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Despite repeated opportunities to reconsider their natural science ambitions, social psychologists have not done so, and there are no obvious signs of this changing. Why? This paper pursues an answer to this question by defining the field after the fashion of Michael Polanyi's thought. According to Polanyi, interpretative frameworks develop from our primitive bodily encounters with the world and then are shaped by language into the vast conceptual systems of our culture. Concerning frameworks erected on our most fundamental beliefs (e.g., science), he says that we "live in [them] as in the garment of our own skin." Frameworks such as this are not objects of critical evaluation but of commitment, and social psychology, as an outgrowth of positive philosophy, is an interpretative framework in this sense. Professionals' recent responses to the field's political makeup and replication failures demonstrate this. They aim primarily at preserving a natural science understanding of social psychology and point to the influence of belief‐stabilizing mechanisms Polanyi finds operative in folk religious practices. These mechanisms appear at work also in psychology as a whole. They are implied, for instance, in the field's resistance to Sigmund Koch's authoritative judgement against its scientific self‐conception in the latter half of the 20th century. Noting this reveals the broader implications of this paper's definition of social psychology, but it also urges questions about truth and relativity that cannot be ignored. These questions are addressed briefly in the end where it is suggested that what psychology needs most of all is a change of heart, and that this will happen, if at all, not primarily through argument and evidence, but through persons who authentically believe in the veracity of a different framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to discern, clarify, criticise, and advocate some uses of phenomenology in sociological research. Phenomenology is increasingly evoked or implicitly employed in sociological endeavours. Little attention, however, is paid to what is entailed in taking a phenomenological approach, and whether it is employed to advance empirical or theoretical knowledge. I build an analytic typology of different empirical and theoretical uses of phenomenology, criticise a range of these uses, and argue that other uses bear significant potential for the advancement of theoretical and empirical knowledge. The paper's main contribution lies in comparing and contrasting the many invocations of phenomenology in contemporary social scientific research to discern their benefits and shortcomings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At the core of what makes humans, and their behaviour, social, is the interplay between self and other. Our identities, for example, are essential to our functioning as social beings as they allow us to make sense of ourselves, and others, across different contexts. We care about how others see us and achieving congruence between how we see ourselves, how we think relevant others see us, and indeed how relevant others actually see us in turn, becomes integral for achieving a positive sense of self. Therefore, humans require recognition from relevant others. This recognition can take many different forms, from legal recognition of one's rights in society, to social recognition of one's belonging to different groups. Moreover, the absence of recognition can lead to serious repercussions and consequences, resulting, on an individual level, in a reduced mode of being and feelings of exclusion, and on a social and political level, in tensions and conflict. The current special issue takes a multidisciplinary approach to contribute to the growing debates and discussions around the importance of understanding recognition and its role in social behaviour. As the introduction to this special issue, this paper argues that the concept of recognition enables a better understanding of how identification and belonging become entangled with power struggles and expressions of agency. Doing so leads us to conclude that a social psychology of identity and intra/intergroup relations which does not consider power relations, as bound up in processes of recognition and its denial, fails to consider the key processes and broader impact that exclusion, subtle or explicit, has on individuals' well‐being, belonging and ability to act in the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Major paradigms in sociology and social sciences usually embrace either individualism or anti‐individualism as fundamental worldview. This paper explores a third way between individualism and anti‐individualism developed by German sociologist Niklas Luhmann in his systems theory. Luhmann treats actors or individuals as psychic systems and he distinguishes them from social systems. In a nutshell, social systems produce communication, whereas psychic systems produce consciousness. In line with anti‐individualism, Luhmann therefore argues that social systems are irreducible to psychic systems and their actions. On the other hand, Luhmann joins ranks with individualism to assert that psychic systems are not rigorously constrained by social systems. Ultimately, Luhmann explains that social systems and psychic systems are part of each other's environment and that each type of systems provides the ecological conditions that the other type depends on to emerge and grow. To discuss this third way between individualism and anti‐individualism, the paper examines more specifically two central points in Luhmann's theory: (1) how social systems and psychic systems are separated from each other, and (2) how social systems and psychic systems are coevolving. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the nexus between contingency, social engagement and change, through investigating the potential of severe ("disruptive") contingency to bring about new forms of joint agency. By challenging Boltanski's notion of existential tests (which can only be experienced in isolation), the paper argues that social actors can experience disruptive contingent events in an inherently intersubjective manner. Although they severely hinder social interaction, disruptive contingent events enable a possibility of what might be called "negative common knowledge" between social actors which in turn renders certain societal norms meaningless. This possibility is mediated through processes of mutual engagement (calls between actors) that could, further, be transformed into a new "norm circle" (Dave Elder‐Vass). Social domination – in particular its "complex" variety – in this context appears as the obstructing of such transformation. A recent political episode in Serbia is analyzed to demonstrate the emancipatory potential of contingency and the logic of complex domination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Connecting the critical