidirectional mediator between large-scale social structures and individual behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents several abstracts on social behavior. 'Nothing More than Feelings? The Role of Emotions in Moral Judgement,' by David Pizarro; 'Interpretation, Truth and Correspondence,' by Pentti Moilanen; 'Mutual Aid Theory and Human Development,' by Michael Glassman; 'Agency and Culture,' by Carl Ratner.

William James is remembered as the philosopher of pragmatism, but he was principally the founder of modern scientific psychology. During the period of his most intense scientific involvement James developed a trenchant critique of science. This was not a rejection of science but an attempt to identify limitations of the contemporary conceptualization of science. In particular, James emphasized the failure of science to understand its basis in human emotions. James developed a scientific theory of emotions in which the importance of emotion in cognition and decision-making is central. James’ appreciation of the significance of emotions in science has continuing value. Nevertheless, his characterization of science in terms of its method introduces tensions in his account that an emphasis on the social dimensions of science, which he implicitly acknowledged, tends to resolve. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this article is to motivate and outline a dialogical perspective on agency that accommodates centrifugal and centripetal tendencies in current cultural theories of agency. To complement approaches that assume a high degree of integration and clarity, we emphasise the diversity of agency as it is experienced in the open-ended dialogical relationship with a particular other. While these former approaches to agency provide us with the means to examine the influence of social processes such as division of labour and reproduction of community, they tend to underplay the importance of agency as it is embodied and experienced in the lives of particular people. To reflect on this aspect of agency, we will draw extensively on Bakhtin's work, which crosses boundaries between philosophy, psychology and literary criticism, and which is concerned to understand what is personal in activity. In terms of agency, his work draws our attention to the sense of responsibility and potentiality that imbues our dialogues with particular others, the aesthetics and ethics involved in dialoguing with the other, and the sense of dilemmatic choice and intonation that is involved in our dialogue with the other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the psychological literature, love is often seen as a construct inseparable from that of close, interpersonal relationships. As a result, it has been often assumed that the same motivational factors underlie both phenomena. This often leads researchers to propose that love does not exist in itself—that it is an emotion which stems solely from a need for attachment, fulfillment of reproductive aims, or for social exchange. The popular cultural imagination, however, perceives love as a unique, mysterious, altruistic, ever-lasting bond between two people—a vision of love which is at odds with its supposed psychological origins. We propose that an ideal of love and its enactment in our culture is a result of two intertwining factors. Within the last few centuries, interpersonal relationships and love have replaced religion as islands of existential comfort. Toward this end, lovers project illusory meaning on their partners. The laborious and turbulent process of withdrawing these projections can lead to what many thinkers think “love” is: bestowal of value on another, and consequent respect for, and care for that person, unmotivated by one's own needs, within the context of a real relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Little is known about the circumstances that give rise to blushing and there have been no systematic attempts to classify and analyze the types of situations where it occurs. The study reported here analyzes a sample of recollections of occasions and a selection of literary episodes. The two sources of evidence yield somewhat different patterns but prominent themes in both are being the centre of attention, whether this is positive, neutral or negative, and the disclosure, or threat of exposure, of a private or sensitive topic. Inspection of example suggests that a blush is associated with self-consciousness. More specifically, it is elicited when circumstances cause someone to take another's perspective on the self, and this generates awareness of a discrepancy between his or her position and this position as it appears to the other. A blush does not require that the other take an adverse view of the actor's position. The blush shows sensitivity to the opinions of others and it is its capacity to communicate this that makes it effective in deflecting aggressive or rejecting responses from others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kristján Kristjánsson, On the Very Idea of “Negative Emotions”, pp. 351–364 As attention has shifted towards the emotions in general, the notion of so-called negative emotions has come in for renewed interest. The author explores this notion and argues that its invocation cannot be done without cost to our understanding since it obscures all sorts of relevant complexities. There are thus no emotions around to which we can helpfully refer collectively as “negative,” although there are of course painful emotions, emotions that negatively evaluate states of affairs, emotions that are negatively morally evaluated, and so forth. Furthermore, while attempts are under way to reappraise various (commonly) negatively evaluated emotions, those attempts involve different kinds of argument which cannot and should not be collected together as “defenses of negative emotions.” [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents a conceptual-discursive perspective based on naturalistic examples of individuals vacillating between pride and other emotions. Examination of some challenges in studying vacillating emotions; Similarities and differences between discursive and cognitive appraisal theories of emotions; Discussion on the Borderline Personality Disorder.

In this essay, we argue that the concepts of valence and polarity are misleading tools in emotion research. We begin by discussing the origins of the concept of valence in ancient philosophy and ethics and provide evidence from the psychological literature showing the complexity of these constructs. By closely examining such topics as the relationship between emotions and physical health, the role of appraisal, and the issue of what it means for an emotion to be “good” or “bad”, we conclude that the emotional world is much more complex than the simple categorization of valence allows. We then explore the question of polarity or emotional “opposites” (e.g., pleasure–pain, happy–sad) and reach a similar conclusion. Since emotions are considered to be multidimensional, what does the idea of polarity mean? By forcing the experience of emotion into such categorical boxes, researchers may be ignoring or misrepresenting the complexity and subtlety of the richness of human emotional life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Advances the thesis that emotions require abstract elicitors and flexible responses to examine the case of disgust. Definition of disgust; Discussion of emotions and assessments; How to transform drives into emotions.

Identifies the conditions that will produce blushing and proposes that such expression of emotion is contingent on the exposure of some topic that ought to remain hidden. Nature of hidden topics; Features of a blush; Descriptions of blushing taken largely from literary sources.

Presents abstracts of various articles featured in the March 2004 issue of the journal "Theory of Social Behavior." "What Happened to the "Social" in Social Psychology?"; "Cognition and Emotion? The Dead End in Self-Esteem Research"; "Language Games and Natural Reactions."

Investigates the role of emotions in moral judgements. Definition of emotions; View of theorists on emotions as detrimental to moral reasoning and moral judgement; Description of the dialectical interaction between empathy and moral beliefs; Discussion on the three objections-based theories of moral judgement.