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Despite repeated opportunities to reconsider their natural science ambitions, social psychologists have not done so, and there are no obvious signs of this changing. Why? This paper pursues an answer to this question by defining the field after the fashion of Michael Polanyi's thought. According to Polanyi, interpretative frameworks develop from our primitive bodily encounters with the world and then are shaped by language into the vast conceptual systems of our culture. Concerning frameworks erected on our most fundamental beliefs (e.g., science), he says that we "live in [them] as in the garment of our own skin." Frameworks such as this are not objects of critical evaluation but of commitment, and social psychology, as an outgrowth of positive philosophy, is an interpretative framework in this sense. Professionals' recent responses to the field's political makeup and replication failures demonstrate this. They aim primarily at preserving a natural science understanding of social psychology and point to the influence of belief‐stabilizing mechanisms Polanyi finds operative in folk religious practices. These mechanisms appear at work also in psychology as a whole. They are implied, for instance, in the field's resistance to Sigmund Koch's authoritative judgement against its scientific self‐conception in the latter half of the 20th century. Noting this reveals the broader implications of this paper's definition of social psychology, but it also urges questions about truth and relativity that cannot be ignored. These questions are addressed briefly in the end where it is suggested that what psychology needs most of all is a change of heart, and that this will happen, if at all, not primarily through argument and evidence, but through persons who authentically believe in the veracity of a different framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At the core of what makes humans, and their behaviour, social, is the interplay between self and other. Our identities, for example, are essential to our functioning as social beings as they allow us to make sense of ourselves, and others, across different contexts. We care about how others see us and achieving congruence between how we see ourselves, how we think relevant others see us, and indeed how relevant others actually see us in turn, becomes integral for achieving a positive sense of self. Therefore, humans require recognition from relevant others. This recognition can take many different forms, from legal recognition of one's rights in society, to social recognition of one's belonging to different groups. Moreover, the absence of recognition can lead to serious repercussions and consequences, resulting, on an individual level, in a reduced mode of being and feelings of exclusion, and on a social and political level, in tensions and conflict. The current special issue takes a multidisciplinary approach to contribute to the growing debates and discussions around the importance of understanding recognition and its role in social behaviour. As the introduction to this special issue, this paper argues that the concept of recognition enables a better understanding of how identification and belonging become entangled with power struggles and expressions of agency. Doing so leads us to conclude that a social psychology of identity and intra/intergroup relations which does not consider power relations, as bound up in processes of recognition and its denial, fails to consider the key processes and broader impact that exclusion, subtle or explicit, has on individuals' well‐being, belonging and ability to act in the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A serious consideration of pain has largely been absent in sociology, especially physical pain's close neurobiological relative, social pain. Social pain is the process by which rejection and exclusion recruits similar neural circuits as physical pain, generating an affectual response that mirrors the response one feels from physical trauma. Pain is essential to any sociological analysis of motivation and action because, like many affective responses, it is a necessary ingredient in cognition and behavior; and, in many cases, it preconsciously commands and even controls how we think and act. While exploring this concept, it becomes apparent that sociology has an entire set of distantly related concepts that can be classified as different processes of social pain that reveal the structural, cultural, and situational conditions shaping the distribution of social pain. The paper concludes by thinking through the implications social pain portends for neuroscience and sociology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Keywords: classical tolerance; democracy; identity politics; political freedom; postmodern tolerance EN classical tolerance democracy identity politics political freedom postmodern tolerance 237 241 5 06/24/22 20220601 NES 220601 INTRODUCTION In his paper "The meanings of tolerance", Maykel Verkuyten (2022) deals with the case of a student who posted comments on Facebook that expressed his disapproval of homosexuality and same sex marriage because it was considered a sin and abomination in his Christian belief. Classical tolerance, democracy, political freedom, postmodern tolerance, identity politics In his study Verkuyten distinguishes "classical tolerance" and a different, "modern" understanding of the term tolerance. CLASSICAL TOLERANCE Despite a long history of the term tolerance its traditional meaning can be summarized as follows: Classical tolerance is understood as enduring and putting up with issues one dislikes and even may disapprove of. [Extracted from the article]