realist morphogenetic model to insights made by Nicholas Rescher, this paper argues that our predictions are always subject to chance and contingency but nevertheless ineluctably useful for both practical and scientific inquiry. Contingency results from the causal openness of the world, including the causal openness of our own decision‐making. On the other hand, as Rescher notes, human interaction would fail without a degree of stability, which makes the predictions of morphostatic relations if not lawlike at least predictable in a practical sense. Nor is it just habit that makes for morphostasis. Human agents strive reflectively to produce in morphostatic ways the human goods they have created by their interaction. And beyond individual actors, there is, from the critical realist point of view, the combined effects of structure and culture inclining at least in the short‐term to reliably predictable if not lawlike outcomes. With that background, the paper reflects on the dual role of coincidence in social theory, on the one hand signalling contingency and the other on what, according to the active causal mechanisms, generally co‐occur. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines Durkheim's relationship to realism. I argue that there is enough prima facie evidence of realist commitments in his work that our task should be to consider what kind of realist Durkheim was. I discuss, first of all, Durkheim's epistemics and follow that analysis with a discussion of metaphysical realism in his texts. The first part of the paper covers a wide range of his work; the second part focuses primarily on The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. In a final concluding section, I go on to consider how his epistemic arguments and his philosophical realism might work together to support important parts of his general sociology. Realism is not often brought to bear on Durkheim's work. When it has been, Durkheim has been identified as a naïve realist. These interpretations of Durkheim do not recognize the sophistication of contemporary realism, which does not reduce to naïve representationalism. This paper will sort out Durkheim's realist commitments in his texts, and in light of the variety of realisms consistent with "sophisticated" (that is, non‐naïve) realism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discussions on the body frequently foreground in empirical studies of social representations. However, there is scarce theoretical literature within social representations theory focusing on embodied social representation. This paper aims to contribute to the understanding of embodied, sensory experiences as part of social representation. More precisely, it attempts to elaborate how individual, social, bodily, and material layers work together in embodied social representation. This paper approaches the topic from four viewpoints: (1) social representation as action, (2) phenomenology, (3) embodied and socially situated cognition, and (4) sensory epistemologies and sensescapes. These approaches are used to provide insight into the conscious and unconscious processes of social representation and the multimodality of social representation. The paper contributes to the understanding of the role of sensory experiences and embodiment in the theory of social representations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some philosophical and psychological approaches to social interaction posit a powerful explanatory tool for explaining how we navigate social situations: scripts. Scripts tell people how to interact in different situational and cultural contexts depending on social roles such as gender. A script theory of social interaction puts emphasis on understanding the world as normatively structured. Social structures place demands, roles, and ways to behave in the social world upon us, which, in turn, guide the ways we interact with one another and the ways we coordinate our behaviors. In this paper, I explore the phenomenon of coordinated behaviors in social interactions in humans. I argue that looking closely at everyday interactions, for which social coordination is central, strongly points to a fundamental role of scripts for social cognition and interaction. In order to explain some social interactions, like those based on social coordination, we do not need to recourse to mental state attribution. Rather, I argue, scripts are a powerful resource for explaining social interaction and especially coordinated behaviors. Scripts have been neglected in standard approaches to social cognition but are (re‐)gaining attention via the normative turn in social cognition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Heritage sites and places are often mobilized to represent a group's identity and sense of place and belonging. This paper will illustrate how heritage and museum visiting, as a leisure activity, facilitates or impedes recognition and redistribution in direct and indirect ways. Drawing on extensive qualitative interviews with visitors to 45 heritage sites and museums in the USA, Australia, and England, the paper demonstrates the importance of emotions in mundane struggles over recognition and misrecognition. How emotions uphold or challenge investments in heritage narratives are examined. The paper argues that heritage and heritage‐making is a valuable focus of analysis that reveals the nuances of how people sustain or impede claims for recognition and redistribution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I reinterpret the classic concept of order position, as well as privilege and discrimination in the concept and types of order position. In the first part of the paper, I give a short survey of the classic conception of order position, with special regard to Max Weber's concept of social status or order position. In the second part, I define the concept of order position in my conception. Accordingly, order position is the real institutional position of the given individual (or group) as compared to the institutional position that can be occupied by the given individual (or group) in the general social institutional norm system assumed on the basis of the expressed values, especially the deviation between the two positions as related to the interests of the subject. In the third part, I typify order positions from the aspect of whether the institutional norm system that is valid or realized in reality deviates or does not deviate from the assumed general norm system, and if it does, whether it deviates in a direction corresponding or contrary to the interests of the individuals. In this way, I make a distinction between privileged, normativized and degraded order positions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Efforts to challenge mental health-related stigma have been limited by an insufficient conceptualization of the problem space. As is common in health communication, practitioners have neglected the multiple tacit understandings the public embody in everyday life. Using the example of our recent research into the public’s social representations of mental health and illness, in this paper, we will work through the theoretical-methodological considerations involved in how we approached expanding the problem space. Using social theory, we tailored thematic analysis and natural language processing techniques to examine the public’s polyphasic sense-making processes. The approach is novel, as it diverges from standard methods in understanding health communication and the possibilities for behaviour change. Instead, we root our approach in a dynamic and relational epistemology to iteratively reveal in greater complexity some of the contents and processes that sustain mental health-related stigma. