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Sociologists tend to see G. H. Mead's conceptualization of self as fundamentally correct. In this paper, we develop a critique of Mead's notion of the self as constituted through social interactions. Our focus will be on Mead's categorial distinction between the socially constructed self and subjective experience, as well as on the tendency of post‐Meadian sociologists to push Mead's position in ever more radical directions. Drawing inspiration from a multifaceted understanding of selfhood that can be found in Husserlian phenomenology, we then propose that the most basic level of selfhood is anchored in irreducible subjective experience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Axel Honneth's theory of recognition outlines the personal and social contexts of family, law and community solidarities in which recognition – and misrecognitions – are experienced. His work has implications for Mezirow's theory of transformative learning. Transformative learning is critiqued for an over dependence on the Dewey/Habermas foundations that demand high levels of rationality and for an over reliance on individual learning to the exclusion of social learning. Honneth's ideas are explored in order to further develop the understanding of how experience is central to transformative learning. Disorienting dilemmas and the perplexities that lead to transformative learning are reinterpreted as experiences that have personal and social dimensions. Experience – often seen as individual and unique ‐ cannot be disconnected from social contexts. Honneth helps us resolve these issues and allows us to re‐interpret transformative learning as the transformation of experience. Finally, two further concepts are introduced: a) the dialectic nature of experience (Negt); and b) the importance of completeness (Negt). These further enhance the experiential grounding for emancipation and the emancipatory project of transformative learning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Russi (2021) suggests 'eavesdropping' as a way to appreciate the practical implications of Shotter's (2015) stance that social inquiry is an art/craft beginning with experience, rather than a technique pre‐determined by theory and methods. Following Russi's instruction to eavesdrop on his eavesdropping, I explore his concepts of experience and listening. Contrary to Russi I issue a plea for theory, as theoretical frameworks are key for tracking the politics of knowledge surrounding social inquiry. Illustrating the process theoretical character of Russi's concepts of experience and listening, I argue for the possibility of theory as emergent within experience. Here my concept of cultures of listening is relevant, as it helps to consider eavesdropping as a form of dark listening (Motzkau & Lee, forthcoming). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]