The Affect Theory of Social Exchange (ATSE) research program has produced cumulative insights on how instrumental exchanges lead to the development of affectual attachments. With its focus on task responsibilities, ATSE leaves space to interrogate how factors not related to task execution are at play in the production of interpersonal bonds. In this paper, we integrate insights from social psychology, cultural sociology and organizational research to develop a theoretical framework suggesting (a) why and how cultural tastes contribute to social cohesion and (b) the conditions under which cultural tastes remain a source of strategic advantage or, worse, symbolic exclusion. Our theory rests on the basic proposition that shared cultural tastes increase the likelihood of experiencing positive emotions, which in turn are key in the development and maintenance of affectual attachments. Variations to this proposition are subsequently introduced, considering culture in declarative and nondeclarative forms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hence, Wachelke's ([12]) theoretical framework elaboration seems to be still halfway to the assumption and deployment of a true relational epistemological frame, hindering the possibilities of a real dialogue with the basic assumptions of SR theory and cultural psychology. Does social psychology need a new semiotic overarching framework for grasping social knowledge? Commentary on J. Wachelke: Semiosis, thought and codes: A theoretical framework for social knowledge. [Extracted from the article]

Consumer culture and neoliberal political economy are often viewed by social psychologists as topics reserved for anthropologists, economists, political scientists and sociologists. This paper takes an alternative view arguing that social psychology needs to better understand these two intertwined institutions as they can both challenge and provide a number of important insights into social psychological theories of self-identity and their related concepts. These include personality traits, self-esteem, social comparisons, self-enhancement, impression management, self-regulation and social identity. To illustrate, we examine how elements of consumer culture and neoliberal political economy intersect with social psychological concepts of self-identity through three main topics: 'the commodification of self-identity', 'social categories, culture and power relations' and the 'governing of self-regulating consumers'. In conclusion, we recommend a decommodified approach to research with the aim of producing social psychological knowledge that avoids becoming enmeshed with consumer culture and neoliberalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I argue that something important, and something social, is missing from contemporary accounts of social cognition, social neuroscience and evolutionary social psychology. Contemporary accounts of social cognition focus on cognition directed towards social objects, that is, towards persons and social groups. In contrast, early twentieth century accounts of socially engaged cognition focused upon beliefs and attitudes oriented to the represented beliefs and attitudes of members of social 'reference groups' and directed towards both social and non‐social objects. I argue that this earlier conception of socially engaged cognition should be integrated with contemporary research on social cognition, social neuroscience and evolutionary social psychology, since it poses a challenge but also an opportunity for these disciplines. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the field of psychology, the topic of everyday life as a specific subject of inquiry has been afforded little attention. Indeed, everyday life has recently been analyzed mainly in psychological studies that examine people's ways of behaving and thinking when they act in situations termed as mundane and ordinary. These studies are mainly carried out in two fields of social psychology which we refer to in general terms as Social Cognition and Social Representation Theory. The aim of this paper is to examine how both these fields treat some of the features commonly attributed to everyday life. In particular, the features of familiarization, continuity and stability over time and automaticity are discussed in order to try to figure out meeting points between the two fields mentioned. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper re-examines Kurt Lewin's classic leadership studies, using them as a concrete example to explore his wider legacy to social psychology. Lewin distinguished between advanced "Galileian" science, which was based on analysing particular examples, and backward "Aristotelian" science, which used statistical analyses. Close examination of the way Lewin wrote about the leadership studies reveals that he used the sort of binary, value-laden concepts that he criticised as "Aristotelian". Such concepts, especially those of "democracy" and "autocracy", affected the way that he analysed the results and the ways that later social scientists have understood, and misunderstood, the studies. It is argued that Lewin's famous motto--"there is nothing as practical as a good theory"--is too simple to fit the tensions between the leadership