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I examine what it means for culture, in both its personal and public forms, to be implicit. I begin by considering a recent attempt to develop a descriptive taxonomy of other people's views of practices developed by Stephen Turner. A key result is that a specific combination of claims about the properties of practices yields an ontologically problematic category, which is a candidate for elimination. Following Turner's lead, I provide my own refurbished taxonomy of practical culture that does not contain ontologically problematic members. Another key result of the initial analysis is that implicitness is a relational property presupposing at least one agent with awareness (or unawareness) of the cultural element in question. This epistemic dependence implies that only personal culture internalized by people can be coherently thought of as 'implicit' (to them). Finally, I conclude that using mentalistic versions of implicitness to characterize public culture, such as texts, language, monuments, tools, and classifications on paper, yields the same ontologically incoherent category eliminated in the first step. Following from this, I argue that it is desirable to conceptualize 'implicit' in a way that makes sense for public culture without stirring up the ghosts of collective minds and related conundrums. I propose one such (weak) version of implicitness when speaking of public culture that does not run afoul of this issue. I then return to personal culture, considering whether 'implicitness' is a unitary property of this kind, answering in the negative. This conclusion requires us to develop a principled taxonomy of the distinct ways personal culture can be ‘implicit,’ yielding personal culture that is implicit because it acquired 'automatic' status, versus personal culture that is implicit because it lacks (access) consciousness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social and human sciences have demonstrated again and again how commensality—the practice of eating together—has substantial implications, across time and place, for how social life is configured. Closely related phenomena have also been explored in biologically oriented sciences focused on human behavior. Yet, there is still little dialogue between these and the mainstream social science analysis of food and eating, despite their shared interests in the role played by food and eating in the organization of social life. The paper strengthens this dialogue and proposes that eating together be analyzed as a social tool: an innovation for the organization of complex behavior. More precisely, the proposition is that the habitual, routinized, and ritualized communal eating we see today developed into a social tool for exercising a diverse set of biologically evolved social traits. Through in‐depth analyses of food sharing, meal sharing, and feasting, I propose three distinct propositions of commensality as a social tool: social coordination of needs (mainly nutritional); social order and complex interaction (primarily conversations); and the symbolic display of stratified social relations. Understanding communal eating as a social tool thus opens up for a unified theory to explain seemingly disparate social phenomena, such as the underlying sociality displayed through different meal arrangements. For a thorough understanding of this, intensified conversations across the borders of scientific paradigms are required. Commensality is a social tool that satisfies both the social and biological appetites. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social scientists often treat the commodity form and commodity fetishism as concepts that reduce meaning to an economic base. The paper claims that this view is misguided and, furthermore, that these concepts enable us to formulate a dynamic approach to meaning in economic life. Building on recent discussions of commodity fetishism, I outline this dynamic approach to meaning and the commodity form. This approach demands attention to three issues: (1) the distinction between interpretations‐in exchange and interpretations‐of exchange; (2) how interpretations‐of exchange relate to interpretations‐in exchange; and (3) how status hierarchies can mediate this dynamic of meaning associated with the commodity form. In explaining these issues, I draw on a range of examples that illustrate their relevance to the organization of the capitalist world. The purpose is to illustrate that we can discuss meaning and the commodity form in a non‐reductive manner, and in so doing draw distinct strands of social scientific investigation into conversation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Emergence is central to critical realism, but there has been little attempt to develop a systematic account of this concept within the tradition. Two notable exceptions are seen in the work of Dave Elder‐Vass and Tony Lawson. However, both face problems in responding to reductionist claims and accounting for downward causation. This paper proposes contextual emergence as a robust alternative that overcomes these issues and provides a better justification for critical realism's stratified worldview. Contextual emergence explains that while properties at a lower 'level' offer necessary conditions, for emergence to obtain, there must also be contingent conditions at a higher 'level'. This approach maintains many of critical realism's intuitions about emergence, providing a robust account of ontological stratification and downward causation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a gap between concern about environmental degradation such as climate change and effective action taken against the forces that drive degradation. This paper argues that real helplessness, a social condition producing powerless, stupefied, and repressed actors, is a fortified barrier between climate concern and effective climate action. Political‐economic analysis has theoretical and methodological implications for environmental social science and helps explain a current conundrum in critical sociology: Why are alternatives to a system that drives climate change and other catastrophic risks