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In this paper, I attempt to shed more light in Bourdieu's habitus and doxa, by drawing on phenomenological and Bourdieusian‐based literature, social theory and some findings from sociological research. Despite the fact that there is a vast work concerning the examination of these two concepts, there are still some misunderstandings about them. For that reason, I have tried to draw a clearer picture of habitus, by linking it with phenomenological "being‐in‐the‐world" and describing its elements. As for doxa, I discuss its conceptual relation with habitus and phenomenology's natural attitude. Also, attention is given to some aspects of both habitus and doxa, which have not addressed in detailed fashion yet, but they are nevertheless theoretically useful for empirical qualitative research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bourdieu's concept of habitus relies heavily on insights from phenomenology, yet his theoretical effort falls short of existing phenomenological solutions to the problems of cognition, agency, and reflexivity in social action. These shortcomings are evident in the analytical and descriptive failures of the concept of habitus documented by critics. Turning to the work of Alfred Schutz, this paper offers his concept of pragma, meaning context, and theory of relevances as an alternative way to describe the embodied and temporal nature of social action and accounting for social determinations. The paper further parses out key differences between Schutz's social phenomenological understanding of embodied action and Bourdieu's habitus, including differences in understanding schemas of standardization and their relation with objectivities of the social world. The paper ends with a call for a critical reassessment of Schutz's social phenomenology, with potentially wide ranging implications not only for understandings of agency, but also of meaning and the constitution of objectivities of the social world, as well the underlying interpretive method of social science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides a conceptual account of Pierre Bourdieu's operational concept of habitus through the lens of social recognition. More precisely, a 'habitus of recognition', or 'recognitive habitus', is defined as a set of perceptive patterns and expectations whose main function is to actualize social behaviour that allows reciprocal recognition among social agents. In this respect, this paper explains why, thanks to the recognition paradigm, we can better grasp how habitus works as a pre‐reflective common sense capable of producing coordinated collective actions and social reproduction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is a widely accepted conception that institutions are norm systems or norm‐guided practices. Opening this conception itself to discussion, the paper initially discusses a group of concepts, such as norm, power, practice, structure, etc., that are related to the definition of institution. Following the discussion, it focuses on the possibility of understanding institutions as spaces. Finally, the paper suggests that institutions mediate ontologically between structure and agency within a framework developed with a critical‐realist approach, and formulates the two sides of this mediation (structure‐institution and institution‐agency) as two spatialities. While the institution as a topos corresponds to a ground on which social structures materialize their causal powers, the institution as a locus manifests itself as a place where agents reproduce and/or transform with their strategic and dispositional actions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes a way of integrating the concepts of habitus and mood. The purpose of this conceptual move is to enrich Pierre Bourdieu's treatment of habitus with a better recognition of its affective aspects. The paper draws on phenomenological studies of psychic disorders and applies the concept of existential feeling to specify what moods are and do. The framing proposed distinguishes between dispositions that function in the foreground and in the background of habitus. Thereby it is possible to regard moods as background dispositions of habitus. This paper also discusses what this idea of moody habitus can do for research in habitus and human practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues for the sociological relevance of contemporary research from 'relational' or 'systems' biology on the microbiome‐gut‐brain (MGB) axis. I review research on the MGB from microbial neuroendocrinology, nutritional psychiatry and other fields with a specific focus on nutrition as a critical element of the social environment influencing gene‐environment interactions and a range of social behaviors. I discuss two plausible causal pathways from nutritional factors such as dietary inflammatory potential and hypocholesterolemia to social bonding, violence, and political extremism, and conclude with a discussion of the theoretical, methodological, and epistemological implications of these pathways, and of MGB research and relational biology generally, for social science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that two key puzzles arising from the theories of Bourdieu are inter‐related. One is the question of how Bourdieu analyses the relationship between structure and habitus, and the other is the place of reflexivity in Bourdieu's work. We contend that it is only by carefully analysing Bourdieu's theoretical structure to grasp the relationship between these elements that one can understand whether or not his work offers useful resources for analysing the relation between routine action and self‐reflection. This paper argues that there are two narrations of the structure/habitus relation in Bourdieu's work, and that the concept of self‐reflective subjectivity is a residual element of the first narration and does not appear in the second. We then contend that this residual and under‐developed concept of self‐reflective subjectivity should not be confused with Bourdieu's analysis of epistemic reflexivity. These moves allow us to contribute to ongoing debates about the relation between routine action and self‐reflection by arguing that the concept of the "reflexive habitus" – which some have argued is characteristic of social agents in high/late modernity – is both conceptually confused and is not a logical extension of Bourdieu's theories. In this way we try to clear the ground for more productive ways of thinking about routine action and self‐reflection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]