studies and his own views of what counts as good theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Accepting Cole's the premise that, 'cultural-inclusive psychology has been ... an elusive goal' (1996, pp. 7-8) but one worth striving to attain, I first set out to identify my domain of interest and competence as an intellectual. Deciding it to be social interaction between individuals, I then searched out theoretical approaches to this domain that encompassed as many approaches to this trans-historical concern that have emerged from cultural traditions bequeathing us their legacies. Doing this search comprehensively required me to move outside my Judeo- Christian, Greco- Roman, Renaissance heritage and its international diffusion via the European Empires since the 1500's, embodied most recently the American dominance of intellectual discourse since the Second World War. In my case, this journey has taken me in to Chinese culture and psychology where I have worked towards integrating the Chinese worldview and its psychological measures into the discipline of social psychology. Striving for a more inclusive culture-view, I am now using multi-cultural data bases to transcend this two-cultural focus and incorporate wider measures of cultural variation into our theorizing and empirical validation of universal models for social interaction. This paper describes my current procedures for such culture-mapping. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I describe the relevance of philosopher Peter Sloterdijk's (1998/2011) book Bubbles for social psychology. Bubbles offers the opportunity for the development of what I call a round social psychology. This is in contrast to the flatness characteristic of some of the more influential contemporary varieties of social psychology. Flat social psychology stays close to the ground, and is focused on the coordination of action. Round social psychology describes the atmosphere that surrounds and makes interaction possible in the first place. It requires a theory that links intersubjectivity with spatiality. To describe flat social psychology I analyze the assumptions of three contemporary versions of social psychology: social cognition theory, Goffman's dramaturgy, and Gergen's relational psychology. I then describe in greater detail Sloterdijk's bubble philosophy and the characteristics of round social psychology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Robert Michels and Alfred Schutz might not seem to have much in common. Michels was a political sociologist and Schütz was a philosopher of phenomenology, but they shared one crucial thing: they were both strangers in foreign countries. Michels left Germany for Italy and Switzerland because he was not permitted to complete the second degree necessary to teach at the university level while Schutz was compelled to leave Austria for France and the United States because of his Jewish background. Their experiences of trying to adapt in a foreign country prompted them to reflect on what it means to be "the stranger" ("Der Fremde"). Michels wrote "Materialien zu einer Soziologie des Fremden" in 1925 and Schutz published "The Stranger: An Essay in Social Psychology" in 1944. While Schutz' article has been repeatedly cited, there does not seem to be a study devoted to it. Michels' article remains among his most neglected writings. However, both works offer a theoretical and contextual account of the obstacles the stranger encounters when trying to understand and to acclimate oneself to a new environment. As Schutz noted, the stranger is a person "without a past", and Michels suggested, is also a person with an uncertain future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: McDonald, Gough, Wearing, and Deville (2017) call for the discipline of social psychology to investigate issues of neoliberalism, consumption and self‐identity more seriously. We make two contributions in relation to their analysis. First, we highlight some current issues associated with neoliberalism as a concept that leave us in doubt regarding the analytical usefulness of the term. Due to its imprecision and over‐extension, predominant association with the left who use it pejoratively, and altered economic circumstances, we are increasingly skeptical of neoliberalism's analytical validity to social psychology. Second, we also stress the importance of interdisciplinarity, but suggest that empirical insights from mainstream social psychology have much to offer social scientists concerned with how current economic developments impact upon self‐identity and social behaviour. We conclude by pointing out that a greater openness to heterodoxy within and between critical and mainstream strands and the wider social sciences are required if social psychologists are going to make more persuasive impacts to the study and resistance of market logic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Drawing on the dual process framework from social and cognitive psychology, this paper reconciles two distinct conceptualizations of trust prevalent in the literature: “rational” calculative and irrational “affective” or normative. After critically reviewing previous attempts at reconciliation between these distinctions, we argue that the notion of trust as “reliance” is the higher order category of which “deliberate trust” and “intuitive faith” are subtypes. Our revised approach problematizes the conflation of epistemic uncertainty with phenomenological uncertainty while