still seen as unrealistic? We suffer from a political‐economic system impervious to transformation before we suffer from a lack of alternative ideas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I attempt to shed more light in Bourdieu's habitus and doxa, by drawing on phenomenological and Bourdieusian‐based literature, social theory and some findings from sociological research. Despite the fact that there is a vast work concerning the examination of these two concepts, there are still some misunderstandings about them. For that reason, I have tried to draw a clearer picture of habitus, by linking it with phenomenological "being‐in‐the‐world" and describing its elements. As for doxa, I discuss its conceptual relation with habitus and phenomenology's natural attitude. Also, attention is given to some aspects of both habitus and doxa, which have not addressed in detailed fashion yet, but they are nevertheless theoretically useful for empirical qualitative research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper proposes an alternative approach to the ontology of social institutions by systematizing various normative institutional influences and identifying processes that distinguish between conforming and violating behaviour. The prevailing – cost‐based model – suggests that an agent's conformity to a specific institutional rule can be represented by a single measure – cost. The model is limited in its explanatory potential since it accounts for varieties of institutional behaviour in terms of single parametrical changes in the agents' utilities. The central argument shows that normative attitudes represent a distinctive normative structure capable of explaining crucial aspects of institutional behaviour. These attitudinal aspects provide the structure necessary for understanding institutional normativity and its violations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper applies methodological relationalism, leaning on a pragmatist theory of action of classical Deweyan origin, supplemented among other things with Alva Noë's enactivism, to analyze the development of communication technologies as a part of human cultural evolution. Tool‐use and technologies are understood as skillful human activities that form hubs of organized activity in developed human communities. Appreciating the quite slow pace of evolution, the article adopts, all told, a two million year time frame. Six epochs of cultural evolution are distinguished, linked to the introduction of communication tools and technologies as skillful human activities that serve the members of growing communities in the ecological niche at hand. The first two epochs arose from forms of communication serving local, small‐sized hunter‐gatherer bands; the second couple arose with technologies apt for building nation‐wide communities and culture; and the latest two have been propelled by global communication networks, having an impact on billions of people. Finally, certain peculiarities of the presently unfolding World Wide Web epoch, connected in particular to this era's exceptionally efficient behavior modification, are compared with earlier epochs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we attempt to rehabilitate the notion of role by linking sociological role theory to recent work on motivational, affective, and cognitive neuroscience specifying the internal mechanisms behind motivated action. We argue that there is nothing inherently problematic or retrogressive in the idea of "role," once its link to a purely normative account of motivated action is severed. Instead, by conceptualizing roles as emerging and persisting around structured reward systems, we are able to incorporate contemporary motivational science such that rewards become the proximate causal mechanisms currently missing in role theory. Consequently, a key implication of our argument is that the best way to link role, action, and structures is by reviving the idea of institutions as literal reward systems, which allows us to envision roles as the mechanisms via which the pursuit and delivery of rewards and goal‐objects are routinized. Implications for a motivational theory of roles, rewards, and institutions is discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philosophy of social science (PoS) typologies can help practitioners in the social sciences to reflect upon the often‐tacit assumptions embedded in research. Existing PoS typologies however suffer from various shortcomings, one of them being a tendency to present extreme versions of the assumptions underpinning research. Having considered this and other shortcomings, the present paper advances a flexible PoS typology. Operating with strong and moderated versions of three PoS perspectives – positivism, constructionism and (critical) realism – the typology captures key assumptions underpinning a broad range of contemporary social research. Moreover, it opens up the possibility of contemplating the assumptions embedded in research in a more fruitful way. To render tangible how the typology constitutes an improvement over existing typologies, it is used in reflections on sustainability research on climate negotiations, green growth and housing development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are several theses in political science that are usually explicitly called 'laws'. Other theses are generally thought of as laws, but often without being explicitly labelled as such. Still other claims are well‐supported and arguably interesting, while no one would be tempted to call them laws. This situation raises philosophical questions: which theses deserve to be called laws and which not? And how should we decide about this? In this paper we develop and motivate a strategy for thinking about laws in political science which integrates two core concepts: spatio‐temporal stability and social mechanisms. The proposed strategy is a set of guidelines that political scientists can use to reflect on and argue about specific cases within their discipline, not a clear‐cut demarcation criterion. We defend and motivate this strategy and apply it to two cases (one with respect to state repression, one about parliamentary elections). After we have developed and motivated our strategy for political science, we show that our proposal is relevant for other disciplines in the social sciences. We explain how our views fit into critical realism and embed them in the debate on laws in general philosophy of science and in the philosophy of the social sciences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bourdieu's concept of habitus relies heavily on insights from phenomenology, yet his theoretical effort falls short of existing phenomenological solutions to the problems of cognition, agency, and reflexivity in social action. These shortcomings are evident in the analytical and descriptive failures of the concept of habitus documented by critics. Turning to the work of Alfred Schutz, this paper offers his concept of pragma, meaning context, and theory of relevances as an alternative way to describe the embodied and temporal nature of social action and accounting for social determinations. The paper further parses out key differences between Schutz's social phenomenological understanding of embodied action and Bourdieu's habitus, including differences in understanding schemas of standardization and their relation with objectivities of the social world. The paper ends with a call for a critical reassessment of Schutz's social phenomenology, with potentially wide ranging implications not only for understandings of agency, but also of meaning and the constitution of objectivities of the social world, as well the underlying interpretive method of social science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper brings the thought of philosopher and world‐class chemist Michael Polanyi to bear on psychologists' study of honor cultures. After reviewing some fundamentals of Polanyi's outlook on science and persons, the paper develops a heuristic involving two dimensions to the process of knowing others—one that is integrative, another that is affective—in which seeing with honor cultures only characterizes one side of the intersection between these dimensions. This leads on to consideration of the Honor Ideology for Manhood scale (Barnes, Brown, & Osterman, 2012), an operationalization of honor in the southern U.S. that misses understanding because of impairments it naturally suffers as an instrument of detachment. The possibility follows that understanding as seeing with another culture most readily succeeds when that culture's way of life is personally indwelt so that the psychologist directly encounters what its members can speak of and only convey by showing. The distinction Polanyi makes between explicit and tacit knowledge informs this proposal, and his vision of apprenticing—such as occurs between masters and pupils in the training of a science or an art—is presented as an exemplary form of such encounters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses a key moment in the development of sociology when its status as a science was criticised from within by ethnomethodologists (Harvey Sacks and Harold Garfinkel), post‐Althusserian Marxists (Barry Hindess) and Michel Foucault. These criticisms seemed to come from different sides, but they converged in arguing their positions from the point of view of a proper conception of science through which mainstream sociology was found wanting. Neither secured its own position and each had a similar legacy of a form of interpretivism hostile both to scientific sociology and its critical project. The paper situates this moment and its legacy where both correspondence and coherence criteria for sociological knowledge claims come to be undermined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to organize and classify cultural dimensions within and across six widely‐employed cultural frameworks by relying on modernization theory and the human development perspective. The study adopts a 4‐stage approach. In stage 1, the cultural dimensions in each framework are dichotomized. In stage 2, using Aristotelian categories, cultural dimensions are divided into meaningful hierarchical categories based on their essential features. In stage 3, cultural dimensions are organized according to modernization theory and human development perspective. In stage 4, the inter‐correlations are calculated, and an integrative model of cultural dimensions is proposed. The paper offers insights into the dynamics of cultural values and discusses the relationship between culture, social change, human development, and modernization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides a conceptual account of Pierre Bourdieu's operational concept of habitus through the lens of social recognition. More precisely, a 'habitus of recognition', or 'recognitive habitus', is defined as a set of perceptive patterns and expectations whose main function is to actualize social behaviour that allows reciprocal recognition among social agents. In this respect, this paper explains why, thanks to the recognition paradigm, we can better grasp how habitus works as a pre‐reflective common sense capable of producing coordinated collective actions and social reproduction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Choices made under risk appear to differ depending on whether the decision problem is presented as an explicit description or experienced by subjects through a series of choices and outcomes. The difference, labeled the description‐experience gap (DEG), has attracted a fair amount of attention and generated a substantial body of research. Alongside important insights gained, noticeably (and puzzlingly) absent from this literature are emotions – a feature more pertinent to actual experience than to mere description of events, thus potentially a source of difference in decisions observed in these two conditions. Even though emotions are considered a hallmark of experience, existing studies concerned with various aspects of DEG do not seem to address this facet of the question. This paper suggests the possibility that emotions comprise an important factor contributing to DEG. Theoretical considerations and relevant empirical evidence of decision‐making guided by emotions are reviewed to support the proposed hypothesis. General perspective, directions for future research, and possible caveats are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the gradual evolution of the French Régulation school (FR) for the study of capitalism through the lens of structure and agency. The analysis first segments the school into two epochs, the early Régulation, led by authors Aglietta and Lipietz, and the later Régulation, which saw the rise of Boyer. We find that the gradual progression that occurred within the FR school is linked to its authors' implicit ontic engagement with structure and agency, which, in turn, provides natural linkages to Critical Realism. In the second part of the paper, we demonstrate how the comparison between Morphogenetic Régulation and French Régulation (FR) can facilitate a much deeper reading of the structure‐agency debate pertaining to the transformation of capitalism. In so doing, it discusses the value addedness of Morphogenetic Régulation through three specific concepts by stressing their relevance for contemporary studies in international political economy. These concepts are: stratified emergence; causality and the problématique of hierarchy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper re‐examines a key feature of Emile Durkheim's sociology of knowledge from a critical realist perspective. It is argued that Durkheim's attempt to establish a social basis for the categories in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life should be understood along ontological rather than epistemological lines. This brings to light new