providing sound footing for a key sociological insight: that reliance on the routine social order is both the cognitive default and based on substantial practical evidence. We develop two broad suggestions for future research from these implications: (1) sociological research should examine the role of intuitive faith—as opposed to deliberate trust—in late modern societies, and (2) analysts should challenge the role of deliberate trust as the “modal” form of reliance in contemporary research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By leveraging the case of Hindu sati, this paper elucidates the ways in which structure and culture condition suicidal behavior by way of social psychological and emotional dynamics. Conventionally, sati falls under Durkheim's discussion of altruistic suicides, or the self-sacrifice of underindividuated or excessively integrated peoples like widows in traditional societies. In light of the fact that Durkheim's interpretation was based on uneven data, nineteenth century Eurocentric beliefs, and a theoretical framework that can no longer resist modification and elaboration, by reconsidering sati it is possible to sketch a new model that strengthens Durkheim's theory by making it more robust and generalizable. The following model is built on five principles. First, integration and regulation are not distinct causal forces, but overlapping contextual conditions. Second, to better explain the variation in suicidality across time and space, we must also pay attention to culture as it provides the underlying meanings of suicide that can increase the odds a person or class of persons become suicidal or are protected against suicidality. Third, structure still matters, but in many cases, the role power and power-differentials play must be considered. Fourth, understanding why and how people choose suicide depends on incorporating identity and status processes. Fifth, because the expression of social emotions like shame are patterned by structural and cultural conditions, to understand how suicidality is socioculturally patterned we must further explore the link between identity/status, social emotions, and structure and culture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social representations research is often undertaken by scholars who seek to 'give voice' to knowledge(s) that are held by socially disenfranchised individuals and groups. However, this endeavour poses a number of problems in practice, not least because it assumes that the 'voices' voiced by individuals and/or groups in social research will be unambiguous and uniform, and unchanged by the research encounter. Despite the growth of attention to the critical potential of social representations theory, there remains a lack of scholarship on the relationship between the theory's emphasis on the relational, or dialogical, nature of social life (the Ego-Alter-Object relation) and the implications of this for critical research. In this article, I argue that the dialogical epistemology from which social representations research must depart incites reflection upon (i) the design of empirical studies, which must equally attend to both 'Ego' and 'Alter', and (ii) the researcher-researched relationship, which may itself be best viewed as an Ego-Alter interaction. I make the case for adopting dialogical epistemology in critical social psychology, and argue that this is essential to undertaking ethical social research. I conclude by suggesting that claims to 'giving voice' have little place in critical social psychology in general, and social representations scholarship in particular. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I present a theoretical social psychological framework for social knowledge based mainly on the triadic concept of sign relations and the process of semiosis. The framework is based on concepts from authors aligned with interpretative semiotic approaches, such as Peirce, Deely and Eco. After defining signs and sign relations, I propose to conceive social knowledge as sign relations happening in communication processes, and employ the notion of code to account for socially shared group conventions. I suggest that the analysis of code properties such as content, social acknowledgment and history can identify differences in social knowledge forms and the concrete contexts that sustain them. The framework is discussed in comparison with other social and cultural psychological approaches based on semiosis. Finally, methodological implications are commented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite wide acceptance that replications across operationalizations and contexts is positive for psychology, the present goal is to suggest a more nuanced view that sometimes successful replications can be to the detriment of progress in psychology. The present manuscript distinguishes between replication in two idealized universes. In one such universe, the only difference between original and replication studies is randomness. In the other such universe, there are systematic differences between original and replication studies. Of course, replication in the real universe is subject to both randomness and systematicity. Although it is desirable to maximize, to the extent feasible, the probability of replication in the idealized universe where only random effects differ between original and replication studies; this may or may not be so with respect to systematicity. An important factor that determines the desirability