problems with the argument which, however, can be brought fruitfully into contact with the more recent social psychological literature on collective intentionality. This yields insights into future lines of inquiry into social cognition and theories of human conceptualizing capacities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To understand social issues and practices such as those related to climate change and technological change that are clearly future‐oriented – collectively experienced events that are "not yet" – and co‐constructed by different actors, we need nuanced conceptualizations of how people think about, negotiate and co‐create futures that allow us to understand not only what people (can) think and do about future‐related issues but also how that happens, what for and with which implications. However, so far, one of the key theoretical approaches that has conceptualised how people make meaning in situations of change and uncertainty – the socio‐psychological social representations theory (SRT) – has not often engaged with the future or with different forms of temporality. By contrast, the French pragmatic sociology of engagements and critique (PS) has engaged with these notions, conceptualising them in relation to materiality and a plurality of moral orientations – two dimensions often seen as key to how collective futures are made and imagined. To offer a more nuanced and systematic conceptualization of how people represent the future and with what consequences, this paper will present, compare and synthesise SRT and PS, as a first step towards an interdisciplinary research agenda on social change and representations of the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sociologists tend to see G. H. Mead's conceptualization of self as fundamentally correct. In this paper, we develop a critique of Mead's notion of the self as constituted through social interactions. Our focus will be on Mead's categorial distinction between the socially constructed self and subjective experience, as well as on the tendency of post‐Meadian sociologists to push Mead's position in ever more radical directions. Drawing inspiration from a multifaceted understanding of selfhood that can be found in Husserlian phenomenology, we then propose that the most basic level of selfhood is anchored in irreducible subjective experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the nature of bank money on two complementary levels. The first level deals with theoretical considerations. Here, the departure point is Social Positioning Theory, which provides a framework to investigate the nature of money. Within the theory, the paper situates bank money in credit‐debt relations, that are themselves integral part of a wider productive‐consumptive nexus of the economy. In this perspective, bank money is the relation, accounting economic positions of participating members, resulting from their economic activities realized within the context of the overall society. The second level uses the methods of Oral History and Memory Studies and, through semi‐structured interviews, provides empirical material illustrating ideas about the nature of money in a specific historical form. The article thus explores the contrasting experiences of banking in the context of a centrally planned economy and banking in the transformation to a market economy. These two contrasting episodes are illustrative because of the significant change in the form of bank money, which brings to light various aspects of its nature. Moreover, the article utilizes interviews that present the lived experience of bankers with years of involvement in the sector, enriching the perspective on the issue under study. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper offers a theoretical analysis of Self‐Determination Theory (SDT) and its claims regarding human autonomy. Self‐determination theorists have advanced a form of self‐regulated, engaged behavior (i.e., autonomy), founded upon on a consilient account of human motivation that assumes multiple, hierarchical levels of organization and causation (e.g., biological, psychological, and social). Autonomy, from this perspective, is taken to emerge from underlying biological mechanisms, but also able to exert its own causal effects in the world as a unique psychological phenomenon. We contend that in theorizing this way, self‐determination theorists have invoked a mixed discourse of mechanism and autonomy that leaves important questions unanswered, perhaps most importantly those concerning how autonomy as a kind of volition can fit coherently in the mechanistic account of world that they advocate. We then offer an alternative perspective based upon the work of various hermeneutic‐phenomenological thinkers in philosophy and psychology. This alternative perspective conceptualizes human phenomena such as autonomy and motivation in agentic terms, emphasizing meaningful participation in possibility‐laden contexts of everyday practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a widely accepted conception that institutions are norm systems or norm‐guided practices. Opening this conception itself to discussion, the paper initially discusses a group of concepts, such as norm, power, practice, structure, etc., that are related to the definition of institution. Following the discussion, it focuses on the possibility of understanding institutions as spaces. Finally, the paper suggests that institutions mediate ontologically between structure and agency within a framework developed with a critical‐realist approach, and formulates the two sides of this mediation (structure‐institution and institution‐agency) as two spatialities. While the institution as a topos corresponds to a ground on which social structures materialize their causal powers, the institution as a locus manifests itself as a place where agents reproduce and/or transform with their strategic and dispositional actions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The topic of subjectivity has been treated peripherally by philosophy. It has appeared in philosophy not as a specific human phenomenon, but attached to other concepts without specifying its ontological definition, such as intersubjectivity, the place of the Other in the emergence of the self, consciousness and so forth. This paper reconstructs some of the overlooked moments and ideas of several classical philosophers, such as Marx, Dewey, Merleau Ponty, Cassirer and Foucault, in order to identify in their works important antecedents to advance a different concept of subjectivity. The concepts and questions which are raised by those philosophers and which are revived in this paper have remained overlooked both by philosophy and psychology because of the lack of any representation of subjectivity capable of making them more visible. The ontological monopoly of language and discourse in explaining all human phenomena, taken together with the critique of theoretical systems and of epistemology, has found in social constructionism its strongest expression in psychology. The value of theoretical systems in generating intelligibility about complex and configurational phenomena is recovered, along with the need to develop new epistemologies capable of generating intelligibility on such systems. Finally, I argue that a new theoretical and epistemological avenue is opened up for the development of psychological thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Performativity has been one of the most dynamic research programmes in the last few decades that has sought to move beyond conventional, positivistic understandings of science. This paper interrogates the central premise of performativity – that science makes rather than describes its phenomena – through a critical analysis of the hugely influential performativity turn in economic sociology. The paper argues that while the performativity turn has importantly highlighted how economic theory shapes economic practices, its conflation of economic theory and its objects of analysis renders it unable to recognize economic processes that are not identified by economic models themselves. To address this limitation, this paper then proposes an alternative account, representation as intervention, that retains the critical impulse of exploring how economic models reshape economic life without conflating theories and their objects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: This paper addresses the question what the fundamental nature and mode of being of institutional reality is. Besides the recent debate with Tony Lawson, Barry Smith is also one of the relatively few authors to have explicitly challenged John Searle's social ontology on this metaphysical question, with Smith's realism requirement for institutions conflicting with Searle's requirement of a one‐world naturalism. This paper proposes that an account of institutions as powers or dispositions is not only congenial to Searle's general account, but can also satisfy both the realism and the one world requirements. Searle's worry that such a dispositional account is unable to account for the deontic nature of institutions is countered by an appeal to higher‐order powers as well as Searle's notion of the gap and desire‐independent reasons for action. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The intersection between Critical realism, complex system thinking and Luhmannian autopoiesis has been subject to various debates. By showing how a complex system necessitates a trans‐immanent philosophical foundation, Knio proposed in a previous article a problématique of calibration which seeks to bring back to the fore the importance of considering a complex causality generated by environments onto boundaries and systems in an iterative, recursive, and emergentist way. The next step is to understand the motivation behind the actions of a trans‐immanent system. This paper contributes to this discussion by operationalizing the motivation behind action in terms of the Spinozian conatus. In so doing, this research shows how trans‐immanent systems such as people and society not only objectify (socially construct) but objectivate (create) objects behind desire. Finally, the forgoing shows how systemic persistence is not a simple matter of inertia or imitation but it is a matter of empowering reflexivity or, perseverance. This is shown through a thorough overview of the different interpretations of the conatus, followed by their application to several case studies within pre‐existing and prominent theories of institutional change within capitalism. As a result, the conatus as based on a trans‐immanent system offers great potential in institutional analysis; exemplified in the Critical Realist model of social change: Morphogenetic Régulation. This research contributes not only to political, economic, social, and cultural analyses of institutional change but analyses of complex and open systems as a whole, and thus understandings of human empowerment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, critical realists have increasingly engaged with the thought of Charles S. Peirce (1839‐1914), the founder of the American pragmatist tradition. But the engagement has been mostly narrow in focus and at times misinformed. This paper examines points of continuity between Peircean thought and critical realism with respect to causation, ontology, and truth. Its purpose is to lay the groundwork for further and more fruitful engagement between the traditions by bringing attention to some things critical realists may not have known, and to correct some inaccurate things they thought they knew, about Peirce's philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Anti‐dualistic social ontologies, those highlighting the intrinsic interdependency of agency and structure as two sides of the same coin, are sometimes criticized for failing to provide a satisfactory account of autonomous – capable and free – agency, or even denying the reality of such agency. This paper contests these claims, arguing that anti‐dualistic ontologies only conflict with autonomous agency when the latter is understood in a highly voluntaristic sense, whose ideational roots go to what philosophers of free will call "incompatibilist" intuitions of freedom. Those intuitions suggest that actions (intentions, decisions) ultimately determined by extrinsic causes lack the kind of freedom presupposed by moral responsibility, so when agentive autonomy is presumed to involve such freedom, it does indeed cohere poorly with the anti‐dualistic picture of intrinsically structured agency. Herein, however, an alternative, "compatibilist" notion of autonomy is advanced, such that does not conflict with extrinsic determination and is therefore congruent with anti‐dualistic social ontologies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Researchers have been observing a complexification of interpersonal relationships in contemporary societies. However, current theoretical perspectives on relationships fall short of comprehensively grasping increasingly diverse and fluid relationship types (e.g., friends with benefits, polyamory, living‐apart‐together, coparenting, etc.) and patterns of change. In an attempt to meet the need for more integrative and interdisciplinary theorizing, this paper introduces a first outline of relationship course theory to better comprehend the complexity of relationships. In contrast to previous theoretical perspectives that conceptualize relationships as a single trajectory, I posit that the course of a relationship is composed of multiple intertwined trajectories, each of which stemming from differentiated domains such as sexuality, friendship, love, family, domesticity, and occupation. These relationship domains constitute a metatypology from which to examine the multiple sets of meanings and temporalities that intertwine throughout the course of a relationship. I propose that