of replications in the context of systematic differences pertains to auxiliary assumptions. A famous crisis in social psychology, with respect to the influence of attitudes on behaviors, illustrates the relevance of auxiliary assumptions in the replication context where there is serious consideration of systematic likeness or unlikeness between original and replication studies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Stereotypes is one of the most researched topics in social psychology. Within this context, negative self‐stereotypes pose a particular challenge for theories. In the current work, we propose a model that suggests that negative self‐stereotypes can theoretically be accounted for by the need to communicate in a social system made up by groups with unequal power. Because our theory is dynamic, probabilistic, and interactionist, we use a computational simulation technique to show that the proposed model is able to reproduce the phenomenon of interest, to provide novel accounts of related phenomena, and to suggest novel empirical predictions. We describe our computational model, our variables' dynamic behavior and interactions, and link our analyses to the literature on stereotypes and self‐stereotypes, the stability of stereotypes (in particular, gender and racial stereotypes), the effects of power asymmetries, and the effects of intergroup contact. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents the author's perspectives on the article "The implications of dialogicality for giving voice in social representations research," by Sophie Zadeh. She mentions that Zadeh argues that in spite much research on giving voice to socially disenfranchised groups and individuals, many are imbued with difficulties, which are mostly because of the lack of scholarship in association with epistemoological foundations of social representations' theory and dialogical communication.

Based on an analysis of ten popular introductions to social psychology, we will show that Karl Popper's philosophy of 'critical rationalism' so far has had little to no traceable influence on the epistemology and practice of social psychology. If Popper is quoted or mentioned in the textbooks at all, the guiding principle of 'falsificationism' is reduced to a mere 'falsifiability' and some central elements of critical rationalism are left out - those that are incompatible with positivism and inductivism. Echoing earlier attempts to introduce Popper to social psychology by Paul Meehl and Tom Pettigrew, we will argue that a discussing Popper's ideas in more depth could help social psychology to move forward in view of the 'crisis of confidence' (Pashler and Wagenmakers, 2012) that has emerged recently in view of the 'Stapel affair' and the reports of failures to replicate social psychological experiments in high-powered replication attempts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since its inception, experimental social psychology has arguably been of two minds about the nature and role of theory. Contemporary social psychology's experimental approach has been strongly informed by the 'nomological-deductive' approach of Carl Hempel in tandem with the 'hypothetico-deducive' approach of Karl Popper. Social psychology's commitment to this hybrid model of science has produced at least two serious obstacles to more fruitful theorizing about human experience: (1) the problem of situational specificity, and (2) the manifest impossibility of formulating meaningful general laws of human social behavior. It is argued that a social psychology based on the search for this kind of lawfulness, under the auspices of either a strict or loose interpretation of the largely Hempelian model, is ultimately unworkable. An alternative approach to social psychology that is attentive both to the need for understanding individual situations and behaviors and to the need for generalized understanding of actual human behaviors is offered. This approach is grounded in the hermeneutic tradition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The sociology of violence still struggles with two critical questions: What motivates people to act violently on behalf of groups and how do they come to identify with the groups for which they act? Methodologically the article addresses these puzzling problems in favor of a relational sociology that argues against both micro- and macro-reductionist accounts, while theoretically it proposes a twofold reorientation: first, it makes a plea for the so called cognitive turn in social theory; second, it proposes following praxeological accounts of social action that focus on the dynamic interpenetration of cognition and socio-cultural practices. The argument is that symbolic boundaries constitute the 'missing link' that allows for overcoming the micro-macro gap in violence research: Symbolic boundaries can cause people's participation in collective violence by providing the essential relational resources for violent action and by triggering the cognitive/affective mechanisms necessary for social actors to become drawn into mobilization processes that can cause their engaging in coordinated attacks on sites across the boundary. The article offers a new theoretical argument by drawing on knowledge from violence research, social action theory and cognitive science allowing for a non-reductionist theory of action that explains how and why people engage in collective violence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]