relationships are defined based on the combination of relationship domains, with different iterations and permutations of these domains producing various relationship configurations. Furthermore, the theory defines three levels of relationship courses: Sociocultural (i.e., stories that circulate about relationships in given sociocultural contexts), interpersonal (i.e., stories that individuals co‐construct about the particular relationships they experience), and life courses (i.e., stories that individuals co‐construct about themselves as relational beings). This proposition will hopefully stimulate the theoretical conversation on the complexity of relationships and foster dialogue between researchers from different theoretical and disciplinary affiliations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social positioning theory, or an account of the human individual that it grounds, qualifies as a quantum social theory. This is an assessment that I explain and defend in the paper. It is of interest in that, in a world where increasing numbers are seeking to construct quantum social theories, it serves to help demonstrate that this goal can be achieved without giving up on meeting criteria like explanatory intelligibility or power or discarding real‐world notions like human (and other) entities. As it turns out, a central feature of the account defended and a core element of the 'standard' interpretation of quantum mechanics are found to stand in an interesting, unanticipated and suggestive relation to each other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The term function currently features prominently in outlines of social positioning theory but a sustained account of the view of function informing social positioning theory has yet to be supplied. In the absence of a fuller articulation of the theory's underlying view of function confusion and misinterpretation are likely to be encouraged especially among those committed to one or other of the numerous alternative accounts of function available. In this paper key features of the concept of function as it now appears in social positioning theory are identified and the similarities and differences between it and selected other views of function explored. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social scientific work on argumentation is yet to address the perennial tension between social cognition and social constructionism. Moreover, argumentation‐based qualitative analysis protocols are needed for interview and textual data. Nonetheless, argumentation models remain too complex to reflect everyday argumentation and are not necessarily reflective of underlying cognitive processes. This presents the need for further theorising social behaviour, with a view to formulating a model of argumentation that (a) is parsimonious, and (b) aligns with the literature on joint projects, due to the fact that in social cognition terms, argumentation is for doing. In this paper, we draw upon interdisciplinary literature on argumentation, noting convergences among different approaches. We then proceed to consider the socio‐cognitive bedding provided by Lay Epistemic Theory, to present our Minimal Model of Argumentation (MMA). In MMA, interlocutors are held to make claims concerning an issue of concern, and defend them using warrants, evidence and qualifiers. We end by providing empirical examples supporting the utility of our model in qualitative research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that anti‐social behaviour, in the context of homelessness, ought to be seen as acts of civil disobedience. Firstly, I identify public space as a hostile space for people experiencing homelessness. Secondly, I detail how this reveals a default interpretation of them as anti‐social through their mere presence. Thirdly, I explore how this de‐politicises. I go onto define and examine civil disobedience theory, as a counter narrative to anti‐social behaviour. I then argue how acts of disruption by people experiencing homelessness in public space can qualify as civil disobedience. I acknowledge this as a wicked problem but claim that flipping the default framing of homelessness in this way has normative gain, undoing the de‐politicising othering that anti‐social behaviour narratives have caused. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As field change is often explained by recourse to agentic efforts of a few or revolutionary turbulence of many, this paper provides a complementary explanation of change grounded in the quotidian dynamics of physical objects and settings. Using the culinary and mountaineering fields, we demonstrate how attending to the materiality of objects and settings offers analytical leverage into the ways fields conflict and change. More specifically, we argue field instability is normal because, at the level of social action, mass and energy are inherently finite. As a result, actors responding to effects from distal fields may nevertheless collide over the objects and settings in which they are compelled to act. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Charles S. Peirce's realism has been neglected by pragmatists and critical realists alike in the current debate over metatheoretical realism in sociology. This paper introduces Peirce's view of what is at stake in the question of realism, specifically regarding causation. Leveraging current interest in Peirce's conception of abduction, I show how realism about causation is implicit therein. I present a genealogy of the concept of real causation Peirce embraces. I explicate Peirce's view of the scientific significance of realism about causation, and why he finds it compelling. Finally, I argue that Peirce would intervene in the current debate by saying that those committed to abductive theorizing and causal explanation are implicitly realist. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims at analyzing the communicational dynamics activated by the dissemination of fake news on social media in moments of collective mobilization, in the frame of the dialogic approach of social representations. In order to establish a comparative analysis, three focus groups were created with voters of candidates Fernando Haddad and Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, who discussed the content of purposely selected Facebook posts. The study extrapolated the conversational exercise to the dynamics of a social media, concluding that digital ecosystems, in moments of collective mobilization, behave as representational fields guided, from the psychosocial point of view, by relations of identity tension and, from a rhetorical or communicational point of view, by a phenomenon called diatopic tension, characterized by the coexistence of four interdependent variables: (1) topological divergence; (2) situational heteroglossy; (3) affective intensity and 4) apparent perception of factual control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]